RESTRICTED Crown Copyright Reserved JSP 440 D Def Sy/6/3 The Defence Manual of Security Volumes 1, 2 and 3 Issue 2 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE October 2001 By Command of the Defence Council THIS CD IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT, and is issued for the information of such persons only as need to know its contents in the course of their official duties. Any person finding this CD should hand it to a British forces unit or to a police station for its safe return to the MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DDef Sy, St Giles Court, 1-13 St Giles High Street, LONDON WC2H 8LD, with particulars of how it was found. THE UNAUTHORIZED RETENTION OR DESTRUCTION OF THE CD MAY BE AN OFFENCE UNDER THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS 1911-89. (When released to persons outside Government service, this CD is issued on a personal basis. The recipient to whom it is entrusted in confidence, within the provisions of the Official Secret Acts 1911-89, is personally responsible for its safe custody and for seeing that its contents are disclosed only to authorized persons.) i RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Crown Copyright Reserved This page intentionally left blank. ii RESTRICTED RESTRICTED JSP 440 THE DEFENCE MANUAL OF SECURITY: ISSUE 2 1. This manual comprises the following parts of JSP 440, the Defence Manual of Security: a. Issue 2 of Volume 1. The principles of protective security, the responsibilities of those concerned with applying them, and physical security policy. b. Issue 2 AL 11 of Volume 2. Personnel security policy including the vetting system, line manager responsibility and travel security. c. Issue 2 of Volume 3. Guidance and policy on the security of Communications and Information Systems (CIS). 2. The three volumes have been updated to reflect the organisational changes of the Security Structures Review (see Volume 1 Chapter 2 for further details), and in the case of Volume 2 the collocation of the Defence Vetting Agency at York. Issue 2 also incorporates a number of amendments to JSP 440 that have been issued to security staffs in the form of policy letters or separate security instructions. 3. These three volumes can be viewed on the MODWeb (http:/www.chots.mod.uk/admin_instructions/security/security.htm) and on connected MOD and single Service intranets. They are available on CD ROM for establishments that are not able to access the MODWeb and connected intranets. A limited number of hard copies of Issue 2 are being published, as requested by the Royal Navy and Army. Those using the hard copy version are warned that there will inevitably be a delay between the electronic publication of Issue 2, and publication in hard copy. This also applies to future amendments to Issue 2. 4. The publication of Issue 2 of JSP 440 represents the first step towards production of security policy guidance that will fully reflect the principles of delegated security risk management set out in the Security Structures Review. The rewrite of JSP 440 will be designated `Issue 3 JSP 440'. Issue 3 JSP 440 is not expected to be published (in electronic form) until 2003. In the meantime, interim guidance will be issued in the form of DSO Guidance Notes and Issue 2 will also be amended approximately at six-monthly intervals. The first four DSO Guidance Notes are included on the Issue 2 CD ROM; they are also published separately on MODWeb and are being placed in the Army Electronic Library. 5. Establishments and units should address any requests for further advice or interpretation in the first instance to their TLB Principal Security Adviser (see Volume 1 Chapter 2 for details). Should they wish to seek advice from Directorate of Defence Security staff, the following are the desk ­ level points of contact: 1 The original Issue 2 of Volume 2 was published during 2000 before the Security Structures Review was completed. RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Volume 1 Protective Security PhysSy(Gd/ROE) Tel: 020 721 80289 CHOtS: DDefSyPhys(Gd/ROE) Volume 2 Personnel Security Pers Sy 2 Tel: 020 721 83764 CHOtS: DDefSyPers Sy 2 Volume 3 IT Security Hd InfoSy(Pol) Tel: 020 721 83746 CHOtS: DDefSyHd InfoSy(Pol) 6. Suggestions for amendments to and comments on the Defence Manual of Security should be sent through TLB and Trading Fund Principal Security Advisers to the Directorate of Defence Security. 7. Requests for additional copies of the CD ROM should be sent to: DSDC(L)6a2 Defence Storage and Distribution Centre Mwrwg Road Llangennech Llanelli South Wales SA14 8YP John Cochrane J C COCHRANE Director Defence Security 26 October 2001 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Personnel Security VOLUME 1 Issue 2 PROTECTIVE SECURITY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE October 2001 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Personnel Security This page intentionally left blank. RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contents VOLUME 1 ­ PROTECTIVE SECURITY CONTENTS Chapter 1. 2. 3 4 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. Principles of Security Security Responsibilities Risk Management Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Physical Security Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Counter Terrorist Measures Spare Spare Spare Disclosure of Protected Information Contracts Security Security Education, Training and Awareness Security on Operations- Security Elements of Force Protection Spare National Caveats JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 i RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 17. 18. STRAP Security Guidelines (SANITIZED) Security Instructions For The Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Glossary of Terms List of Abbreviations Index JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 ii RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Principles of Security CHAPTER 1 PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY Chapter 01 Principles of Security 0101 0103 0105 0106 0107 0108 0109 0110 0111 0112 0113 0114 1A-1 1B-1 1C-1 1D-1 1E-1 Para Page The Definition of Protective Security The Security System Special Markings The Threat Espionage Sabotage Subversion Terrorism Non Traditional Threats Posed by Other Individuals or Organizations Components of Security Risk Precepts of Security Annex A Annex B Annex C Annex D Annex E Security Standards Descriptors Definitions of Levels of Espionage Threat Definitions of Levels of Terrorist Threat Defence in Depth JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Principles of Security CHAPTER 1 PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY The Definition of Protective Security 0101. Protective security is the protection of assets from compromise. Compromise can be a breach of: a. Confidentiality. The restriction of information and other valuable assets to authorized individuals (e.g. protection from espionage, eavesdropping, leaks and computer hacking). b. Integrity. The maintenance of information systems of all kinds and physical assets in their complete and usable form (e.g. protection from unauthorized alteration to a computer programme). c. Availability. The permitting of continuous or timely access to information systems or physical assets by authorized users (e.g. protection from sabotage, malicious damage, theft, fire and flood). 0102. In assessing integrity and availability, consideration must be given to both the direct and indirect consequences of compromise. For example, the theft of a personal computer may be of limited direct consequence as such equipment can be relatively cheaply replaced. The loss of the information contained on the computer may have significant indirect consequences, particularly if no arrangements have been made for backup storage of the information it contains. The Security System 0103. Assets are defined as "anything of value, either tangible or intangible that is owned or used by an organization or business". They can be documents and information; material such as buildings, equipment, valuables or cash; operating systems or personnel. Material assets can have different degrees of value, these are defined within the following protective markings: a. TOP SECRET. The compromise of TOP SECRET information or material would be likely to threaten directly the internal stability of the UK or friendly countries; to lead directly to widespread loss of life; to cause exceptionally grave damage to the effectiveness or security of UK or allied forces or to the continuing effectiveness of extremely valuable security or intelligence operations; to cause exceptionally grave damage to relations with friendly governments; to cause severe long-term damage to the UK economy. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. SECRET. The compromise of SECRET information or material would be likely: to raise international tension; to damage seriously relations with friendly governments; to threaten life directly, or seriously prejudice public order, or individual security or liberty; to cause serious damage to the operational effectiveness or security of UK or allied forces or the continuing effectiveness of highly valuable security or intelligence operations; to cause substantial material damage to national finances or economic and commercial interests. c. CONFIDENTIAL. The compromise of CONFIDENTIAL information or material would be likely to materially damage diplomatic relations (i.e. cause formal protest or other sanction); to prejudice individual security or liberty; to cause damage to the operational effectiveness or security of UK or allied forces or the effectiveness of valuable security or intelligence operations; to work substantially against national finances or economic and commercial interests; substantially to undermine the financial viability of major organizations; to impede the investigation or facilitate the commission of serious crime; to impede seriously the development or operation of major government policies; to shut down or otherwise substantially disrupt significant national operations. d. RESTRICTED. The compromise of RESTRICTED information or material would be likely to affect diplomatic relations adversely; to cause substantial distress to individuals; to make it more difficult to maintain the operational effectiveness or security of UK or allied forces; to cause financial loss or loss of earning potential to, or facilitate improper gain or advantage for, individuals or companies; to prejudice the investigation or facilitate the commission of crime; to breach proper undertakings to maintain the confidence of information provided by third parties; to impede the effective development or operation of government policies; to breach statutory restrictions on disclosure of information; to disadvantage government in commercial or policy negotiations with others; to undermine the proper management of the public sector and its operations. 0104. When an asset merits a protective marking the appropriate levels of protection shown at Annex A are to be provided. The protective marking given to a document must be determined solely on the information it contains. It is therefore very important that the protective marking selected is correct. Special Markings 0105. Only those with a need to know, or need to hold, should have access to protectively marked information. When it is necessary to provide additional protection by reinforcing the "need to know" principle, special markings that restrict JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Principles of Security access should be used, normally in conjunction with a protective marking. Special markings consist of: a. National Caveats. National caveats exist for the additional protection of certain types of protectively marked UK material, e.g. UK EYES ONLY and CANUKUS EYES ONLY. Definitions of these and other caveats, and advice on their use, are given in Chapter 16. b. Descriptors. Descriptors help to implement the "need to know" principle by indicating the nature of the asset's sensitivity and the need to limit access accordingly. A list of MOD descriptors is at Annex B. c. Additional Markings. Additional markings may be required to ensure the special handling of some material to indicate particular aspects of ownership, issue or release, e.g. CODEWORD material. Further details are in Chapter 4. d. International Defence Organization (IDO) Markings. IDOs e.g. the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU) and their member nations, use similar protective markings to the UK prefixed NATO or WEU as appropriate. Further details are in Chapter 4. The Threat 0106. The following paragraphs detail the five threats to security. Espionage 0107. Espionage is defined as "Attempts to acquire information covertly or illegally in order to assist a foreign power". Foreign intelligence services are continuously collecting information for intelligence purposes. They: a. Work mainly through agents who are either introduced into a country or recruited locally. Such agents in their search for targets may be expected to seek out those with human weaknesses who can be exploited particularly through corruption or blackmail. b. Mount technical operations such as eavesdropping, including telephone interception, interception of radio communications (SIGINT) and surveillance. No establishment is immune from attack. No one with access or potential access to protected assets is too unimportant to be cultivated either as a useful contact or JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security possible agent. Definitions of levels of espionage threat, including from SIGINT and extremists, are at Annex C. Sabotage 0108. Sabotage is defined as "An act falling short of a military operation, or an omission, intended to cause physical damage in order to assist a hostile foreign power or to further a subversive political aim". The following should be noted: a. Although sabotage on a major scale is likely only in the period immediately before or after the outbreak of war, it can be used as a means of advancing political causes. b. In peacetime agents of foreign intelligence services may select targets for future attack by trained, experienced saboteurs. c. Saboteurs may be capable of using highly sophisticated methods and their aim will be to disrupt essential communications, damage vital military installations, impede industrial production and lower national morale. d. In acts of terrorism, sabotage may be used for widely differing purposes ranging from attacking unimportant targets with the object of attracting publicity to the terrorists' cause, to damaging important installations as part of a major terrorist campaign. Subversion 0109. Subversion is defined as "Action designed to weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its citizens". The threat from subversion stems not only from foreign intelligence services but also from members of organizations such as those based on anarchism, religious fanaticism, and extreme left and right wing ideologies. Organizations with these ideologies may try to acquire protectively marked information, not necessarily to give to a potential enemy, but to use it in a way that would bring the government in general into disrepute. Terrorism 0110. Terrorism is defined as "The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives". It represents a world-wide threat and is characterized by sudden and violent attacks. Terrorist methods include murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, hijacking of air, sea, road and rail transport, and attacks on people, buildings, aircraft and vehicles by JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Principles of Security small arms, mortars, bombs and mines. Definitions of terrorist threat levels are at Annex D. See also Chapter 7. Non Traditional Threats Posed by Other Individuals or Organizations 0111. Government assets are under threat from a variety of sources beyond those traditionally regarded as hostile or otherwise of significance in terms of national security. The responsibility for providing advice to counter non-traditional threats will not always lie with the security staff and may often be provided by the appropriate Service, MOD or civil police agency. The main threats of this type are posed by investigative journalists, pressure groups, investigation agencies, criminal elements, disaffected staff, dishonest staff and computer hackers. The types of threat from these sources can be categorized in six broad groups: a. Confidentiality. Compromise of politically sensitive information. This threat is presented by: (1) Pressure groups and investigative journalists attempting to obtain sensitive information. (2) Unauthorized disclosure of official information (leaks). b. Exploitation of Sensitive Information. Debt collection agencies and investigation agencies are known to attempt to obtain personal information held in confidence by government. Investigative journalists have exploited personal tax information; they also target commercial and financial information as do criminal elements seeking financial advantage. c. Theft, Burglary and Fraud. There is a growing threat of theft, particularly of IT equipment. Arms, ammunition and explosives are always at particular risk. Theft may occur through burglary or the actions of dishonest staff. Establishments responsible for the collection or disbursement of public funds are prone to fraud and there is an increasing threat of fraud through the manipulation of IT systems. d. Corruption, Destruction, or Unauthorized Access to, Computer Data. The integrity of data held on computer systems is under threat mainly from disaffected staff. Existing levels of programming expertise, the ready availability of malicious software, e.g. viruses, and the ease with which they can be deliberately or accidentally introduced, combine to create a substantial threat. It is apparent that some staff misguidedly interfere with or compromise systems. There is also a level of threat of damage resulting from JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security the actions of hackers - either those with legitimate access to systems or those without such access. e. Pressure Groups. Pressure groups for such causes as animal rights, nuclear disarmament and the environment will sometimes carry out demonstrations against MOD policy and activities. Although often confined to peaceful demonstrations, extremist elements can cause violent attacks on individuals and property, which can pose a threat as significant as terrorism. f. Criminal Damage. Employees, dependants, visitors or intruders can carry out criminal damage. g. Natural Disaster. Natural disasters are risks to the integrity or availability of facilities, buildings or equipment etc caused by such incidents as fire, flooding, subsidence, or lightning strike. Components of Security 0112. There are two different and interdependent parts of security: a. Security Intelligence. The collection of information and production of intelligence concerning the security threat. Plans to counter the activities of foreign intelligence services or subversive organizations and individuals must be based on accurate and timely intelligence concerning the identity, capabilities and intentions of the hostile elements. This intelligence is known as 'security intelligence'. It is derived from studying attempts to break through security controls, combined with knowledge gained from penetrating hostile organizations. One means of obtaining security intelligence is the investigation of breaches of security. Although security intelligence is a matter which is principally the concern of security staffs and security units, all personnel in the MOD, whether Service or civilian, contribute to it by the prompt reporting of suspicious activity. b. Protective Security - consists of: (1) Laws, Orders and Instructions. These measures range from the Official Secrets Acts to Establishment Security Standing Orders. (2) Physical Measures. Physical measures are the physical obstacles, which protect specific security interests. These range from perimeter defences such as fences and lighting to security containers. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Principles of Security (3) Personnel Security Measures. The aim of personnel security measures is to ensure that only reliable and trustworthy persons have access to protected information. (4) Security Education and Training. The aim of security education is to ensure that all who work for the MOD, irrespective of access, understand both the threat and their general responsibilities for countering it. The aim of security training is to ensure that individuals who have specific security responsibilities as part of their normal employment are properly trained in their security duties. Security education and training is the responsibility of commanders and HOE at all levels. (5) Security Procedures. Security procedures include document handling, control of access, checks and audits. Risk 0113. Risk can be defined as "a future uncertain event" and is measured in terms of likelihood and impact. No amount of security measures can ever totally eliminate risk. The vulnerability of assets to threats must be reduced so that the likelihood of compromise or loss is reduced to an acceptable level. Over protection leads to a waste of resources and under protection leads to an unwarranted risk. Security measures selected must be balanced and cost effective in their application. Further details are in Chapter 3. The Precepts of Security 0114. The main precepts of security are: a. Command Responsibility. Whilst every individual who works for the MOD has a personal responsibility to promote and maintain security at all times, HOE are responsible for security within their establishments and commanders/heads of department have overall responsibility for security within their formations or departments. b. Need to Know. Knowledge of protected matters must be limited strictly to those who are security cleared to the appropriate level and who need such knowledge in order to carry out their official duties. c. Need to Hold. Protectively marked documents and material must only be retained by individuals who need them for the efficient discharge of their duties. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security d. Defence in Depth. Effective protective security results from a carefully planned system of defensive security measures designed to protect information, material, personnel, activities and installations. These controls must form an interdependent and interlocking series of defences arranged in depth outward from the target. (A diagram is at Annex E). e. Make Sense. effective. Security measures must be practicable and cost JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Principles of Security ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 1 SECURITY STANDARDS Assets in each level of the protective marking system are required to be protected to a specific level of protection. The protective markings therefore provide a means of establishing the value of, and hence the level of protection to be afforded to, particular assets. These levels of protection are detailed below. TOP SECRET: Information and other assets should be held, processed, transmitted or transported and destroyed under conditions which ensure that only those who can be trusted with them and have been authorized gain access to them, that actual or attempted compromises will be detected, and those responsible will be identified. SECRET: Information and other assets should be held, processed, transmitted or transported and destroyed under conditions which make it highly unlikely that anyone without authorized access will, by chance or design, gain access to them, that compromise will go undetected or that those responsible will remain unidentified. CONFIDENTIAL: Information and other assets should be held, processed, transmitted or transported and destroyed under conditions which inhibit casual or wilful access by unauthorized people and which are likely to assist in the identification of compromises. RESTRICTED: Information and other assets should be held, processed, transmitted or transported and destroyed with discretion in order to avoid access by unauthorized people. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Principles of Security ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 1 DESCRIPTORS 1. Descriptors may be helpful in implementing the "need to know" principle by indicating the nature of the asset's sensitivity and thereby helping to ensure that access is limited accordingly. Aside from PERSONAL, which by definition requires that the information is only made available in the first instance to the addressee, the descriptors will normally be used in conjunction with a protective marking. Used alone, descriptors may indicate who should see the material but do not of themselves impose any particular handling or level of protection. A list of MOD descriptors is below: a. APPOINTMENTS. Concerning actual or potential appointments that have not been announced. b. BUDGET. Concerning proposed or actual measures for the budget before they are announced. c. COMMERCIAL. Subject matter of actual or potential commercial value, the disclosure of which would prejudice a commercial interest. The rules for the use of this marking are given in Chapter 12. d. CONTRACTS. Matters concerning tenders under consideration and the terms of tenders accepted. e. CONTROL (or DS). Exercise papers for use only by control or directing staff. f. EXAMINATION. Subject matter relating to setting, marking or future examination papers. (For MOD use only). g. EXERCISES. Concerning orders and instructions pertaining to military exercise at home and abroad. h. HONOURS. Matters concerning military or civilian honours and awards. i. INTELLIGENCE. assessments. Concerning intelligence source material and JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security j. INVESTIGATION. Concerning investigations into disciplinary or criminal matters. k. LOCSEN. Concerning locally sensitive information. l. MANAGEMENT. Management policy and planning matters, the premature disclosure of which would not be in the interest of the Ministry of Defence or the Services. m. MEDICAL. reports and records. Medical matters concerning individuals including n. OPERATIONS. Concerning orders and instructions pertaining to military operations at home and abroad. o. PERSONAL. Material only to be seen by the person to whom it is addressed. p. POLICE. Police matters concerning police operations and activities. q. POLICY. Concerning proposals for new or changed policy before publication. r. STAFF. Matters concerning the administration (e.g. confidential reports), discipline, security status and service of named or identifiable personnel. s. VETTING. Concerning matters pertaining to the security clearance of personnel. t. VISITS. Concerning details of visits by, for example, royalty, ministers or very senior staff. 2. Should additions to this list be sought, they should be addressed to D Def Sy through the security reporting chain. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Principles of Security ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 1 DEFINITIONS OF LEVELS OF ESPIONAGE THREAT The definitions and threat levels below are used by the Security Service when considering the threat from espionage, including SIGINT and Extremist threats. Grade Definition Intelligence shows that attacks against this target or the UK's interests in this location are a top priority for an individual, group or country that has a formidable degree of capability and effectiveness. Intelligence shows that attacks against this target or the UK's interests in this location are an important priority for an individual, group or country, which is capable and effective. Intelligence indicates that attacks against this target or the UK's interests in this location are high priority for an individual, group or country that has limited capability or effectiveness. SIGNIFICANT or Intelligence indicates that attacks against this target or the UK's interests in this location are a medium priority for an individual, group or country, which is capable and effective. Intelligence indicates that attacks against this target or the UK's interests in this location are a medium priority for an individual, group or country, which has a limited degree of capability and effectiveness. Intelligence indicates that attacks against this target or the UK's interests in this location are an unimportant priority for an individual, group or country, which has little capability. Intelligence indicates that attacks against this target or the UK's interests in this location are unlikely to be considered by an individual, group or country; or Intelligence indicates that an individual, group or country lacks both capability and effectiveness. VERY HIGH HIGH MODERATE LOW NEGLIGIBLE JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Principles of Security ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 1 DEFINITIONS FOR LEVELS OF TERRORIST THREAT 1. The definitions and terms for use in terrorist threat assessments have been agreed by ACPO for use by the civil police and national agencies. 2. These standard definitions are to be used by all those concerned in assessing the terrorist threat and implementing counter-measures in the MOD. Level 1 2 Term IMMINENT HIGH Definition Specific intelligence shows that a target is at a very high level of threat and that an attack is imminent. Specific intelligence, recent events or a target's particular circumstances indicate that it is likely to be a high priority and the target is at a high level of threat. Recent general intelligence on terrorist activity, the overall security and political climate of the target's general circumstances indicate that it is likely to be a priority target and is at a significant level of threat. A target's circumstances indicate that there is potential for it to be singled out for attack and it is at a moderate level of threat. There is nothing to indicate that a target would be singled out for an attack and there is a low level of threat. A target is unlikely to be attacked. negligible level of threat. There is a 3 SIGNIFICANT 4 MODERATE 5 6 LOW NEGLIGIBLE JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1D-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1D-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Principles of Security ANNEX E TO CHAPTER 1 DEFENCE IN DEPTH Official Secrets Acts 1911 - 1989 Perimeter Fences Patrols Guard Dogs Passes Security Areas Containers Keep Areas Need to Hold Protective Marking Locks Guards Information and Material Need to Know Strong Rooms Alarms Vetting Gate Control Protective Lighting Military Lands Act 1892 - 1903 Secure Rooms JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1E-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 1E-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities CHAPTER 2 SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES Chapter 02 General Impact of Security Structures Review Responsibilities of Government Security Departments and Agencies Responsibilities in the Ministry of Defence Responsibilities of TLB Holders and Chief Executives of Trading Funds Responsibilities of Principal Security Advisers Categorisation of Establishments Security Surveys, Inspections and Audits Responsibilities of Command and other Security Staffs Responsibilities of the Head of Establishment (HOE) Responsibilities of the Establishment Security Officer Lodger Units Responsibilities of Security Units Other Security Appointments Reporting of Incidents Security Incidents ­ Mandatory Reporting to Ministers Security Investigations Disciplinary and Criminal Considerations Post Incident Analysis Action on Loss or Compromise and Levels of Authorization to Write Off Leaks of Official Information Waivers and Exemptions Security Responsibilities 0201 0203 0207 0212 0220 0221 0222 0224 0228 0229 0232 0233 0234 0235 0236 0237 0242 0245 0248 0249 0255 0261 Para Page JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Other Security Related Responsibilities Amendments to JSP 440 Defence Manual of Security Annex A Annex B Annex C Annex D Annex E Annex F 0264 0270 2A-1 2B-1 2C-1 2D-1 2E-1 2F-1 Categorisation of Establishments and Security Inspections Guide to the Contents of Establishment Security Standing Orders Security Orders, Regulations and Instructions for Security Officers Security Incidents ­ Mandatory Reporting To Ministers Security Incidents ­ Mandatory Reporting To Ministers ­ Initial Report Signal Format Format of IMMEDIATE Signal Report of Suspected Loss or Compromise of Protectively Marked Material JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities CHAPTER 2 SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES General 0201. The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 1998 led to significant changes in the way the business of the MOD is conducted. As a result, in September 1999, 2nd PUS commissioned a review to examine the organisation of security in the department. The Security Structures Review (SSR) considered all aspects of security except policing, guarding and vetting. The results of the review were endorsed by the Defence Management Board on 25 January 2001 as DMB(00)12. DCI GEN 148/01 reported the outcome. 0202. This chapter describes the organisation, management and delivery of security in the MOD following the SSR. It sets out the delegations to Top Level Budget (TLB) Holders and Chief Executives of MOD Trading Funds (TFCEs), and the revised responsibilities of organisations and staff involved in determining security policy, those implementing policy, and those providing security support, advice and assistance. Impact of Security Structures Review 0203. A guiding principle of the SSR was that security is a core business issue and should be firmly embedded in management systems and processes of the Department with ownership of risk unambiguous, and aligned with budgetary authority and accountability. The management of security risk is to complement and mirror the application of corporate governance principles. 0204. Every individual who works for the MOD has a responsibility to promote and maintain security at all times. Directors, heads of divisions, chief executives of defence agencies/GOCOs and commanding officers/heads of establishments are specifically responsible for security within their directorates, headquarters, formations/stations, agencies/GOCOs or units/establishments and are responsible for accepting the risks arising from the risk management process. 0205. TLB Holders remain responsible for implementation of security measures in those Vote funded Defence Agencies for which they, or their senior staff, are Owners. Trading Funds will for security assurance purposes be treated in the same way as TLB Holders, and be held accountable to the Departmental Security Officer (DSO). 0206. Separate guidance is issued on revised responsibilities for dealing with the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear materiel. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Responsibilities of Government Security Departments and Agencies Cabinet Office 0207. The Prime Minister is ultimately responsible for national security advised by the Cabinet Secretary. The Official Committee on Security (SO) is chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and attended by Permanent Under Secretaries. SO is responsible for formulating policy on all aspects of security co-ordinated across government in consultation with departments carried out through sub-committees and working groups. The Cabinet Office provides the secretariat and draws the threads together, setting government protective security policy and standards which are promulgated in the Manual of Protective Security (MPS), after consultation with departments and after taking advice from the Security Service and the Communications Electronics Security Group (CESG). Security Service 0208. The Security Service is the UK authority for all aspects of security. It is the principal security adviser to government and is responsible for providing advice to departments and agencies and other organisations on the nature and levels of threats to security from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, and from the activities of those who seek to overthrow or undermine Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means. In order to counter such threats the Security Service provides advice and assistance on physical, personnel, document, IT and technical security measures and training for departmental staff. Communications-Electronics Security Group (CESG) 0209. The CESG of the Government Communications Headquarters is the National Authority responsible for all technical issues relating to the security of IT, communications, radar and other such systems, and radiation security. It is responsible for general and specific assessments of the threat of technical attacks on protectively marked information, including that held in IT systems. It is also the National Cryptographic Authority and the authority on the technical threat from SIGINT, hacking and malicious viruses etc. In meeting these responsibilities CESG publishes a wide variety of technical guidance, designs and approves encryption equipment, and produces keying material. CESG helps to formulate policy in this field and contributes to the overall threat assessments produced by the Security Service. Security Strategy Unit Technical Group (TG) 0210. Technical Group (TG), which operates within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), is the National Authority for counter eavesdropping (CE). It is responsible for advising the Security Service on the technical aspects of CE and carrying out related work for the FCO and, in the UK, on behalf of the Security Service. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities Security Services Group (SSG) 0211. The SSG provides support to the MOD under a supply and services agreement. The SSG advisory service is free to MOD customers at the point of delivery while other SSG services are charged for on repayment terms. The service may be in response to specific requests from security staff for project management, installation, commissioning and/or maintenance of security equipment and control systems based on set standards. Applications for project support are to be made through PSyAs and Command security staff. They, in turn, may instigate SSG support through D Def Sy for the project. Establishments are not to make direct contact, in the first instance, with SSG. Responsibilities in the Ministry of Defence 0212. Overall responsibility for security in the MOD rests ultimately with the Defence Council and PUS is a member of the Official Committee on Security (SO). The Director General Security and Safety (DGS&S), is the DSO, responsible for overseeing the implementation and dissemination of protective security policy, the issue of guidance and for incident reporting. The DSO also contributes to the formulation of national security policy and is a member of SO sub committees dealing with information security (SO(IS)), and protective security (ICPS). As part of the process of security assurance required under corporate governance, DGS&S is required to submit an annual report as a Certificate of Assurance to the Defence Audit Committee (DAC). Role and Responsibilities of the Directorate of Defence Security 0213. A single headquarters policy and standards-setting division, the Directorate of Defence Security (D Def Sy), formed on 1 April 2001 reporting to the DSO. This new division has been created from the former Directorate of Security Policy (DSy(Pol)) and policy elements dealing primarily with industrial security matters and scientific and technical security advice from the former DHQSy division. The Directorate's responsibilities include the newly- created Joint Security Co-ordination Centre (JSyCC) to co-ordinate alerts and warnings of information security incidents, including electronic attacks. The JSyCC will provide a 24-hour/7 day week watch keeping capability. Its role is described at paragraph 0216. D Def Sy is responsible to the DSO for the formulation and promulgation of security policy for the protection of all MOD information, assets and personnel, including international security arrangements for the sharing of MOD information with other governments and with the Defence industry. 0214. D Def Sy has the following principal responsibilities: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. Contributing to the formulation of government protective security policy and representing the MOD in interdepartmental and international discussions on protective security policy. b. Formulating and promulgating defence security policy, setting MOD security objectives and providing guidance on their implementation and resource implications. c. Primary responsibility for nuclear security matters (but on key issues will act only in concert with the Director of Nuclear Policy). d. Co-ordinating and providing advice to ministers, PUS and CDS on the political and presentational and legal aspects of protective security policy and security intelligence operations. e. Liaison with the Cabinet Office, Security Service, OGDs and the Civil Police on security policy issues. f. Developing security policy and providing security advice to companies holding MOD protectively marked assets or information. g. Advising DCDS(C) on defensive measures to counter the terrorist and extremist threats to MOD personnel and assets in Great Britain and, in consultation with the Counter Extremist Advisory Group (CEAG), setting the counter-extremist alert state for MOD establishments throughout Great Britain. h. Timely dissemination of security threat information relating to terrorist threats in Great Britain and overseas. i. Timely dissemination through the JSyCC of electronic threat information relating to the Department's information systems, covering both IT incidents and electronic attack. j. Oversight of the reporting and investigation of security incidents and leaks of official information by TLB Holders/TFCEs, with particular emphasis on the possible need to revise current security policy, and other remedial action. k. Serving as departmental focus for the application of UK policy for sensitive document handling and dissemination, and representing MOD on the STRAP management board. l. Enabling Risk Owners to establish the correct balance of risk to Information Systems by advising on security policy and the residual risk. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities m. Advice to MOD and to UK Defence Manufacturers on all technical security matters relating to the overseas release of military information; clearance of UK protectively marked equipment and information at UK and overseas defence exhibitions; and for review of Patent Applications and inventions notified by the general public. n. Support the DSO in identifying the MOD's security education and training needs and in contributing to the formulation of the policy to meet those needs. (Note: This reflects a responsibility placed on the DSO in the Manual of Protective Security. Exercise of this responsibility will have to take account of the Defence Training Review). o. Preparation of the annual DSO's report to the DAC, including tasking and collation of TLB Holder/TFCE reports and staffing of follow-up action required. 0215. D Def Sy is accountable through DGS&S to: a. DCDS(C) and thence to VCDS for the policy on the protection of MOD personnel and assets against terrorists and other extremists including the counter extremist Alert State. b. The Personnel Director and thence to 2nd PUS for all other aspects of protective security policy. Role and Responsibilities of the Joint Security Co-ordination Centre (JSyCC) 0216. The JSyCC acts as a focal point for information security intelligence. It maintains a central source of vulnerability and threat information, and promulgates summaries, alerts and rectification directives as necessary. The specific responsibilities of the JSyCC include: a. Collating progress reports against Threat Change Notices (TCN) and Vulnerability Rectification Directives (VRD). b. Receiving and collating incident detection information, liaison with the Unified Incident Reporting and Alert Scheme (UNIRAS) and the Federation of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) for all IT related incidents, and determining the nature of response required. c. Arranging for, and supervising, any necessary external response where inappropriate to be carried out at unit level. d. Carrying out any necessary post-incident analysis. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security e. Supervision of the overall information verification program including provision of generic software toolkits. f. Maintaining a central register of the Minimum Essential Defence Information Infrastructure (MEDII) element of the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). g. Direct control of the verification activities associated with MEDII. h. Provision of MOD contribution to the National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre's (NISCC) virtual organisation, and related aspects of the CNI protection programme. i. Provision of awareness and training relating to CIS threats, vulnerabilities, and incident handling. j. Liaison with similar organisations in UK Government, industry, allies, hardware manufacturers, software providers and the police. Defence Security Standards Organisation 0217. The Defence Security Standards Organisation (DSSO) was established under the DSO on 1 April 2001 to provide an independent security audit capability and a central source of advice on security implementation issues. The work of the DSSO will in future be integrated into that of the DAC to meet the requirements of corporate governance. The DSSO will include a centralised accreditation function for networked IT systems that cross TLB/TF boundaries. The responsibilities of the DSSO fall into two main areas: a. Accreditation. Provision of a centralised IT security accreditation service, acting as a single source for advice and expertise on MOD's increasingly networked IT systems. DSSO accreditors will advise business managers of the risks to their IT systems and how best to mitigate and reduce them. The decision to accept the residual risk will lie with the business manager in consultation with other stakeholders. If stakeholder interests conflict, resolution will be determined by either DG Info, ACDS (Ops) or CJO in accordance with established crisis response processes. b. Security Audit. Provision of an independent security audit capability to enable the DSO to certify that security policy is being implemented adequately and cost-effectively across the whole of MOD and its Trading Funds. DSSO auditors will focus on assessing the effectiveness of the integrated risk management process of the TLB Holder/TFCE. The precise methodology will be developed in partnership with TLB Holders/TFCEs in a series of pilot audits. Key areas to be addressed include: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Linkage of security risk to corporate objectives. Common terminology. Assessment by likelihood and impact. Dynamic review and reporting. Effective reaction. The formal audit process will draw upon the DSO's Annual Report to the DAC to determine the key themes to be examined. STRAP Administration 0218. There are plans for STRAP administration responsibilities currently carried out by STRAP Security Officers (STRAPSOs) to be re-brigaded under the DSSO. Pending implementation of this change the pre-SSR arrangements are to continue. Personnel Security Responsibilities 0219. Post SSR, arrangements for the exercise of personnel security responsibilities, including management of risk cases, have still to be finalised. In the meantime the following arrangements will apply: a. D Def Sy is responsible for Civilians in the Central TLB, DPA and Trading Funds and their non List X contractors, for List X industry (but TLBs are responsible for List X contractors employed at their sites), and for categories such as SCS and MDP managed centrally. b. The single Services are responsible for their Service personnel wherever they are employed, for Civilians employed in Service TLBs (except for categories managed centrally), and for contractors employed at their Service sites. c. The DLO and PJHQ are responsible for Civilians employed in their TLBs (except for categories managed centrally), and for contractors employed at DLO and PJHQ sites. Responsibilities of TLB Holders/Trading Fund Chief Executives 0220. Responsibility for the implementation and risk management of security policy and standards has now been formally delegated to TLB Holders by means of a single letter of delegation from PUS. Each TLB Holder is required to nominate a Security Risk Manager to advise the TLB on the balance between business needs and security requirements, taking account of affordability, and act as a TLB point of contact with JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security the DSO. They will form the membership of a new DSO advisory group, the DSO's Risk Managers Forum (DRMF). TLB Holders and TFCEs will be responsible for maintaining an audit trail of their risk management decisions, and for making a formal annual report to the DSO on the state of security in their TLB/TF. An extract from PUS's letter of delegation to TLB Holders is shown below: I look to you to ensure that Departmental security policy and standards set out in JSP 440 are implemented across your TLB. Your Principal Security Adviser (to be appointed by you) will support you and should be consulted whenever you are unclear about specific delegations or need more general advice. Should you or your Principal Security Adviser be unsure about the interpretation and exercise of the delegations or need specialist advice, you should consult the Departmental Security Officer. Specific Authority Authority for the implementation of Departmental security policy and standards (set out in JSP440 and other policy guidance) in your TLB. Authority to take necessary timely action on receipt of terrorist and other security threat alerts, and when necessary, the co-ordination of BIKINI Alert State and other countermeasures for all units/establishments in your TLB area. Authority to exempt units/establishments in your TLB area from compliance with armed guarding and other prescribed security measures, within the limits for variation set out in JSP 440 and other MOD policy guidance. Authority for accrediting IT systems that are delegated to you by the Departmental Security Officer (DSO). Authority to undertake a programme of assurance activities to verify internal security control processes. This will be subject to audit by the Defence Security Standards Organisation (DSSO). Responsibilities You should ensure that your decisions on security adhere to Departmental risk management guidelines. You should, in consultation with the DSO, appoint a Principal Security Adviser (PSyA) who will be your source of authoritative day-to-day advice. The PSyA should meet minimum core competencies and have received the appropriate training. The PSyA may be appointed from your TLB, or be provided from another, under agreed arrangements. He or she should consult the DSO for specialist advice when needed, including on any cross-TLB issues. You should nominate a `risk manager' to advise you on the balance between your business needs and the security requirements, taking account of affordability, and to act as the point of contact for the TLB with the DSO. You should invest in the necessary training and education to ensure that all staff in your TLB are adequately trained and have the right level of security awareness. You must agree an audit programme for your TLB with the DSO. You must submit an annual report to the DSO on the state of security in your TLB. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities Responsibilities of Principal Security Advisers 0221. The former Sector Security Authorities were abolished on 1 April 2001. In their place, TLB Holders and TFCEs are to appoint their own Principal Security Adviser (PSyA). The services of another TLB may be chosen to provide the relevant security advice but the responsibility and accountability for the application and maintenance of security in their area is vested in the TLB Holder/TFCE. The role of PSyAs is to provide corporate security advice to the Management Board of the TLB Holder/TFCE and oversight and direction of security across the TLB/TF. The following are specific PSyA responsibilities: a. Advice to the TLB Holder/TFCE and the Management Board on all security issues that have a corporate bearing on TLB/TF business. This includes advice on: (1) (2) (3) Interpretation of Departmental security policy. Evaluation of the security risk applicable to the TLB/TF. Implementation measures. b. Strategic oversight of security activity across the TLB/TF, ensuring compliance with policy as implemented within the context of risk-based security management. c. Representing the TLB/TF corporate interests in all security activity within the department, consulting with business units and agencies as appropriate. d. Providing the TLB/TF focal point for the DSO and D Def Sy. e. Liaison with other PSyAs and co-ordinating the sharing of security support activities. f. Liaison with the police and other security agencies in government and industry as necessary. g. Ensuring procedures for reporting and investigating security incidents are followed, where necessary conducting investigations. h. Ensuring security surveys and periodic inspections are carried out in all subordinated establishments. i. Undertaking a range of tasks associated with those IT systems that are specific to the TLB/TF, including accreditation, of those IT systems for JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security which the TLB/TF has been delegated responsibility, ensuring compliance with security requirements, and reporting IT security incidents. j. Development and implementation of revised structures as necessary to meet the full range of TLB Holder's/TFCE's responsibilities that flow from the Security Structures Review. k. Provision of security guidance to subordinate headquarters, units and establishments across the TLB/TF as necessary. l. Development of a security culture within the TLB/TF that is costefficient and makes use of best practice within the context of risk management as applied to business needs. Categorization of Establishments 0222. In order to determine priorities for the allotment of security effort, each establishment should be allocated a security category. Categorisation of MOD establishments will maintain a consistent baseline across the Defence spectrum and assist with the risk management process that will inform resource allocation decisions. It is, therefore, important that TLB Holders/TFCEs are able to give their establishments a security profile, assessed against common definitions. Details on the categorization of establishments are at Annex A. 0223. The categories into which establishments are placed must be reviewed at regular intervals and on the following occasions: a. On formation, reorganisation or amalgamation of an establishment. b. When significant changes occur in the role or organisation of an establishment or in the type of equipment held. c. When there is a major change in accommodation and guarding arrangements. Security Surveys, Inspections and Audits 0224. The following definitions apply: a. Survey. A detailed, pre-planned security examination carried out by a specialist team to examine, report and make recommendations on the protective security requirements of an establishment. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-12 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities b. Inspection. A periodic, on-site review of compliance with security orders, regulations and instructions, conducted by a security team tasked by the TLB Holder/TFCE that owns the risk at the establishment concerned. c. Audit. An independent review by the DSSO of the systems and structures in place to support the TLB Holders'/TFCEs' security risk management processes. 0225. TLBs/TFs are required to carry out a security survey when an establishment is first formed, is reorganised and changes its role, or on completion of major works services. The comprehensive survey report will be the baseline against which future protective security of the establishment will be measured. Additional security surveys may be conducted in response to special requirements as required by TLBs/TFs. 0226. A new regime has been introduced to reflect the delegated responsibilities for security risk management and a more flexible approach managing all aspects of the changing threat. Threats to Defence establishments vary widely, as do their vulnerabilities. Although every establishment should be subject to periodic formal security inspection, the programme should reflect these differences. In determining the frequency of inspections for establishments within their area, TLBs/TFs will need to consider various factors. These will include: the criticality of the establishment's output in meeting MP objectives, the risk profile, the outcome of previous inspections and audits, turnover of key personnel and any mandated requirements. Security inspection reports will provide a major input into the DSO annual report to the DAC. TLB Holders/TFCEs may elect to supplement formal inspections by advisory visits and by the completion of security questionnaires. Further detail on inspections and guidelines for periodicity are at Annex A. Special Security Surveys 0227. In addition to the initial security surveys referred to above, certain establishments will require surveys of a specialist nature, for example counter sabotage surveys, air transport security surveys, aircraft physical security surveys and counter terrorist surveys. PSyAs and Command security staff are to arrange the frequency and implementation of these surveys to meet their needs. Responsibilities of Command and other Security Staffs 0228. Command security staff officers and responsibilities include security are responsible for: a. other staff officers whose Advice to their Commanders/Directors on all security matters. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. The processing of security intelligence and the production of up-todate assessments of the threat to security. This includes the dissemination of threat assessments. c. The preparation and issue of security standing orders and instructions. d. The provision of assistance and advice, and the issue of instructions, to subordinate staffs and establishments on all aspects of security. This includes the planning, co-ordination and application of protective security measures throughout the formation including those for exercises and operations. e. Advising on the granting to establishments of waivers and exemptions from the baseline measures and mandatory standards of JSP 440 having first obtained authority from D Def Sy when this is necessary. f. Contributing to the Operational Security (OPSEC) staffing process for exercises and operations with particular reference to the formulation of the threat and recommendations for protective security measures. g. Tasking, and direction where appropriate, of security units. h. Ensuring the maintenance of a close liaison with the Civil Police and the co-ordination of security contingency plans when necessary. i. Action to ensure security incidents are investigated and that the procedures laid down for reporting and investigating breaches of security are followed. Security staff is responsible for ensuring that counter-compromise action is taken and for making recommendations on the security aspects of breaches to the Commander. Records and statistics concerning breaches should be kept to enable the state of security in the formation to be assessed and the adequacy of the existing security measures to be reviewed. j. Actioning Parliamentary Questions and Parliamentary Enquiries on matters relating to the implementation of security as directed by Min AF and copying the reply to Min AF and D Def Sy. k. Advice to the Commander, staff and establishments on security education and training, including its organisation and conduct. l. m. The provision of security support to sponsored organisations. Advice to the relevant staff on: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-14 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities (1) The security aspects of new projects and maintenance works services in the early planning stages. (2) Priorities for the issue and replacement of security furniture and equipment. (3) Requirements for works services arising from the recommendations of protective security survey and inspection reports. n. Regular review of the Developed Vetting Master List (DVML) of posts, where held. o. Contributing to the TLB/TF annual report to D Def Sy. p. Ensuring that security surveys and periodic inspections are carried out on all subordinate establishments. q. Ensuring close liaison is maintained at all levels with appropriate security units. Responsibilities of the Head of Establishment (HOE) 0229. HOE are responsible for all aspects of the security of the establishments under their command and control and for personally accepting the risks arising from the risk management process. 0230. The responsibilities of the HOE include bringing to the attention of all personnel specific aspects of protective security as detailed below: a. General. Personnel are to be reminded of: (1) (2) Their responsibilities under the Official Secrets Acts. The threat and their responsibilities in countering it. (3) The provisions of security standing orders. (Subjects that should be considered for inclusion in security standing orders are listed at Annex B). (4) The need for vigilance at all times. (5) The need to report all suspicious occurrences and anything which may lead to a breach of security without delay. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-15 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (6) The requirement to report all contacts with persons from countries to which special security regulations apply, and contacts with persons from other foreign countries which give rise to suspicion. (7) The need to report, well beforehand, proposed visits to or from countries to which special security regulations apply or travel in their controlled air, rail or shipping lines. (8) The requirement to ensure security approval exists for official visitors attending briefings, discussions or making use of establishment or site facilities and also contractors. b. On appointment to a post giving access to protected information. The aim is to ensure that all individuals whose duties include handling protected information: (1) Understand their security responsibilities. (2) Know the establishment system of custody and handling of protected information, documents and material necessary to carry out their duties. (3) Understand the principles of 'need to know' and 'need to hold'. (4) Are aware of the action to be taken on the loss or compromise of protected documents or equipment. (5) When a proposal to job share a security post is received the HOE should weigh the consequences of such sharing against the possibility of a loss of accountability or any weakening of responsibility for the control of either Physical, Documentary, IT or Personnel security. In the first instance the HOE should contact his own PSyA or Command security staff for advice. c. On specific occasions. The aim is to ensure that all Service and civilian staff are made aware of their responsibilities for security on the following occasions: (1) (2) Before taking part in operations. Before taking part in exercises. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-16 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities (3) Prior to travel, either on duty or leave, to or through countries to which special security regulations apply. This includes members of the reserve and officers of the cadet forces. (4) When on duty at open days, exhibitions, demonstrations, or trials of protected equipment in any official capacity, for example as guards, drivers, or exhibitors. (5) When attending courses which include foreign students. (6) At conferences, seminars and meetings to which foreign representatives are invited. Responsibilities of the Establishment Security Officer 0231. The HOE is to appoint an establishment security officer (ESyO) who is directly responsible to his HOE for the implementation of security policy. It is mandatory that the ESyO is correctly trained in his responsibilities and, unless already trained as a security officer, attends a security officers' course either prior to, or immediately after, assuming his appointment. 0232. The responsibilities of the ESyO include: a. Threat assessment and planning. Assessment of the threat to the security of the unit and the planning and implementation of counter measures. b. Security standing orders (SSOs). The production and promulgation of SSOs. A guide to the headings is at Annex B. c. Security education and training. The education of all personnel on the threat and their responsibilities for countering it and the training of individuals having specific security duties and responsibilities. d. Vetting register. The supervision of the establishment vetting register where applicable. The register is to include a list of posts in the establishment that require SC or DV security clearance, the name of the post holder, his/her clearance level, the expiry date and any limitation to the clearance. e. Security orders, regulations and instructions. Acquainting themselves with relevant current security policy, orders, regulations and instructions and advising the HOE on their implementation. References for security officers are listed at Annex C. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-17 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security f. Protective security. The maintenance of protective security through systematic reviews, checks and inspections to ensure that: (1) The recommendations of security surveys and inspections have been implemented or that the security staff have been informed of the reason for non-compliance. (2) SSOs are comprehensive, understood and observed. (3) Security equipment such as PIDS, IDS and access control systems are functioning correctly. g. Initial investigations. breaches of security. Carrying out initial investigations into h. Reporting. Keeping the HOE informed on all matters affecting the security of the establishment. i. Security liaison. Liaison with the security staff, the local security unit and the local Civil Police. j. IT security. Where so appointed, ensuring the measures for IT security promulgated in Volume 3 of JSP 440 are fully instigated. k. Supervision. Ensuring that the holders of any subordinate security appointments are adequately briefed for their duties. Lodger Units 0233. Lodger Units will normally conform, in the first instance, to their own Security Regulations, but they are also responsible to those of the host establishment, whose HOE has a duty of care to ensure that security within the establishment does not fall below the standards set out in JSP 440 and his own single service or HQ Security Instructions. Where conformity is not possible deviations are to be noted in a written agreement between the host establishment and the lodger unit, endorsed by the PSyA of the host establishment TLB/TF and the chain of command of the lodger unit. In principle, security responsibilities must lie where they can best be exercised. If however the lodger unit has its own secure perimeter a different security regime may apply within that perimeter, if this is considered to be in the best interest of security. In the normal course, lodger units will, whenever possible, be subjected to security inspections and audits at the same time as the host establishment and these may, if appropriate, be conducted by the host unit security authority, even if the lodger unit is required to submit its own annual report or be subject to inspection. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-18 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities Copies of all inspection/audit reports will be forwarded to the chain of command of the lodger unit. Responsibilities of Security Units 0234. Security units (see Glossary) operate under the direction, as appropriate, of PSyAs and Command security staff. Security units undertake the following tasks: a. The provision of advice to the security staff and establishments, where appropriate, on factors affecting the threat assessment and on protective security measures. b. The acquisition of security intelligence. c. The collation of all security information to support and assist security intelligence operations. d. e. The provision of security advice and assistance to establishments. The investigation of security incidents, which may include: (1) Activities of foreign intelligence services involving espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism. Such investigations are carried out in conjunction with the appropriate civilian agencies. (2) The loss or compromise of protectively marked material, in particular, documents and leaks of official information. (3) The loss or compromise of protectively marked or protected material, including records of combination lock settings and security keys. (4) The loss of arms, ammunition or explosives. (5) Certain aspects of criminal activity affecting security. Such investigations are conducted jointly, where appropriate, with the Service Police or MDP, in conjunction with the appropriate civilian authorities. f. Protective security surveys, and security inspections of establishments as directed by PSyA and Command security staff. g. The formulation of protective security plans for particularly sensitive establishments. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-19 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security h. The maintenance of records and statistics. i. The provision of technical advice on security planning and where appropriate specialist resources for public occasions such as open days or Royal/VVIP visits. j. The provision of technical advice to the security staff in planning the protection of personnel. k. The vetting of locally engaged civilians overseas for access to official information. l. Where appropriate, the screening of persons for access to military areas and establishments. m. The provision of assistance to commanders, staffs and establishments in security education and training. n. o. Liaison with other Service agencies. Liaison with allied and civilian security agencies. Other Security Appointments 0235. According to the role, size, sensitivity and dispersion of an establishment, or grouping of establishments, other security appointments may be necessary. Where other appointments are made, co-ordination of security effort within an establishment remains the responsibility of the ESyO. Examples of other security appointments include: a. Branch Security Officer (BSO)/Unit Security Officer (USO). Where it is justified by size, dispersion or the existence of a specialized installation, BSOs/USOs should be appointed. In the case of a specialized installation, an officer with a knowledge of the specialist equipment should be nominated. b. Control Officer. Establishments which hold documents protectively marked TOP SECRET, and documents which require special handling such as those marked ATOMIC or ATOMAL, are to appoint a control officer who is to be personally responsible for the safe custody of and accounting for all such documents. Details are given in Chapter 4. c. IT Security Officer (ITSO). Establishments are responsible for appointing IT security officers as required by JSP 440 Volume 3. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-20 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities d. Project Security Officer. Personnel appointed to plan and oversee the implementation of the security measures required in the realization of major projects involving protectively marked information. e. Station Security Officer/Garrison Security Officer. Personnel appointed to co-ordinate the implementation of security measures across a number of establishments in a station or garrison area. Reporting of Incidents 0236. It is important that all Defence related suspected, attempted, or actual security incidents and weaknesses are reported to the appropriate PSyA and Command security staff. PSyAs and Command security staffs are to stipulate their requirements for upward reporting of incidents (losses, compromises, breaches, weaknesses and attacks) on their establishments. The following incidents are always to be reported to D Def Sy via the chain of command: a. Any terrorist act or incident likely to have had terrorist involvement (e.g. suspected recce of an MOD establishment). b. Incursions into MOD sites which involve a significant threat to the security of that unit or establishment. c. Significant losses or theft of arms or explosives and/or significant quantities of ammunition. d. All cases of suspected sabotage and other cases of malicious damage to assets where the damage would equate to that requiring the protective marking CONFIDENTIAL or above. e. Any loss or theft of documents or material, where espionage is thought to have been involved or where there is likely to be media, public or parliamentary interest, or embarrassment caused. f. Leaks of official information to the media. g. All instances of hacking into MOD CIS systems, and of significant damage due to destruction or corruption of information on MOD CIS systems, as a result of computer viruses to be reported to the JSyCC (see also JSP 440 Volume 3 Chapter 10). h. All personnel security cases involving appeals against denial or withdrawal of security clearances and any other personnel security cases likely to attract parliamentary and/or media attention or otherwise cause embarrassment to the MOD. Where appropriate, incidents should also be JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-21 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security reported to security units and the Service Police, MDP or Civil Police in accordance with single-Service instructions. Security Incidents - Mandatory Reporting to Ministers 0237. Guidelines on the reporting of security incidents that might attract public, Parliamentary or media attention and require involvement of Ministers are at Annex D. The instruction identifies which types of incident are to be reported to Ministers in an accurate and timely way, the methods to be used and contact telephone numbers. Particular attention is drawn to the requirement to include D Def Sy as an information addressee at all stages of the reporting process. The initial report signal format is at Annex E. D Def Sy is required to maintain data on all security incidents reported in order to provide a record of remedial action, particularly in relation to any need to amend security policy. 0238. Losses. For the purposes of reporting and investigation, losses are categorized as follows: a. Category 1. All TOP SECRET, COSMIC/ATOMAL ATOMIC and comparted information including Codeword material. Also COMSEC material (which means all documents, aids, devices or equipment, including CRYPTO material, associated with the securing or authentication of telecommunications). b. Category 2. SECRET (including NATO and other IDO) material. CONFIDENTIAL (including NATO and other IDO) c. Category 3. material. 0239. Aggregation. It is recognised that the aggregation of multiple losses of information at the Category 2 level could warrant that information being raised to the Category 1 level overall. PSyA and Command security staff should try and ascertain whether or not the losses in question fall into this category and, if they consider this to be the case, to inform D Def Sy. 0240. STRAP. The loss and/or compromise of STRAP material should be reported and investigated in accordance with the security regulations laid down in the STRAP Manual (JSP 440 Volume 5). 0241. Reporting. During working hours, incidents should normally be reported to the PSyA and Command security staff. For significant issues that occur outside core working hours, the MOD maintains an Information Security Duty Officer (ISyDO), which is a role fulfilled by members of D Def Sy or JSyCC staff. Some TLBs/TFs maintain a 24 hour Duty Officer who will be responsible for upward reporting to the JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-22 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities JSyCC/ISyDO. Further details on incident reporting are contained in Chapter 11 of Volume 3. Security Investigations 0242. PSyA and Command security staff are responsible for the overall coordination of security investigations within their areas following submission of an immediate report, either by signal or e-mail, within 24 hours of the loss or compromise of the protectively marked material being confirmed or suspected (see Annex F) by the establishment concerned. Early initial reports to PSyA and Command security staffs allow a rapid judgement to be made as to the severity of the incident and minimise any delay likely to accrue in returning to normal working whilst any required security response takes place. It will also provide an opportunity to provide specialist advice and guidance to the establishment at which the incident occurred. After the immediate report has been sent, the following procedure should be followed: a. Initial report. An initial report should be submitted, in writing (either as a letter, signal or e-mail) to the appropriate PSyA and Command security staff, within 48 hours of the immediate report. b. Progress reports. Progress reports should be submitted, in writing to PSyA and Command security staff, within seven days of the immediate report, giving an update on the progress of the investigation. If the investigation is not complete when the first progress report is due, PSyA and Command security staff should be consulted on the frequency of future progress reports. c. Final report. The final report should be forwarded, in writing to PSyA and Command security staff, once the investigation is completed. It should be comprehensive and include recommendations for action to be taken. Notes: 1. Where a major security investigation is required, at least one member of any investigation team used must be aware of the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). 2. In the case of the MDP, Service Police, members of the Intelligence Corps, RN Area Security Teams or regional RAF Provost and Security Services (P&SS), such knowledge can be assumed. In all other cases, staff acting as security investigators must be formally registered with JSyCC on behalf of the Departmental Security Officer (DSO). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-23 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 3. Minor breaches' investigations can be performed on behalf of the Head of Establishment by local security staffs. 4. All serious breaches are to be reported to D Def Sy. 0243. Care must be taken to assign an appropriate protective marking to all reports, and to use appropriate communications channels. Disciplinary and Criminal Considerations 0244 In addition some incidents may also involve disciplinary and criminal considerations. 0245. Malicious damage and theft. Deliberate damage to, and theft of, MOD assets are clear indications of a criminal act having occurred, and other than in cases where a serious breach of National Security has also occurred, the pursuit of such incidents will normally be through the MDP or Service Police as appropriate. 0246. Immediate incident report. Unless the criminal activity is detected whilst in progress, when MDP or Service Police as applicable should be contacted directly, in all other cases an Immediate Incident Report should be raised to the PSyA or Command security staff who will ensure that the appropriate Police authority is contacted. 0247. Physical infiltration. The physical infiltration of a MOD site by unauthorised persons should be dealt with by either local security staffs, through the MDP or Service Police as appropriate, as laid down in this volume and reported. Any collateral incidents (e.g. theft) should, however, be assessed against the guidance in this Chapter. Post Incident Analysis 0248. PSyAs and Command security staff are responsible for ensuring that copies of all final reports, about lost or compromised material, are sent to their originators or owners at the close of the investigation. They are also responsible for ensuring that any counter-compromise action is completed as necessary. The HOE is responsible for ensuring that an Aftercare Incident Report (AIR) is raised to the DVA for all instances where MOD or contractor personnel have been involved in either misuse of MOD resources and/or criminal activity. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-24 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities Action on Loss or Compromise and Levels of Authorization to Write Off Action to be Taken in the Event of Loss or Compromise 0249. When protectively marked material is presumed lost or believed compromised, it is important that the circumstances should be reported to the appropriate PSyA and Command security staff. Loss in Transit 0250. When material has been lost in transit between establishments, it is the responsibility of the dispatching establishment to take all the necessary action and, where appropriate, to inform the originator or owner of the material. Loss outside MOD Establishments 0251. Whenever protectively marked material is lost outside MOD establishments, the following urgent action is to be taken by the loser: a. Take all reasonable steps to effect recovery, e.g. by reporting the loss to the local security unit, the Civil Police, transport authority and lost property office as appropriate. b. Notify, by the quickest means, the ESyO of the dispatching, originating or parent establishment who will then follow the reporting procedure. Loss in Emergency Conditions 0252. When protectively marked material is lost under emergency conditions e.g. fire, flood, aircraft crash, disaster at sea, armed attack etc every reasonable effort is to be made to recover or account for any residue or debris. Authorization Levels to Write Off Losses 0253. Authority to write off lost material is as follows: a. Category 1. (1) All TOP SECRET ­ PSyA and Command security staff (at one star level). (2) All ATOMIC and Codeword - to be referred to the appropriate agency for approval. (3) COMSEC - An action copy of all CRYPTO losses should also be sent to the appropriate MOD HQ and Single Service Communications Authorities. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-25 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. c. Category 2. Designated PSyA and Command security staff officers. Category 3. HOEs/COs/Directors. d. NATO and other IDO material of all categories are to be referred to the NATO Office of Security (NOS) for NATO material or the appropriate Security Office of the IDO concerned and copied to MOD DIS Sy (IDR). Note: Authority to write off losses, as stated above, is only given from a security standpoint. It in no way gives authorization to write off the sums of money that may be associated with losses. This is covered in JSP 414. 0254. Should PSyA and Command security staff consider any loss or compromise of such significance as to warrant attention by Ministers then D Def Sy should be informed immediately. Leaks of Official Information 0255. Leaks usually take the form of reports in the public media which appear to involve the unauthorised disclosure of official information (whether protectively marked or not) that causes political harm or embarrassment to either the UK Government or the Department concerned. Such disclosure may have been made either orally, whether deliberately or carelessly, or following the unauthorised sight or passage of a document. Information that is formally reported as lost to a security authority, and subsequently appears in the public media, should not be treated as a leak but judged to be a compromise of lost information and treated as a loss. 0256. First news of a leak may come direct from a journalist attempting either to verify the information obtained or wishing the Department or agency to know what access to official information has been gained. In the rare cases where this occurs prior to publication, it may be possible to seek an injunction to prevent publication. 0257. Leaks of official information are to be reported to the appropriate PSyA or Command security staff in the first instance. Where the leak is judged to be serious, the PSyA or Command security staff are to bring it to the attention of D Def Sy as soon as practicable, and within 24 hours if possible. The consequences of leaks of official information are considered serious when they undermine government policy or cause embarrassment to the government. Examples are: a. The premature leaking of information on Defence Estimates or other financial details. b. The leaking of MOD correspondence on issues that are controversial at the time. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-26 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities c. The leaking of details of overseas defence equipment negotiations prior to formal agreements being signed. 0258. The following factors need to be taken into account by the relevant PSyA or Command security staff in preparing to report the incident as a leak to D Def Sy: a. The medium/media and journalists (if known) concerned. b. The intrinsic importance of information leaked. (If there is any doubt as to whether or not the information is important, D Def Sy should be consulted for advice). c. d. e. How widely the information was circulated and in what form. Can a specific document be identified for the contents of the leak. The identity, if immediately apparent, of the source of the leak. f. Whether or not the Official Secrets Acts are believed to have been breached, if immediately apparent. 0259. In general there is likely to be advantage in pursuing a leak investigation in those cases where: a. b. c. A specific document can be identified from the contents of the leak; The authorised circulation of the leaked document was small; or It has been possible to take the decision to investigate promptly. 0260. D Def Sy, in conjunction with the relevant TLB/TF, will seek advice from the DSO as to whether the details of the case warrant an investigation by the PSyA, Security Unit, Service Police or MDP. This option must be considered before such an investigation is initiated since an investigation that may result in criminal proceedings must be conducted in accordance with the Police Codes of Practice. D Def Sy will take all necessary upward reporting action within the Department where a serious leak has been identified or is strongly suspected. Waivers and Exemptions 0261. The procedures relating to waivers and exemptions for IT and nuclear assets are described respectively in JSP 440 Volume 3 Chapter 1 and Volume 4 Chapter 1. For all other waivers and exemptions to JSP 440 Volume 1 the rules are detailed below. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-27 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 0262. The Baseline Measures for protecting the confidentiality of protectively marked information and material, and the physical security standards for the protection of arms, ammunition and explosives are mandatory. No material in this category is to be held if the mandatory standards are not met, unless a deviation in the form of a waiver or exemption has been issued by the appropriate authority. Waivers and exemptions can be granted by TLB Holders/TFCEs and CinCs on their own authority. Exemptions need to be referred to D Def Sy if they involve the assets of other government departments being placed at risk and therefore require Cabinet Office agreement. A list of waivers and exemptions is to be included in the TLB Holder/TFCE annual report to D Def Sy. 0263. Definitions of waivers and exemptions (other than for nuclear and IT assets) are: a. Waiver. A waiver is a risk management tool that allows rules to be waived, in extraordinary circumstances, for periods of up to one year, when it is judged that a temporary deviation will not result in any vulnerability being exploited. Accordingly, a waiver gives approval for the temporary deviation from the mandatory standards in circumstances where: (1) Essentially the same level of security is afforded and compensatory measures are not required; or, (2) A vulnerability has been created and acceptable compensatory measures have been applied; or, (3) A vulnerability exists and, despite the application of all feasible counter measures, remains extant. b. Renewal. If renewal of a waiver is approved, details are to be notified by the PSyA or Command security staff to D Def Sy. c. Exemption. An exemption is similar to a waiver but applies where there is a need for long-term dispensation. The likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited will increase with duration, frequency and predictability. Accordingly, an exemption will only give approval for the long-term deviation from the mandatory standards in circumstances where: (1) Essentially the same level of security is afforded and compensatory measures are not required; or, (2) All feasible compensatory measures have been taken and nothing more can be done. d. Review. Exemptions are to be reviewed every 5 years. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-28 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities Other Security Related Responsibilities 0264. It is necessary security staffs to be aware of the general state of security and the effectiveness of protective measures in their areas of responsibility. Within the chain of command this is achieved by such means as the receipt of security survey/inspection reports, the reporting of breaches of security and a close working relationship between the security staff, security units and ESyOs. It is equally important for the DSO to be able to monitor the overall state of security and the effectiveness of protective measures within the MOD as a whole. Relations with the Intelligence Staff 0265. Where appropriate, but particularly in Service HQs, the security staff should maintain close liaison with the intelligence staff. In overseas commands both security and operational intelligence assessments should normally be combined to give commanders a complete and balanced intelligence picture. Liaison 0266. In addition to normal staff liaison and inter-Service consultation (through local security and intelligence committees, where they exist), contacts are to be maintained at staff level with other national and international HQs and with appropriate local security organisations and civil authorities. In parallel with this, security staffs are to ensure that contacts between security units and the Civil Police are established and maintained. Contact with the Security Service and Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB) is only to be carried out through D Def Sy unless authority has been previously been granted for direct contact. Financial Economy 0267. Recommendations for works services frequently involve high costs in materials and labour charges but, while the need for economy is recognized, this must not inhibit security units from making recommendations necessary to achieve proper security protection. It is the task of PSyA and Command security staffs to examine recommendations for security works services ensuring that only those that are justified on security grounds are given their support. Where high costs are involved, security staffs may require security units to suggest alternatives, with their advantages and disadvantages, to help determine the most cost-effective measures. Protection against the Threat 0268. It is the responsibility of PSyAs and Command security staff to make an assessment of the local threat from espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism to establishments in their areas of responsibility. They should give advice on the protection of establishments to include further precautions to be taken if the threat increases. Responsibility for ordering protective measures against terrorist attack is usually vested in the operations/security staff. The security staff is responsible for JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-29 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security providing assessments of the threat from terrorism, and for the planning and coordination of protective security measures to counter the threat. In Great Britain assessments are disseminated by D Def Sy. Overseas and in Northern Ireland, assessments are made and disseminated by commands except that in the case of HM ships visiting foreign ports the threat assessment at the time of the visit will be promulgated by signal by DI RA (Coord). (Chapter 7 gives details of counter terrorist measures). Key Points (KPs) 0269. The Director of Military Operations, through MO2, is responsible for the direction and staffing of KP policy. Single-Services are responsible for nominating their own KPs and passing details to the Joint Planning Staff (JPS (UK)). JPS (UK) collates these and forwards them, through the MOD KP Committee, to the Cabinet Office KP Committee for endorsement. Once endorsed, KPs are included in JPS (UK) KP Lists. Advice on the security measures at KPs is the responsibility of MOD, PSyAs and Command security staff. Specialist security units are responsible for conducting KP surveys. Responsibility for deciding on the criteria for selection of KPs abroad rests with CINCs, advice on their protection being given by the Command security staff and the local security unit (see Glossary). There will be a need for co-ordination of KPs protection plans in overseas theatres to take account of the requirements of all Service and civilian KPs. The principles governing sabotage planning and the protection of KPs are currently under review. Amendments to JSP 440 Defence Manual of Security 0270. If PSyAs, Command security staff, HOEs, ESyOs or security units feel that the policy or any of the instructions or guidance contained within this manual are inappropriate or incomplete and require deletion or amendment they are to inform D Def Sy, through their chain of command. D Def Sy will consider the matter and if appropriate, review the policy and take any necessary amendment action. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2-30 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 2 CATEGORISATION OF ESTABLISHMENTS AND SECURITY INSPECTIONS Introduction 1. The adoption of a combined matrix for categorization of establishments takes account of the full threat spectrum and Risk Impact Level. It facilitates a comprehensive approach to security inspections to include, where relevant, personnel, physical and procedural security measures within the GSE/LSE Inspection (GLI) of CIS installations within sites contained in Chapter 12 to JSP 440 Volume 3 Issue 2. This combined matrix is shown in outline below: Asset Category A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 Risk Impact Level High Medium High Medium Medium Low Low Very Low Guarding Category P1 P2 P3 2. Categories A1-C2 relate to all aspects of the threat to the security of information and materiel (assets) and are based on the new definitions below. The combined matrix to be used in determining the risk profile of an establishment is produced by bringing together separate assessments on all aspects of the threats to information and material (assets), and on the threat to life posed by terrorism. The former involves selection of a category in the range A1-C2; the latter a category in the range P1-P3. In each case, the categories selected are consistent with the Level 2 matrix of Risk Impact Levels referred to in the Risk Management Guidance at Annex C to DSO Guidance Note No 2. JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 2A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Categorization Definitions 3. The definitions to be used in determining the categorisation of an establishment in relation to the threats to information and material (assets) are as follows: Category A1. (Risk Impact High). Establishments with a nuclear role and holding nuclear weapons or Special Nuclear Material (SNM). For example: See JSP 440 Volume 4. Category A2. (Risk Impact Medium High). Establishments holding assets or carrying out an exceptionally sensitive or critical role, the loss, disruption or compromise of which would cause exceptionally grave damage to the operational effectiveness or key business output of the TLB/TF or MOD. For example: Establishments, including branches of HQs, with an exceptionally sensitive or critical role; or whose main outputs depend upon processing information on a CL1 CIS system; or carrying out TOP SECRET research and development activity of major importance to UK defence capability. Category B1. (Risk Impact Medium). Establishments holding assets or carrying out a very sensitive or critical role the loss, disruption or compromise of which would cause serious damage to the operational effectiveness or key business output of the TLB/TF or MOD. For example: Establishments, including branches of HQs, with a very sensitive or critical role whose key outputs depend upon processing information on a CL2 CIS system; or carrying out SECRET research and development activity. Category B2. (Risk Impact Medium Low). Establishments holding assets or carrying out a role the loss, disruption or compromise of which would cause damage to the operational effectiveness or key business output of the TLB/TF or MOD. For example: Establishments, including branches of HQs, with a sensitive or critical role; or with a deployable operational role in a readiness cycle or having an essential force generation function; or whose key outputs depend upon processing information on a CL3 CIS system. JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 2A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities Category C1. (Risk Impact Low). Establishments holding assets or carrying out a role the loss, disruption or compromise of which would cause difficulty in maintaining the operational effectiveness or a key business output of the TLB/TF or MOD. For example: Establishments, including branches of HQs and units not included in Category A or B holding protectively marked information or equipment mainly at CONFIDENTIAL level or below with CL4 CIS systems that are not critical to key TLB/TF business or operational outputs. Category C2. (Risk Impact Very Low). Establishments holding assets or carrying out a role the loss, disruption or compromise of which would cause negligible damage and would not significantly degrade the operational effectiveness or a key business output of the TLB/TF or MOD. For example: Establishments, including branches of HQs and units not in Category A or B that do not hold protectively marked information or equipment above RESTRICTED level or full bore weapons. 4. Categories P1-P3 relate to the threat to life posed by terrorism and retain agreed pre-SSR definitions used to determine guarding criteria. These definitions are contained in Section VIII to Chapter 5. 5. The process of categorisation of establishments is to involve an assessment of both the establishment's asset and guarding risk impact level, producing a combined value, e.g. B2/P1. Individual establishments and lodger units within a large site should be assessed according to their individual assets and vulnerabilities. For example, the perimeter and Service living accommodation on a large site may be designated P1 for threat to life reasons and include a sensitive unit that requires a Category A2 rating. This does not mean that each and every establishment within the site need be accorded the same Category A2 rating, regardless of the activities conducted within its own discrete area. Where there is a specific area within an establishment that requires a higher category, e.g. an operations or communications centre, it may be categorised separately from the remainder of the establishment which may then be placed in a lower category for inspection purposes. Inspection Periodicity 6. Threats to Defence establishments vary widely, as do their vulnerabilities. Although every establishment should be subject to periodic formal security inspection, the programme should reflect these differences. In determining the frequency of inspections for establishments within their area, TLB Holders/TFCEs will need to consider various factors. These will include: the criticality of the establishment's output JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 2A-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security in meeting MP objectives, the risk profile, the outcome of previous inspections and audits, turnover of key personnel and any mandated requirements. Security inspection reports will provide a major input into the DSO's annual Certificate of Assurance. TLB Holders/TFCEs may elect to supplement formal inspections by advisory visits and by the completion of security questionnaires. The guidelines for inspection periodicity are shown below: Asset Category A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 Risk Impact Level High Medium High Medium Medium Low Low Very Low Inspection Periodicity (years) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Guarding Category P1 P2 P3 Inspection Periodicity (years) 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 7. It will be for TLB Holders/TFCEs to determine the detailed form of the inspections conducted, adjusting the emphasis of the inspection to take account of the importance of the establishment's outputs to the TLB/TF, its risk profile and security history. Whenever practicable, however, a security inspection should in principle be holistic in approach, taking due account of all relevant aspects of physical, personnel and information security, including the procedural measures taken to protect assets and CIS systems on the site concerned. 8. TLB Holders/TFCEs may opt to arrange inspections at more frequent intervals than given in the above matrix, in accordance with their risk management and resource decisions. If they elect to inspect establishments in a given category at intervals greater than the periodicity indicated in the matrix, TLB Holders/TFCEs will be required to provide an audit trail and rationale for the decision as part of the process of their reporting of security assurance and subsequent audit. 9. For many establishments, the guidance periodicity for asset and guarding categories will differ. It will be for TLB Holders/TFCEs to schedule the inspections programme so that both asset and guarding elements are inspected satisfactorily. As a guide, when asset and guarding category periodicities differ, the asset category periodicity should be taken as the driver for the conduct of comprehensive inspections, and the guarding category periodicity for supplementary inspections of relevant CT measures. For example TLB Holders/TFCEs might choose to schedule these additional JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 2A-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities CT inspections around the mid point between comprehensive inspections. following examples illustrate the options that are open to TLB Holders/TFCEs: The a. An establishment is categorised B1/P2, giving periodicity for inspections of 3 and 4 years. The TLB Holder/TFCE might choose to merge the two categories and carry out a combined inspection between the 3 and 4 year points. Alternatively, the TLB Holder/TFCE might choose to conduct all aspects of security inspection at the 3 year point, and carry out a supplementary CT-orientated inspection at the 4 year point. b. An establishment is categorised C2/P2, giving periodicity for inspections of 6 and 4 years. The TLB Holder/TFCE might choose to adhere to the guideline periodicity, or to advance the CT inspection to the 3 year midpoint between holistic inspections. JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 2A-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 2A-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 2 GUIDE TO THE CONTENTS OF SECURITY STANDING ORDERS The headings given below are a guide to the items to be considered for inclusion, as appropriate, in security standing orders (SSOs). The list is not exhaustive as there are normally local matters to be included, nor is it intended to be a guide as to layout which should be arranged to enable parts to be issued as notices or for particular appointments. Unit Security Organisation 1. Details of establishment security officers (showing name, establishment appointment and telephone numbers). Include details of any other officers with security responsibilities such as IT security officers and those responsible for overseeing the security aspects of contracts and contractors. 2. Include a general statement of their specific security responsibilities for: a. Control of arms, ammunition and explosives (including privately owned weapons such as shotguns). b. c. Safeguarding vehicles and equipment. Safeguarding protectively marked documents and material. Control of Access 3. Control of access by: a. b. c. Gate controls. Passes and permits. Patrols and guards. 4. Handling of visitors, cleaners, contractors, public utility employees, and tradesmen. 5. 6. Handling of trespassers. Security area controls. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 7. 8. 9. 10. Key control. Temporary vacation of offices. Locking up and inspection of offices. Operation of alarms. Security of Information 11. Orders for and method of promulgation of: a. b. c. d. Establishment postal address. `Need to know' principle. Security warnings. Use of copying and electronic equipment. e. Reporting of contacts with nationals of countries to which special security regulations apply and the intention to travel in these and certain other countries. f. g. h. j. k. l. m. n. Reporting suspicious incidents. Reporting of losses of identity cards, passes and permits. Reporting of rumours. Pen/tape friendships. Amateur radio activities including Citizen Band radio. Use of privately owned cameras in restricted areas. Communications with press and broadcasting organizations. Release of information. Security of Communications 12. 13. Telephone security. Radio security (procedures, use of codes). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities Security of Documents 14. Instructions for: a. b. 15. Protected document registers (nominated and supervising officers). TOP SECRET control (if required). Control of distribution, messenger service, and dispatch. 16. Removal of documents from offices, carriage of documents by hand at home and abroad with particular attention to the crossing of international frontiers by casual couriers with protectively marked documents. 17. 18. Review, destruction, weeding and downgrading of documents. Checks and musters of documents and files. 19. Reporting of and searching for missing documents, and action on loss or compromise of protectively marked documents. 20. 21. Action to be taken on finding protectively marked documents. Orders to be specially published to cover: a. Control of security containers, keys and combination lock settings. b. Minimum standards for the protection of protectively marked documents. c. d. e. f. Operation of duplicators and copying machines. Control of typing. Destruction of protectively marked documents and waste. Emergency destruction of documents. g. Ranks and appointments authorized to produce protectively mark documents. Security of Weapons, Equipment and Material 22. Protection and inspection of weapons, protectively marked equipment and material. 23. Security of armouries. Control and issue of arms, ammunition and explosives, and orders for storage and movement. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2B-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 24. Reporting loss, compromise or finds of protectively marked equipment, arms, ammunition and explosives. Security of Information Technology Systems 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. Security operating procedures. Physical security. Technical security. Document security. Personnel security. Security of Personnel 30. Maintenance of establishment vetting register. Security Education and Training 31. Education of all ranks and civilian staff. 32. Training of clerical staff, protectively marked equipment storemen, and arms storemen in their security procedures. Security on Exercises or Operations 33. Planning, organization, and briefing. (See also Chapter 14). 34. Restrictions on, and control of, protectively marked material taken on exercises or operations. 35. Security of information and documents, particularly: a. b. c. d. e. f. During loading and unloading of office vehicles. Guarding of documents. Control of access. Careless talk. Reporting of suspicious incidents. Searching of vacated areas. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2B-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities g. h. 36. Telephone security. Radio security (procedures, use of codes). Security of arms, ammunition and explosives. Contracts Security 37. Security regulations for contractors. (See also Chapter 12). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2B-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2B-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 2 SECURITY ORDERS, REGULATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR SECURITY OFFICERS 1. Security officers at all levels must acquaint themselves with current security directives. They must also be aware of the sources of reference and guidance on security matters contained in the publications detailed in this Annex. It is not expected that all of the publications will be held, but security officers should be aware of the existence of the documents. 2. Documents applicable to all security officers. a. Queen's Regulations for the Royal Navy, Army or Royal Air force (as applicable). b. Manual of Naval Law (BR 11) - Manual of Army Law or Manual of Air Force Law (as applicable). c. JSP 440 - The Defence Manual of Security (DMS) Volumes 1 - 5. d. Royal Navy, Army or Royal Air Force supplements (as applicable) to JSP 440. e. f. Human Rights Act. JSP 406 ­ Guidance to the Data Protection Act. g. Defence Council Instructions and other administrative instructions (to include CONFIDENTIAL issues). h. i. Technical Grading Committee lists. Command and establishment security standing orders. j. JSP 205 - Directory of Subscribers to Secure Voice Systems. (To be superseded by DCSA Publication 16 - BRAHMS/BRERE/STUII/STUIII secure speech systems. k. m. Tempest regulations. Table X - Release of UK Classified Military Information. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security n. IDO regulations: (1) C-M(55)15 (Final) - Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Volumes I and II. (2) C-M(64)39 - Draft agreement for co-operation regarding ATOMIC information. (3) C-M(68)41 (5th Revise) - Administrative arrangements to implement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty on co-operation regarding ATOMAL information. (4) C-M(71)27 (Revised) (including AC/35-WP/75) - Special Procedure for the Handling of US-SlOP Information. (5) ACP 122 - Handling of ATOMAL Information within Classified Communication Centres, NATO supplement 2. (6) CENTO/C/13D5 - Parts I to IV. (7) AC/35-D/1006 (Revised) - Guidance on the Conduct of Inspections by NATO Component Security Authorities (8) ACO 130 (Revised 1999) - Rules for the Handling and Release of Information Marked ATOMIC. o. 3. Other documents that may be specified in JSP 440. Documents for Royal Navy security officers only. a. b. c. c. d. e. f. BR 8988. Ships Standing Orders. BRN 01/17 - Manual of Naval Signals Intelligence. FLAGOs. Fleet Engineering Orders. CB 03329 - Security of Classified Material. Fleet Temporary Memoranda. 4. Documents for Army security officers only. a. BWO 01/1 - Instructions for the handling of CRYPTO. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities b. c. d. 5. AGAIs (60974). Div/District/Bde Standing Orders. Unit Documentation Manuals. Documents for RAF security officers only. a. b. c. d. e. f. g. AP 3087; Manual of Security Education. AP 3392; Manual of Personnel Administration. PAM(Air) 58; A Guide to the News Media. PAM(Air) 150; Introduction to Security. CD 1167. CD 1155; Communications Doctrine. RAF GAls. h. BAM/01/2; Instructions for the handling of COMSEC material in the RAF. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2C-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2C-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 2 SECURITY INCIDENTS - MANDATORY REPORTING TO MINISTERS Scope 1. There is a requirement to staff reports on security incidents to Ministers in an accurate and timely way to ensure that security incidents which might attract public, Parliamentary or media attention are brought to their notice. This instruction identifies which types of incident are to be reported and the methods to be used. Advice can be sought at any stage from the appropriate TLB/Chain of Command, who should be informed immediately that an incident has occurred. Types of Security Incident 2. Security incidents falling into any or all of the following categories are to be reported to Ministers: a. Incursions onto MOD sites which involve a significant1 threat to the security of the unit or establishment. (e.g. if a significant asset is compromised, even if temporarily). b. Incursions onto MOD sites where there has been a significant failure of security measures. c. Incursions which are likely to attract media, public or parliamentary attention. d. Any incident where espionage, terrorism or sabotage is thought to have been involved (except in NI, where procedures laid down in CDS's Directive to GOC NI will be followed (i.e. incidents are reported in a dual system, firstly to MO2 by HQNI G3 (Ops) and then relayed up the Chain of Command as necessary and additionally by either HQNI, Sec(HSF)3 or D Policy to Ministers, verbally in the first instance with a follow-up written report if required by Ministers' Private Offices, with D Def Sy as an information addressee. e. All losses or theft of arms/explosives or significant quantities of ammunition. 1 It is not possible to define "Significant" more specifically. It is a matter of judgement but advice may be sought from the appropriate TLB PSyA/Chain of Command Security Staff or D Def Sy. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2D-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security f. Any loss or theft of information where there is likely to be media, public or parliamentary interest, or embarrassment to the Department. g. All leaks of official information. h. All instances of intrusion into or malicious electronic attack on MOD IT Systems from external sources. j. All instances of intrusion into or malicious electronic attack on MOD IT Systems from external sources. k. All instances where significant damage results from the destruction or corruption of information on MOD IT Systems, as a result of malicious software e.g. viruses, worms or trojan programmes. l. Personnel security cases where there is likely to be media, public or parliamentary interest, or embarrassment to the Department. (In many incidents the personnel security aspect will not become apparent until an investigation is under way and it is likely therefore that the incident will initially fall within one of the criteria described above). Responsibilities 3. Responsibility for staffing reports to Ministers rests with the TLB/Chain of Command which should take the lead consulting, as necessary, the Security Staff and Civil Secretariats which must also be involved, and D Def Sy. (The exception to this is HQ LAND where the Command Secretary will lead). However, the following exceptions to this staffing arrangement apply: a. Northern Ireland. Civil Secretary HQNI or Sec HSF 3 (consulting MO2 as necessary). b. Nuclear Security. The TLB/Chain of Command responsible is to make the report except for the specific areas of nuclear security below: (1) Nuclear Weapon/Material Movements (including incidents at staging posts - D Nuc Pol/AD NAR. (2) (3) Nuclear Assets at Sea (i.e. out of port) - NS(Sec). AWE ­ DPA NW IPT. It should, however, be noted that separate reporting instructions are set out in JSP 440 Volume 4 covering Terrorist threats to nuclear assets, under Codeword BINGHAM and where such incidents have a safety dimension additional reporting under Codewords TOPSTAR, PRIMROSE or LIABLE remains unchanged. JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 2D-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities c. Security at USAF Bases in GB. DAS 3b(Sec). d. MOD Police Operations and Organisation. The MDP is not a Security Authority, but when security incidents involving MDP personnel take place, the reporting TLB/Chain of Command is to liase with MDP Secretariat to ensure that the MDP involvement is fully covered. Early liaison with the MDP Secretariat will ensure that only one Ministerial submission is prepared. MDP Sec is equally responsible for liaison with the appropriate TLB/Chain of Command before making a Ministerial submission. e. Security Involving Defence Contractors (List X). D Def Sy. f. Personnel Vetting Cases. CE/DVA. DVA will consult PSyAs and Security Staffs and Secretariats who may lead if the decision on a case was taken outside the DVA. 4. Any cases of doubt regarding responsibility should be referred to D Def Sy in the first instance. Procedures 5. In order to alert the security system that an incident has occurred and to provide subsequent monitoring of it, there are four steps outlined below which are to be followed. D Def Sy is to be an information addressee on all reports/submissions and is able to provide advice at any stage of an incident or during the reporting process. Step 1: Initial Report 6. An initial report, usually by telephone, is to be made to MOD as soon as is practicable after a security incident. This will allow early notification of Ministers and appraisal of the degree of importance of the incident to take place. TLBs/Chain of Command should decide who should make this report; however reports should not be delayed. This is particularly important in the case of a major incident (e.g. a terrorist attack or large incursion to an establishment). Contact details are: General Incidents (terrorism, extremism, espionage etc) Working hours: D Def Sy Phys (Non Tech/Threats), MB 84815/020 7218 4815. Out of hours: CDSDO, MB 88850/020 7218 8850. Documentary Losses JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2D-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Working hours: D Def Sy InfoSy (Pol)1, MB 83994/020 7218 3994. Out of hours: CDSDO, MB 88850/020 7218 8850. IT Incidents Working Hours: D Def Sy InfoSy (Tech), MB 84505 or 87811/020 721 84505 or 87811. Out of hours: Duty IT Sy Officer Via MDP 01371 85 4444. Nuclear Weapons/Material Movements During Moves: D Nuc Pol/NAR Ops, MB 86763/020 7218 6763. During Overnight Stops at Staging Posts: CDSDO, MB 88850/020 7218 8850. 7. The initial report is to be followed as soon as possible by a written report, normally by signal, in the format at Annex H. The relevant TLB/Chain of Command is to decide whether this is sent by the unit/establishment concerned or by the TLB HQ. Step 2: Ministerial Submission 8. Ministerial submissions should normally be made within 24hrs and are to expand on the information given in the initial written report. They should be made direct to PS/Minister(AF) and copied to: APS/SofS PS/PUS DGS&S D Def Sy PS/Minister(DP) PS/2nd PUS MA/DCDS(C) D Nuc Pol ACNS and NS(Sec) JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 2D-4 } } } } Where the Defence Procurement Agency is involved. Where civilian staff are involved. Where operational matters are concerned. Where nuclear involved. } facilities/materials/weapons are All incidents. RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities ACGS via ASD 1 }Where single Service matters are concerned. ACAS and DAS 3b Sec } MA/CDL CCMDP D News Where DLO matters are concerned. Where MDP officers are involved or based. All incidents (sensitive details may be excluded). Step 3: Progress Reports 9. Progress reports may be required, depending on the seriousness of the incident and directions given by Ministers following the initial report. D Def Sy will agree with the TLB/Chain of Command concerned whether these are needed, at what frequency they should be submitted and their distribution. This process will ensure that lessons from any incident are identified as early as possible and used to amend or develop policy and/or procedures. It will also ensure that Ministers are kept fully informed. Step 4: Final Report 10. A final report may be submitted once the incident is closed and following discussion between D Def Sy and the TLB/Chain of Command concerned. This may take the form of a submission to Ministers, depending on the outcome of the investigation. It should include any specific recommendations for alterations to security policy or procedures arising from the investigation of the incident. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2D-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 2D-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities ANNEX E TO CHAPTER 2 SECURITY INCIDENTS - MANDATORY REPORTS TO MINISTERS - INITIAL REPORT SIGNAL FORMAT (Text in italics is for completion by originator) From: Unit/ establishment or TLB/Chain of Command HQ To: Info: MODUK Chain of command(including PSyA and Security Staff) Others as required SIC: YAL/Y2G IMMEDIATE Precedence: Protective Marking: RESTRICTED (as a minimum) SECURITY INCIDENT ­ INITIAL REPORT 1. 2. 3. 4. Date, time and place of incident. Brief details of incident. Persons/property involved (if known). Organisation(s) conducting the investigation. 5. Presentational aspects, including known media interest and suggested lines to take. 6 7. 8. Any immediately apparent conflict with extant security policy. Expected date/time of submission to Ministers. TLB/Chain of Command POC. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2E-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 2E-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities ANNEX F TO CHAPTER 2 FORMAT OF IMMEDIATE SIGNAL REPORT OF SUSPECTED LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF PROTECTIVELY MARKED MATERIAL The report is to state: a. b. What has been lost. Its protective marking (including caveats and descriptors). c. Its originator or sponsor, date of origin, reference number, title or subject and copy number. d. An assessment of whether compromise is certain, probable, possible or unlikely. PSyAs or Command security staff will inform the sponsor in order to obtain an assessment of the effect of compromise. e. Although the major cause of losses is carelessness, the reporting officer may nonetheless, by virtue of his inquiries, have formed an opinion that espionage or subversion is or may be involved. When this is the case, or where no further action is intended, a brief summary of circumstances surrounding the loss is to be given, together, where appropriate, with the full names and service or staff numbers of those involved. Where names are given the signal is to be protectively marked at the appropriate level and is to include the descriptor STAFF. f. Corrective measures to prevent a recurrence (if appropriate at this stage). g. Whether or not further action is intended. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2F-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 2F-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Risk Management CHAPTER 3 RISK MANAGEMENT Chapter 03 General The Theory of Risk Management Risk Management Practice Annex A Annex B Annex C Risk management Para Page 0301 0302 0303 3A-1 3B-1 3C-1 Record for Steps 1, 2 and 3 of Risk Management Process. Record for Steps 1, 2 and 3 of Risk Management Process ­ Example. Universal Baseline Measures. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Risk Management CHAPTER 3 RISK MANAGEMENT General 0301. Risk management provides the method for conducting the protective security process. It is the means to ensure that the security measures adopted to counter the threats posed to assets reduce the likelihood of compromise to an acceptable level but are not greater than are warranted by the asset's value. It is a common sense methodology to enable the selection of appropriate and cost effective security measures. The main elements are: a. Deciding what assets need to be protected and how valuable those assets are. b. Deciding what threats are posed to the assets and how vulnerable they are to them. c. Reviewing and adapting existing security measures to ensure that they: (1) Meet mandatory security requirements known as baseline measures. (2) Provide an acceptable level of risk that compromise will not take place. d. Examining overall security procedures on a regular basis to make sure that they provide a sensible and economic interrelationship. e. The process is to be documented at establishment level and the records retained so that any future changes to asset values, vulnerabilities and threats can be accommodated. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security The Theory of Risk Management 0302. The theory of risk management is shown below: Stepdd List Assets Step 7 Total Security Review Step 2 Determine Asset Values Step 1 Step 5/6 Review existing security methods against risk and implement necessary changes Step 3 Identify Threats Step 4 Identify Vulnerabilities Risk Management Practice 0303. The following is an explanation of the steps given in the above diagram: a. Step 1. List All Valuable Assets. The risk management methodology can be applied to any asset to which the HOE attaches value. These could be information, physical assets and even peoples' expertise. It is mandatory for these assets to be listed in the manner shown at Annex A: (1) Information. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Risk Management (a) Protectively marked documents. (Document, as defined in the Glossary, includes maps, view foils, IT storage media, etc). (b) Equipment confidentiality. that merits protective marking for (c) IT systems giving access to protectively marked information. In addition to requirements for protecting the information, as such, these will also require protection as physical assets. They are subject to approved system security policies (SSPs) and security operating procedures (SyOPs). Further detail is in Volume3. Information Technology. (2) Physical Assets (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Arms. Ammunition. Explosives. Dangerous drugs. Toxic substances. Public funds. (g) Any physical asset the compromise of which would cause serious damage to the operational effectiveness of the establishment e.g. aircraft, ships, AFVs or an essential IT system or command and control centre. (3) People (a) Service personnel and MOD employees working in the establishment. (b) Dependants living within the establishment. (c) Visitors to the establishment (e.g. students attending courses or contractors working on a project). b. Step 2. Determine Asset Values. Using the protective marking definitions at paragraph 0103 of Chapter 1 decide the protective marking JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security category for each asset taking into account compromise of confidentiality, integrity and availability. Consider both the direct and indirect consequences of compromise. Where there are a number of assets of the same type and protective marking, take into account their aggregated value, e.g. Would the information contained in a large number of CONFIDENTIAL documents, held in a single file, require the protective marking of SECRET if that information was condensed into a single document? Physical assets which require to be listed (e.g. arms, ammunition and protected equipment) are unlikely to carry protective markings but must be treated, for security purposes, as though they were protectively marked. c. Step 3. List both Types and Levels of Threat. Against each asset group (such as information) list the type(s) of threat (e.g. espionage or theft) and the threat level as defined in Annex D to Chapter 1 or in the case of terrorism Annex E to Chapter 1. An example of a completed record that might be made by an establishment for Steps 1 to 3 of the Risk Management Process is at Annex B. d. Step 4. Identify the Vulnerability of Assets. Consider any vulnerabilities of the asset itself e.g. that it radiates sensitive information and is therefore vulnerable to intercept. Also consider vulnerabilities in the existing security arrangements. Usually this will be carried out with the assistance of professional security personnel. Aspects to be considered include: (1) Perimeter security e.g. access control and effectiveness of security fences. (2) Internal security e.g. intruder detector systems (IDS), security furniture, procedures such as the disposal of protectively marked waste and arrangements for the movement and storage of arms, ammunition and explosives. (3) Personnel security e.g. escorting of visitors and vetting and supervision of relevant staff. (4) Communications and technical security e.g. security of photocopiers and computer systems. e. Step 5. Review existing Security Counter-measures for Confidentiality and implement necessary changes to achieve Baseline Measures. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Risk Management (1) Stage 1. For all assets where confidentiality is a concern it is necessary to apply any measure required to achieve the security standards set out at Annex A to Chapter 1. In order to achieve a common and acceptable standard of protection throughout the Government Service at each level of the protective marking system, certain baseline measures are mandatory. The following baseline measures are to be applied when confidentiality is at stake: (a) Universal Baseline Measures. These are the general preventative measures that form a normal part of good management practice e.g. implementing relevant health and safety legislation. A list of universal baseline measures is at Annex C. (b) Control and Carriage Baseline Measures. The mandatory standards for the control and carriage of protectively marked assets are given throughout Chapter 4 and at Annex C to Chapter 4. As these baseline measures are set for a "Low" threat, it may be necessary to add additional measures if the threat is higher than "Low". (c) Physical Security Baseline Measures. The mandatory standards for the physical protection of assets are arrived at by following the matrix of options and menu of measures at Annexes A and B to Section 1 of Chapter 5. (d) Counter-eavesdropping Baseline Measures. The mandatory standards for protection against eavesdropping are covered in Chapter 27 of Volume 3. (2) Stage 2. Having noted the relevant baseline measures and standards of security, review existing security counter-measures and decide if they are excessive, adequate or inadequate in relation to the threat. If excessive, consider whether funding or resources can be saved by reducing them sensibly while still maintaining the desired level of security. If wholly adequate, do no more. If inadequate, then the assets are at an unacceptable degree of risk. A decision is required on what to do to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. This may be achieved by either introducing suitable counter-measures to bring the level of security up to the baselines or by reducing the risk in some other way such as transferring the most valuable assets to a site with a higher degree of security. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security f. Step 6. Review existing security counter measures for integrity and availability and implement necessary changes to achieve mandatory standards. (1) Stage 1. For all assets where integrity or availability are a concern, it is necessary to consider how to achieve the standards of security set out at Annex A to Chapter 1 as they can be related to the value of the asset. In order to achieve a common and acceptable level of protection the following standards are mandatory: (a) Universal Baseline Measures. The universal baseline measures at Annex C are to be applied. (b) Arms, Ammunition and Explosives. The mandatory requirements for the protection of arms, ammunition and explosives given in Chapter 5 are to be applied. (c) Nuclear Assets. The mandatory requirements for the protection of nuclear assets given in the Defence Manual of Security Volume 4 are to be applied. (d) Dangerous Drugs, Toxic Substances and Public Funds. Those mandatory security requirements for the protection dangerous drugs, toxic substances and public funds that form part of current, MOD or single-Service instructions are to be applied. (2) Stage 2. Having noted the relevant baseline and mandatory levels and standards of security, review existing security countermeasures in the manner described at para 0303e(2) above and take action accordingly. In some cases the measures designed to protect confidentiality may provide or contribute to protection for integrity and availability. However, usually integrity and availability can best be safeguarded by making suitable contingency plans e.g. by making regular backup copies of information vulnerable to loss of availability. Where an asset has a clear monetary value, cost benefit analysis techniques will help to decide how much it is worth spending to protect it. g. Step 7. Total Security Review. Conduct a general review of counter-measures against threats and vulnerabilities to ensure that the overall result meets mandatory standards, is cost effective and that the HOE is prepared to accept any remaining residual risk. Also ensure that the key facts JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Risk Management and decisions in the risk management analysis have been recorded to enable audit in the future. 0304. Follow Up Action. Risk management is an ongoing process. The ingredients: asset values, threats, vulnerabilities, risks counter-measures and the degree of risk that is acceptable do not remain static. The risk may vary over time requiring changes in protective security. Any risk management process must therefore be sensitive to changes and should be reviewed by the ESyO whenever a significant change takes place and annually. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3-10 RESTRICTED JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Record for Steps 1, 2 and 3 of Risk Management Process Asset group/type Asset (Note 1) C Value (Note 2) I A Quantity (Note 3) Listing (Note 4) Location (Note 5) C Aggregate Value (Note 6) I A Threat type/level (Note 7) ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 3 Information Documents Equipment IT Systems RESTRICTED Risk Management RESTRICTED Physical Arms Ammunition Explosives Dangerous drugs Toxic substances Public funds Operational effectiveness 3A-1 People MOD employees Dependants Visitors RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Notes on completion of record for steps 1, 2 and 3 1. Note 1 - Asset. List assets in general terms under the appropriate asset type heading, for example the "Arms" asset type might show just 2 entries "small arms" and "support weapons". In the case of documents it is only necessary to show "TOP SECRET", "SECRET", "CONFIDENTIAL", "RESTRICTED" if documents with any of those protective markings are held. For IT systems state only the project name and PC for personal computers. 2. Note 2 - Value. Show the protective marking for each asset under the appropriate headings of Confidentiality (C) Integrity (I) Availability (A). In the case of documents or other material, it is probable that only the 'C' column would be completed, where as for equipment or IT systems the 'I' and 'A' might have a protective marking value. For example although an IT system might only store information protectively marked up to RESTRICTED, the damage that might arise following the corruption or non availability of vital data might warrant a higher protective marking under 'I' and 'A'. Unless physical assets have an aspect of confidentiality such as a weapon that is CONFIDENTIAL, their value should be recorded under 'A'. All arms, ammunition, and explosives are to be allocated the protective marking SECRET, unless such as in the case of nuclear weapons their value might be TOP SECRET. 3. Note 3 ­ Quantity. State only the approximate quantity e.g. for CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS ­ `200-250' or an IT system ­ '12 Terminals'. 4. Note 4 ­ Listing. State the register in which the assets are recorded if a record is held. In the case of SECRET or TOP SECRET protectively marked documents, equipment and material show `MOD Form 102' and relevant volumes. As CONFIDENTIAL and RESTRICTED are not recorded state `Not Recorded' for any such holdings. Likewise for Physical Assets, give the record if one is kept such as `Arms Register'. 5. Notes ­ Location. Give a very general statement of where the asset is normally held or worked upon e.g. for Arms ­ `Armoury' or RESTRICTED documents ­ `all buildings'. 6. Note 6 ­ Aggregate Value. If the compromise of the full collection of assets of a particular type would cause greater damage than the compromise of a single asset, state the aggregate value under the headings Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I) and Availability (A). For example, the compromise of the total holdings of SECRET documents might cause damage in confidentiality to the value of TOP SECRET. If the aggregation of items would not increase their compromise damage from that shown in the value column, enter the same protective markings as that of the Value column. 7. Note 7 ­ Threat Type/Level. Insert threat type e.g. Theft and level e.g. MODERATE. Guidance for threat levels can be found in Annexes C, D and E to Chapter 1. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Risk Management ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 3 RECORD FOR STEPS 1, 2 AND 3 OF RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS EXAMPLE Asset group/type Asset (Note 1) Value (Note 2) C Information Documents TOP SECRET SECRET S T S 2 12 MOD F102 Vol 1-4 40-60 C RESTRICTED R Not listed Equipment IT Systems Ptarmigan CASH UNICOM PCs C S R R C R R C C R R 5 Terminals 21 Terminals Physical Arms Small arms S 650-700 Arms Register Armoury S Theft/Low -"-"HQ+bldg 5 & 7 R R R 5 Sets 1 Terminal MOD F102 IT REGISTER Building 3 HQ building HQ building C S C R R C C R 500-600 Not listed Most buildings R MOD F102 Vol 1 Strong room (Strong room (2IC office (Int cell HQ building S Data Corruption/ Med T S S Espionage/Low Leaks/Med I A Quantity (Note 3) Listing (Note 4) Location (Note 5) Aggregate value (Note 6) C I A Threat type/level (Note 7) CONFIDENTIAL Theft/Med Support wpns S 25-30 Arms Register Trg S Ammunition Small bore S 250-270K Ammo Register Ammo Store S All natures S 6-7000 Ammo Store S Explosives PE S 10-12 lbs Ammo Register Explosives Store S Dangerous drugs Toxic substances Drugs None Funds - C R small £3-4K Explosives Register MO Register HQ Building Med Centre C R JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Asset group/type Asset (Note 1) Value (Note 2) C I A Quantity (Note 3) Listing (Note 4) Location (Note 5) Aggregate value (Note 6) C I A Threat type/level (Note 7) Public funds AFVs B Vehicles Operational effectiveness MT MT People MOD employees Individuals working in establishment 850-875 UNICOM C R C R 101 71 AB 562 sub-unit offices S Vehicle Park Vehicle Park C S C 2xMesses Accn blocks A&B Jnr Ranks Club Offices N/A Terrorism/Low N/A 250-275 Dependants Individuals living in establishment 30-50 Visitors Individuals visiting establishment Guardroom register UNICOM N/A JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Risk Management ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 3 UNIVERSAL BASELINE MEASURES 1. MOD organizations must comply with all relevant legislation including: a. b. c. All health and safety legislation. All fire acts. All relevant building acts. d. Any legislation concerned specifically with the safeguarding of information and assets. 2. MOD organizations are to comply with current counter terrorist guidelines, appropriate to the terrorist threat. 3. MOD organizations handling protectively marked information must adhere to interdepartmentally agreed technical standards where relevant, such as in computer and communications security. 4. MOD organizations are to take all reasonable steps to ensure that security considerations are taken into account in the design of information systems. 5. MOD organizations are to respect all international obligations to protect assets to a required level. 6. MOD organizations are to take reasonable steps to ensure that new buildings are designed to reach reasonable standards of security and that the same standards of security are achieved when existing buildings are adapted. (The appropriate British standards provide useful guidance). 7. MOD organizations are to ensure that all valuable assets are kept in environmentally suitable conditions. 8. MOD organizations are to ensure that all staff receive adequate education in the application and relevance of protective security measures and in their own protective security responsibilities in order to raise their level of awareness of the importance of security issues. 9. MOD organizations releasing protected assets outside Government service must ensure that the assets concerned are at no greater risk than if they were being JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security held by a Government department or agency. The conditions necessary to satisfy this requirement must form part of a contract or be included in a legally binding confidentiality agreement. 10. MOD organizations are to ensure that those handling protected assets are made aware of the level of protection required. Usually this will be by marking the asset but sometimes this may not be possible. Where protected assets are released outside Government service, holders must also be given guidance about how to achieve the required level of protection. 11. MOD organizations are to consider the need for a contingency plan in the event of an emergency. 12. MOD organizations are to ensure that people are accommodated and work in conditions which protect them from any likely threat. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 3C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents CHAPTER 4 CONTROL AND CARRIAGE OF PROTECTED DOCUMENTS Chapter 04 Para Control and carriage of protected documents Section I. Control of documents General Preparation of protectively marked documents Copy numbering of reproduced documents Security warning notice Authorization for typing and/or reproduction of protectively marked documents Registration and filing Recording location, movement and disposal of protected documents Maintenance of files/folders and other covers containing protectively marked documents Production/reproduction of TOP SECRET and SECRET documents Security of user-held copiers JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-1 04001 04003 04007 04008 Page 04009 04011 04013 04022 04023 04029 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Safe custody of material used in the production or reproduction of protected documents Destruction Disposal of unwanted documents Downgrading of information Methods of destruction Kraft paper sacks for burning/pulping protected waste Spot checks Musters Section II. Transmission of protected documents Baseline measure General Files Packaging Methods of transmission Approved methods of transmission Restrictions on display of national caveats on envelopes Use of window, transit and self-sealing envelopes Sealing - general High security tape JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-2 04056 04057 04059 04060 04061 04062 04063 04064 04065 04066 04033 04034 04035 04040 04041 04042 04044 04055 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Keepsafe security envelopes Approved security seals and ties Receipting Opening and examination of envelopes, packages, bags, etc Boxes, pouches, etc Despatch of protected documents to private addresses in Great Britain Despatch of other mail to private addresses in Great Britain Addressing of mail to private addresses (including civilian firms) in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland Transmission of mail to addresses overseas via diplomatic bag Transmission of mail to British Forces Post Office (BFPO) addresses Transmission of mail to foreign governments and foreign-based defence contractors Despatch of protectively marked documents to UK defence contractors Transmission of mail to private addresses overseas Transmission of mail to HM Ships JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-3 04070 04077 04078 04083 04087 04093 04095 04096 04097 04101 04102 04105 04106 04107 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Transmission of cabinet and ministerial committee documents Section III. Removal of protected material from official premises Introduction Removal for return or delivery within the same working day Removal for retention outside official premises for one or more nights Authorization - review of MODF924 Carriage of official documents by officials travelling within GB or Northern Ireland Carriage of official documents by officials travelling overseas Carriage of protectively marked documents to non-NATO countries by casual couriers possessing diplomatic immunity conferred by the FCO Carriage of protectively marked documents to NATO countries by casual couriers not possessing diplomatic immunity Precautions against hijacking 04108 04109 04111 04112 04114 04115 04123 04129 04134 04146 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Carriage of protectively marked material overseas by Service personnel as Casual Couriers during emergency operations Countries with special security risks Return to the UK Removal of protectively marked documents between official premises during office relocation Homeworking Section IV. Special markings Special Markings Annex A. Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Annex B. Appendix 1 Annex C. Appendix 1. Appendix 2. Appendix 3. Example MOD F 672 Example of MOD F 171 Example of MOD F 924 Office security check sheet Specimen spot check report Transmission of protected documents. 04149 04152 04155 04156 04158 04161 4A-1 4A1-1 4A2-1 4B-1 4B1-1 4C-1 4C1-1 4C2-1 4C3-1 Transmission of TOP SECRET documents Transmission of SECRET documents Transmission of CONFIDENTIAL documents JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Appendix 4. Appendix 5. Appendix 6. Appendix 7. Transmission of RESTRICTED documents Sealing of envelopes with high security tape Specimen despatch note Transmission of documents bearing descriptors and restrictive markings Methods of transmission within and from UK - summary Specimen form of application to take documents marked CONFIDENTIAL or above overseas MOD casual courier certificate Instructions to officers on the personal carriage of protectively marked documents overseas Instructions to officers on the personal carriage of protectively marked documents overseas - certificate Guidelines to couriers in regard to hijacking Descriptors Codewords and nicknames International defence organisations (IDO) and international organisations Security instructions for homeworkers Casual couriers ­ prohibited items 4C4-1 4C5-1 4C6-1 4C7-1 4D-1 Annex D. Annex E. 4E-1 4F-1 Annex F. Annex G. 4G-1 Annex H. 4H-1 4I-1 4J-1 4K-1 4L-1 4M-1 4N-1 Annex I. Annex J. Annex K. Annex L. Annex M. Annex N JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents CHAPTER 4 CONTROL AND CARRIAGE OF PROTECTED DOCUMENTS SECTION I CONTROL OF DOCUMENTS General 04001. Universal baseline measures. measures: The following are universal baseline a. Protectively marked documents must be produced, handled and reproduced only by persons with authorized access to the information they contain. Care must be taken to apply the "need to know" principle in the preparation, processing and distribution of protectively marked material. It is particularly important that copies are to be limited to those persons with a "need to know". b. The protective marking on any asset must be conspicuous so that its value is readily apparent. c. The protective marking is given to an asset by the originator and it may not be changed without the originator's authority. This applies equally to UK assets and those originating from foreign governments or organisations. d. Assets sent overseas to UK posts, foreign governments, or other organisations are to be protected in accordance with the originator's marking and, additionally, care must be taken where appropriate to protect it from disclosure under any freedom of information (FOI) legislation by the use of national caveats and other special handling instructions. e. Assets received from overseas posts, foreign governments or other organisations must also be protected in accordance with the originator's marking. f. No "originator's copy" of a protectively marked document in any media may be destroyed unless it has been determined by the Desk Officer that it has no historical or research value (JSP 441 - The Defence Records Management Manual refers). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Note: Physical protective measures for documents, including those in transit and at temporary locations, are referred to in this Chapter but are given in more detail in Chapter 5. 04002. Responsibilities of heads of establishment(HOE). for: HOE are responsible a. Ensuring effective supervision when protected documents are being handled. b. The correct creation, reproduction (by whatever means and in whatever form), receipt, despatch or disposal of such documents and their control. c. Ensuring that, where called for by these regulations, such documentation is correctly recorded in protected document registers (PDR)(MOD F 102, or equivalent). Preparation of protectively marked documents 04003. General. The protection to be afforded to a document is to be indicated by a series of markings which conveys how that document is to be handled. The agreed order of markings is: PROTECTIVE MARKING/DESCRIPTOR/STRAP VALUE/CODEWORD/NATIONAL CAVEAT. Such markings are to be centred and placed at the top and bottom of each page. They should be in larger or bolder print or stamped. Overstamping is not required. The following regulations apply to all protectively marked documents. Additional requirements generated by special rules, eg Caveats, will be dealt with in the appropriate sections of this manual. The creation and distribution of TOP SECRET and SECRET information on IT systems may differ from the procedures for paper based documents and is covered in detail in JSP 440 Vol 3. 04004. Baseline measure. The following are baseline measures: a. Each SECRET and TOP SECRET document is to bear the title of the originating office, a reference number and date of origin. Any protectively marked documents issued in a series are to be serially numbered. b. All TOP SECRET, TOP SECRET (CODEWORD or CAVEAT) documents and SECRET publications are to be copy numbered. Where appropriate, copy numbering is to be done at once. c. Each page of a SECRET or TOP SECRET document is to be numbered. Each SECRET or TOP SECRET appendix or annex is to be page numbered in a separate series. (Although not a Baseline measure it is best practice to show the total number of protectively marked pages at the front of a document). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents d. It is best practise that any protectively marked document that is likely to be amended is to include an amendment record sheet in the format shown in Fig 1. AL No and Authority Date Fig 1 Amendment Sheet e. Originators of multi-page documents, whose overall protective marking is SECRET and above, should, where possible, show the protective marking for each individual paragraph. The protective marking should be shown at the end of each paragraph using the first letter of the appropriate marking eg (R), (C), (S) or (TS). Caveats, descriptors etc that are also applicable to individual paragraphs are to written in full eg (C-UK EYES ONLY), (S-STAFF) etc. 04005. Responsibilities. Those originating or authorizing the production of protectively marked documents, or authorizing subsequent reproduction or printing, are responsible for ensuring the maintenance of proper security during those processes. Where originators consider document protection justifies tighter control, the words "No copy to be taken without reference to and agreement by [the originator]" should be included below the protective marking and descriptor/caveat/codeword. HOEs/ COs/Directors shall delegate authorization for the production or reproduction of protectively marked documents to those persons within their organisation whom they deem to be sufficiently experienced and reliable to ensure that adequate control of security procedures is maintained. 04006. Originators of protectively marked documents which are issued against standard distribution lists must ensure: a. b. c. All addressees have a continuing need to know. All addressees have been correctly identified. The above should be achieved by periodic review - at least once a year. Date Insertion of By Whom Independent Amended Checker d. TOP SECRET documents are never to be issued on a standard distribution list. Copy numbering of reproduced documents 04007. Reproduced copies of all TOP SECRET documents, and SECRET documents bearing copy numbers, are to be marked: "Reproduction copy No.... of ....". JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Establishments authorizing reproduction are responsible for adding numbers to individual copies provided by a reprographics pool or using in-house facilities: they are also responsible for ensuring that original documents and copies taken are accounted for in accordance with the relevant regulations (see separate instructions for IDO material). Security warning notice 04008. A security warning notice is to be placed on all manuals, works of reference or sets of instructions, etc (but not on correspondence) marked RESTRICTED and above and reading as follows: "THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT, and is issued for the information of such persons only as need to know its contents in the course of their official duties. Any person finding this document should hand it to a British forces unit or to a police station for its safe return to the MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, (DDefSy), ST GILES COURT, 1-13 ST GILES HIGH STREET, LONDON WC2H 8LD with particulars of how and where found. THE UNAUTHORIZED RETENTION OR DESTRUCTION OF THE DOCUMENT MAY BE AN OFFENCE UNDER THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS OF 1911-89. (When released to persons outside Government service, this document is issued on a personal basis and the recipient to whom it is entrusted in confidence, within the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts 1911-89, is personally responsible for its safe custody and for seeing that its contents are disclosed only to authorized persons)." Authorization for reproduction of protectively marked documents 04009. Documents marked SECRET or above which are to be typed or reproduced require a full audit trail, this can be achieved by the use as appropriate of MOD F 72, MOD F 24 or MOD F 102. The authority for reproduction must be signed by officers with the appropriate delegated authority. Originator's approval must be obtained before reproduction of TOP SECRET or copy-numbered SECRET publications. Copies produced are to be numbered in accordance with the relevant regulations. 04010. If MOD F 72 is being used, Part A of the completed form will be returned with the completed work for retention with its duplicate for at least five years. Parts B and C (as appropriate) will be retained for six months by the typing and/or reproduction pool with the record of work done. Registration and filing 04011. Baseline measure. All TOP SECRET and SECRET documents and files need to be registered and placed as soon as possible in serially numbered files or containers. The movement of SECRET and TOP SECRET material whether JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents internal, incoming or outgoing to a department or agency, must be recorded. 04012. Documents protectively marked SECRET or above must: a. Be traceable at all times. b. Be handled by as few people as possible and access to them restricted to personnel having a need to know. c. Have the number of copies produced, in whatever medium: (1) Recorded (see para 04013). (2) Kept to the absolute minimum. (3) Be segregated from unclassified material where this is practical. Recording location, movement and disposal of protected documents 04013. Recording protected documents. A record is to be kept of the creation, reproduction, receipt, despatch, movements or disposal of all documents marked SECRET or above: a. Records are to be kept in protected document registers (PDR) (MOD F 102 or equivalent) maintained in establishments. b. Where convenient, PDRs can be kept in private offices and in any branch or section separate from the parent organisation. In this event, PDRs are to be registered with the parent Registry custodian so that the necessary independent checks of protectively marked material required in paras 04044 -04054 are comprehensively carried out. c. All incoming documents with receipts attached must be page checked before receipt is acknowledged. d. Dispensation for not recording documents. In very exceptional cases, where large quantities of protected documents are held or worked upon and where managers could achieve significant savings by establishing secure zones within which the recording of protected documents could be abandoned, a request for dispensation for not recording documents may be submitted to the appropriate Principal Security Adviser for consideration. The request for dispensation should include a full description of physical and procedural compensating measures, either in place or proposed, which would ensure the continued security of the documents to the appropriate standard. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 04014. PDRs (MOD F 102) are to show by date of registration: a. The appointment of the originator/sender, the date of origin, reference, copy number (if any), title (or subject) and protective marking of the document. b. If the item is retained within the area served by the registration point, "final disposal" details must give the reference of the file, folder, filing box or library together with the enclosure/folio number. c. Particulars of receipts (MOD F 24, etc) and, if appropriate, details of destruction, are also to be shown. d. The temporary location of a loose document marked SECRET or above circulated within an organisation (under cover of a document location slip [MOD F 1 or equivalent]) prior to filing must be shown in the PDR with the appointment or name of the officer currently holding it. e. PDR entries must be completed at the earliest possible opportunity by recording the final disposal of documents. 04015. Regular, efficient inspections of PDRs constitute a principle safeguard of document security. They identify inaccuracies, omissions or outstanding items in good time for them to be rectified: a. PDRs are to be inspected by a nominated supervising officer at least once a month to ensure that they are being maintained correctly. (1) The front page of the PDR provides space for the supervising officer to be identified and record the inspections. (2) In establishments where details of protected documents are recorded/retained on computer systems, similar checks are required to ensure completeness of the entries through the production of monthly printouts. Supervising officers should record their inspection separately. b. PDRs are also to be subject to periodic spot checks under local arrangements. PDRs are not considered "closed" until final disposal details are included for all entries and, where appropriate, receipts obtained for documents. In Service establishments, PDRs are not considered to be "closed" until all entries have been "red-lined" indicating the destruction or downgrading of the document or its transfer to another register. Closed PDRs must be retained by the registry for at least five years. 04016. Filing protected documents. All protectively marked papers are to be placed on files with the minimum of delay. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-12 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents a. Protectively marked documents which require to be circulated (eg as float copies) should be enclosed in suitably marked colour-coded folders appropriate to the contents. b. Such documents should not be retained by officers until they have been correctly and permanently filed. c. Files containing protectively marked documents not currently in action should be returned to, and held in, the appropriate registry. d. Should any enclosure/folio be removed temporarily from a file, a note is to be placed on the file identifying the document by its reference, date, originator and subject and giving details of its temporary location. e. Enclosure/folio numbers and particulars of all TOP SECRET and SECRET documents (together with details of any protectively marked attachment, annex etc) are to be recorded on an enclosure/folio sheet placed inside the front of the file cover. MOD F 672 has been designed for this purpose. An example is at Annex A. 04017. All documents marked SECRET or above which cannot be placed on a file because of size or the nature of the material (eg books, computer tapes, films and transparencies) are to be: a. Traceable through PDR entries or RN CB Form R. b. Either placed inside numbered, or otherwise identifiable, folders, filing boxes or library bearing the appropriate protective marking or, if this is impracticable, should themselves be marked with an identifier which corresponds to the entry in the final disposal column of the PDR. c. Housed in a security container of appropriate standard. 04018. Spare copies. Spare copies of protectively marked documents, including float and book copies, require as much protection as the originals and should be kept to a minimum. The requirement for the spare copies is to be reviewed not less frequently than once a quarter with a view to destruction. Spare copies are not to be made of TOP SECRET documents. 04019. Amendments to protected documents are to be incorporated into the document by authorised personnel as soon as possible after receipt. It is of vital importance that extreme care is taken when amending protected documents of looseleaf format. It is best practise that the following checks are carried out: a. On receipt of an amendment, it is to be checked for completeness before it is incorporated in the document it relates to; JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. After incorporation of the amendment, the person who has made the amendment should: (1) Check the document against the list of effective pages (LEP). (2) Check that, if any pages have been extracted, they tally with the instructions accompanying the amendment. (3) Before any extracted pages are destroyed, hand over the documents to an authorised person for checking. (4) The extracted pages may then be destroyed as required, either in accordance with the amendment instructions, or, as detailed at paras 04034 - 04043. 04020. Personal retention of documents. The personal retention of documents marked SECRET and above at official premises by individuals on a semi-permanent or personal basis is to be discouraged but, where it is unavoidable: a. A list of documents is to be made, kept up to date, and a copy lodged with the registry. The holding official will sign the list held by the registry to the effect that he/she assumes responsibility for the documents. b. The documents will be subject to spot checks and regularly reviewed, first for the need to retain them and secondly, for disposal or destruction as appropriate. c. TOP SECRET documents are to be mustered as required by para 04048 and before the individual relinquishes his/her appointment. 04021. Documents associated with information technology (IT). Information on the marking, recording and storage of documents associated with IT is set out in DMS Vol 3. Maintenance of files/folders and other covers containing protectively marked documents 04022. Security colour codes. Files, folders and other covers are to be marked to show the protective marking of the contents and should be of the appropriate colour as follows: a. b. c. d. TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED 4-14 RED PINK GREEN BUFF JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Production/reproduction of TOP SECRET and SECRET documents 04023. Baseline measure. All originals of TOP SECRET documents must be numbered. If a recipient needs to make copies, his/her original document should be annotated with the number of copies made. 04024. Authorization. Requests for production/reproduction are to be authorized in accordance with para 04005 above. Where work to be done entails the production of printing blocks, eg for diagrams or illustrations, originators must state, at the ordering stage, the protective marking of the diagram, etc, in isolation. Appropriate security measures should then be taken by those responsible for initiating block manufacture. 04025. Typing sections/reprographic pools. The following basic principles are to be observed in typing sections/reprographic pools etc: a. The receipt and despatch of TOP SECRET and SECRET work is to be recorded. Where work to be done involves a series of processes, progress from stage to stage is also to be recorded. Records are to be checked frequently, causes of delay being investigated to confirm that documents have not been vulnerable to compromise. b. Supervisors must ensure that all spoiled or rejected copies are destroyed immediately. When not in use, contact material for typewriters, photocopiers, etc (including inked ribbons, paper, negatives, etc), byproducts and pieces of equipment retaining images of documents processed, must be locked away in a container that provides protection commensurate with the protective marking of the information contained therein. c. Protected waste is to be collected together for removal at least once a day; where this is impossible, collected waste should be locked away by the supervisor in a security container appropriate to its highest protective marking. 04026. Shorthand writers. When requests are made for the services of a shorthand writer, the security grading of the work is to be stated so that appropriate security safeguards may be applied. The following principles are to be observed: a. Controllers of typists are to issue instructions to typing sections regarding the control of shorthand notebooks used to take down information marked SECRET and above in shorthand. b. Such information is to be recorded in shorthand notebooks that clearly show the protective marking of the information contained therein and with serially numbered pages. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-15 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c. The protection afforded shorthand notebooks must be commensurate with that required for the appropriate level of protective marking. 04027. Audio typing. Audio tapes received by typing sections for the production of protected work should be safeguarded at all times according to the highest protective marking ever recorded on the tape. 04028. Security instructions. Detailed security instructions reflecting the above paras are to be issued to staff by supervisors of typing sections and reprographics installations, etc. Security of user-held copiers 04029. General. The following paras outline requirements for the control of office machines commonly identified as "photocopiers". Similar safeguards should be applied to other facilities capable of reproducing copies of documents in any form, including viewfoil producing equipment, facsimile terminals, microform equipment, "flipchart" copiers (as used for presentations), computer based image capture devices, etc. (See Chapter 5 Section XV for the detailed physical security measures to be applied to photocopiers.) 04030. Conditions for the installation and use of copying facilities. Where centralised facilities are not available, or are unsuitable, eg for work on specially sensitive or abnormal material, local copying facilities may be provided within Establishments. The following conditions are to be observed: a. Establishment security officers should always be consulted when considering the introduction of user-held copiers. Such facilities require control to prevent abuse; eg unofficial work or the unauthorized copying of protectively marked documents, and should be supervised at all times. The following requirements should be met: (1) Photocopiers should only be sited in a supervised environment (ie in an occupied room) or in a separate room to which access is controlled (eg via a simplex lock or swipe card mechanism). (2) Use of a branch/unit photocopier should be restricted to the members of that branch/unit unless formal arrangements and authorities are organised to provide reassurance that the security controls are not being abused. (3) Only the copying of documents marked SECRET and above need be recorded in a PDR, supported, if required, by the completion of MOD F 72 or other authorization. (4) Must be locked at the end of each working day/power supply disconnected and secured. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-16 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents 04031. Where copiers are under the control of supervisors or their deputies, the following procedure must be followed: a. All staff intending to take copies by operating the machine must ensure that the appropriate authority (MOD F 72 or equivalent) has been raised before SECRET and above documents are copied. b. Supervisors or their deputies are to carry out spot checks of documents being copied, paying particular attention to protective markings. Any misuse should be investigated immediately. All irregularities should be reported to the Establishment security staff should it appear that protected documents may have been copied without authorization. 04032. Where user-held copiers, and copiers in centralised facilities which are available to other staff, are controlled by automated devices, separate security instructions will need to be promulgated. Advice should be sought from security staff or security units. Safe custody of material used in the production or reproduction of protected documents 04033. The following document security requirements should be observed: a. Cylinders, discs, tapes and wires, shorthand notebooks, braille tapes, stencils and carbon papers, etc, used to record protected material are to be safeguarded as protected documents. Carbon paper and stencils, etc, which are not likely to be re-used are to be treated as protected waste. b. Printer and other inked ribbons and correction tapes (eg acetate, paper, thermal transfer and carbon ribbons) which have been used for protected work must be kept in an appropriate security container when not in use and eventually disposed of as protected waste. All typewriter ribbons, etc, should be removed from equipment before it is allowed to leave official premises for repair. Destruction 04034. Baseline measure. Documents which are no longer in use and for which there is no longer any adminstrative need, or which are considered unsuitable for consideration for permanent preservation ­ guidance on the criteria and where to forward relevant material is given in JSP 441 ­ may be destroyed. Destruction to be undertaken by the originator, successor, or a person duly authorised within the holding department. A record of SECRET and TOP SECRET documents should be made which includes the date of destruction and authorisation. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-17 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Disposal of unwanted documents 04035. General. Establishments receiving copies of protectively marked documents in which they have no direct interest should arrange for their disposal in accordance with the following paragraphs. The originator should also be informed so that distribution of further documents can be curtailed. 04036. Documents which holders MUST NOT destroy. Unwanted documents in the following categories must be sent to the authority shown. Type of document UK ATOMIC documents, ATOMIC PRINCIPAL and CONIFER US ATOMIC documents Action including Return to the ATOMIC Control ATOMIC Officer/ATOMIC Liaison Officer in accordance with ACO 130 Return to the ATOMIC Control Officer (London) or UKAEA as appropriate in accordance with ACO 130 TOP SECRET IDO accountable documents Return to the International and all protectively marked ATOMAL Documents Registry (DIS Sy IDR) documents (1) Cabinet or other ministerial committee Return to the Secretary of State's papers, minutes of meetings or conclusions Private Office (Documents held on (whether protected or unclassified). charge from the Cabinet Office). (2) Extracts from minutes of Cabinet or Cabinet ministerial committees. Return to the Secretary of State's Note: (1) and (2) above do not apply to Private Office. Cabinet Office official committee documents. These may be destroyed by holders when no longer required. Accountable documents from Government departments and documents subject to special control other Return to the publications division or other other distributing agency 04037. Documents which holders may destroy. Unwanted documents other than those in categories included above may be destroyed and disposed of as protected waste in accordance with paras 04038 - 04043 below. 04038. Records of destruction. The destruction of documents marked SECRET or above must be recorded in accordance with the following guidelines: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-18 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents a. The final column of the PDR should be endorsed with the names and signatures of those certifying destruction of individual documents together with the date. b. Alternatively records may be made using MOD Forms 426 (destruction certificate). c. Destruction certificates should be kept for 5 years from the date of completion. d. Destruction of NATO accountable documents, ie those bearing COSMIC and/or ATOMAL markings, should be undertaken only by the International Documents Registry (DIS Sy IDR), who will retain COSMIC destruction certificates for 10 years from the date of completion. ATOMAL destruction certificates are to be retained indefinitely. e. The destruction of MOD Registered Files is to be certified on MOD Form 262F. 04039. Certification. The destruction of SECRET and TOP SECRET documents is to be witnessed and certified by two suitably vetted persons, one of whom must be an officer not lower in rank than Warrant Officer (or a Senior NCO nominated by the Commanding Officer), Administrative Officer or equivalent. The destruction/certification of documents marked CONFIDENTIAL, where recorded in a MOD F 102, may be undertaken by one authorised member of the Armed Forces or Civil Service. Downgrading of information 04040. The regular review of holdings of protectively marked documents in any media is desirable in terms of security, cost and convenience. Any review should consider whether the current grading needs to be retained or whether it is possible to downgrade or destroy the material. Only the originator, or successor, may authorize downgrading but exceptionally, where the originator, or successor, cannot be traced, copy documents may be downgraded by the holders after consultation with other addressees. MOD F 171 may be used to request and authorize downgrading. An example is at Appendix 1 to Annex A. Methods of destruction 04041. General. Protected waste is to be destroyed by machine shredding, pulverising, pulping or burning. Methods which enable protected material to be reduced to unclassified waste before leaving the building/site are preferred. All paper waste is to be destroyed by tearing into a minimum of four pieces and placing in an appropriate Kraft paper sack. Before destruction, magnetic media which has been used to store protected data should be wiped using a security-approved bulk eraser or, where possible, overwritten using an approved erasure programme. If media contains JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-19 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security information protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL or lower it may be disposed of or re-used as though it had never been graded provided an approved erasure package is used. Media which contained material marked SECRET or TOP SECRET may only by re-used if it will continue to attract the same or higher protective marking. If not, it must be destroyed or stored in accordance with approved measures. Detailed instructions are provided in Chapter 5, Section XVI. Kraft paper sacks for burning/pulping protected waste 04042. In MOD HQ buildings/sites, office keepers are responsible for overseeing the collection, control and safekeeping of sacks or protected waste until destroyed under MOD control or collected for destruction by HMSO. At DPA establishments, messenger services normally undertake these functions. Service Establishments have their own arrangements. Special kraft paper sacks are available from respective staffs for the disposal of protected waste. They are identified by HMSO code numbers as follows: a. b. Code 971-003 Multiwall printed in red for burning. Code 971-004 Multiwall printed in black for pulping. Sacks to be burnt under MOD arrangements are to be securely tied; sacks to be burnt or pulped under HMSO arrangements are to be sealed using a security approved tag or seal such as those issued by the Defence Courier Service. 04043. Messengers, etc, collecting sacks of unshredded waste protectively marked SECRET or above are to keep a permanent notebook record of the following details: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. Date of collection. Establishment providing waste. Number of sacks collected. Signature of officer handing over waste. Signature of officer receiving waste. Number of sacks sent for destruction. Date sent for destruction. Supervisors signature. Office keepers, etc, must inspect collection notebooks at intervals to ensure correctness of entries and make spot checks of bags to ensure that quantities in store tally with quantities recorded in the notebooks. Pending destruction, protected waste in sealed sacks is to be kept in secure storage or security containers appropriate to its protective marking. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-20 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Spot checks 04044. Baseline measure. Spot checks are intended to ensure that the document control system is adequate and functions correctly and that the rules are being observed by the staff. 04045. Checks. Checks of recorded protectively marked material are an essential part of the system for the physical protection of such material. The detailed requirement for checking is to be included in Establishment Security Standing Orders which must lay down: a. b. c. d. The material to be checked. The frequency with which the material is to be checked. The appointment of the person responsible for checking. The form of report to be submitted by the checking officer. e. The action to be taken in the event of losses or discrepancies being discovered. f. Any special requirements for documents subject to special handling procedures. 04046. Daily checks. There is to be an effective procedure for ensuring that protectively marked material is adequately protected out of working hours. The use of office check sheets (specimen at Annex B) should be considered, and a clear desk policy is recommended. 04047. Protectively marked material left on display. Where there is a requirement to do so, COs/HOEs may authorise the open display of UK RESTRICTED information, for example on notice boards, after taking account of the local security environment and the potential risk and consequences of disclosure to those who potentially have access (eg cleaners/guards). In certain MOD(HQ) buildings, because there will generally be a higher proportion of RESTRICTED information carrying special policy and other sensitivities, material of this level should not normally be left on open display. The guidance of local security organisations should be sought as necessary. Material graded UK CONFIDENTIAL and above may only be left on display in secure rooms of the appropriate standard to which only suitably cleared personnel have access. 04048. Checks by security and inspection teams. During all establishment protective security surveys and inspections, security personnel are to make a physical check of all aspects of the security of protectively marked documents. Irregularities in document procedures will be reflected in the resultant report. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-21 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 04049. Minimum standards for checks and musters. Checks and musters of documents marked SECRET and above are to be carried out to the following minimum standards: a. TOP SECRET (1) All incoming documents at TOP SECRET protective marking should be page by page mustered on first receipt and before returning the MOD Form 24. (2) On Handover of HOE (or equivalent in Headquarters) and TOP SECRET Control Officers (TSCOs). All TOP SECRET documents are to be mustered and checked against MOD Form 102, or F 6809 where used, the folio sheets of files (MOD F 672) and also checked page by page for presence and completeness; this is to include documents such as bulky publications not held on files. On handover of HOE (or equivalent) this should be done by an officer other than the TSCO or his deputy. (3) Annually. Musters and checks as at (1) above are to be carried out by a person other than the TSCO, Deputy TSCO or person having custody of the documents (unless a muster has been carried out within the last year on handover as at (1) above). (4) Monthly. Spot checks are to be carried out at unannounced random intervals of approximately one month, preferably when work starts or is about to stop, of a number of documents, eg six, selected from both current and open MOD Forms 102 or F 6809; a check that downgrading/weeding action has been carried out is to be included. A specimen Spot Check Report is at Appendix 1 to Annex B. (5) Daily. All TOP SECRET documents in use are to be recalled daily for centralized storage unless retained in accordance with para 04017. (6) During security surveys and inspections. Security survey and inspection teams are to inspect at least 20 documents and 10 files, or the establishment's total holdings, if less than these quantities. Although the majority of the documents and files inspected should be from those originated and received since the date of the last survey or inspection, a small proportion should be selected from before that date. The inspection is to include a check of all TOP SECRET documents which are stored separately (ie not within files). b. SECRET JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-22 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents (1) It is best practise that all incoming documents at SECRET protective marking should be page by page mustered on first receipt and before returning the MOD Form 24. (2) Annually. It is best practice, but not mandatory for all SECRET files to be mustered and checked against file lists; this is to include all SECRET documents not held in files. (3) Monthly. Spot checks as at sub-para a (4). Inspections of (4) During security surveys and inspections. SECRET documents and files as at sub-para a (6). Note: Additionally, the following TOP SECRET and SECRET documents are also subject to spot checks: a. Documents including any attachments circulated as loose papers to individual officers (ie without being placed on a file or folder), and which are still on their charge. b. c. Documents which are being typed or reproduced. Shorthand notebooks. d. Film, transparencies, slides, viewfoils, etc (checks including physical examination and comparison of content with listed holdings to guard against substitution). c. CONFIDENTIAL. It is best practice, but not mandatory, for CONFIDENTIAL files, bearing caveats for which access is controlled by induction or indoctrination and therefore require the contents to be accounted for in a MOD Form 102, to be mustered annually against the master file list. Such material, together with items not held in files, eg Books, Equipment and Magnetic Media, are to be subject to Spot Checks. 04050. Records of checks and musters. a. Records of checks and musters are to be kept by establishments for 2 years. These records are to show: (1) (2) The type of check or muster, with dates, carried out. The files and documents seen and by whom. (3) Details of any irregularities found and action taken to rectify them. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-23 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. Completion by Army units of the checks and musters at paras 04044 04049 is to be confirmed as part of the annual report on a unit (see AGAl paras 2091 to 2100). 04051. Microform. In order that the spot checking officer can verify that a jacketed fiche master copy is complete, a diazo copy, which cannot be tampered with, should be made for comparison purposes and should be replaced with a fresh copy whenever the master is amended. The silver halide master and the diazo copy must he stored separately. In addition, the following points affecting the integrity of microfilm should be noted: a. Aperture cards. As well as checking the microform against the register, it is desirable to check periodically that the correct image is in the card. b. Roll film. Check the container details against the register and periodically put the film on a reader to ensure that it is the correct film, that frame numbers are in sequence and the diazo film is free from splices. c. Jackets. Check periodically the contents of the film in the Jacket against the diazo duplicate to detect possible substitution of the film strip in the jacket. d. Microfiche. Check periodically that all fiche in sets are present and that no improper substitution has been made. 04052. The officer conducting a spot check is to report to the head of establishment or the nominated security officer. The report must contain the details as shown at Appendix 1 to Annex B. 04053. HOE should ensure that all irregularities noted in reports are resolved. Significant irregularities or any which cannot be resolved locally are to be reported to the appropriate Principal Security Adviser's staff who will notify DDefSy where appropriate. 04054. Reports are to be retained personally by the head of establishment or the nominated security officer and, to ensure that spot checks are completely random, are not to be made available to spot checking officers or to other members of the staff. The reports are to be made available to security inspectors during security surveys/inspections, investigations or advisory visits. Musters 04055. TOP SECRET files are to be mustered annually. Musters ensure that TOP SECRET files are not lost between the registry and areas served, a fact which would not be disclosed by the system of spot checks outlined above. Special rules exist for mustering ATOMIC and certain other documents on limited distribution. These are in no way invalidated by the procedures outlined above. Certain documents originated by JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-24 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents other Government departments and used within the Ministry of Defence may also be subject to mustering and accounting procedures. Accountable IDO documents will be mustered once every twelve months under arrangements made by DIS Sy (IDR). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-25 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security SECTION II TRANSMISSION OF PROTECTED DOCUMENTS Baseline measures 04056. Protective markings of SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL and RESTRICTED assets should not appear on the outer cover, packaging or container sent outside an establishment. The protection given to assets sent to or received from other countries must take into account any international agreements on the carriage of protectively marked assets. For TOP SECRET see Appendix 1 to Annex C. General 04057. Protectively marked documents are to be prepared for transmission in accordance with the instructions contained in Annex C and its Appendices; a. The instructions contained in this Chapter relate to protectively marked documents which do not bear supplementary restrictive markings (other than the simple prefixes "UK" denoting documents of UK origin and "NATO" or "WEU" identifying International Defence Organisation [IDO] documents). b. Procedures governing the transmission of documents bearing markings such as "ATOMIC" and "ATOMAL", etc, and documents subject to special handling arrangements, are issued separately to those with 'need to know'. c. Persons receiving documents bearing markings which are unfamiliar to them should consult their establishment security officer (ESyO). Note: Care must be taken when addressing letters, etc, and their envelopes/packaging, to ensure that details entered are clear, complete and correct; similarly include an address to which replies can be sent. Detailed instructions for preparing envelopes/packages containing protected material will be found at Annex C to this Chapter. Certain material must be addressed to the recipient by name. Mail for organisations listed in the MOD Directory should be addressed to branches, etc, identified by abbreviated titles. 04058. Officers receiving protected or sensitive documents which are not of their concern, are responsible for the items' onward despatch to the proper addressee or return to the originator. Appropriate safeguards, as laid down in this Chapter, must be applied. Where the consignor appears to be in breach of security regulations, the establishment security officer should be informed who will take reporting action as necessary. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-26 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Files 04059. When files bearing different protective markings are transmitted together, the file bearing the highest marking is to be placed topmost inside the envelope or wrapping. Files are to be securely fastened together and prepared for transmission in accordance with instructions appropriate for the highest protective marking. Packaging 04060. To reduce risk of loss or compromise during transmission, particular care is to be taken when packing protectively marked documents or material. For detailed advice on the correct way to package bulky/awkwardly shaped items, staff should contact their local mail room or consult JSP 367. However, the following points are to be considered: a. Selection of the correct envelopes/packaging commensurate with the weight and size of items for despatch is vital. b. Corners of stiff-covered documents can easily tear through envelopes or other wrappings. To prevent compromise due to torn packaging, staff should consider the use of "Jiffy" envelopes and "bubble wrap". c. Extra strength can be provided by applying cellulose or adhesive tape or by double wrapping (even though the latter may not be called for on security grounds*). d. Extra care must be taken when packing documents, etc, as parcels (even when sent by "Letter Post") will be subject to rough handling during sorting and transmission. e. If necessary, extra-strong envelopes are available to special order through CS(PS). Linen sacks may also be used for bulky consignments. *Where applicable (see Annex C), double cover must be provided irrespective of the type of packing or method of transmission. Methods of transmission 04061. Certain documents, identified by their protective marking and/or destination (see Annex C) must never be sent by Post Office services; a. It is mandatory for TOP SECRET and cryptographic material to be transmitted by hand to hand with the provision of auditable receipts at each transfer. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-27 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. External services (other than the Post Office) may only be used for transmission of material marked CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET where approved by DDefSy. Approved methods of transmission 04062. A number of mail services operate within/between MOD establishments and the Services. The British Forces Post Office carries mail between establishments/buildings in London and the Home Counties. (Details of locations served are published in JSP 367; see also Annex C, para 3). Other services operate between neighbouring establishments/sites under local arrangements. Annex D provides summary details of transmission. Restrictions on display of national caveats on envelopes 04063. National caveats must not be visible on any envelope in transit. Detailed instructions regarding the protection and transmission of such material are issued separately on a 'need to know' basis. The occasions when standard protective markings should be shown on envelopes are identified in Annex C and must be followed. Use of window, transit and self sealing envelopes 04064. Window, transit and self-sealing envelopes must not be used for the transmission of documents marked RESTRICTED or above. Sealing - general 04065. All envelopes, packages and sacks, etc, containing TOP SECRET material, and similar consignments of SECRET material for delivery abroad or in Northern Ireland, are to be sealed to guard against surreptitious tampering. The following paragraphs describe alternative methods to be employed. High security tape 04066. Red high security tape is no longer supplied by the Stationery Office. However existing stocks should continue to be used to exhaustion. It should be applied to envelopes containing material marked TOP SECRET, and to inner envelopes containing SECRET material intended for despatch to addresses abroad or in Northern Ireland. (Annex C, Appendix 1 and Section IV of Appendix 2 refers). Application of the tape is detailed in Appendix 5 to Annex C. 04067. High security tape is not suitable for use other than on envelopes; conventional wafer seals are to be applied to parcels and packages and metal seals to mail sacks, etc (see para 04077). 04068. Storage, maintenance and disposal of high security tape. The following should be observed: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-28 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents a. The tape should remain sealed in the polyethylene wrapping in which it is supplied until required for use. b. To avoid deterioration, high security tape should be stored away from direct sunlight and sources of heat, in a frost free environment without extremes of humidity or temperature (ie 30-60% relative humidity and 15-25 degrees centigrade) and should not be exposed to adverse conditions for extended periods. c. High security tape has a shelf-life of twelve months when stored under recommended conditions. Rolls of tape will be serially numbered during manufacture to facilitate sequential use and allow identification should this be necessary. d. Rolls, lengths and waste portions of high security tape, including any remaining on used envelopes, should be protected to RESTRICTED standards and kept under lock and key. Waste tape and used envelopes bearing high security tape should be treated as protected waste and disposed of in accordance with the relevant security regulations. 04068. Evidence of tampering. While use of high security tape on envelopes will deter surreptitious attack, staff should be alert to the possibility of tampering. Those receiving envelopes to which tape has been applied should look for the following: a. b. c. Colour run of tape. Damage to serrated edge of tape. Blurring of the tape underprinting. d. Evidence of underprinting remaining as green or blue image on envelope surface indicating the tape may have been repositioned. e. Evidence of slitting along flap or seam (indicated when flexing the envelope along its flap/seams shows the colour of the envelope through the tape). Where tampering is suspected, establishment security officers should be alerted. When opening the envelope, care must be taken to ensure that evidence is not disturbed. Reports of possible tampering should be forwarded through establishment security officers to security units together with the envelope. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-29 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 04069. Alternatives to high security tape. Until a suitable, economically acceptable alternative to the high security tape can be found, staff should select from the tape and seals detailed below which are suitable for sealing envelopes, packages, parcels and boxes and have been approved by SEAP. Your Principal Security Adviser's staff may be able to provide further advice, if required. Product Applied Holographics tamper-evident surface seals MARKITWISE surface seals (especially types: GR/2, MRP/2, S & Micro LA) GOSHERON tamperevident tape (polyester & polystyrene) GOSHERON surface seals (types: D201-A, D210-V, C222 & V223) Notes: 1. The level of security offered by these alternatives is less than was available from the red high security tape. Security Class Low/Medium Company Applied Holographics (Tel: 0191 4175434) Markitwise International (Tel: 01886 812427) Medium/High Medium John Gosheron & Co Ltd (Tel: 0181 847 3901) Low John Gosheron & Co Ltd (Tel: 0181 847 3901) 2. The Keepsafe envelope is still available and offers the security and a high level of integrity for the transmission of SECRET and TOP SECRET material. Keepsafe security envelopes 04070. Keepsafe security envelopes are approved for the transmission of TOP SECRET, SECRET and material requiring controlled distribution abroad, and of TOP SECRET material transmitted within the UK and Northern Ireland. 04071. The approved Keepsafe security envelopes are available in a range of sizes, are opaque and made from super strength plastic film. They incorporate a specialised closure system offering maximum evidence of tampering and other security features as follows: a. Each envelope is printed with a unique identification number located on the envelope, and on the closure and label flaps. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-30 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents b. The label flap has been added to enable addressees to affix labels to it when required because, for security reasons, labels must not be fixed to the main body of the envelope. c. The secure portion of the envelope is surrounded by a printed "chain", designed to provide evidence of tampering. 04072. Consignees should bear in mind that when sending material in Keepsafe security envelopes for onward transmission via a forwarding agent (eg the Defence Courier Service (DCS)) protective or other markings may be masked by overwrapping. Arrangements should therefore be made with such organisations to ensure that the material receives appropriate handling through all stages of its journey. 04073. Addressing and sealing. The following procedure should be followed when addressing and sealing Keepsafe security envelopes: a. When the receipt for the material to be transmitted is prepared, the unique serial number of the Keepsafe envelope should be included on the receipt. b. The main body of the Keepsafe envelope is marked and addressed in the same way as an envelope to be sealed with high security tape (Note: use ball point pen - do not use labels or stamps). c. Adhesive address labels must only be affixed to the special flap provided for such labels/stickers or stamps. When using such items, the envelope number on the flap must not be obscured. d. e. The material to be transmitted is placed in the Keepsafe envelope. The Keepsafe envelope is then sealed as follows: (1) On a flat surface remove the printer release tape from the special adhesive strip. (2) Allow the closure flap to fall naturally over the envelope mouth, and then press down on the adhesive strip so that the number of the envelope remains legible. The envelope is correctly sealed only when the printed release tape has been removed. Envelopes must not be patched until they have been correctly sealed. Special attention should be paid to sealing when the item to be transmitted is not flat; sharp edges or points should be masked. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-31 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security f. Where it is required that the Keepsafe envelope should be covered, it must be placed inside another opaque cover, addressed and sealed as appropriate (the cover need not be another Keepsafe envelope). 04074. Evidence of tampering. While the Keepsafe envelope will deter surreptitious attack, staff should be alert to the possibility of tampering. The following procedure for establishing whether an envelope has been tampered with may seem extensive, but evidence of tampering can be spotted at a glance when the process becomes familiar: a. Ensure the envelope's high security closure has been sealed. b. Examine the envelope's surfaces, which should be white, unbruised and with no visible cuts. c. Examine the four sections of "chain" printing surrounding the secure portion of the envelope; they should be straight, continuous and with complete chain printing on the front of the envelope. d. Ensure the number on the keepsafe envelope corresponds with that on the closure and label flap. e. Examine the specialised closure system: (1) There should be no blurring, distortion or disruption of any of the black lettering, numbers or sharp patterns. (2) The envelope is designed to have a narrow black strip at either end of the closure strip. (3) The red colour should be continuous; no change in colour should be present; look especially for black, white or yellow staining. (4) The closure must not have any added reinforcing (eg cellulose tape). Where tampering is suspected, establishment security officers are to be alerted. Advice on the enquiries required by the establishment security officer may be obtained from security staffs. 04075. Storage. Keepsafe envelopes: a. Should be stored in cool, dark conditions, and in their original packaging until used. b. They should not be stored in excess heat or cold. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-32 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents c. It is important that they are not exposed to sources of ultraviolet radiation, such as strong sunlight or positioned close to fluorescent lamps. d. Under these conditions, the envelopes should have a shelf-life of at least 12 months. e. The envelopes should be kept in lockable containers to prevent unauthorized access. f. Once used, those Keepsafe envelopes bearing markings which themselves are protected (eg CODEWORDS) should be treated as protected waste and disposed of in accordance with the relevant security regulations. 04076. Procurement. Keepsafe security envelopes are available from two sources: a. HMSO, Bristol through normal channels. Contact point is as follows: HMSO, Bristol Distribution Park, Hawkley Drive, Woodlands Lane, Bradley Stoke, Bristol BS12 0BF. Customer enquiries: 01454 621 200. They are supplied as follows: HMSO Product Code 027-4000 027-4001 027-4002 027-4003 Dimensions Quantity per box 250 250 500 250 460x377mm + label flap(A3 Wide) 330x462mm + label flap(A3 Long) 280x385mm + label flap(A4) 195x285mm + label flap(A5) b. Trigon Cambridge Ltd. Contact point is as follows: Customer Service Department, Trigon Cambridge Ltd, Saxon Way, Melbourn, Royston, Herts SG8 6DN. Telephone 01763 261 900. They are supplied as follows: STOCK Code Dimensions HRDC A3W HRDC A3L HRDC A4E HRDC A5E 460x377mm + label flap(A3) 330x462mm + label flap(A3) 280x835mm + label flap(A4) 195x285mm + label flap(A5) Approved security seals and ties 04077. Where the item to be sealed is not contained in an envelope, security approved seals are to be used. Parcels and packages should have wafer seals applied along all seams at intervals not greater than 100mm. If the item is bulky it should be inserted in an appropriate sized mailbag (these can be supplied by the local mail room) and tied with an approved tie and sealed. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-33 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. Wafer seals are to bear a recognisable signature in ink, the signature being part on the seal and part on the wrapping; all seams and seals should be fully covered with strips of transparent cellulose tape. b. Bags and seals. Mail bags or sacks used for the transmission of bulky protectively marked items should be robust and not have any holes or patches on them. They should be tightly tied and sealed using approved security seals such as those provided by the DCS or supplied in the Catalogue of Security Equipment. Where an address label, ie self-addressed label or MOD Form 488, is used with wafer seals, the label should be stuck down first before applying any seals. Receipting 04078. Receipts are to be obtained confirming delivery of the following: a. TOP SECRET documents and material. b. SECRET documents transmitted outside a building/site (see Appendix 2 to Annex C). c. Other documents where transmission is subject to special handling instructions issued on a 'need to know' basis or where the originator requires confirmation of delivery. In addition to receipts completed by the addressee, MOD Forms 32 (providing a record of hand-to-hand transmission with date/time of despatch/receipt) are to be used when envelopes, packages, boxes, etc, containing TOP SECRET material are carried between establishments. 04079. Receipts rendered in accordance with para 04078 above may be standard MOD Forms 24 or specially prepared proformae, eg produced as a tear-off strip on a distribution sheet. In either case, the receipt should identify the following: a. The consignor's address - to which the receipt is to be returned. b. Details of the document transmitted - typically reference number and date plus copy number (if any); the document title should not be shown. c. Details confirming receipt of the subject document - the signature, name (in block letters) and official address (branch stamp, etc) of the individual opening the envelope or package. 04080. Receipts are to be completed and returned to the consignor immediately following delivery of the subject envelope, etc. They should normally be completed by registry staff immediately prior to making PDR entries. Where envelopes, etc, are addressed "Exclusive to..." and delivered to individual officers, those officers should JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-34 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents complete any receipt enclosed before arranging for PDR entries to be made. See also sub para 04013(c). 04081. HOE are responsible for ensuring that receipts against items despatched from their areas are returned promptly - within the time normally taken for transmission over the route concerned (eg 10 working days for transmission within the United Kingdom). Failure to respond quickly can result in detection of loss and compromise of sensitive material being seriously delayed. Consignors who identify addressees who persistently fail to return receipts promptly should report the matter to the establishment security officer. 04082. Completed receipts, other than those relating to accountable documents (see Definitions) for which separate instructions apply, are to be retained for two years. Opening and examination of envelopes, packages, bags, etc 04083. A local record is to be maintained of officers authorized by HOE to open TOP SECRET envelopes, etc. 04084. If the person opening an envelope or package containing material marked SECRET or above suspects that it has been tampered with, the head of establishment, via his security representative, should be informed. The latter should consult the respective security staffs as necessary. The documents concerned and related envelopes, etc, should be set aside and handled by the minimum number of other persons in case forensic examination is required. 04085. Before envelopes, mailbags and other containers used in the transmission of protectively marked or sensitive material are discarded, they should be carefully checked to ensure that they are empty. 04086. No unopened mail is to be left out on display in empty offices or registries. All unopened mail is to be locked away in an approved combination lock security container. Boxes, pouches, etc 04087. A locked box or pouch is acceptable as outer cover to an envelope or package containing a protectively marked document which would otherwise be transmitted 'double enveloped' (see Annex C). They should normally be used for transmission between a central controlling organisation, eg a registry, and another permanent address, keys being held by both. 04088. Boxes, etc should be addressed to a key-holder, by appointment or name and appointment. Where delivery of a box, etc, containing protectively marked material to a minister, etc, is not practicable using normal methods of transmission (eg MOD van service, car or courier), the appropriate Principal Security Adviser's staff should be consulted. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-35 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 04089. Where boxes, etc, are used to transmit a number of documents to a distribution point, eg a mail room, consignors must place documents in envelopes addressed to individual recipients so that 'need to know' is maintained after the box, etc, has been opened. 04090. Empty containers are to be returned to the controlling organisation without delay. Boxes, etc must not be used by recipients to send protectively marked documents, etc, to addressees other than the controlling organisation. Controlling organisations are to record the movement of their boxes, etc, and investigate where any are not returned within six working days. 04091. The security of a suite of boxes, etc, may be compromised by loss of a key or when an unauthorized person has the opportunity to examine the lock. When not in use, they are to be kept locked and stored under lock and key. When delayed in transit, boxes, etc, are to be stored in a security container. 04092. When not in use, keys to boxes, etc, should be kept in a locked security container. Boxes, etc, and their keys are to be mustered twice a year by the controlling organiser. Key holders are personally responsible for the safety of keys in their charge. Before handing-over official responsibilities, including handover to cover temporary absence, keys are to be formally mustered and transferred to another officer. Any changes in holders of boxes, keys, etc, are to be reported to the controlling organisation immediately. Despatch of protectively marked documents to private addresses in Great Britain 04093. Documents marked CONFIDENTIAL or above are not normally to be sent to private addresses. When this is unavoidable, or where officials or consultants are authorized to work at home, the following rules are to be observed: a. TOP SECRET documents are not to be sent without specific approval by PUS. Where approved, documents must be conveyed by hand of an authorized courier. b. TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL documents are not to be sent to addresses where: (1) A foreign domestic servant is known to be employed; or (2) Where there is no container of appropriate standard in which to keep them. c. The consignor is to contact the addressee and obtain confirmation that: (1) The provisions in sub-para 'b' are satisfied; and JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-36 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents (2) The addressee will be on hand to receive the documents. d. Subject to the conditions at sub-paras 'a' to 'c' above, protectively marked documents should be despatched in accordance with the procedures at Annex C. If the addressee is likely to be away from the address to which protectively marked documents are about to be sent, they must not be despatched. Note : Where TOP SECRET or other documents are to be sent by courier, the addressee must be warned that he/she must receive them in person, producing identification to the courier's satisfaction before the documents can be handed over. 04094. If the intended recipient has no security container of appropriate standard in which to store documents, they are to be despatched to the security officer of the nearest MOD/Navy/Army/Air Force establishment. The consignor is to: a. Instruct the establishment to hold the documents in a sealed envelope for the intended recipient to see (but not to remove from the establishment or retain); and b. To inform the intended recipient where the documents may be seen. The intended recipient is also to be informed that, after examination, the documents must be replaced and resealed in an envelope for return to the consignor via the holding HQ/Unit or, if needed for future reference, for retention by the latter. Despatch of other mail to private addresses in Great Britain 04095. Where RESTRICTED or UNCLASSIFIED correspondence has to be sent to a private address, care must be taken to ensure that no wording or marking can connect the addressee with the department. In the case of correspondence to be sent to exService personnel, the use of their former Service ranks and decorations is to be avoided unless they specifically instruct otherwise. Addressing of mail to private addresses (including civilian firms) in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 04096. The personal security of Service personnel, civilians and their families and exService personnel resident in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland can be compromised by incorrect transmission of official mail to private addresses (including civilian firms). Material marked CONFIDENTIAL or above must never be sent to a private address in Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland. The following rules must be observed when transmitting (including redirecting) RESTRICTED or UNCLASSIFIED mail: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-37 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. RESTRICTED and UNCLASSIFIED mail is normally to be addressed via a Service establishment identified by BFPO number (except for mail to the British Embassy in Dublin ­ see sub-para 04096b below.). b. Where, in exceptional circumstances, correspondence has to be sent to a private address (as is the case for all such mail to the British Embassy in Dublin) the following rules must be observed: (1) Use a plain envelope or wrapping without pre-printed official markings such as "On Her Majesty's Service" or MOD Form numbers. (2) Address carefully and correctly, including the post code, ensuring no reference to rank, decorations or appointment is shown on the envelope. (3) Do not stamp the envelope with any official stamp or add any detail which could associate the item with the Ministry of Defence. (4) Postage stamps must be used in all cases, do not use franking machines or PPI impressions, labels or stickers. (5) No return address is to be shown on the envelope that indicates that the sender is associated with the MOD or Services. PO Box 701 is not to be used as a return address. (6) Parcels to the Republic of Ireland must have a customs pack affixed - Post Office Form PFU 5 (not a Service type customs form). Transmission of mail to addresses overseas via diplomatic bag 04097. All TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL mail for despatch to addresses outside the United Kingdom must be sent by diplomatic bag or an approved courier service. Despatch procedures, described in Annex C, should be read in conjunction with the following guidance. 04098. RESTRICTED and UNCLASSIFIED mail (other than unclassified publicity and information material) addressed to British Embassies or consulates in countries presenting a special security risk (see para 6 of Annex C) must be sent by diplomatic bag. RESTRICTED and UNCLASSIFIED mail for other overseas addresses may be sent through normal postal services, including (for BFPO numbered addresses) the British Forces Postal Service. 04099. The envelopes/wrappings of all mail to be sent by diplomatic bag (including UNCLASSIFIED which must be so marked) are to be marked "Certified Official" and endorsed by a service officer or civilian of at least executive officer grade or equivalent. However COs/HOEs may in exceptional circumstances nominate suitable SNCOs or AOs to complete the task. In addition: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-38 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents a. The protective marking (or UNCLASSIFIED) should be stamped boldly in red above and below the address. b. The despatching organisation and the reference and date of origin of the document enclosed should also be shown. c. Envelopes/packages prepared in this way are then to be sent in a second envelope to HQ DCS, BFPO 747 or LCT, BFPO 1000 in accordance with Annex C. 04100. Private mail for Service personnel and Defence Attaches serving in diplomatic posts in countries of special security interest (see para 6 of Annex C) should be sent c/o Private Letter Section, F&CO, via HQ DCS, BFPO 747. Transmission of mail to British Forces Post Office (BFPO) addresses 04101. Mail for diplomatic and Service posts, including HM Ships and international organisations should include a BFPO number in the address, where one is in use. Details of BFPO addresses are published in JSP 367. Transmission of mail to foreign governments and foreign-based defence contractors 04102. Documents marked SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL and RESTRICTED for despatch to foreign governments or foreign-based defence contractors must be prepared in accordance with procedures detailed at Annex C. 04103. The 'despatching authority' must ensure that the originator has approved release of their UK marked information to the recipient country. Where there is any doubt, the appropriate Principal Security Adviser should also be consulted. Where the intended recipient is a foreign-based defence contractor, the despatching authority must also consult InfoSy(Industry)1 to ensure that the recipient company is authorized to safeguard and store protectively marked material at the appropriate level. 04104. Mail received from UK defence contractors for onward transmission overseas is only to be released in accordance with the rules contained in Chapter 11. Despatch of protectively marked documents to UK defence contractors 04105. Documents marked CONFIDENTIAL or above which are to be sent to List X companies must be addressed via the site security officer - identified by name only; the words "security officer" must not be shown on the envelope or wrappings. Mail for companies which have only received provisional clearance should be addressed to the recognised contact who must ensure that the material is properly recorded and safeguarded. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-39 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Note: Names of security officers in List X companies may be obtained from InfoSy(Industry) 2/3. Transmission of mail to private addresses overseas 04106. No protectively marked mail is to be despatched to any private address overseas without prior reference to security staffs. Transmission of mail to HM Ships 04107. TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL mail for HM Ships, RFAs or other authorities afloat in home waters or abroad must be prepared for transmission in accordance with the procedures at Annex C. In addition: a. Outer envelopes/wrappings should be marked "HMS..., c/o BFPO 999" to ensure correct handling within UK and prevent protectively marked mail passing through foreign postal channels in the event of sudden departure or diversion of the ship. b. RESTRICTED mail should also be despatched in accordance with Annex C. Envelopes/wrappings should, however, be addressed to "HMS..., BFPO..." (insert number of ship as issued in JSP 367). Transmission of cabinet and ministerial committee documents 04108. Procedures governing the transmission of cabinet and ministerial committee documents are laid down in "Getting it Done" The Ministry of Defence Office Guide (MOD Manual 2). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-40 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents SECTION III REMOVAL OF PROTECTED MATERIAL FROM OFFICIAL PREMISES Introduction 04109. The removal of protectively marked material from official premises exposes it, and often the carrier, to additional security risks. Protectively marked documents are not to be taken away from official premises unless this is absolutely unavoidable and essential for the conduct of official business. Every effort should be made to reduce the risks associated with hand carriage by sending material through official channels (including use of the DCS), and restricting documents carried both to the minimum quantity and the lowest protective marking. Removal is subject to conditions laid down in the following paragraphs. References to "protectively marked documents" relate to documents marked CONFIDENTIAL or above. 04110. Documents marked SECRET or above are only to be taken outside official premises by individuals holding written authority to do so (MOD F 924 or locally produced alternative). A specimen is at Appendix 2 to Annex A. a. TOP SECRET and ATOMIC documents. Written authority to remove documents marked TOP SECRET or ATOMIC can only be given by HOE or Capt RN, Col, Gp Capt, Grade 7 or equivalent status or, where appropriate delegated authority has been given, by independent unit commanders. Authority should only be given in exceptional circumstances. (See ACO 130, Chapter 4, for correct procedures regarding ATOMIC documents). b. SECRET documents. Written permission is to be obtained from the HOE. Authority to sign MOD forms 924 may be delegated to senior members of staff (not normally below the rank of Lt Cdr, Maj, Sqn Ldr, HEO or equivalent) at the discretion of the head of establishment. HOE are to satisfy themselves that the security risks involved in removing protected documents from official premises are justified in the public interest. Before departure, officers authorized to remove protected documents are to be briefed on their safe custody during transit and, if appropriate, overnight. Documents remain the responsibility of the named individual until returned to the holding establishment or handed-over to another authorized person (or official representative, eg contractor). (Note: Briefcases, etc, are not approved security containers and cannot protect contents against surreptitious examination by unauthorized persons (even if given only limited access). Briefcases and other containers used to transport protectively JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-41 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security marked/sensitive material must remain under the carrier's personal custody at all times until their contents can be secured in accordance with minimum security standards.) Removal for return or delivery within the same working day 04111. Protected documents may be removed from official premises where they are required for reference, etc, at a meeting subject to the following: a. removal. Files/folders should be checked for completeness before b. Documents should be carried in a locked container (either a sturdy dual combination lock commercial type briefcase or officially approved box, bag, case or pouch). c. Documents removed by persons acting as couriers for delivery to third parties should be prepared and packaged as detailed in Section II. d. The signed (top copy) of MOD Form 924 (or alternative) is to be carried by the officer authorized to remove documents and presented on demand to any person empowered to search briefcases, etc, - eg a security guard. The duplicate form is to be retained by an officer appointed by the head of establishment in accordance with local security instructions. e. On return to the office, all documents removed are to be checked against the duplicate MOD Form 924 by another officer. Files/folders should be examined to ensure that they are complete. The duplicate form should then be endorsed by the checking officer to confirm safe-return of each item listed. Discrepancies are to be investigated immediately as potential breaches of security. Removal for retention outside official premises for one or more nights 04112. Protectively marked documents should only be retained outside official premises if they cannot be returned to the holding office, or alternative official premises. 04113. Permission, as a "standing authority" or for a single occasion, may be granted subject to the following conditions: a. Standing authority (for overnight working at home). Where a regular and long-term need can be established for an officer to take protectively marked documents home, the officer must be provided with a security container suitable for their storage, the container being installed under arrangements made through the appropriate Principal Security Adviser (for homeworking rules see Annex M). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-42 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents b. Single occasions (for retaining documents overnight at home or in an hotel,etc). An officer authorized to remove documents is responsible for ensuring that they are safeguarded, remaining in his care at all times (see para 04115 below). Authorization - review of MOD forms 924 04114. HOEs are to establish procedures for periodic review of MOD Forms 924 to ensure that authorizations are not being given without proper consideration. Duplicate copies of the forms should be retained for 2 years and made available for inspection by the appropriate Principal Security Adviser's staff. Carriage of official documents by officials travelling within Great Britain or Northern Ireland 04115. When authority has been given for documents marked CONFIDENTIAL and above to be taken out of official premises for intended use elsewhere in Great Britain or Northern Ireland, they are to be carried in a locked container (see para 04111) and remain in the care of the authorized officer at all times until they are housed under officially approved arrangements. Each container is to bear a label securely attached to the outside (with a similar label affixed inside) giving instructions to a finder. Only one side of the label should normally be visible, the reverse being obscured by a protective cover. The visible side of the label is to read: "IF FOUND PLEASE SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS LABEL". The reverse side is to read: "ANYONE FINDING THIS CONTAINER IS ASKED TO TELEPHONE .................... OR HAND IT IN AT THE NEAREST POLICE STATION OR RAILWAY OR OTHER TRANSPORT AUTHORITY WITH A REQUEST THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE THAT ACTION." (The telephone number to be given is that of the security control room for your building/establishment. If in doubt, consult your Principal Security Adviser for advice.) While carrying protectively marked documents, briefcase, etc, keys should be kept secure on the person, separate from the container. Note: Authorised officers must not carry the prohibited items listed at Annex N para 2 in their briefcase with protectively marked documents. 04116. Officials travelling to Northern Ireland should carry documents in a sturdy dual combination locked commercial type briefcase, not one bearing the Royal Cypher. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-43 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 04117. Any briefcase may be used when carrying material marked RESTRICTED provided it is locked (but see para 04116 regarding advice on travel to Northern Ireland). 04118. Protectively marked documents are not to be consulted or worked on anywhere where their contents might be overlooked or otherwise noted. Documents protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL and above are not to be left unattended in any place, such as an hotel, restaurant, taxi, public service vehicle or railway carriage. They are not to be entrusted to the custody of a member of the public (eg by being placed in an hotel safe), or left locked in an unattended motor vehicle. However, documents protectively marked up to RESTRICTED may be left unattended in a locked hotel room or in a locked boot of a motor vehicle provided they are contained within a sturdy dual combination locked commercial type briefcase. 04119. Wherever possible (and particularly where long journeys and overnight stops are likely): a. Protectively marked documents are to be sent ahead by secure means and addressed for the official to collect on arrival. b. Arrangements are to be made by the convenor of the conference or meeting, etc, to safeguard protectively marked documents belonging to visitors who have to stay overnight away from their own office. 04120. Where these arrangements are not practical, the following conditions apply: a. Retention at home (ie normal place of residence). Documents marked CONFIDENTIAL or above must not be left in an unoccupied house or flat, etc; they must not be left in the care of other residents. RESTRICTED documents are not to be left unattended unless locked inside a container to which only the officer has access. b. Retention in an hotel room, etc. Documents marked CONFIDENTIAL or above must not be left unattended nor entrusted to the care of persons other than Government officials or representatives. RESTRICTED documents contained within a sturdy dual combination locked commercial type briefcase may be left unattended in your locked hotel room. 04121. Travel involving private/official vehicles. must not be left in an unsupervised vehicle. Protectively marked material 04122. Travel by civil aircraft within UK. When travelling by civil aircraft within UK (including Northern Ireland), staff may be required (as a precaution against possible terrorist action) to assist airport security staff, by disclosing the contents of their hand luggage, including briefcases. To prevent compromise of material protectively marked SECRET or above, the following procedures are to be followed: a. Prior to departure. 4-44 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents (1) Complete MOD form 924. (2) Place the document(s) to be removed from official premises in an unused envelope and stick down the flap. (3) Courier's name and destination is written on the front of the envelope, adding the branch stamp and reference number of the document(s) enclosed at the bottom left hand corner. (4) Lock the package and top copy of the MOD form 924 in a sturdy dual combination lock and labelled commercial type briefcase; the package should normally remain inside the briefcase until it reaches its destination. (5) Airport security may require sealed packages to be electronically scanned before loading as hand luggage. If there is any risk of the contents being damaged by scanning, couriers should seek advice from the appropriate Principal Security Adviser prior to departure. b. If challenged by airport security staff. (1) If asked by airport security staff to open the briefcase, the MOD officer should explain, discreetly, that it contains official documents carried in pursuit of HMG business; to avoid public recognition as a MOD official and to avoid the material carried being compromised, the courier may ask for any search to be conducted in private. The briefcase may be opened and the MOD Form 924 offered as confirmation. (2) The sealed package should not be opened except in the presence of senior security staff and then only sufficient to display the nature of the contents, eg papers; uncleared persons must not be allowed to read or otherwise study sensitive material. (3) Airport security staff should be asked to assist the officer, as necessary, in resealing any package opened at their insistence. c. Return journeys. Similar arrangements are to be made where material has to be returned by hand. Officers carrying protectively marked material should inform the appropriate Principal Security Adviser's staff, through their local security officer, of any difficulties encountered when following the procedures outlined above. Note: The advice contained in this paragraph applies also to ferry journeys between Great Britain mainland and Northern Ireland, where similar checks may be made at departure points. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-45 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Carriage of official documents by officials travelling overseas 04123. Normally, documents marked CONFIDENTIAL or above required by an official after arrival overseas should be dispatched in advance, allowing adequate time for their arrival. The DCS is responsible for the movement of all MOD material marked CONFIDENTIAL and above overseas. This service must be used except in very exceptional cases which require clearance from the appropriate Principal Security Adviser. Exceptional circumstances DO NOT extend to TOP SECRET material. Under no circumstances may IDO accountable documents, eg those bearing COSMIC and/or ATOMAL markings be personally carried overseas. Where it is not practical to make use of the service offered by DCS, the appropriate Principal Security Adviser must be contacted, allowing 7 days notice. After confirmation by DCS that the task cannot be met by an official defence courier, the application will be endorsed and forwarded to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for issue of a single journey casual courier passport. 04124. Except where specifically stated, paragraphs 04126-04148 do not apply to RESTRICTED documents. 04125. When travelling overseas: a. Officers should try to remain inconspicuous. b. Documents should be carried in a sturdy dual combination locked commercial type briefcase. Prohibited items listed in para 1 of Annex N must not be carried. Note: When RESTRICTED material is carried abroad, a briefcase meeting the specifications as described above must be used. 04126. Memoranda or minutes of the Cabinet and its committees or of Ministry of Defence committees (including committees of the Chiefs of Staff), whatever their protective marking, may not normally be taken or sent out of the country. If it is essential for such papers to leave the country, permission should be sought as follows: a. For Cabinet and Cabinet committees. Through Secretary of State for Defence (Private Office) for documents handled by them (ie cabinet and Ministerial committee documents and the documents of official committees where Ministry of Defence representation is at Defence Council level), and direct from the private secretary to the secretary of the Cabinet for all other official committee documents. b. For Ministry of Defence committees. Through the secretary of the committee concerned. In no circumstances may Cabinet conclusions be taken or sent out of the country. 04127. Except when ministers or senior officials are travelling with a group of colleagues in British controlled transport to or from meetings in territories of countries JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-46 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents presenting a special security risk (see Annex C), in no circumstances will permission be given for the personal carriage of protectively marked documents (including RESTRICTED) across the borders of, within, or over, such countries. 04128. In all cases where documents marked CONFIDENTIAL or above are taken overseas, a list of the documents must be left with the dispatching establishment, a copy being held with the documents in the container carried by the courier. The establishment originating the consignment should also give notice, to the office to which the material is addressed, of the courier's travel arrangements, so that undue delay in delivery can be notified to the originating establishment for immediate investigation. Carriage of protectively marked documents to non-NATO countries by casual couriers possessing diplomatic immunity conferred by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 04129. Where documents are required at destinations in Non-NATO countries, every possible effort should be made to send them in advance through normal channels. Because of the additional risks entailed when carrying protectively marked documents to/from such countries by hand, Defence Courier or Queens Messenger Services should be employed where transmission in advance is not practical. Only where these services cannot meet delivery will personal carriage by staff be entertained. 04130. Written authority from the appropriate Principal Security Adviser on behalf of the PUS, is required in respect of all applications for authority to carry protectively marked material as a casual courier possessing diplomatic immunity. Authority will only be granted to officers or senior non-commissioned officers of the Services or established officials not below Administrative Officer grade, who are UK based and citizens of the United Kingdom or Commonwealth and have been vetted at the appropriate level. 04131. Applications for the personal carriage of protectively marked documents overseas, signed by the head of establishment, should be submitted IN DUPLICATE in the form shown at Annex E to this chapter to reach the appropriate Principal Security Adviser at least 7 working days before the start of the journey abroad. Applications will be referred as a matter of routine to the DCS and only forwarded to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for their action where the former confirms that neither they nor the Queen's Messenger Service can assist. 04132. Subject to authority granted by the appropriate Principal Security Adviser, the officer who is to act as casual courier will be required to report, with the documents to be carried, to the Communications Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The courier will be briefed for the journey and provided with a special courier's passport and "diplomatic way-bill" valid for one journey only; the documents will be sealed in a diplomatic bag. The officer must be in possession of a valid British passport and visas necessary for the journey. These documents, and the properly constituted diplomatic bag, provide the courier with inviolability and immunity from JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-47 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security any form of arrest or detention in the country of his destination abroad and in any other countries he may pass through en route in accordance with international agreement. The diplomatic bag may not be opened, examined (eg by airport scanner) or detained by foreign authorities en route; in case of difficulty the local British representative must be contacted. However, the privilege of diplomatic immunity must not be abused by also carrying prohibited items in the diplomatic bag with protectively marked documents. A list of prohibited items is given at para 1 of Annex N. 04133. Where it is essential for ministers or senior officials (normally members of the Defence Council) travelling abroad to have access to official papers during the journey, the appropriate Principal Security Adviser should be asked to make arrangements with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for the documents to be carried in a locked and labelled pouch or briefcase instead of in a sealed bag. (Whatever the destination, such exceptions require personal authorization by the PUS.) The requirement should be indicated when submitting a request to the appropriate Principal Security Adviser in accordance with para 04130. Note: The reading of protectively marked papers during journeys, whether in the United Kingdom or abroad, is essentially insecure; not only may documents be overlooked and/or mislaid but once they are out of the pouch or bag, a foreign customs officer may attempt to inspect and possibly seize them. Carriage of protectively marked documents to NATO countries by casual couriers not possessing diplomatic immunity 04134. Where documents are needed in NATO countries at very short notice, the appropriate Principal Security Adviser may exceptionally, at their discretion and subject to the restrictions at paras 04125-04128 above, waive the need for diplomatic immunity and authorize the carriage of UK or IDO (non-accountable) documents marked CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET. Applications seeking authorization of casual couriers within these constraints, signed by the head of establishment should be sent (in the form shown at Annex E to this chapter) to the appropriate Principal Security Adviser at least 7 working days before the start of the journey abroad. Sector security authorities, at 1 star level or above, may delegate to nominated HOEs/COs authority to waive the need for diplomatic immunity, and to authorize carriage of such documents by staff subject to the restrictions at paras 04125-04128. 04135. Provided the journey does not involve travel through, to or over countries presenting a special security risk, officers may carry UK and IDO RESTRICTED documents without formal documentation as a casual courier. The documents must, however, be carried in a sturdy dual combination locked commercial type briefcase. 04136. Before authorizing carriage of documents to NATO countries with waiver of diplomatic immunity, the authorizing officer should: a. Establish that it is essential for the document(s) to be taken out of the United Kingdom for use at a meeting in a NATO country. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-48 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents b. Seek confirmation from the Foreign and Commonwealth Diplomatic Bag Service and the DCS that the documents cannot be consigned through their channels to reach the destination in time. c. Ensure that the officer nominated is cleared for access to the information carried. Authority to carry documents must be provided in writing (see para 04139) and be issued only by, or on behalf of, the appropriate Principal Security Adviser (see para 04134). 04137. The officer may be authorized to travel to or through the following countries, and to no others: Belgium Canada Denmark France Germany Greece Iceland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Turkey United States 04138. To reduce security hazards the preferred method of travel is by United Kingdom Service or civil aircraft. However aircraft of one of the countries listed in para 04137 may be used. SECRET documents are not to be carried on foreign airlines unless authority to do so has been granted by the appropriate Principal Security Adviser. The Authorizing Officer should always select practicable means of travel with due regard to the current threat of hijacking of aircraft (see paras 04146 ­ 04148 and Annex I). 04139. Authorization under these rules must be in the form of Annex F, prepared in duplicate, and signed by an officer to whom powers have been delegated by the appropriate Principal Security Adviser (normally not below the rank of Assistant Secretary or 1 star equivalent). The duplicate copy of each authorization should be retained by the establishment security officer and made available for inspection by security staff. Officers intending to carry documents must be issued with a set of instructions, as detailed in Annex G, and must certify in writing, as in Annex H, that they have read and understood them before departure. 04140. Authorization for carriage under the rules set out in this section is limited solely to the transmission of UK, non-accountable NATO CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET documents and UN documents (See Annex L). Documents bearing additional markings should not be carried without reference to the appropriate Principal Security Adviser or to the delegated officer. Provided the journey does not involve travel through, to or over any non-NATO countries, UK and NATO RESTRICTED JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-49 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security documents may be carried without authority. Such documents must, however, be carried in a sturdy dual combination locked commercial type briefcase. The personal carriage of documents protectively marked UK or NATO CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET to non-NATO countries and the carriage of UK TOP SECRET material overseas to NATO and non-NATO countries, must be in accordance with para 0412904133. Guidance on the international transmission of accountable material, eg, that bearing marking, ATOMAL, COSMIC and WEU, is contained in Section IV of this Chapter. These rules generally prohibit personal hand carriage, recommending official transmission via the controlling authority concerned. Further details will be found in the appropriate instructions or by contacting the relevant controlling office. Two copies of the list of documents to be carried must be prepared one to be retained in the establishment and the other packed with the documents. 04141. Documents must be carried under cover. The cover, securely sealed in accordance with the rules contained in Section II, must be addressed to the officer himself care of his destination. The cover must bear the reference number of the Certificate of Authorization (Annex F), the departmental stamp and the signature of the officer who signed the Authorization Certificate. The package must be carried in a sturdy dual combination locked commercial type briefcase or similar container of a type meeting the approval of the relevant security regulations. 04142. Authority under these rules will be given only in respect of documents required at a meeting, subject to the conditions addressed in paragraph 04138. Agreements on security with other countries generally provide that protected information may only be exchanged on a Government-to-Government basis or between international organisations concerned. Protectively marked documents should, therefore, not be handed directly to representatives of overseas firms but where necessary, released to a Government Department of the country concerned, or to the local British Embassy or High Commission, for onward transmission. Receipts should be obtained where necessary. 04143. On conclusion of a visit and whenever practicable, documents should be returned to the United Kingdom by diplomatic bag through the local British Embassy, High Commission or Consular Office. If personal hand carriage is necessary on the return journey, the carrier must be provided, before the outward journey, with the necessary documents, - ie, spare envelope(s) bearing the same reference number, stamp and signature as used on the outward journey and materials for resealing the package(s). The return journey must also be noted in the original authorization. Note: Where an officer (who is not a casual courier) attends a meeting overseas and has reason to believe he/she may be required to bring back protectively marked documents to the United Kingdom, the officer should arrange with the British Embassy, High Commission or Consular Office for his/her documentation as a casual courier. Facilities for sealing the documents should be sought, and a sturdy dual combination lock commercial type briefcase or other suitable official container used to transport the documents to the UK. 04144. On return the casual courier should personally verify with the officer holding the duplicate lists of material removed that all documents have been returned or receipts JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-50 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents obtained. The casual courier should also send his Authorization Certificate to his security officer. Any incidents of possible security significance that occurred during the journey should be reported to the security officer. 04145. Under no circumstances should a NATO Travel Order be used as authority to carry protectively marked documents overseas. Precautions against hijacking 04146. Where HOE have been given the authority to authorize members of their staffs to act as casual couriers of documents to, or through the countries listed in para 04140, due regard must be given to the threat of hijacking of aircraft. This requires the exercise of judgement on each occasion, weighing the necessity for personal carriage of each document against the risks entailed. 04147. Any difficulties arising out of the implementation of para 04146 should be referred to the appropriate Principal Security Adviser. 04148. Because of precautions taken by airline authorities, both at home and overseas, to minimise the hijacking of aircraft on international flights the additional instructions in Annex I should, until further notice, be issued to officers acting as casual couriers. Carriage of protectively marked material overseas by Service personnel acting as Casual Couriers during emergency operations 04149. It is recognised that there are times when protectively marked material is required urgently in an operational non-NATO theatre and the Services needs cannot be met by the use of the DCS or the QMS of the FCO. An example of this is the nonotice deployment of aircraft/ships/support personnel in an out of area operation to non-NATO countries. 04150. Only in such exceptional circumstances may Sector security staff authorise, at their discretion, an officer to carry material protectively marked up to SECRET without diplomatic immunity. Where descriptors, codewords or caveats are included in the marking then the approval of the appropriate Principal Security Adviser (at the appropriate level) should be sought. Such Casual Couriers travelling under this facility may be subject to Customs and security checks. 04151. Casual Couriers must not carry NATO documents to the following countries without the permission of the appropriate NATO authority: Australia Japan Switzerland JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-51 Austria Sweden New Zealand RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Countries with special security risks 04152. Casual couriers should not be used to carry protectively marked material to the following countries unless authorised by the Director/Head of the appropriate Principal Security Adviser and then only if all efforts to secure diplomatic immunity for the proposed courier has failed. Afghanistan Cuba Lebanon Russia Ukraine Belarus Iran Libya Sudan Vietnam China (inc Hong Kong SAR, Tibet and Macao) Iraq North Korea Syria Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) Note: Travel by the airlines of the above countries should be avoided where possible but may be allowed after due consideration of the risks which may attract to the courier as well as the material he/she is carrying. 04153. PSyA staff should check with the FCO for the latest travel advice on all countries before authorisation is given. The Casual Courier should also be briefed on the dangers of hijacking and given a copy of the guidance at Annex I. 04154. PSyA staff must ensure that the Casual Courier is: a. Cleared for access to the material carried; b. Issued with instructions (Annex G) which he/she should certify as having read and understood; c. Carrying a written authorisation in the form of Annex F; and d. Provided with a list of documents to be carried. A second copy should be retained by the ESyO/USO/BSO. Return to the UK 04155. On return the Casual Courier should personally verify with the officer holding the duplicate list of material removed that all documents have been returned or receipts obtained. Removal of protectively marked documents between official premises during office relocation 04156. Normally branches will be relocated under arrangements whereby a contractor and its staff who are cleared to handle up to and including SECRET will be involved. Such relocations will in all likelihood also involve the movement of office furniture, ordinary and security containers and computer equipment. Documents up to and including SECRET should be moved in accordance with the details shown below; the JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-52 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents movement of TOP SECRET and other documents where only bags and small boxes are involved is covered at para 04157. a. RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET documents should be packed in crates (to be supplied by contractors with lids which have holes in capable of being fastened by the use of plastic ratchet ties). Plastic ratchet ties, which can be removed only by cutting, with a tag showing a serial number, should be used. A list of the contents of each crate is to be maintained, detailing RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET material. The serial numbers on each tie should be noted before and after shipment, to ensure that tampering has not taken place. In the event of evidence of tampering and possible compromise having taken place, the appropriate Principal Security Adviser should be notified in accordance with sub para l below. b. A list containing details of consignment (as required by sub-para 04156a above) should be sent either in advance to the final destination, or given in a sealed envelope to the driver or crew of the commercial vehicle with instructions to hand it over to the staff at the delivery point. c. Driver and crew should be given no indication of the protective marking or subject of the items. d. Stick-on labels giving details of contents and protective markings must not be used. e. During loading and unloading, staff must ensure that crates containing protectively marked documents are not left unsupervised. f. Where possible, the transmission of documents is to be completed in one move and vehicles must be manned at all times. When an overnight stop is involved, vehicles must be parked on guarded premises subject to prior MOD approval. g. Driver and crew should be advised if any crates include fragile items ie computers, etc. (The appropriate Sector IT security staff should be consulted regarding relocation of computers). h. Vehicles must have secure cargo areas where the only form of entry is through lockable doors. Rear doors (ie main access to secure cargo area) of vehicles are to be locked with an approved security padlock or with a good quality padlock. Advice on locks and padlocks can be obtained from the appropriate Sector security staff. Arrangements should be made to ensure that one key is held by the relevant MOD officials at both the sending and receiving points of the journey, unless the load is escorted by MOD staff, who are insured to travel in the commercial vehicle. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-53 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security i. The driver is to be given a contact number to alert a relevant area in MOD capable of organising remedial action in the event of a breakdown. j. Separate instructions should be given to the driver on action to be taken in the event of a traffic accident, or emergency. The instruction should identify circumstances in which the vehicle may be unloaded and action to be taken to record the transfer of crates, etc. k. The guard Forces at both the pickup and delivery points should be informed of the crew and vehicle details and time of departure and arrival. l. Contents to be checked by staff on arrival, or as soon as possible and to advise the appropriate Principal Security Adviser if a compromise has taken place. Further detailed advice on the above can be obtained from the appropriate Principal Security Adviser at an early stage. 04157. Branches that have quantities of TOP SECRET, ATOMIC or other documents requiring special handling must send them separately through the DCS or by MOD Mail Service (MMS). DCS/MMS will also move bags or boxes containing documents marked up to SECRET provided the weight of each bag or box does not exceed 15Kg. Documents will be moved on existing routes although special tasks can be undertaken with prior consultation. Homeworking 04158. Homeworking is defined as the use of a person's home as their normal place of work and requiring access to/retention of official information. It is often described as working from home. It should not be confused with working at home, which is the term used to describe something which is strictly on a temporary basis eg during transport disruptions or for overnight working (see para 04113). 04159. Homeworking entails special security risks and will only be allowed following consideration, on a case by case basis by line management, the appropriate personnel management authority and Sector security staff. 04160. The specific security rules which apply to homeworking are shown at Annex M. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-54 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents SECTION IV SPECIAL MARKINGS 04161. Only those with a need to know, or need to hold, should have access to protectively marked information. When it is necessary to provide additional protection by reinforcing the "need to know" principle, special markings that restrict access should be used, normally in conjunction with a protective marking. Special markings consist of: a. National caveats. National caveats exist for the additional protection of certain types of protectively marked UK material, eg UK EYES ONLY, CANUKUS EYES ONLY. Definitions of these and other recognized caveats, and advice on their use, are given in Chapter 16. b. Descriptors. Descriptors help to implement the "need to know" principle by indicating the nature of the asset's sensitivity and the need to limit access accordingly. A list of MOD descriptors is at Annex J. c. Additional markings. Additional markings may be required to ensure the special handling of some material to indicate particular aspects of ownership, issue or release, eg Compartmented or Codeword material. Further information concerning Compartments, Codewords and nicknames are at Annex K. d. International defence organisation (IDO) markings. IDOs, eg the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU) and their member nations, use similar protective markings, known as classifications, to the UK and prefixed NATO or WEU as appropriate. Further details are at Annex L. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-55 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4-56 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 4 EXAMPLE OF MOD F 672 MOD Form 672 Record of Protectively Marked Documents (TOP SECRET and SECRET) contained in:File Number This card should be kept on the LEFT hand side of the file as the top enclosure. Encl. No. Document Reference No. Date of Document Copy No. Protective Marking Date of Downgrading Note: The reverse of the form is also ruled in columns as above. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 4 EXAMPLE OF MOD F 171 MOD FORM 171 Part 1 - Request for Downgrading of Protectively Marked Documents To: From: It is requested that authority be given for the downgrading of the documents listed overleaf. If downgrading is agreed, please state new protective marking in column (e); otherwise insert "No change". Date........................... Signature.................................... JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Part 2 - Authority to Downgrade Protectively Marked Documents To: From: Please note that the documents listed below should now be graded as shown in column (e) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Reference No. Description (i.e. File, letter, report etc.) Date Present protective marking Revised protective marking Date..................... Signature....................................... Grade............................. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4A1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 4 Serial No: Original MOD Form 924 Authority for and notification of the removal of documents marked CONFIDENTIAL and above from official premises to destinations in the United Kingdom Before completing this form, read the relevant paragraphs of DMS Vol 1, and the notes on the cover of this pad. Part A: Authorising officer Officer's name: Rank/grade: Branch: Part B: Destination, date(s) and reason for removal of documents The documents listed at Part C are to be removed to on for the purpose of Part C: Documents removed Reference of document/file Last encl/minute numbers (files only) (b) (a) (c) Protective marking Part D: Authority to remove documents Authority is given to remove the documents listed at Part C from official premises for the reason stated at Part B. The officer named in Part A is aware that the documents removed must be carried in accordance with current security regulations and remain in his/her custody at all times unless placed in secure storage under officially approved arrangements. Signature Name (Block letters) Date Head of Establishment Part E: Certificate of return of documents JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4A2-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Serial No: Duplicate MOD Form 924 Authority for and notification of the removal of documents marked CONFIDENTIAL and above from official premises to destinations in the United Kingdom Before completing this form, read the relevant paragraphs of DMS Vol 1, and the notes on the cover of this pad. Part A: Authorising officer Officer's name: Rank/grade: Branch: Part B: Destination, date(s) and reason for removal of documents The documents listed at Part C are to be removed to on for the purpose of Part C: Documents removed Reference of document/file (a) Last encl/minute numbers (files only) (b) Protective marking (c) Part D: Authority to remove documents Authority is given to remove the documents listed at Part C from official premises for the reason stated at Part B. The officer named in Part A is aware that the documents removed must be carried in accordance with current security regulations and remain in his/her custody at all times unless placed in secure storage under officially approved arrangements. Signature Date Name (Block letters) Head of Establishment Part E: Certificate of return of documents (Duplicate only) I certify that all documents listed at Part C were returned to the office on Signature Name (block letters) Branch date JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4A2-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 4 OFFICE SECURITY CHECK SHEET Room...................... Month...................... The undersigned certifies that: 1. All security containers are securely locked and security keys mustered. 2. No protectively marked papers, waste, security keys, computer media or other protected material has been left accessible to unauthorised persons. 3. All photocopiers, computers and facsimile machines have been switched off, hard disks removed (if applicable) and power supplies secured. Date Time Signature Date Time Signature Completed forms should be returned to the establishment security officer. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 4 SPOT CHECK REPORT Establishment......................... 1. Date and Time ............................. checking started I selected the following documents at random from the protected document register (PDR)(MOD F 102), file index etc, for checking in accordance with DMS Vol 1 Chapter 4. Loose documents (as distinct from files/folders - see para 2 below) together with any annexes and appendices were checked for completeness. PDR serial No (i) a. b. c. d. e. f. Doc ref Doc date Protective marking (iv) Location of doc (if held, quote file no) (v) Remarks # Serial (ii) (iii) (vi) 2. Of the files/folders listed above, I checked the TOP SECRET and SECRET contents of the following, page by page and against the entries on the minute or inventory sheets. a. ________________________________________________________________ b. ________________________________________________________________ c. ________________________________________________________________ 3. In the course of my check I found: * No irregularity/difficulty. * Irregularities/difficulties which are the subject of the report overleaf. Date and time check completed.......................................Signed............................................. Rank/Grade..................................................................Name in Capitals.............................. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4B1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Notes: 1. 2. A spot check should cover all PDRs. If a document or receipt is produced insert "Seen", if not, insert "Not Seen" and report action taken overleaf. 3. * Delete as appropriate. 4. No other record of this check should be made either on the documents themselves or in any supporting register or index/inventory. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4B1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 4 TRANSMISSION OF PROTECTED DOCUMENTS General 1. These instructions provide guidance for the transmission of all types of protected and unclassified documents except: a. ATOMIC, COSMIC, ATOMAL, FOCAL, CRYPTOGRAPHIC and STRAP material; b. Cabinet/Ministerial committee documents; c. Documents subject to special handling arrangements notified separately to those with a need to know. Note: Envelopes, packages, etc, reaching the mail room which do not comply with instructions in this Annex will be returned to the originator. If necessary, mail will be opened to identify the originator. 2. The instructions are broken down by security protection, and destination as follows: Protective Destination Marking TOP SECRET Appendix 1 SECRET Appendix 2 Section I Appendix 2 Section II Appendix 2 Section III Appendix 2 Section IV Appendix 2 Section IV CONFIDENTIAL Appendix 3 Section I Appendix 3 Section II Appendix 3 Section III Appendix 3 Section IV Appendix 3 Section IV RESTRICTED/ UNCLASSIFIED Appendix 4 Section I Appendix 4 Section II Appendix 4 Section III Appendix 4 Section IV Appendix 4 Section IV Within the same location or to another listed location inc OGDs To Embassies and High Commissions in Central London To other postal addresses in the UK excluding Northern Ireland To diplomatic posts abroad To other addresses overseas and to Northern Ireland Appendix 1 Appendix 1 Appendix 1 Appendix 1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Note: For transmission purposes CRYPTOSECURITY documents and cypher logs are always to be treated as TOP SECRET and sent under cover of MOD Form 488 (see Appendix 1). Use of Defence Mail Service 3. The Defence Postal and Courier Service (DPCS) operates a dedicated mail service to a number of Service and civilian organisations throughout the country. The majority of these locations are organised in a manner that allows simplified procedures to be followed when despatching protected documents to them. Details of the locations served by the Defence Mail Service, indicating those between which transmission of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL is permissible using a single envelope (without protective marking), is published periodically in JSP 367 to which despatching organisations should refer. Advice on the latest list can be obtained from the DPCS. Use of the Diplomatic Bag for Transmission of Material to Diplomatic Posts Overseas 4. Rules for preparation of mail for despatch via diplomatic bag are described in paras 04097 - 04101. In all cases, mail must be addressed as detailed in Appendices to this Annex. 5. All mail originating from DIS branches (with a protective marking of CONFIDENTIAL and above) addressed to diplomatic posts abroad MUST be despatched by diplomatic bag. 6. All official mail, (other than unclassified publicity and information material) for diplomatic posts in the following countries is also to be sent by diplomatic bag: Afghanistan Albania Belarus Bulgaria Cambodia Cuba Iran Iraq Laos Libya Mongolia North Korea Romania Russia (The Federation) South Africa Syria Ukraine Vietnam Envelopes containing TOP SECRET or SECRET material addressed to these locations are to be transmitted in Keepsafe envelopes or sealed, if still available, with high security tape; similarly addressed parcels and packages must be wafer-sealed (see para 04077). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Unreliable Postal Services 7. Detailed information on current rules for transmission of RESTRICTED or Unclassified mail via diplomatic bag, eg to countries with unreliable postal services, is provided by DCS in JSP 367. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 4 TRANSMISSION OF TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS FROM ANY MOD OR SERVICE LOCATION IN THE UK TO ANY ADDRESSEE WARNING 1. TOP SECRET documents must never be transmitted through Post Office or other non-official channels. They must travel hand-to-hand, receipted. 2. TOP SECRET documents must never be over-covered so that their protective marking is obscured. 3. For transmission purposes, CRYPTOSECURITY material and cypher logs are always to be treated as TOP SECRET. 4. Where IDO material is to be transmitted, the marking "COSMIC" or "FOCAL" (as appropriate) is to be inserted on MOD Form 488 to appear in front of the marking TOP SECRET. 5. Approval must be obtained from InfoSy(Industry)1 or Command HQs before TOP SECRET documents are transmitted to a foreign or Commonwealth-based defence contractor. 6. TOP SECRET documents are only to be sent to private addresses in exceptional circumstances and with specific permission from PUS. They are not to be sent to addresses where foreign servants are employed or where there is no suitable container in which to keep them (see paras 04093 - 04094). 7. Envelopes or packages, etc, in transit must never be left unattended. 8. Use of Keepsafe security envelopes is permitted. Preparation for Normal Despatch 1. Select one unused envelope of suitable size and apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation, eg. a branch stamp. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 2. Prepare MOD Form 488 (special TOP SECRET label), addressing it personally to an officer by name or appointment and correct address. Include the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. 3. For addresses within approved locations served by the Defence mail service (see para 3 of Annex C), the address must include the building and room number (for locations outside London, the name of the town/city should also be included). The post code must not be included. 4. For diplomatic posts abroad, Service and international organisations served by BFPO numbers, include the words: "c/o LCT, BFPO 1000". 5. For all addressees overseas, add the words "Certified Official", this being endorsed by an authorising officer. 6. For ships in UK or overseas ports or waters, include the words: "HMS ...., c/o BFPO 999." 7. If the document bears a National caveat, eg "UK EYES ONLY", this must not appear on the label; the label must be addressed "Exclusive to" the addressee by name and appointment. 8. Prepare receipt (MOD Form 24) and insert, with the document, into the envelope and proceed as follows: a. Unused envelope: affix MOD Form 488 already prepared to the envelope and seal in accordance with Appendix 5; or b. Keepsafe security envelope: affix MOD Form 488 already prepared to the envelope flap and seal in accordance with para 04073. Note: Parcels, packages, etc, must be sealed using wafer seals (see para 04077). Normal Despatch 9. Sealed envelopes are to be conveyed by hand to the central registry, where they will be recorded and inserted in an outer cover for further transmission. The carrier is to give and take timed receipts (MOD Form 32) bearing the despatcher's room number and stamp. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Despatch using Locked Pouches, etc 10. Locked pouches, etc, are to be sent direct by hand of carrier as described at para 2 above. Documents transmitted in a locked pouch or box need not be enveloped unless recipient is to forward them to a third party; a receipt (MOD Form 24 or equivalent - see para 04078) is to be attached to each loose TOP SECRET document to be placed in the pouch; the pouch is to be addressed to the intended recipient personally by name and/or appointment. (Key-holders are responsible for onward transmission (taking appropriate safeguards) of any documents received which are not of their concern). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C1-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C1-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 4 TRANSMISSION OF SECRET DOCUMENTS SECTION I TRANSMISSION WITHIN MOD OR SERVICE BUILDINGS/SITES OR BETWEEN APPROVED LOCATIONS (INCLUDING OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS) SERVED BY THE DEFENCE MAIL SERVICE (SEE PARA 3 OF ANNEX C) WARNING 1. Envelopes or packages in transit must never be left unattended. 2. Mail to other Government departments in Central London not served by the Defence mail service (see para 3 of Annex C) should be despatched in accordance with Section III. Preparation for Normal Despatch 1. If the document is to be sent outside the building/site, prepare and affix a receipt (MOD Form 24) (see para 04078). 2. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings), or an envelope of good quality to be used with an economy label, of suitable size and apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg. a branch stamp). 3. Address the envelope/package by name and/or appointment/branch plus room number and building/establishment. For locations outside central London, the address should include the appropriate town, eg. Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. The postcode must not be included. 4. If the document bears a National caveat, eg. "UK EYES ONLY", the envelope is to be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope, etc. 5. The security marking of contents must not be shown on the envelope/package; descriptor markings, eg. "STAFF" may be shown. 6. Insert the document (and receipt if appropriate) and stick down the flap (or pack the document sticking down all seams). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents 7. Mark envelope "Defence mail service only". Normal Despatch 8. Sealed envelopes or packages should be placed in the "out" tray for collection by transit services. Despatch using Locked Pouches, etc 9. Documents transmitted in a locked pouch or box, destined for an addressee outside the building/site, need not be enveloped unless the recipient is to forward them to a third party. A receipt (MOD Form 24 or equivalent (see para 04078) is to be attached to each loose SECRET document or set of documents to be placed in the pouch. The pouch is to be addressed to the intended recipient personally by name and/or appointment. (Key-holders are responsible for onward transmission (taking appropriate safeguards) of any documents received which are not of their concern). Pouches, etc should be conveyed by hand or despatched through normal transit services. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C2-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents SECTION II TRANSMISSION TO EMBASSIES AND HIGH COMMISSIONS IN CENTRAL LONDON SERVED BY THE DEFENCE MAIL SERVICE FROM APPROVED LOCATIONS ALSO SERVED BY THE DEFENCE MAIL SERVICE (SEE PARA 3 OF ANNEX C) WARNING 1. Envelopes or packages in transit must never be left unattended. Preparation for Normal Despatch 10. Prepare and affix a receipt (MOD Form 24) to the document. 11. Inner envelope/wrapping. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrapping) of suitable size and apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg. a branch stamp) and the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. 12. Address the envelope/package by name and/or appointment/branch plus room number and name of Embassy/High Commission. If the document bears a National caveat, eg. "UK/US EYES ONLY", the envelope/package is to be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope/package. 13. Mark "SECRET" boldly in red above and below the address; the protective marking should be prefixed "WEU" or "NATO" if the contents are so marked. 14. Insert the document (and receipt) and stick down the flap (or pack the document sticking down all seams). 15. Outer envelope/wrapping. Select a second unused envelope (or unused wrappings) and apply the address as at para 12 above. "PO Box 701, London WC2H 8BG" should be used as a return address; a branch stamp should not be used. 16. Insert the first envelope/package and stick down the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). 17. Mark envelope "Defence mail service only". JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C2-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Normal Despatch 18. Sealed envelopes or packages should be placed in the "out" tray for collection by transit services. Despatch using Locked Pouches, etc 19. Documents transmitted in a locked pouch or box need not be enveloped unless the recipient is to forward them to a third party; a receipt (MOD Form 24 or equivalent - see para 04078) is to be attached to each loose SECRET document or set of documents to be placed in the pouch. The pouch is to be addressed to the intended recipient personally by name and/or appointment. (Key-holders are responsible for onward despatch (taking appropriate safeguards) of any documents received which are not of their concern.) Pouches, etc should be conveyed by hand or through normal transit services. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C2-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents SECTION III TRANSMISSION TO ADDRESSES IN THE UK OTHER THAN THOSE COVERED IN SECTION I & SECTION II OF APPENDIX 2 AND EXCLUDING NORTHERN IRELAND (SEE SECTION IV) FROM ANY MOD OR SERVICE LOCATION IN THE UK WARNING 1. Envelopes and packages containing SECRET material must be prepared for despatch by one of the following approved mail services: a. Parcelforce 10, 12 or 24 b. Special Delivery Service 2. SECRET documents are only to be sent to private addresses in exceptional circumstances and with specific permission from a Head of Establishment. They are not to be sent to addresses where foreign servants are employed or where there is no suitable container in which to keep them (see para 04093 - 04094). 3. Envelopes or packages in transit must never be left unattended. Preparation for Normal Despatch 20. Prepare and affix a receipt (MOD Form 24) to the document. 21. Inner envelope/wrapping. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings) of suitable size and apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg. a branch stamp) and the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. 22. Address the envelope/package by name and/or appointment/branch and full postal address. If the document bears a National caveat, eg. "UK EYES ONLY", the envelope/package is to be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope/package. 23. Mark "SECRET" boldly in red above and below the address; the protective marking should be prefixed "WEU" or "NATO" if the contents are so marked. 24. Insert the document (and receipt) and stick down the flap (or pack the document sticking down all seams). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C2-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents 25. Outer envelope/wrapping. Select a second unused envelope (or unused wrappings). 26. For mail to official addresses, apply the address as at para 22 above. 27. For mail to private addresses, use a plain envelope; address by name without reference to rank, decorations, appointment, etc. 28. Insert the first envelope/package and stick down the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). Note: The outer envelope/wrapping must not bear any security markings, branch stamp, or other markings which might associate it with the Department. "PO Box 701, London WC2H 8BG" should be shown as the return address. 29. Mail for ships in UK ports or home waters should be addressed to "HMS....., c/o BFPO 999." 30. Mark the envelope/package with the appropriate approved mail service in the top left hand corner. Normal Despatch 31. Sealed envelopes or packages should be placed in the "out" tray for collection by transit services. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C2-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents SECTION IV TRANSMISSION TO DIPLOMATIC POSTS ABROAD, AND OTHER ADDRESSES OVERSEAS INCLUDING NORTHERN IRELAND FROM ANY MOD OR SERVICE LOCATION IN THE UK WARNING 1. In no circumstances may Post Office services be used for transmission of SECRET material to Northern Ireland or to other overseas locations. 2. Envelopes or packages in transit must never be left unattended. 3. SECRET material for foreign or Commonwealth Governments or their defence contractors may only be transmitted to those countries approved by the RMIPC, and then only via the appropriate British Diplomatic post. 4. Approval must be obtained from InfoSy(Industry)1/Command HQs before SECRET mail is sent (via the appropriate British Diplomatic post) to a foreign or Commonwealth-based defence contractor. 5. The appropriate MOD Form 189 (condition of release stamp) or statement of release (Annex C to Chapter 11 of JSP 440 Volume 1) must be firmly attached to each SECRET document sent to a foreign or Commonwealth Government, or defence contractor of that country. The prefix "UK" or, where appropriate, "NATO" or "WEU", should appear before the protective marking on the document. 6. The use of Keepsafe security envelopes is permitted. Preparation for Normal Despatch 32. Prepare and affix a receipt (MOD Form 24) to the document. In addition, a completed despatch Note (see Appendix 6) should be attached to documents intended for transmission to foreign or Commonwealth Governments or their defence contractors. Note 1: For the transmission of mail to foreign or Commonwealth Governments or their defence contractors (sent via the appropriate British Diplomatic Post), see para 42. Note 2: For the transmission of mail to British Defence Attaches/Advisers and to addresses in Northern Ireland, see para 33. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C2-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Note 3: For the transmission of mail to British officers or civilians serving in international organisations, see para 55. Note 4: see para 64. For the transmission of mail to HM Ships in overseas ports or waters, Mail to British Defence Attaches/Advisors, BDS Washington and BFPO addresses including Northern Ireland 33. Inner envelope/wrapping. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings) of a suitable size. Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp) and the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. 34. Address the envelope/package to the British Defence Attache/Adviser by name or appointment, with full address of the diplomatic post. For mail to Northern Ireland, address envelope as appropriate. 35. If the document bears a (composite) National caveat, eg "UK/US EYES ONLY", the envelope/package must be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelopment/package. 36. Mark "SECRET" boldly in red above and below the address; the protective marking should be prefixed "UK", "NATO" or "WEU" if the contents are so marked. 37. Mark the envelope/package "Certified Official", this being endorsed by an authorising officer (see para 04099). 38. Insert document and receipt (MOD Form 24) and seal the flap and seams of the envelope with high security tape as described at Appendix 5. 39. 40. 41. If a Keepsafe security envelope is used - seal in accordance with para 04073. Packages - seal using wafer seals (see para 04078). Outer envelope/wrapping: a. For mail emanating from approved locations served by the Defence mail service (see para 3 of Annex C): (1) Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings). (2) Apply legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp), and address to "LCT, BFPO 1000". No protective marking is to appear on the envelope/package. (3) Insert inner envelope/package and seal the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C2-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents (4) b. Despatch as described in para 76 below. For mail emanating from other locations: (1) Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings). (2) Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp), and address to "LCT, BFPO 1000". NO protective marking is to appear on the envelope. (3) Insert inner envelope/package, seal the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). (4) Mark the envelope/package with the appropriate approved mail service (Parcelforce 10, 12 or 24 or Special Delivery Service) in the top left-hand corner. (5) Despatch as described in para 76 below. Mail to Foreign or Commonwealth Governments or their Defence Contractors (sent via the appropriate British Diplomatic Post) 42. First envelope/wrapping. wrappings) of a suitable size. Select one unused envelope (or unused 43. Address the envelope/package by name and/or appointment/branch and full postal address of the foreign or Commonwealth government. Apply the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. If the document bears a (composite) National caveat, eg. "UK/US EYES ONLY", the envelope/package must be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope/package. 44. Mark "SECRET" boldly in red above and below the address; the protective marking should be prefixed "UK", "NATO", or "WEU" if the contents are so marked. 45. Insert the document and receipt (MOD Form 24) and despatch note (see Appendix 6). Do not seal the flap of the envelope; packages should be loosely secured, ie, do not stick down seams. 46. Second envelope/wrapping. Select a second unused envelope (or unused wrappings) of a suitable size. Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp) and the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. 47. Address the envelope/package to the British Defence Attache/Adviser by name or appointment, with full address of the diplomatic post. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C2-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents 48. If the document bears a (composite) National caveat, eg "UK/US EYES ONLY", the envelope/package must be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope/package. 49. Mark "SECRET" boldly in red above and below the address; the protective marking should be prefixed "UK", "NATO" or "WEU" if the contents are so marked. 50. Mark the envelope/package "Certified Official", this being endorsed by an authorising officer (see para 04099). 51. Insert first unsealed envelope/loosely secured package and seal the flap and seams of the envelope with high security tape as described at Appendix 5. 52. 53. 54. Keepsafe security envelope - seal in accordance with para 04073. Packages - seal using wafer seals (see para 04078). Third (outer) envelope/wrapping: a. For mail emanating from approved locations served by the Defence mail service (see para 3 of Annex C): (1) Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings). (2) Apply legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp), and address to "LCT, BFPO 1000". No protective marking is to appear on the envelope/package. (3) Insert second envelope/package and seal the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). (4) b. Despatch as described in para 76 below. For mail emanating from other locations: (1) Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings). (2) Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp), and address to "LCT, BFPO 1000". No protective marking is to appear on the envelope. (3) Insert second envelope/package, seal the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). (4) Mark the envelope/package with the appropriate approved mail service (Parcelforce 10, 12 or 24 or Special Delivery Service) in the top left-hand corner. (5) Despatch as described in para 76 below. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C2-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Mail to British officers or Civilians serving in International Organisations 55. Inner envelope/wrapping. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings) of a suitable size. Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp) and the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. 56. Address the envelope/package by name and appointment with postal address (as appropriate) as follows: Within SHAPE Within NATO Within SACLANT Within WEU "c/o UKNMR, SHAPE, BFPO 26" "c/o UK Delegation to NATO, (Brussels area) Brussels, BFPO 49" "c/o UKNLR to SACLANT, HMS SAKER, BFPO 2" "c/o British Embassy, Paris" 57. If the document bears a (composite) National caveat, eg "UK/US EYES ONLY", the envelope/package must be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope/package. 58. Mark "SECRET" boldly in red above and below the address; the protective marking should be prefixed "UK", "NATO", or "WEU" if the contents are so marked. 59. Mark the envelope/package "Certified Official", this being endorsed by an authorising officer (see para 04099). 60. Insert document and receipt (MOD Form 24) and seal the flap and seams of the envelope with high security tape, if still available, as described at Appendix 5. 61. 62. 63. If a Keepsafe security envelope is used seal in accordance with para 04073. Packages - seal using wafer seals (see para 04078). Outer envelope/wrapping: a. For mail emanating from approved locations served by the MOD mail service (see para 3 of Annex C): (1) Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C2-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents (2) Apply legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp), and address to "LCT, BFPO 1000". No protective marking is to appear on the envelope/package. (3) Insert inner envelope/package and seal flap (or pack sticking down all seams). (4) b. Despatch as described in para 76 below. For mail emanating from other locations: (1) Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings). (2) Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp), and address to "LCT, BFPO 1000". No protective marking is to appear on the envelope. (3) Insert inner envelope/package, seal the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). (4) Mark the envelope/package "Parcelforce 24" in the top lefthand corner. (5) Despatch as described in para 76 below. Mail to HM Ships in Overseas Ports or Waters 64. Inner envelope/wrapping. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings) of a suitable size. Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation and the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. 65. Address the envelope by name and/or appointment to "HMS..." 66. If the document bears a (composite) National caveat, eg "UK/US EYES ONLY", the envelope/package must be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope/package. 67. Mark "SECRET" boldly in red above and below the address; the protective marking should be prefixed "UK", "NATO", or "WEU" if the contents are so marked. 68. Mark the envelope/package "Certified Official", this being endorsed by an authorising officer (see para 04099). 69. Insert the document and receipt (MOD Form 24) and seal the flap and seams of the envelope with security tape as described at Appendix 5. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C2-12 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents 70. 71. If a Keepsafe security envelope is used seal in accordance with para 04073. Packages - seal using wafer seals (see para 04078). 72. Outer envelope/wrapping. Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings). Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg. a branch stamp), and address to "HMS..., c/o BFPO 999". No protective marking is to appear on the envelope/package. 73. Insert inner envelope/package and seal the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). 74. Mark the envelope/package "Parcelforce 24" or "Defence mail service only" (if service available) in the top left-hand corner. 75. Despatch as described in para 76 below. Normal Despatch 76. Sealed envelopes or packages should be placed in the "Out" tray for collection by transit services or forwarded to registries or Defence mail service collection points. In locations where several establishments are served by a single collection point, An audit trail will be required between the establishments and the collection point. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C2-13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C2-14 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 4 TRANSMISSION OF CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS SECTION I TRANSMISSION WITHIN MOD OR SERVICE BUILDINGS/SITES OR BETWEEN APPROVED LOCATIONS (INCLUDING OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS) SERVED BY THE DEFENCE MAIL SERVICE (SEE PARA 3 OF ANNEX C) WARNING 1. Envelopes or packages in transit must never be left unattended. 2. Mail to other Government departments in Central London not served by the Defence Mail Service (see para 3 of Annex C) should be despatched in accordance with Section III. Preparation for Normal Despatch 1. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings), or an envelope of good quality to be used with an economy label, of suitable size and apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg. a branch stamp). 2. Address the envelope/package by name and/or appointment/branch plus room number and building/establishment. For locations outside central London, the address should include the appropriate town, eg. Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. The post code must not be included. 3. If the document bears a National caveat, eg. "UK EYES ONLY", the envelope is to be addressed "Exclusive to" and officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope, etc. 4. The protective marking of contents must not be shown on the envelope, package. Descriptors, eg. "STAFF" may be shown. 5. Insert the document and seal the flap (or pack the document sticking down all seams). 6. Mark envelope "Defence mail service only". 4C3-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Normal Despatch 7. Sealed envelopes or packages should be placed in the "out" tray for collection by transit services or forward to registries or mail collection points. Despatch using Locked Pouches, etc 8. Documents transmitted in a locked pouch or box need not be enveloped unless the recipient is to forward them to a third party; the pouch, etc, is to be addressed to the intended recipient personally by name and/or appointment. (Keyholders are responsible for onward despatch (taking appropriate safeguards) of any documents received which are not of their concern). Pouches, etc should be conveyed by hand or despatched through normal transit services. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C3-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents SECTION II TRANSMISSION TO EMBASSIES AND HIGH COMMISSIONS IN CENTRAL LONDON SERVED BY THE DEFENCE MAIL SERVICE FROM APPROVED LOCATIONS ALSO SERVED BY THE DEFENCE MAIL SERVICE (SEE PARA 3 OF ANNEX C) WARNING 1. Envelopes or packages in transit must never be left unattended. Preparation for Normal Despatch 9. Inner envelope/wrapping. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings) of suitable size and apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg. a branch stamp) and the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. 10. Address the envelope/package by name and/or appointment/branch plus room number and name of Embassy/High Commission. If the document bears a National caveat, eg. "UK/US EYES ONLY" the envelope/package is to be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope/package. 11. Mark "CONFIDENTIAL" boldly in red above and below the address; the protective marking should be prefixed "WEU" or "NATO" if the contents are so marked. 12. Insert the document and stick down the flap (or pack the document sticking down all seams). 13. Outer envelope/wrapping. Select a second unused envelope (or unused wrappings) and apply the address as at para 10 above. "PO Box 701, London WC2h 8BG" should be used as a return address; a branch stamp should not be used. 14. Insert the first envelope/package and stick down the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). 15. Mark envelope "Defence mail service only". Note: The outer envelope/wrapping must not bear security markings. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C3-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Normal Despatch 16. Sealed envelopes or packages should be placed in the "out" tray for collection by transit services or forward to registries or mail collection points. Despatch using Locked Pouches, etc 17. Documents transmitted in a locked pouch or box need not be enveloped unless the recipient is to forward them to a third party. The pouch is to be addressed to the intended recipient personally by name and/or appointment. (Key-holders are responsible for onward despatch (taking appropriate safeguards) of any documents received which are not of their concern). Pouches, etc should be conveyed by hand or despatched through normal transit services. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C3-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents SECTION III TRANSMISSION TO ADDRESSES IN THE UK OTHER THAN THOSE COVERED IN SECTION I & II OF APPENDIX 3 AND EXCLUDING NORTHERN IRELAND (SEE SECTION IV) FROM ANY MOD OR SERVICE LOCATION IN THE UK WARNING 1. Parcels containing CONFIDENTIAL material must be prepared for despatch by Letter Post. Parcel post is not to be used. 2. CONFIDENTIAL documents are only to be sent to private addresses in exceptional circumstances and with specific permission from a head of establishment. They are not to be sent to addresses where foreign servants are employed or where there is no suitable container in which to keep them (see paras 04093 - 04094). 3. Envelopes or packages in transit must never be left unattended. Preparation for Normal Despatch 18. Inner envelope/wrapping. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings) of suitable size and apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg. a branch stamp) and the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. 19. Address the envelope/package by name and/or appointment/branch and full postal address. 20. If the document bears a National caveat, eg. "UK EYES ONLY", the envelope/package is to be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope/package. 21. Mark "CONFIDENTIAL" boldly in red above and below the address; the protective marking should be prefixed "WEU" or "NATO" if the contents are so marked. 22. Insert the document and stick down the flap (or pack the document sticking down all seams). 23. Outer envelope/wrapping. Select a second unused envelope (or unused wrappings). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C3-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 24. For mail to official addresses, apply the address as at para 21 above. 25. For mail to private addresses, use a plain envelope; address by name without reference to rank, decorations, appointment, etc. 26. Mark the envelope/package "Letter Post" in the top left hand corner. 27. Insert the first envelope/package and stick down the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). Note: The outer envelope/wrapping must not bear security markings, branch stamp, or other marking which might associate it with the department. "PO Box 701, London WC2H 8BG" should be shown as the return address. 28. Mail for ships in UK ports or home waters should be addressed to "HMS..., c/o BFPO 999". Normal Despatch 29. Sealed envelopes or packages, etc, should be placed in the "out" tray for collection by transit services or forward to registries or mail collection points. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C3-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents SECTION IV TRANSMISSION TO DIPLOMATIC POSTS ABROAD, AND OTHER ADDRESSES OVERSEAS INCLUDING NORTHERN IRELAND FROM ANY MOD OR SERVICE LOCATION IN THE UK WARNING 1. In no circumstances may Post Office services be used for transmission of CONFIDENTIAL material to Northern Ireland or to other overseas locations. 2. Envelopes or packages in transit must never be left unattended. 3. CONFIDENTIAL material for foreign or Commonwealth Governments or their defence contractors may only be transmitted to those countries approved by the RMIPC and then only via the appropriate British Diplomatic Post. 4. Approval must be obtained from InfoSy(Industry)1/Command HQs before CONFIDENTIAL mail is sent (via the appropriate British Diplomatic post) to a foreign or Commonwealth-based defence contractor. 5. The appropriate MOD Form 189 (Condition of Release Stamp) must be firmly attached to each CONFIDENTIAL document sent to a foreign or Commonwealth Government, or defence contractor of that country. The prefix "UK" or where appropriate, "NATO" or "WEU" should appear before the protective marking on the document. Preparation for Normal Despatch 30. Prepare and affix a completed despatch note (see Appendix 6) to documents intended for transmission to foreign or Commonwealth Governments or their defence contractors. Note: (1) For the transmission of mail to foreign or Commonwealth Governments or their defence contractors (sent via the appropriate British Diplomatic Post), see para 38. (2) For the transmission of mail to British Defence Attaches/Advisers and to addresses in Northern Ireland, see para 31. (3) For the transmission of mail to British officers or civilians serving in international organisations, see para 51. (4) For the transmission of mail to HM Ships in overseas ports or waters, see para 58. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C3-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Mail to British Defence Attaches/Advisers and BFPO addresses including Northern Ireland 31. Inner envelope/wrapping. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings) of a suitable size. Apply a legible branch stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg. a branch stamp) and the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. 32. Address the envelope/package to the British Defence Attache/Adviser by name or appointment, with full address of the diplomatic post. For mail to Northern Ireland, address as appropriate. 33. If the document bears a (composite) National caveat, eg. "UK/US EYES ONLY", the envelope/package is to be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope/package. 34. Mark "CONFIDENTIAL" boldly in red above and below the address; the protective marking should be prefixed "UK", "NATO" or "WEU" if the contents are so marked. 35. Mark the envelope/package "Certified Official", this being endorsed by an authorising officer (see para 04100). 36. 37. Insert document and seal flap (or pack sticking down all seams). Outer envelope/wrapping: a. For mail emanating from approved locations served by the Defence mail service (see para 3 of Annex C): (1) Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings). (2) Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg. a branch stamp), and address to "LCT, BFPO 1000". No protective marking is to appear on the envelope/package. (3) Insert inner envelope/package and seal the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). b. For mail emanating from other locations: (1) Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings.) (2) Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp), and address to "LCT, BFPO 1000". No protective marking is to appear on the envelope/package. (3) Insert inner envelope/package and seal the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C3-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents (4) (5) Mark packages/letters "Letter Post". Despatch as described in para 65 below. Mail to Foreign or Commonwealth Governments or their Defence Contractors (sent via the appropriate British Diplomatic Post) 38. First envelope/wrapping. wrappings) of a suitable size. Select one unused envelope (or unused 39. Address the envelope/package by name and/or appointment/branch and full postal address of the foreign or Commonwealth Government. Apply the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. 40. If the document bears a (composite) National caveat, eg. "UK/US EYES ONLY", the envelope/package is to be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope/package. 41. Mark "CONFIDENTIAL" boldly in red above and below the address; the protective marking should be prefixed "UK", "NATO" or "WEU" if the contents are so marked. 42. Insert document and despatch note (see Appendix 6). Do not seal the flap or the envelope; packages should be loosely secured, ie. do not stick down seams. 43. Second envelope/wrapping. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings) of a suitable size. Apply a legible branch stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg. a branch stamp) and the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. 44. Address the envelope/package to the British Defence Attache/Adviser by name or appointment, with full address of the Diplomatic post. 45. If the document bears a (composite) National caveat, eg. "UK/US EYES ONLY", the envelope/package is to be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope/package. 46. Mark "CONFIDENTIAL" boldly in red above and below the address; the protective marking should be prefixed "UK", "NATO" or "WEU" if the contents are so marked. 47. Mark the envelope/package "Certified Official", this being endorsed by an authorising officer (see para 04099). 48. 49. Insert first unsealed envelope/loosely secured package. Seal flap (or pack sticking down all seams). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C3-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 50. Third (outer) envelope/wrapping: a. For mail emanating from approved locations served by the Defence mail service (see para 3 of Annex C): (1) Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings). (2) Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp), and address to "LCT, BFPO 1000". No protective marking is to appear on the envelope/package. (3) Insert second envelope/package and seal the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). (4) b. Despatch as described in para 65 below. For mail emanating from other locations: (1) Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings). (2) Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp), and address to "LCT, BFPO 1000". No protective marking is to appear on the envelope/package. (3) Insert second envelope/package and seal the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). (4) (5) Mark packages/letters "Letter Post". Despatch as described in para 65 below. Mail to British Service Personnel or Civilians serving in International Organisations 51. Inner envelope/wrapping. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings) of a suitable size. Apply a legible branch stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg. a branch stamp) and the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. 52. Address the envelope/package by name and appointment with postal address (as appropriate) as follows: Within SHAPE SHAPE,BFPO 26 Within NATO (Brussels area) c/o UKNMR c/o UK Delegation to NATO, Brussels, BFPO 49 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C3-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Within SACLANT Within WEU - c/o UKNLR to SACLANT, HMS SAKER, BFPO 2 c/o British Embassy, Paris 53. If the document bears a (composite) National caveat, eg. "UK/US EYES ONLY", the envelope/package is to be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope/package. 54. Mark "CONFIDENTIAL" boldly in red above and below the address; the protective marking should be prefixed "UK", "NATO" or "WEU" if the contents are so marked. 55. Mark the envelope/package "Certified Official", this being endorsed by an authorising officer (see para 04099). 56. 57. Insert document and seal flap (or pack sticking down all seams). Outer envelope/wrapping. a. For mail emanating from approved locations served by the Defence mail service (see para 3 of Annex C): (1) Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings). (2) Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp), and address to "LCT, BFPO 1000". No protective marking is to appear on the envelope/package. (3) Insert inner envelope/package and seal the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). (4) b. Despatch as described in para 65 below. For mail emanating from other locations: (1) Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings.) (2) Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp), and address to "LCT, BFPO 1000". No protective marking is to appear on the envelope/package. (3) Insert inner envelope/package and seal the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). (4) (5) Mark packages/letters "Letter Post". Despatch as described in para 65 below. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C3-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Mail to HM Ships in Overseas Ports or Waters 58. Inner envelope/wrapping. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings) of a suitable size. Apply a legible branch stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg. a branch stamp) and the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. 59. Address the envelope/package by name and/or appointment to "HMS.....". 60. If the document bears a (composite) National caveat, eg. "UK/US EYES ONLY", the envelope/package is to be addressed "Exclusive to" an officer by name and appointment; the caveat must not appear on the envelope/package. 61. Mark "CONFIDENTIAL" boldly in red above and below the address; the protective marking should be prefixed "UK", "NATO" or "WEU" if the contents are so marked. 62. Mark the envelope/package "Certified Official", this being endorsed by an authorising officer (see para 04099). 63. 64. Insert document and seal flap (or pack sticking down all seams). Outer envelope/wrapping: a. For mail emanating from approved locations served by the Defence mail service (see para 3 of Annex C): (1) Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings). (2) Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp), and address to "HMS ...., c/o BFPO 999". No protective marking is to appear on the envelope/package. (3) Insert inner envelope/package and seal the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). (4) b. Despatch as described in para 65 below. For mail emanating from other locations: (1) Select an unused envelope (or unused wrappings). (2) Apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp) and address to "HMS...., c/o BFPO 999". No protective marking is to appear on the envelope/package. (3) Insert inner envelope/package and seal the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). (4) Mark packages/letters "Letter Post". 4C3-12 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents (5) Despatch as described in para 65 below. Normal Despatch 65. Sealed envelopes or packages should be placed in the out tray for collection by transit services or forward to registries or mail collection points. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C3-13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C3-14 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 4 TRANSMISSION OF RESTRICTED DOCUMENTS SECTION I TRANSMISSION WITHIN MOD OR SERVICE BUILDINGS/SITES OR BETWEEN APPROVED LOCATIONS (INCLUDING OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS) SERVED BY THE DEFENCE MAIL SERVICE (SEE PARA 3 OF ANNEX C) WARNING Envelopes or packages in transit must never be left unattended. Preparation for Normal Despatch 1. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings), or an envelope of good quality to be used with an economy label, of suitable size, and apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg. a branch stamp). A transit envelope should not be used. 2. Address the envelope/package by name or appointment/branch plus room number and building/establishment. For locations outside central London, the address should include the appropriate town, eg. Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. The post code must not be included. 3. The protective marking (RESTRICTED) must not appear on the envelope/package; descriptors, eg. "STAFF" may be shown. (Alternatively, the term "to be opened by addressee only" may be used). 4. Insert the document and stick down the flap (or pack the document sticking down all seams). 5. Mark the envelope "Defence mail service only". 6. Method of despatch. Place in "out" tray for collection by transit services or forward to registries or mail collection points. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C4-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security SECTION II TRANSMISSION TO EMBASSIES AND HIGH COMMISSIONS IN CENTRAL LONDON SERVED BY THE DEFENCE MAIL SERVICE (SEE PARA 3 OF ANNEX C) FROM APPROVED LOCATIONS ALSO SERVED BY THE DEFENCE MAIL SERVICE WARNING Envelopes or packages in transit must never be left unattended. Preparation for Normal Despatch 7. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings), or an envelope of good quality to be used with an economy label, of suitable size, and apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg. a branch stamp). A transit envelope should not be used. 8. Address the envelope/package by name and or appointment/branch plus room number and building/establishment. 9. The protective marking (RESTRICTED) must not appear on the envelope/package. 10. Insert the document and stick down the flap (or pack the document sticking down all seams). 11. Mark the envelope "Defence mail service only". 12. Method of despatch. Place in "out" tray for collection by transit services or forward to registries or mail collection points. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C4-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents SECTION III TRANSMISSION TO ADDRESSES IN THE UK OTHER THAN THOSE COVERED IN SECTION I & II OF APPENDIX 4 EXCLUDING NORTHERN IRELAND (SEE SECTION IV) FROM ANY MOD OR SERVICE LOCATION IN THE UK WARNING Envelopes or packages in transit must never be left unattended. Preparation for Normal Despatch 13. Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings), or an envelope of good quality to be used with an economy label, of suitable size. A transit envelope should not be used. 14. For mail to private addresses, use a plain envelope; address by name without reference to rank, decorations, appointments, etc. 15. Mail to and from locations not served by the Defence mail service should be given the full postal address. 16. The protective marking (RESTRICTED) must not appear on the envelope/package; where descriptors are used, the envelope must be marked "To be opened by addressee only". 17. The envelope/wrapping must not bear any markings, branch stamp, etc, which might associate it with the department. "PO Box 701 London WC2 8BG" should be shown as the return address. 18. Insert the document and stick down the flap (or pack the document sticking down all seams). 19. Method of despatch. Place in "out" tray for collection by transit services or forward to registries or mail collection points. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C4-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security SECTION IV TRANSMISSION TO DIPLOMATIC POSTS ABROAD AND OTHER ADDRESSES OVERSEAS, INCLUDING NORTHERN IRELAND, FROM ANY MOD OR SERVICE LOCATION IN THE UK WARNING 1. Envelopes or packages in transit must never be left unattended. 2. RESTRICTED (and UNCLASSIFIED) mail to Northern Ireland should be addressed to the appropriate establishment by BFPO number. Mail should only be sent to private addresses in Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland in exceptional circumstances (see para 04096). RESTRICTED mail to other private addresses is only to be despatched in accordance with para 04106. 3. RESTRICTED material for foreign or Commonwealth Governments or their defence contractors may only be transmitted to those countries approved by the RMIPC. RESTRICTED material to such organisations in countries listed in para 6 of Annex C and para 23 below, must be sent via the appropriate British diplomatic post. 4. Approval must be obtained from InfoSy(Industry)1 before RESTRICTED mail is sent to any defence contractor in the countries listed in para 23 below. 5. The appropriate MOD F 189 (Condition of Release Stamp) must be firmly attached to each RESTRICTED document sent to a foreign or Commonwealth Government or defence contractor of that country. The prefix UK or, where appropriate, NATO or WEU should appear before the protective marking on the document. Preparation for Despatch 20. These instructions apply to both RESTRICTED and UNCLASSIFIED documents. 21. Private addresses. Mail for private addresses should be sent in accordance with the appropriate advice contained in either paras 04096 or 04106. 22. Ships. Mail for ships in overseas ports or waters should be addressed to "HMS..., BFPO..." (see para 04107). A legible branch stamp incorporating the full postal address of the sender may be used to indicate the return address. Where this is not possible the return address should be "PO Box 701 London WC2H 8BG". JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C4-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents 23. Companies in America/Australia/Austria/Canada /Israel/Italy/ Netherlands/ Republic of Korea/Spain and Switzerland. Mail addressed to any companies based in America, Australia, Austria, Canada, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Spain or Switzerland must be prepared as follows: a. Inner envelope/wrapping. (1) Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings) of suitable size and apply the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. "PO Box 701 London WC2H 8BG" should be used as a return address; a branch stamp is not required. (2) Address the envelope/package to the company concerned by name and full address. (3) Mark "UK RESTRICTED" boldly in red above and below the address. (4) Insert the document and stick down the flap (or pack the document sticking down the seams). b. Outer envelope/wrapping - for companies in Australia, Austria, Israel, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Spain and Switzerland. (1) Prepare a second unused envelope (or wrappings), applying details as at 23a(1) above. Insert the first envelope/package (together with a completed Despatch Note (see Appendix 6) and stick down the flap (or pack sticking down all seams); address the second envelope/package, as appropriate, to: (a) Defence Advisor British High Commission Commonwealth Avenue Yarralumla, Canberra, ACT 2600 Australia or (b) Defence Attaché British Embassy Jauresgasse 12 1030 Vienna, Austria or JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C4-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (c) Defence Attaché British Embassy 192 Hayarkon Street Tel Aviv 63404, Israel Defence Attaché British Embassy Lange Voorhout 102514 ED The Hague Netherlands Defence Attaché British Embassy 4 Chung-Dong Chung-Ku Seoul Republic of Korea or (d) or (e) or (f) Defence Attaché British Embassy Calle de Fernanado el Santo 16 Madrid 4 Spain Defence Attaché British Embassy Thunstrasse 50 3005 Berne Switzerland or (g) c. Outer envelope - for companies in America, Canada and Italy. The full company name and address as detailed on the inner envelope in accordance with sub-paragraph 23a(2) above. Receipts (MOD F24) are required. 24. Use of the diplomatic bag. Mail addressed to diplomatic posts in countries listed at para 6 of Annex C must always be despatched by diplomatic bag. The following procedure should be followed: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C4-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents a. Inner envelope/wrapping. (1) Select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings) of suitable size and apply a legible stamp identifying the despatching organisation (eg a branch stamp) and the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. (2) Address the envelope by name and/or appointment and branch with full postal address. (3) Mark "RESTRICTED" or "UNCLASSIFIED" boldly in red above and below the address. (4) Insert the document (together with a completed Despatch Note (see Appendix 6) where the document is intended for onward transmission to a foreign or Commonwealth Government or its defence contractor) and stick down the flap (or pack the document sticking down all seams). (5) Mark the envelope/package "Certified Official", this being endorsed by an authorizing officer (see para 04101). b. Outer envelope/wrapping. Select a second unused envelope (or unused wrappings) and address to HQ DCS, BFPO 747. A legible branch stamp incorporating the full postal address of the sender may be used to show the return address. Where this is not possible, the return address given should be "PO Box 701 London WC2H 8BG". Insert the first envelope/package and stick down the flap (or pack sticking down all seams). 25. Other destinations. For destinations other than those shown at para 23b above, select one unused envelope (or unused wrappings), or an envelope of good quality to be used with an economy label, of suitable size and apply the reference and date of origin of the document to be enclosed. In the case of UNCLASSIFIED mail, the reference and date of origin of the document enclosed may be omitted from the envelope. Address the envelope/package by name and/or appointment/branch and full postal address. "PO Box 701 London WC2H 8BG" should be used as a return address; a branch stamp is not required. The protective marking (RESTRICTED) must not appear on the envelope/package. 26. Method of despatch. Place in "out" tray for collection by transit services or forward to registries or mail collection points. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C4-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C4-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and carriage of protected documents APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX C SEALING OF ENVELOPES WITH HIGH SECURITY TAPE 1. High security tape must be applied over all the envelope's seams, avoiding the need for small pieces of tape; pocket or wallet style envelopes should be used, seam arrangements simplifying tape application. Pocket style envelopes have a straight sealing flap on one narrow side with a sealed flap opposite, and a seam running the length of the envelope. Wallet style envelopes have a straight edge sealing flap along their length, and side seams. Banker style envelopes are not suitable for use with the tape; These have a triangular shaped sealing flap situated on one broad side of the envelope and seams running diagonally across the envelope. 2. Moisten and stick down the gummed flap of the envelope. Apply high security tape to cover the flap edge; tape should extend at least 1.5 cm on to the front of the envelope. On pocket style envelopes, then apply tape to the sealed flap opposite. Tape remaining seam(s) on the envelope last, overlapping tape on to other flaps/seams and extending beyond crossover points on to the front of the envelope so that both ends of each piece of tape are visible and seen to be firmly stuck to the envelopes surface. Tape should always be applied to flaps/seams parallel to the nearest edge of the envelope. See diagrams below. Note: Some envelopes have deep flaps/seams which cannot be completely covered by single widths of high security tape. In such cases additional strips of tape should be applied to cover the exposed joins and extending round to the front of the envelope as described above. 3. Care should be taken to ensure address labels, where used, do not prevent application of the tape directly to the surface of the envelope. Similarly, address labels should not be applied so that they obscure high security tape. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C5-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Wallet style envelope Wallet style envelope sealed - back Wallet style envelope sealed - front JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C5-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and carriage of protected documents Pocket style envelope Pocket style envelope sealed - back Flap B Pocket style envelope sealed - front JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C5-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Pocket style envelope with deep flap back incorrectly sealed Deep flap not completely covered by tape Pocket style envelope - back correctly sealed Extra strip of sealing tape Extra strip of sealing tape Pocket style envelope - front view correctly sealed Extra strips of tape extending to front of envelope JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C5-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 4 SPECIMEN DESPATCH NOTE UNCLASSIFIED covering (insert protective marking) To: (British Defence Attache/Advisor) _______________________________ _______________________________ _______________________________ Date: Reference: From: _____________________________ _____________________________ _____________________________ The documents listed below have been approved by the Ministry of Defence for release to (insert full postal address of government or contractor facility) _________________________________ _________________________________ _________________________________ (Insert details of enclosed documents) Reference No Protective Marking Date ____________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________ Would you please arrange for their onward transmission through the appropriate security channel. Signed_______________ UNCLASSIFIED covering (insert protective marking) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C6-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C6-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 4 TRANSMISSION OF DOCUMENTS BEARING DESCRIPTORS AND RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS Rules on the transmission of such material are produced below for the convenience of despatch staff. Documents bearing descriptors CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION REQUIRED Material Address : by name or appointment a. Despatch to Enveloping Marking Protective marking/descriptor to be shown on inner envelope. For transmission with MOD van service/hand delivery, single envelope. Descriptor only may be shown on the envelope. b. Despatch to Enveloping Marking c. Despatch to : MOD buildings or via Defence mail service : Single : Single envelope to be marked "Personal" together with the legend "To be opened only by (named addressee)" : Elsewhere in UK : Double : Inner envelope to be marked as for a. : Overseas In accordance with that for relevant protective markings. For transmission outside MOD van service locations, double envelope. Envelope and despatch in accordance with regulations as detailed in Section IV, Appendix 2, Chapter 4. Notes: (1) In all the above cases the restrictive marking "CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION REQUIRED" should not appear on inner, single or outer envelopes. (2) MOD Form 24 receipts are mandatory for all despatches except within a MOD HQ building. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C7-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4C7-2 RESTRICTED METHODS OF TRANSMISSION WITHIN AND FROM UK ­ SUMMARY Protective marking TOP SECRET Destination Any addressee Type of covering and marking (if required) Single wrapping + appropriate marking(s) + MOD Form 488 or Keepsafe envelope + MOD Form 488 Single wrapping ­ no protective marking or Pouch (see Note 1) Double wrapping + appropriate marking(s) on the inner wrapping only or Pouch (see Note 1) Double wrapping + appropriate marking(s) on the inner wrapping only Sealing security tape Stick down flap Receipt Yes Transmission JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 SECRET 4D-1 SECRET SECRET 1. Within MOD bldgs or between approved locations (inc OGDs) served by the Defence Mail Service 2. Embassies and High Commissions in Central London served by the Defence Mail Service 3. Addresses in UK other than 1 and 2 above (excluding NI) Stick down flap By hand of courier. For diplomatic posts abroad include "c/o LCT BFPO 1000". For ships in UK or overseas include "c/o BFPO 999" Yes ­ outside Defence Mail the building Service Control and carriage of protected documents ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Stick down flap Yes Defence Mail Service Stick down flap Yes 1. Parcelforce 24 2. Parcelforce 10 and 12 (see Note 2) 3. Special Delivery Service JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Protective marking SECRET Destination 4. Overseas including NI a. Foreign and Commonwealth Govts or their defence contractors Type of covering and marking (if required) See Annex C Appendix 2, Section IV for detailed instructions Triple wrapping + appropriate marking(s) on the 1st and 2nd inner wrappings but not the outer wrapping. Sealing Receipt Transmission 1st wrapping should NOT be sealed 2nd wrapping to be sealed with security tape or use Keepsafe envelope 3rd wrapping to be stuck down Yes 1st. Address to the foreign govt or company 2nd. Address to the responsible British Embassy official Defence Manual of Security RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 4D-2 SECRET b. Defence Attachs/ Advisers and NI Double wrapping + appropriate marking(s) on the inner wrapping only 1st wrapping seal with security tape or use Keepsafe envelope 2nd wrapping to be stuck down Yes 3rd. Address to LCT BFPO 1000 and use approved mail services. 1st. Address to the Defence Attache/ Adviser or official address in NI. 2nd. Address to LCT BFPO 1000 and use approved mail services. Protective marking SECRET Destination c. British officers/ civilians serving in international organisations Type of covering and marking (if required) Double wrapping + appropriate marking(s) on the inner wrapping only Sealing Receipt Transmission 1st. Address to person concerned and the appropriate international organisation. 2nd. Address to LCT BFPO 1000 and use approved mail services. 1st. Address to appropriate person or CO of the ship using appropriate BFPO number. 2nd. Address c/o BFPO 999 using approved mail services. Defence Mail Service JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4D-3 SECRET d. HM Ships in overseas ports or waters Double wrapping + appropriate marking(s) on the inner wrapping only CONFIDENTIAL 1. Within MOD bldgs or between approved locations (inc OGDs) served by Defence Mail Service Single wrapping with no protective marking showing or Pouch (see Note 1) Yes 1st wrapping to be sealed with security tape or use Keepsafe envelope 2nd wrapping to be stuck down (see note 3) 1st wrapping to Yes be sealed with security tape or use Keepsafe envelope 2nd wrapping to be stuck down Stick down No flap Control and carriage of protected documents RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Protective marking CONFIDENTIAL Destination 2. Embassies and High Commissions in Central London served by the Defence Mail Service 3. Addresses in the UK other than 1 and 2 above (excluding NI) CONFIDENTIAL Type of covering and marking (if required) Double wrapping + appropriate marking(s) on the inner wrapping only or Pouch (see Note 1) Double wrapping + appropriate marking(s) on the inner wrapping only Sealing Stick down flaps No Receipt Transmission Defence Mail Service Defence Manual of Security JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Stick down flaps No 2nd Class letter post. For Ships in home ports or waters address c/o BFPO 999 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 4D- 4 CONFIDENTIAL 4. Overseas including NI a. Foreign or Commonwealth Govts or their defence contractors See Annex C Appendix 3, Section IV for detailed instructions Triple wrapping + appropriate marking(s) on the 1st and 2nd inner wrappings but not the 3rd outer one 1st wrapping should NOT be sealed 2nd wrapping to be stuck down 3rd wrapping to be stuck down No 1st. Address to the foreign govt or company. 2nd. Address to the responsible British Embassy official. 3rd. Address to LCT BFPO 1000 and use approved mail services. Protective marking CONFIDENTIAL Destination b. Defence Attachs/ Advisers and NI Type of covering and marking (if required) Double wrapping + appropriate marking(s) on inner wrapping only Sealing Stick down flap No Receipt Transmission 1st. Address to the Defence Attache/ Adviser or official address in NI. 2nd. Address outer envelope to LCT BFPO 1000 and use approved mail services. 1st. Address to person concerned at the appropriate international organisation. 2nd. Address outer envelope to LCT BFPO 1000 and use approved mail services. 1st. Address to appropriate person or CO of the ship using appropriate BFPO number. 2nd. Address c/o BFPO 999 using approved mail services. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Defence Manual of Security RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL c. British officers/ civilians serving in international organisations Double wrapping + appropriate marking(s) on inner wrapping only Stick down flap No RESTRICTED 4D- 5 CONFIDENTIAL d. HM Ships in overseas ports or waters Double wrapping + appropriate marking(s) on inner wrapping only Stick down flap No Protective marking RESTRICTED Destination 1. Within MOD bldgs or between approved locations (inc OGDs) served by Defence Mail Service 2. Embassies and High Commissions in Central London served by the Defence Mail Service 3. Addresses in the UK other than 1 and 2 above (excluding NI) 4. Overseas including NI Type of covering and marking (if required) Single wrapping with no protective marking showing Sealing Stick down flap No Receipt Transmission Defence Mail Service Defence Manual of Security JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED Single wrapping with no protective marking showing Single wrapping with no protective marking showing Double wrapping + appropriate marking(s) on the inner wrapping only Stick down flap Stick down flap Stick down flaps No Defence Mail Service 2nd Class letter post RESTRICTED RESTRICTED RESTRICTED No 4D- 6 Note: RESTRICTED No (see Note 4) British Forces Post Office or letter post. For mail to diplomatic posts in countries listed at para 6 of Annex C the outer wrapping should be addressed "HQ DCS BFPO 747" 1. 2. 3. 4. Documents transmitted in a locked pouch or box need not be enveloped unless the recipient is to forward them to a third person. The use of Parcelforce 10 and 12 is more expensive than Parcelforce 24. D Def PCS agreement should be obtained for their use. For mail emanating from locations not served by the British Forces Post Office the outer wrapping should be marked "Parcelforce 24" in the top left hand corner. Receipts are required for RESTRICTED documents transmitted to America, Canada and Italy. RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents ANNEX E TO CHAPTER 4 SPECIMEN FORM OF APPLICATION FOR AUTHORITY TO TAKE DOCUMENTS MARKED CONFIDENTIAL OR ABOVE OVERSEAS To (Insert appropriate Principal Security Adviser) 1. Authority is requested for the personal carriage of protectively marked documents overseas by casual courier. 2. Personal details of proposed courier: a. Surname_________________________________________________ Forenames_______________________________________________ b. d. Rank/grade______ c. Establishment___________________________ Tel No_________________ e. Building/Room No_______________ Passport details: f. h. Passport No_____________ g. Place of Issue___________________ Date___________________ i. Date of last renewal_______________ 3. Details of document(s) to be carried (ref. No. of document with highest protective marking to be given): a. c. Protective marking_______________ b. Ref. No.________________ Indicate: (1) If NATO documents_____ (2) If UK documents______________ (3) If other documents (describe)_____________________________ d. Reasons why personal carriage is necessary_____________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4E-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 4. Itinerary of journey: a. Countries to be visited (also destinations within countries visited) ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ b. Method of travel (if by air, state whether RAF or civil; if civil state flight no. and airline). Date of Journey From (airport/port of departure) To (airport/port of arrival 5. State reasons why documents cannot be sent in advance by Defence Courier Service or FCO Queens Messenger. ____________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________ Note: Casual courier status affords reduced protection for protectively marked documents in transit and will only be authorized when absolutely necessary. ___________________________ Head of Establishment Name(block capitals)_________________________________ Rank/grade_________________ Date_______________________ Branch Stamp JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4E-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents ANNEX F TO CHAPTER 4 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE CASUAL COURIER AUTHORIZATION CERTIFICATE Reference No._____________________________ This is to certify that___________________________________________________ Holder of passport no. _________________, an official of the United Kingdom Government is authorised to carry on the journeys detailed below package(s) containing official documents relating to the work carried out by the Ministry of Defence in the interests of the United Kingdom Government/North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and bearing reference no. ____________________ together with the stamp and signature which appears at the foot of this authorization; and that the contents consist solely of documents. Itinerary Outward Date Method of Travel From To Return Date of Issue Stamp of authorizing official, or establishment Signature of directorate, division authorizing official Name_______________ Rank/Grade___________ (DUPLICATE: To be held by the establishment security officer). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4F-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security MINISTRY OF DEFENCE CASUAL COURIER AUTHORIZATION CERTIFICATE Reference No.______________________________ This is to certify that___________________________________________________ Holder of passport no. _________________, an official of the United Kingdom Government is authorised to carry on the journeys detailed below package(s) containing official documents relating to the work carried out by the Ministry of Defence in the interests of the United Kingdom Government/North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and bearing reference no. ____________________ together with the stamp and signature which appears at the foot of this authorization; and that the contents consist solely of documents. Itinerary Outward Date Method of Travel From To Return Date of Issue Stamp of authorizing official, or establishment Signature of directorate, division authorizing official Name_______________ Rank/grade___________ (A certificate of undertaking must be completed by the casual courier prior to the journey). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4F-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents ANNEX G TO CHAPTER 4 INSTRUCTIONS TO OFFICERS ON THE PERSONAL CARRIAGE OF PROTECTIVELY MARKED DOCUMENTS OVERSEAS (To be issued with, but separately from, each Authorization) 1. 2. These instructions are to be carefully observed. The package is addressed to you care of (establishment to be visited). 3. You should ensure that a list of all documents that you will carry has been prepared in duplicate and that the original has been left with your directorate or establishment. The duplicate list must not be inside the package containing the documents. 4. You should carry the package in a brief case or similar container of a type detailed in sub para 04111b. Except in the circumstances described in para 9 below, you should not open the package until you reach your destination. You should ensure that during your journey the package does not leave your possession, thus you should not leave it in hotel rooms or deposit it in hotel safes, luggage offices or lockers. At your destination you should, wherever practicable, have the documents housed overnight with a United Kingdom overseas Government representative or an authority (see 7 below) approved by your Principal Security Adviser. If this is not practicable the documents must not leave your personal custody even for a moment. 5. While carrying these documents you are not to travel: a. By air over, or by airline of, any of the following countries: Afghanistan Belarus China (including Hong Kong SAR, Tibet and Macao) Cuba Iran Iraq Lebannon Libya North Korea Russia Sudan JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4G-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Syria Ukraine Vietnam Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) b. By surface route to or through countries other than the following: Australia Austria * Belgium Canada Denmark France Germany Greece Iceland Italy * 6. Japan* Netherlands New Zealand* Norway Portugal Spain Sweden* Switzerland* Turkey United States Delete if NATO documents are being carried. You are not to discuss the documents you are carrying in any public place. 7. Should you lose the documents or if you are unable, because of sickness or for any other reason, to safeguard them, you should seek immediate assistance from a British Embassy, High Commission or Consular Officer (or Diplomatic Mission or Government Department of any NATO country, NATO International Command or Agency).+ + If NATO documents are not being carried delete the words in brackets. 8. Wherever practicable you should return the documents to the United Kingdom by diplomatic bag through a British Embassy, High Commission or Consular Office. (The package should be open so that the contents can be verified in order to comply with regulations) but it may be sealed in the presence of the Embassy, High Commission or Consular Officer who receives it. If it is necessary for you to carry the documents back with you, you should place them in the spare cover provided bearing the same reference number, stamp and signature as used on the outward journey. The cover must be sealed with wafer seals. (Wafer seals should have the addition of a signature in ink across the seals and the package which should be reinforced by strips of cellulose tape covering the seals and seams. If you have no means of sealing the package in this way you should make the best use of whatever adhesive material is available.) You should address it to yourself at your department. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4G-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents 9. There is no assurance of immunity from search by customs, Airport or Port officials of the countries whose borders you will be crossing. If any official inquires into the contents of the package, you should show your authorization but not these instructions, which must be kept separate from the authorization. This may suffice to pass the package (but not necessarily the briefcase) through the customs unopened. If, nevertheless, an official demands to see the contents of the package you may open it but should take precaution to show him only as much of the contents as will satisfy him that the package contains nothing more than it purports to contain. On no account should you allow the package out of your possession or permit a full examination of the documents. You should request the official to provide evidence of the opening and inspection of the package, for example, by signing or stamping it when closed. You should reseal the package. 10. If you have been obliged to open the package at the request of an official of the country you are visiting, you should where possible notify the local British Embassy, High Commission or Consular Office and you should report the incident to your Principal Security Adviser or to your security officer on your return. If the action was taken by a United Kingdom official you should also inform the above authorities. 11. On your return you should personally verify with the officer holding the duplicate list that all documents have been returned or receipts obtained. 12. On your return you must send your authorization certificate to your security officer and notify him of any incident of possible security significance. For example, any failure or inability on your part to safeguard the documents or any undue interest on the part of other persons in what you were carrying. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4G-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4G-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents ANNEX H TO CHAPTER 4 INSTRUCTIONS TO OFFICERS ON THE PERSONAL CARRIAGE OF PROTECTIVELY MARKED DOCUMENTS OVERSEAS I certify that I have read and understood the above instructions and that I undertake to observe them. Signature..................................................................... Name in block letters..................................................... Rank ......................................................................... Establishment................................................................ Date........................................................................... A list of documents has been left with: (Name)....................................................................... JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4H-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4H-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents ANNEX I TO CHAPTER 4 GUIDELINES TO COURIERS IN REGARD TO HIJACKING (The following advice should be given to all couriers on the threat from hijacking and measures to be taken to counter this threat.) 1. There is an ever present threat of hijacking on all commercial routes worldwide. 2. British airlines are given official advice on security measures against hijacking. These airlines can therefore be relied on to a greater extent than others. These airlines or service aircraft or aircraft on charter to the Armed Services should be used whenever possible. 3. A casual courier should return from overseas with as few protectively marked documents as possible. 4. If a courier is involved in a hijack he/she should do nothing to draw attention to him/herself. 5. At the conclusion of a hijacking when passengers are freed, the courier should whenever possible carry away the documents. 6. If a courier is freed but is forced by hijackers to leave the documents on board the aircraft, he/she should, if possible, ascertain the destination of the aircraft from the airport authorities and have the UK mission or protecting power at the destination informed of the presence of the documents so that action can be taken to recover them. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4I-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4I-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents ANNEX J TO CHAPTER 4 DESCRIPTORS 1. Descriptors may be helpful in implementing the "need to know" principle by indicating the nature of the asset's sensitivity and thereby helping to ensure that access is limited accordingly. Aside from PERSONAL, which by definition requires that the information is only made available in the first instance to the addressee, the descriptors will normally be used in conjunction with a protective marking. Used alone, descriptors may indicate who should see the material but do not of themselves impose any particular handling or level of protection. A list of MOD descriptors is below: a. APPOINTMENTS. Concerning actual or potential appointments that have not been announced. b. BUDGET. Concerning proposed or actual measures for the Budget before they are announced. c. COMMERCIAL. Subject matter of actual or potential commercial value, the disclosure of which would prejudice a commercial interest. The rules for the use of this marking are given in Chapter 12. d. CONTRACTS. Matters concerning tenders under consideration and the terms of tenders accepted. e. CONTROL (or DS). Exercise papers for use only by control or directing staff. (For MOD use only.) f. EXAMINATION. Subject matter relating to setting, marking or future examination papers. (For MOD use only.) g. EXERCISES. Concerning orders and instructions pertaining to military exercises at home and abroad. (For MOD use only.) h. HONOURS. awards. Matters concerning military or civilian honours and i. INTELLIGENCE. Concerning intelligence source material and assessments. (For MOD use only.) j. INVESTIGATION. criminal matters. k. LOCSEN. Concerning investigations into disciplinary or Concerning locally sensitive information. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4J-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security l. MANAGEMENT. Management policy and planning matters, the premature disclosure of which would not be in the interest of the Ministry of Defence or the Services. m. MEDICAL. Medical matters concerning individuals including reports and records. n. OPERATIONS. Concerning orders and instructions pertaining to military operations at home and abroad. (For MOD use only.) o. PERSONAL. addressed. Material only to be seen by the person to whom it is p. POLICE. Police matters concerning police operations and activities. (For MOD use only.) q. r. POLICY. publication. Concerning proposals for new or changed policy before REGULATORY. Material which has come into the possession of government departments or agencies in the course of carrying out their statutory regulatory duties. s. STAFF. Matters concerning the administration (eg confidential reports), discipline, security status and service of named or identifiable personnel. t. VETTING. Concerning matters pertaining to the security clearance of personnel. (For MOD use only.) u. VISITS. Concerning details of visits by, for example, Royalty, ministers or very senior staff. 2. Should additions to this list be sought, they should be addressed to D Def Sy through the security reporting chain. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4J-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents ANNEX K TO CHAPTER 4 CODEWORDS, NICKNAMES AND THE PROTECTION OF COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION Codewords and nicknames 1. Definitions. A codeword is a single word that is always expressed in CAPITAL letters and is used to provide security cover for reference to a particular protected matter. A nickname is a name made up of two words selected by the originator and used for convenience for reference to any matter where security protection is not required. 2. It is important to understand the difference between codewords (which provide security cover) and nicknames (which do not) because confusion in the use of these terms could lead to breaches of security. The adoption of local or unofficial terms or procedures (eg `code names') is forbidden. 3. Use of codewords. Codewords are to be used solely for security purposes and only registered codewords may be used. The primary purpose of codewords is to conceal intentions, but they may also be used to limit the knowledge of particular matters. They may be used: a. b. c. As names for protected plans, projects, equipments, etc. To describe or initiate phases of operations. To initiate action for emergency or contingency plans. d. To provide a short reference to a protected matter, knowledge of which must be restricted to a limited circle of people. e. To identify protected documents with a limited circulation, ie subject to special handling procedures. 4. Control and Allotment of Codewords. All codewords are to be taken from the United Kingdom Codeword Index maintained by the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC). The DCMC makes block allocations of codewords to lead Commands; Service establishments are to apply for codewords or information about codewords to Command HQs. Blocks of codewords not yet taken into use should be treated as CONFIDENTIAL documents to avoid any risk of compromise in their subsequent use. Central Staffs branches should apply for codewords or information about codewords direct to DCMC. DPA and DLO staff should apply to JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4K-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents their Principal Security Adviser. In the event of a codeword being required out of normal working hours, application may be made to the Chief of the Defence Staff's Duty Officer. 5. Notification of Use. When a codeword is taken into use, its meaning, with the protective marking for both the codeword itself and its meaning, must be notified by the user to the issuing authority through normal channels. Any changes must be notified as they occur. Codewords taken into use but subsequently cancelled may not be re-used without authority from the issuing authority. 6. Procedure for Bringing Codewords into Use. The user of a codeword is responsible for allotting a meaning to it with protective markings for both the codeword itself and its meaning. The user should ensure, in conjunction with the issuing authority, that within the limitations of the available registered words, the codeword chosen is suitable for the matter to which it is to refer, namely, it should be: a. Neither frivolous nor likely to invest the matter with an undesirable significance. b. Unrelated to the meaning, eg ICEBERG is unsuitable for cold weather operations. c. Unrelated to other words of a series, eg a series of bird names is unsuitable for, say, the various phases of an operation. 7. The Meaning. The meaning given to a codeword is to be specific and selfexplanatory but should not reveal more than is necessary. 8. Protective Marking. The purpose of a codeword is to conceal the meaning attached to it and as long as this concealment is complete there is normally no reason for the codeword itself, as opposed to its meaning, to attract a protective marking. An unclassified codeword may be used in an unclassified letter or in a telephone conversation in clear to convey a protected meaning, eg contingency plans may have a high protective marking but the order to implement them might be given by signalling a codeword in clear, or by voice over a radio net or by telephone. Occasionally there may be a matter of such secrecy that knowledge of its existence must be limited to few people. In these circumstances a wide knowledge of the codeword might excite unwanted curiosity. When this is the case, the codeword itself should be given a protective marking, although not necessarily as high as its meaning. When a codeword marking is applied, the asset or event must attract a protective marking of RESTRICTED as a minimum. 9. Security of Codewords in Use. Users must ensure that: a. Protective markings of codewords and their meanings are progressively downgraded as the need for secrecy of plans, projects or operations diminishes. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4K-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. A codeword together with its meaning must never feature in any electronic transmission such as a signal, telegram, telex, fax or telephone conversation, although they may appear in the same document, provided the document is correctly protectively marked. c. Codewords in frequent use on a wide distribution are changed from time to time as a protection against possible compromise. 10. Exercises. If, for real security reasons, codewords as opposed to nicknames, are required for exercises, they should be issued by commands from the list of those allotted by the DCMC. Care should be taken in defining the meanings of codewords used on exercises particularly if there is a likelihood that it may become necessary later to release codewords and their meanings to the Press. A codeword used for an exercise must always be prefixed by the word EXERCISE, for example, EXERCISE MATADOR. Nicknames only are required for RESTRICTED exercises. 11. Cancellation of codewords. Users are responsible for notifying the issuing authority, through normal channels, of the cancellation and surrender of a codeword when its purpose has been completed or it has been replaced after compromise. This notification should include the protective marking retained by the meaning. Surrendered codewords must in no circumstances be taken into use again without specific re-issue by the issuing authority. 12. Compromise of codewords. If a codeword is compromised, the appropriate Principal Secuurity Adviser must be informed immediately. To minimize any risk of compromising, a new codeword should not be referred to in the same document as the one it is replacing. When a change of codeword becomes necessary all concerned must be informed that the original has been cancelled and will be replaced by a new codeword to be contained in a later communication. A used codeword will not be reallocated for at least 3 years (or, if the branch concerned so requests, for a period up to a maximum of 5 years) after cancellation. It will be reallocated only if there is no suitable codeword available and if the controller is satisfied that its further use will not cause misunderstanding. The second communication should be given the same protective marking as the meaning of the codeword and should merely refer to the first communication and state `Codeword is ...' 13. Use of codewords for equipment after declassification of the meaning. A codeword allotted to an equipment may be continued in use, if appropriate, as a name for the equipment after it has been declassified. 14. Handling of codewords. Codewords are to be handled as CONFIDENTIAL until they are taken into use and allotted a new protective marking by the user. 15. Use of nicknames. The use of nicknames is limited to RESTRICTED and unclassified matters, examples of which are: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4K-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents a. b. Operations. Enemy locations and target indication. Training. Names for exercises. c. Administration. Titles for logistic projects, routes for movement, geographical locations and place names. 16. Selection, notification and cancellation of nicknames. The user of a nickname is responsible for its selection, notification, use and cancellation as follows: a. It must consist of two words chosen at random which must be distinct and which cannot be run together into a single word (eg. GREAT COAT or PIG SKIN are not to be used). This is to avoid confusion with codewords. b. Notification is to be limited to those concerned with the matter to which the nickname refers. c. Nicknames do not need to be reported to the Ministry of Defence or Command headquarters. Protection of compartmented information 17. For some categories of sensitive material or externally sourced material, generically referred to as compartmented information, but often referred to as Codeword material, in addition to the general requirements for IT system and site accreditation from the designated Accreditor(s), approval is also required from all relevant Control or Release Authorities before the material may be stored, processed or forwarded on IT system(s). 18. Compartment approval. This may be referred to by 3rd parties (i.e. those outside MOD) as an "accreditation", but within MOD the term accreditation is reserved for the activity of ensuring that the IT systems are implemented to meet the needs of UK protectively marked material at the High Water Mark of any and all compartments to be used, which is carried out by the Defence Security Standards Organisation (DSSO). 19. Risk assessment. The only compartmented information which has a MOD recognised Risk Assessment methodology is the STRAP system as laid down in JSP440 Volume 5. In order to assess the overall security requirements for other Compartmented data, a STRAP Equivalent Level (SEL) should be derived before discussing protection requirement with security staffs. Advice on the selection of an appropriate SEL can be obtained from Head of InfoSy(Tech), MB4154, 84505MB. 20. Compartmented INFOSEC representative. Where the compartmented information has a formal Control or Release Authority, a Designated Security Authority (DSA) or Cognizant Security Authority (CSA) will normally fulfil the capacity of a Compartment Infosec Representative (CIR) for the material concerned, acting as a competent authority on behalf of the Control / Release Authority. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4K-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 21. In the cases of compartmented information where the UK Control or Release Authority resides within MOD, for instance the ATOMIC system, the DSA must be drawn from the staff of the DSSO. The Control / Release Authority is responsible for nominating their CIR(s), and the details of this nomination must be supplied to the DSSO in accordance with the format laid down at Appendix 1 to this Annex. In selecting an agent, the following metric should be used: a. Where the system(s) processing the compartmented information are solely contained within the real estate of a single Principal Security Adviser, that authority should be asked to acts as the CIR; b. Where the system(s) processing the compartmented information cross Authority boundaries, either within or without MOD, including NATO or Other Government Departments (OGD), D Def Sy should be consulted, and may in some cases elect to nominate a DD Def Sy(Info) staff officer to fill this capacity. 22. Compartmented information not solely controlled within MOD, for instance STRAP, will have their own arrangements for appointment of CIRs, and any queries should be addressed to Head of InfoSy(Tech), MB4154, 84505MB. 23. Where a requirement to process information from a compartment is identified, but the CIR is not known to the project office, then Head of InfoSy(Tech) should be consulted. 24. Incident handling. If any security incident occurs affecting systems used to store, process or forward compartmented material, then in addition to any local reporting arrangements, the MOD Joint Security Co-ordination Centre (JSyCC), which has overall responsibility for such matters on behalf of the Departmental Security Officer, must also be informed immediately. JSyCC can be contacted on 020-72180117 (80117MB). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4K-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page is intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4K1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents ANNEX L TO CHAPTER 4 INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE ORGANISATION MARKINGS General 1. International defence organization (IDO) documents are those which belong to the defence organizations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) including the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)/Partnership for Peace (PfP) or the Western European Union (WEU). The United Kingdom is a member of both organizations. Documents are marked NATO, NACC, PfP or WEU as appropriate and are circulated on a need to know basis within the IDOs concerned. These documents are subject to certain security procedures and to the regulations of these organizations. 2. The IDO markings NATO, NACC, PfP or WEU immediately precede the protective marking as follows: a. NATO documents. (1) (2) (3) (4) b. NATO UNCLASSIFIED NATO RESTRICTED NATO CONFIDENTIAL NATO SECRET NACC documents. (1) (2) (3) (4) NACC UNCLASSIFIED NACC RESTRICTED NACC CONFIDENTIAL NACC SECRET JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4L-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c. PfP documents. (1) (2) (3) (4) d. PfP UNCLASSIFIED PfP RESTRICTED PfP CONFIDENTIAL PfP SECRET WEU documents. (1) (2) (3) (4) WEU UNCLASSIFIED WEU RESTRICTED WEU CONFIDENTIAL WEU SECRET 3. NATO and WEU documents which are protectively marked TOP SECRET are also marked with the IDO markings COSMIC or FOCAL respectively, as follows: a. NATO documents. COSMIC TOP SECRET b. WEU documents. FOCAL TOP SECRET 4. The meanings of the protective markings (or classifications) are similar to those given at para 0103 of Chapter 1 with the exception that the degree of compromise relates to the international organization concerned and not to the Nation. Should NATO or a partner country wish to restrict distribution on certain NACC/PfP information, this will be indicated by NATO/name of country ONLY on a separate line immediately below the protective marking, eg. PfP CONFIDENTIAL NATO/POLAND ONLY 5. NATO documents containing certain information dealing with nuclear matters are given the restrictive marking ATOMAL. 6. Control officers. A sub control officer, who is appropriately cleared, is to be appointed in each establishment which is required to handle accountable IDO documents. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4L-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Handling procedures 7. Accountable IDO documents. Accountable IDO documents require special handling and safeguarding in accordance with instructions issued on a `need to know' basis. Accountable IDO documents must not be filed with National protectively marked documents since the holder may be required to produce them to an IDO inspecting officer who may not be a United Kingdom National. Accountable IDO documents are: a. b. c. NATO documents marked COSMIC TOP SECRET. NATO documents marked ATOMAL. WEU documents marked FOCAL TOP SECRET. 8. When there is no longer need to hold an accountable IDO document, in the United Kingdom it is to be returned to the appropriate IDO sub-registry and forwarded to the Ministry of Defence (DIS Sy IDR) for destruction. Elsewhere, local security instructions should be consulted. 9. IDO accountable documents are to be stored at the standards required for United Kingdom TOP SECRET material. 10. Non-accountable IDO documents. Non-accountable IDO documents need not be registered or kept separately from National documents unless they are permanently attached to accountable IDO documents. Files containing non-accountable IDO documents or extracts must however be clearly marked on the outside as follows: `This file contains NATO (or WEU, NACC or PfP) information' as appropriate. 11. Separate MOD Forms 102 are to be used for registering IDO accountable documents. Classification and markings 12. Correct use of markings. It is important to use IDO markings correctly because documents so marked are authorized for circulation on a `need-to-know' basis within the IDO concerned and have to be accounted for to it; they are liable to inspection by an international team from the IDO concerned. Incorrect marking may give an IDO the responsibility for documents that are of concern to the United Kingdom only, and, in the event of the loss of such documents, for the subsequent reports and investigations which correctly should be the responsibility of the United Kingdom. 13. The markings NATO, NACC, PfP,COSMIC, WEU, FOCAL or ATOMAL are only to be placed on United Kingdom originated documents when: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4L-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. The document is specifically prepared for issue direct to an IDO. In such cases only the copies for the IDO are to be given the appropriate IDO marking; copies retained for National use are not to be so marked, or b. Copies of a document prepared for United Kingdom use are released to an IDO; only the copies sent to the IDO are to be given the appropriate IDO marking. 14. Reversion to lower classification when detached. Individual parts of protected documents (and covering letters) may revert to a lower classification when detached. This is to be indicated on the parts (or covering letters) concerned, eg, `NATO RESTRICTED when detached'. 15. Covering letters. A letter covering an IDO document is to be protectively marked at least as high as the most highly classified attachment but see para 14. 16. Extracts. When an extract is made from an IDO document it should be protectively marked according to the content of the extract using the appropriate IDO protective marking, eg, NATO SECRET. If the information extracted was originally supplied by the United Kingdom a National protective marking is appropriate. 17. Downgrading. IDO documents may not be downgraded without the consent of the originator. 18. Copy numbering. All IDO TOP SECRET and SECRET documents are to be copy-numbered with the total distribution shown, eg `Copy No 1 of 20'. 19. Page numbering. All IDO documents except those on a single sheet are to be page-numbered. IDO TOP SECRET and SECRET documents are to show the total number of pages of the whole document on the front page, eg `Total pages 14'. IDO TOP SECRET and SECRET documents are also to show the total number of pages in the main part, eg `1 of 9'; annexes and appendices are also to show this information, eg `A1 of 3' or `B2-1 of 7'. 20. Reference numbering. All IDO documents protectively marked SECRET or above are to bear a reference number on each page. A new annex or appendix added to a COSMIC or FOCAL TOP SECRET document, or NATO or WEU SECRET document, is to state on the first page: a. b. The reference number of the original document with its date of issue. The purpose of the new text, eg addition or substitution. Transmission of IDO documents 21. Procedures governing the transmission of documents bearing such markings as ATOMAL, COSMIC and FOCAL are issued to those with a need to know. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4L-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents 22. IDO documents protectively marked SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL are to be handled in accordance with the rules for UK documents protectively marked SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL as set out in Annex C. 23. IDO documents marked RESTRICTED and bearing only the supplementary markings NATO or WEU are to be handled in accordance with the general rules for UK documents protectively marked RESTRICTED set out in Annex C. Storage 24. IDO classified documents are to be stored in accordance with the minimum standards for UK documents of the equivalent protective marking (but see para 9 above). Carriage of IDO documents by casual couriers 25. COSMIC, ATOMAL or FOCAL TOP SECRET documents are not to be carried by casual couriers (either diplomatic or non-diplomatic) in any circumstances. Release of IDO classified information 26. NATO classified information may not be disseminated to Nations or military commands outside the NATO Alliance without the approval of the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee or, when appropriate, the National security authority (ie the Official Committee on Security.) 27. All information exchanged under the NACC/PfP programmes is privileged information and for official use only. It will, therefore, only be disseminated to organisations and persons involved in the programmes and with a need-to-know of the information. 28. WEU classified information may not be passed outside the organization except by the originator or with his consent. Surveys and inspections of IDO sub-registries 29. Principal Security Advisers are to ensure that surveys and inspections include IDO sub-registries and control points and associated communication centres where these are established. Inspections are to be carried out annually and will be additional to any which may be carried out by the security representatives of the IDO concerned. 30. Guidance on the method of carrying out NATO sub-registry and control point surveys and inspection is contained in NATO Document AC/35/D/1006 (Revised) dated 5 July 1976. 31. Separate reports on inspections of NATO sub-registries and control points are to be sent to the Ministry of Defence DIS Sy IDR for onward transmission to NATO. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4L-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Detailed rules for IDO document security 32. The full rules for handling IDO documents are set out in the following documents which are issued to, or are available for staff who need to use them: a. NATO: (1) Security within The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (CM(55)15 (Final)). (Note: Policy in respect of the exchange of information between NATO and NACC/PfP countries will be incorporated in this document.) (2) Agreement for co-operation regarding ATOMIC information (C-M(64)39). (3) Administrative arrangements to implement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Co-operation regarding ATOMAL information (C-M(68)41(5th Revise)). (4) Special procedures for the handling of US-Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) information (C-M(71)(27) (Revised) and AC35/WP75 (attached to C-M(71)(27). (5) Handling of a ATOMAL information with classified communication centres (ACP 122 NATO Supplement No 2). b. WEU: (1) Western European Union security regulations RS 100 April 1995. International organisations 33. United Nations (UN). The UN sometimes require its material to be protected and routinely employ markings (classifications) with the prefix "UN" which are indistinguishable from our own. Although the terms may be the same, the protection required may be different. Unless otherwise instructed, all UN marked material should be accorded the same level of protection as comparable UK markings would dictate. 34. Any messages handed in to a UK commcen for transmission over UK channels are to be protectively marked in accordance with current UK regulations. Any messages handed in with the prefix "UN" for transmission over such UK channels are to be returned to the originator with a request that the prefix be deleted and the appropriate level of protection according to current UK regulations be inserted. Messages prefixed "UN" may of course be passed over UN provided and protected channels. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4L-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents ANNEX M TO CHAPTER 4 SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS FOR HOMEWORKERS Introduction 1. These instructions are designed to ensure that the minimum standards which protect information in MOD offices are applied, as far as possible, in home circumstances and a copy will accompany all letters of appointment for homeworkers. They may not be relaxed and may be applied only in Great Britain. These rules will also apply to those MOD office-based employees who regularly take work home. General 2. Homeworkers are permitted to have access to official information with a protective marking up to and including RESTRICTED, provided: a. He or she understands his/her obligations in respect of physical and procedural security measures necessary to protect such material; and b. All the necessary practical arrangements, as called for by the security staff, have been made to ensure they can be fulfilled. 3. Before homeworking commences the homeworker must provide his or her line manager with a written agreement to a visit to the home (and, thereafter, to periodic spot checks) by representatives of the Principal Security Adviser's staff to confirm that satisfactory physical and procedural security measures are in place. Such agreement must be confirmed whenever regular access to official information is involved, irrespective of its protective marking level. Personal security 4. Homeworkers should be especially careful not to draw attention to the fact that they are working on official information at home. As homeworkers will have few opportunities to discuss work problems with colleagues, they may be more vulnerable to compromise by someone professing to show an interest in their work. They need to be alert to this danger, and any instances of outsiders (or those without a "need to know") showing undue interest should be reported to the appropriate Principal Security Adviser's staff. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4M-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Security in the work area (Including Storage of Information) 5. Many aspects of security which are taken for granted in MOD buildings and establishments are difficult to replicate in the home. As far as possible, homeworkers must adhere to the following guidelines: a. Where possible, a lockable room should be set aside as a working area, used exclusively for official work. If this is not possible, a working area should be selected to minimize, and control, unexpected interruptions from family or visitors. b. If interruptions occur during official work, the homeworker should ensure that official documents, and particularly protectively marked documents, are covered so that they cannot be overlooked. c. When not working on official documents, they should be stored in an appropriate locked container exclusively for the protection of MOD documents (the key(s) to which must be held personally by the homeworker and spare keys to be deposited with the line manager/ESyO of the parent establishment), unless: (1) (2) and (3) The homeworker intends to return to it after a short interval; and It is in a room to which the door and windows have been locked; The homeworker remains in the home. Telephone Security 6. Homeworkers should be alert to the dangers of passing protectively marked information of possible use to terrorists, for targeting purposes, over the public telephone network. Always confirm the identity of originators/recipients of telephone calls. To minimize risk of eavesdropping, party-lines or multi-extensions are not advisable. Similarly, use of radio telephones (including cordless and cellular telephones) for passing RESTRICTED information is prohibited. The following table addresses the precautions necessary when using the telephone to discuss protectively marked information: Type of Telephone Call Within Mainland UK Excluding Northern Ireland Protective Marking RESTRICTED To & Within Northern Ireland UNCLASSIFIED Overseas UNCLASSIFIED JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4M-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Facsimile Transmission Security 7. The considerations outlined in the previous paragraph also apply to facsimile transmissions. Where the need for speed is paramount, an officially approved facsimile machine located in the home may be used for passing information protectively marked up to and including RESTRICTED over networks within the UK. The homeworker must verify that the recipient is ready to receive the message prior to transmission. Unprotected circuits outside the UK and Northern Ireland are only to be used to transmit UNCLASSIFIED information. Computer and Word Processor Security 8. The use of a personal computer or word processor for RESTRICTED or other official information should be approved by the parent establishment IT Security Officer (ITSO). If approved for use at home, the ITSO will issue a site specific Security Operating Procedures (SyOPs). Staff should consult JSP 440 Volume 3 for detailed instructions on the use of such equipment. Photocopying/printing 9. It is important to keep copies of documents to the minimum necessary for the proper conduct of business. Reproduction of RESTRICTED and above documents may only be undertaken on an approved photocopier. UNCLASSIFIED documents may be reproduced on local commercial copiers if operated by the homeworker, care being taken to ensure, as far as possible, that documents are not read or identified as MOD/official documents by others. Posting Documents - to, from and between Homeworkers 10. The minimum standards for transmitting documents, within Great Britain, through the postal services are as follows: Protective Marking RESTRICTED Approved means Enveloping, sealing and marking Single envelope. Ordinary letter post. Full address (including post code). Security markings are not to be shown. As above. As above. Address by name and mark "Personal For:" As for RESTRICTED. As above. RESTRICTED (plus Descriptor(s) UNCLASSIFIED JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4M-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 11. The homeworker's attention is also drawn to Annex C of Chapter 4 for full details on postal arrangements to locations in Northern Ireland and overseas and the use of return addresses on official mail. Carriage - by the Homeworker and other MOD Staff 12. Where it is necessary to remove RESTRICTED documents from the home (to attend a meeting, for example), it should be carried in a locked container such as a briefcase with a combination lock. The container is to bear a label securely attached to the outside giving instructions to the finder. Only one side should normally be visible, the reverse being obscured by a protective cover. The visible side of the label is to read: "IF FOUND, PLEASE SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS LABEL". The reverse side is to read: "ANYONE FINDING THIS CONTAINER IS ASKED TO TELEPHONE 0171-21-86806 OR HAND IT IN AT THE NEAREST POLICE STATION OR RAILWAY STATION OR OTHER TRANSPORT AUTHORITY WITH A REQUEST THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE THAT ACTION". Note: The telephone number given is that of the security control room, MOD Main Building. The number of the appropriate Principal Security Adviser may be given instead. 13. While carrying protectively marked documents, the container should remain in the homeworker's possession at all times. Protectively marked documents are not to be read in any public place or on public transport. Note: Never journey abroad or to Northern Ireland carrying a briefcase bearing the Royal cipher. Review of Holdings 14. The homeworker should minimize official documents held at home. Holdings should be reviewed at least every six months and, where appropriate, forwarded/returned to the MOD. Destruction of Waste 15. UNCLASSIFIED paper waste may be disposed of by shredding or tearing it into small pieces and placing into household waste bins; it must be well mixed with domestic rubbish. It must not be used as "rough" paper for use by other members of the homeworker's household. RESTRICTED paper waste must be disposed of by a method approved of by the appropriate Principal Security Adviser's staff or returned to the MOD for secure disposal. All non-paper waste must be returned to the MOD for secure disposal. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4M-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents Files and File Lists 16. MOD practice should be followed. Lists of all files held at home should be kept by both the homeworker and his/her line manager's Registry to facilitate spot checks. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4M-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4M-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control and Carriage of Protected Documents ANNEX N TO CHAPTER 4 CASUAL COURIERS - PROHIBITED ITEMS 1. Casual couriers who have been granted a single journey - casual courier passport (with diplomatic immunity) for the purposes of carrying protectively marked material overseas are to be aware that the following items are prohibited from being carried in their diplomatic bag: a. Contraband, including controlled substances (particularly narcotics and dangerous drugs). b. Firearms, explosives, ammunition or other material hazardous to personnel. c. d. Combustibles. Liquids, foodstuffs and perishable items. e. Currency, military payment certificates, bonds, securities, gold, silver, jewels, jewellery, postage stamps in quantity or other negotiable instruments. f. Office equipment and office supplies, including blank forms and paper. g. h. Supply items such as blankets, repair parts, tools and clothing. Tobacco and alcohol. 2. Casual couriers travelling within the United Kingdom, and those who have not been granted diplomatic immunity but have nevertheless been authorised by their relevant Principal Security Adviser to carry protectively marked documents overseas, are prohibited from carrying the following items: a. b. c. Contraband, including controlled substances (particularly narcotics and dangerous drugs). Firearms, explosives, ammunition or other material hazardous to personnel. Combustibles. d. Currency, military payment certificates, bonds, securities, gold, silver, jewels, jewellery, postage stamps in quantity or other negotiable instruments. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4N-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 4N-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security CHAPTER 5 PHYSICAL SECURITY Section 0 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI Introduction General Principles Security Aspects of Works Projects and Services External Perimeter Security Measures The Physical Security of Buildings Precautions against Overlooking and Overhearing Closed Circuit Television Intruder Detection Systems Guards and Patrols Control of Entry ­ Pass Systems and General Regulations Automatic Access Control Systems Security Containers and Secure Rooms Locks and Security Keys Mechanical Document Transfer Systems and Automated Document Account Systems Accommodation Moves Reprographic Machines Destruction of Protectively Marked Waste Title JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security XVII XVIII XIX Conference Security Security of Equipment Site Access Management Systems JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security PHYSICAL SECURITY Chapter 05 Introduction Section I. Introduction The Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix Menu of Measures Physical Security Measures Performance Standards Matrix Section 1. Matrix Section 2. Matrix Section 3. Matrix Section 4. Matrix Section 5. Matrix Section 6. Annex A. Annex B. Annex C. Annex D. Containers and Security Locks Rooms Buildings Entry control Guards and Alarm Systems Outer Perimeter Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix Menu of Minimum Baseline Measures Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix ­ Points Checksheet Guide to the Use of the Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix General Principles 05101 05104 05109 05113 05114 05116 05118 05119 05122 05124 5-1-A-1 5-1-B-1 5-1-C-1 Para Page 5-1-D-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Appendix 1. Example - Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix - Points Checksheet Summary of Classes of Security Equipment and Security Measures Security Aspects of Works Projects and Services 05201 05203 05207 05211 05212 05213 05224 05227 05234 05247 5-1-D1-1 Annex E. 5-1-E-1 Section II. General Coordination of Works Projects/Services Procurement of Security Equipment/Systems Counter Terrorist Physical Security Measures for MOD Buildings Site Selection Site Layout Accommodation Planning Secure Zones Security in Open Plan Offices Security of Documents and Activated IT Systems in Unattended Offices Annex A. Annex B. Annex C. Special Services Group (SSG) Security Advice - Capital Works Projects Security Advice - Works Service (PROPMAN) 5-2-A-1 5-2-B-1 5-2-C-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Annex D. Security Involvement in Works Related Private Finance Initiative Drafting the Statement of Security Requirement (SSR) and Operational Requirement Request for Initial SSG Advisory Service in Respect of Security Requirements at a Defence Site Counter Terrorist Physical Security Measures for all MOD Owned or Occupied Buildings External Perimeter Security Measures 05301 05303 05312 05313 05316 05321 05323 5-2-D-1 Annex E. 5-2-E-1 Annex F. 5-2-F-1 Annex G. 5-2-G-1 Section III. Introduction Fences Entrances and Exits Security Notice Boards Perimeter Intruder Detection Systems (PIDS) Security Lighting Types of Security Lighting Section IV. General Use of Security Measures Doors Inter-communicating Doors Internal Doors JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-5 The Physical Security of Buildings 05401 05407 05409 05415 05416 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Emergency Exit Doors Door Frames Door Bolts Hinges and Dog Bolts Grilles and Shutters Wide Angle Optical Viewers Windows Glazing Double Glazing Roofs Skylights, Fanlights, Rooflights Downpipes Sunken Outside Areas Parking/loading Bays Public Utilities Section V. General Overlooking Overhearing Section VI. General System Considerations Video and Disc Recording JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-6 Closed Circuit Television Precautions against Overlooking and Overhearing 05417 05419 05420 05421 05423 05425 05426 05429 05430 05432 05434 05435 05436 05437 05438 05501 05503 05506 05601 05607 05614 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Video Movement Detection Systems Section VII. General Intruder Detection Systems Operational Requirement System Components Detection Sensors Types of Sensor Control Panel Event Log Alarm Display Alarm Signalling for Remote Sites Installation Wiring Reaction Force and Response Time System Management Installation and Maintenance Access Control Panel Testing Event Logs Investigation of Alarms Refurbishment of Buildings Portable Intruder Detection Systems Intruder Detection Systems 05615 05701 05704 05706 05709 05710 05711 05712 05713 05715 05716 05717 05718 05719 05721 05724 05725 05726 05727 05728 05729 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Annex A. Section VIII. General Definitions The AC12 Intruder Detection System Guards and Patrols 05801 05803 05804 5-7-A-1 Principles of Guarding and Patrolling Categories of Defence Establishments for Guarding Purposes and Composition of Guard Force Duties of Guards Search Trespassers Response Plan Static Posts Cadet Units Accommodation and Equipment Access to Protectively Marked Material by Guard Forces Commercial Guard Forces Supervision of Guards Instructions Patrols ­ General Principles Patrol Procedures Dogs Additional Security Measures 05811 05812 05816 05818 05819 05820 05821 05826 05827 05829 05836 05837 05840 05843 05848 05853 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Action to be taken for Unsecured Protectively Marked Material Annex A. Annex B Security Patrol Room Check Sheet Rules of Engagement for the release of dogs by Defence Personnel on duty in the United Kingdom Searching Record of Search Appropriate Wording for Advertising a Liability to Search on MOD Property Control of Entry ­ Pass Systems and General Regulations (UNDER REVIEW) Automatic Access Control Systems 05856 5-8-A-1 5-8-B-1 5-8-C-1 5-8-C1-1 Annex C Appendix 1 Appendix 2 5-8-C2-1 Section IX. Section X. Inroduction 051001 051006 051007 051010 051011 051012 051014 051015 051018 051020 5-0-9 Responsibility for AACS Operational Requirement Definitions Classes of AACS Types of AACS Installation Criteria Security Criteria System Criteria Effective Use JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Management Doors Secondary Systems Section XI. Security Containers and Secure Rooms 051028 051031 051032 Security Containers - General Classification of Containers Standards Care of Security Containers Control of Security Containers Container Records Action in the Event of Suspected Tampering Secure Rooms Classes of Room Choosing a Room Types of Room Annex A. Section XII. Locks - General Classification of Locks Combination Locks Vulnerabilities of Combination Locks Action in the Event of Suspected Compromise Maintenance and Repairs JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-10 Secure Rooms Locks and Security Keys 051101 051104 051105 051109 051111 051116 051118 051119 051121 051122 051123 5-11-A-1 051201 051203 051204 051213 051215 051216 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Vulnerabilities of Key Locks Security Keys - Definition Other Keys Action in the Event of Suspected Compromise or Loss of a Security Key or Combination Setting 051218 051222 051237 051238 Section XIII. Mechanical Document Transfer Systems and Automated Document Account Systems 051301 051303 051305 051309 051312 051314 051315 051316 051317 051320 051321 Accommodation Moves 051401 051403 Mechanical Document Transfer (MDT) Systems ­ Introduction General Security Measures Level of Physical Security Measures Ducting Security Protection of Despatch Control Unit Emergency Power Transmission between Secure Zones Automated Document Transfer Systems (ADAS) General Facilities Security Measures Section XIV. General Planning JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security The Move Closure of Establishments Section XV. General Control of Use Potential Risks Maintenance and Disposal Power Supply Tempest Section XVI. General Administrative Procedures Rules for Destruction Collection, Handling and Storage of Waste Methods of Destruction - Incineration The Destruction of Paper and Paper-based Waste Shredding Pulping Disintegrators and Hammer-mills The Destruction of Magnetic Media Incineration Disintegrators Sanding Shredding JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-12 Destruction of Protectively Marked Waste Reprographic Machines 051405 051406 051501 051503 051505 051506 051507 051508 051601 051604 051605 051606 051609 051611 051613 051614 051617 051618 051619 051624 051625 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Acid and Chemical techniques The Destruction of Microform Total Destruction Partial Destruction Emergency Destruction Methods of Emergency Destruction Annex A. Annex B. Methods of Destruction Table Emergency Destruction of Protectively Marked Material in Ships Conference Security 051626 051627 051628 051631 051633 051637 5-16-A-1 5-16-B-1 Section XVII. General 051701 051703 051705 051706 051707 051708 051709 051710 051711 051712 051713 051714 051715 051719 5-0-13 Conference Security Officer Security Plan Access Control Passes Secure Zones Controlled Areas Documents Security Protectively Marked Waste Security Containers Tape Recorders Technical Security Simultaneous Interpretation Equipment (SIE) Room Security JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Security Breaches Security and Emergency Instructions Counter Terrorist Measures Section XVIII. General Definition of Equipment The Use of a Matrix The Security of Equipment Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix Security of Equipment Menu of Measures Physical Security Measures - Performance Standards Movement of Protectively Marked Equipment Annex A. Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix for Large Items of Equipment Kept Inside Special-to-type Buildings Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix for Large Items of Equipment Kept in the Open Menu of Minimum Baseline Measures for Security of Equipment Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix - Points Checksheet for Large Items of Equipment kept Inside Special-to-type Buildings Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix - Points Checksheet for Large Items of Equipment kept in the Open 5-0-14 Security of Equipment 051720 051721 051722 051801 051803 051804 051806 051814 051818 051819 5-18-A-1 Annex B. 5-18-B-1 Annex C. 5-18-C-1 Annex D. 5-18-D-1 Annex E. 5-18-E-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Annex F. Guide to the Use of the Minimum Baseline Measures Matrices and Menu for the Protection of Protectively Marked Equipment Example ­ Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix - Points Checksheet for Large Items of Equipment kept inside Specialto-type Buildings Example ­ Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix ­ Points Checksheet for Large Items of Equipment kept in the Open Site Access Management Systems 051901 051906 051910 051915 051918 5-18-F-1 Appendix 1. 5-18-F1-1 Appendix 2. 5-18-F2-1 Section XIX. General Networking SAMS System Procurement System Management Pass Production JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-15 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-16 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security CHAPTER 5 GENERAL PHYSICAL SECURITY INTRODUCTION Layout of Chapter 5 05001. This chapter is set out in 18 sections following a similar format to the Cabinet Office base-document, the Manual of Protective Security (MPS). It is so set out to allow for simple amendment of the individual parts of the physical security chapter following changes in policy. Each section has a paragraph at the beginning entitled 'Further advice, information and guidance' the purpose of which is to help the user in the following ways: a. Identify other documents that contain policy direction or more detail on the subject if so required. b. Notify the user that certain documents must be used in conjunction with the Defence Manual of Security (DMS). c. Identify other chapters, sections and parts of the DMS which contain additional information for the user. d. Notify the requirement, where applicable, for the involvement of TLB security staff by an establishment in the decision making process at the earliest opportunity (e.g. in the procurement process for automatic access control systems (AACS), closed circuit television (CCTV), intruder detection systems (IDS) etc). Definition of Physical Security 05002. In general terms, physical security means the positioning of obstacles to prevent: a. Unauthorised access to official material. b. Unauthorised access to property for the purpose of destroying, disabling, compromising or removing it, with the object of impeding operations, or in the pursuance of espionage or personal/financial profit. c. Unauthorised access to official information of Defence property for the purpose of killing or injuring Defence personnel or damaging or destroying Defence property. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Nature and Scope 05003. There is no standard method of providing physical security within the MOD. To give all establishments equal protection would be wasteful. The degree of protection will vary from area to area and HOE must determine their own requirements based on advice from the appropriate security organisation within the minimum baseline measures described fully in section I of this chapter and such other regulations that are promulgated from time to time. The physical security of Defence establishments is to be provided by a balanced mix of physical security measures such as: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. Fences. Lighting. Perimeter intruder detection systems (PIDS). Intruder detection systems IDS). Automated access control systems (AACS). Guards. Guard dogs. Locks and containers. Control of entry. Secure rooms. Hardened buildings. CCTV. Physical security measures are not primarily intended to prevent or deter attack by overt military action. Monitoring 05004. A system of regular surveys, inspections, reviews and checks is to be implemented to ensure that physical security measures are well organised and maintained as a part of the overall protective security of an establishment. Defence in Depth 05005. The physical security measures chosen as a result of the risk analysis (RA) (see Chapter 3) and minimum baseline measures methodologies carried out by an JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security establishment should be arranged so as to be mutually supporting. Additional measures may be required to achieve the degree of protection necessitated by: a. b. The designation of an establishment as a Key Point (KP). The security categorisation of an establishment (see Chapter 2). Basic Principles 05006. The following basic principles apply: a. Physical security measures are more effective and less costly if they are incorporated in the design stage of new projects. It is appropriate, therefore, to plan for higher levels of threat. b. Where cost effective, maximum use is to be made of security equipment such as IDS, PIDS and AACS. c. Protectively marked information and equipment is to be concentrated in as few places as possible. d. Physical security systems are to be related to operational needs and administrative requirements. e. Security measures must produce defence in depth. Responsibility for Physical Security 05007. Responsibility for physical security within Defence establishments is as follows: a. Directorate of Defence Security. D Def Sy is responsible for the issue of security policy for physical security for the Defence estate. b. Top Level Budget Holder. The TLB Holders are responsible for the implementation of security policy at establishments within the Defence estate. Each TLB Holder will have a Principal Security Advisor (PSyA) within his staff. c. Head of Establishment (HOE). Responsibility for physical security measures rests with the HOE who is advised as appropriate by the establishment security officer (ESyO), specialist security unit and/or TLB PSyA. d. OIC buildings, unit commanders, branch and establishment/unit security officers. These office holders are responsible for ensuring that the requirements of this chapter are applied within their areas of responsibility. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security They are to ensure that physical security is properly enforced at all times and that orders exist for duty checkers/guards. e. Individual responsibility. It is the personal responsibility of all Service and MOD civilian personnel, attached members of other Services and Crown employees serving with them, to ensure that all prescribed physical security measures are correctly applied and to take the appropriate countermeasures when breaches of security occur or are suspected. Security Orders and Plans 05008. HOE are responsible for ensuring that their establishment has comprehensive security orders and plans readily available to and which are signed as having been read and understood by appropriate personnel. The Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix 05009. As a result of the Review of Protective Security (RPS), physical security measures, which will indicate the adequacy of the security measures on the establishment according to a given threat level, are given points according to the minimum baseline measures matrix. Full details of the matrix and how it is to be used are contained at Section 1. In particular the following is to be noted: a. The matrix is primarily designed to counter the ESPIONAGE threat, although some of the measures applied will afford a degree of counter terrorist, sabotage and criminal damage defence. Its use is mandatory for the protection against compromise of confidentiality. The risk management process detailed in Chapter 3 will determine its use for 'integrity' and 'availability'. b. The matrix is to be used at LOW THREAT unless establishments are notified otherwise by PSyAs following advice from D Def Sy. c. Notwithstanding sub para b. above, the threat to certain sensitive establishments may be considered to be at higher than LOW. PSyAs may dictate to certain establishments what threat level they face. d. Establishments are to follow the SPIRIT of the baseline measures matrix at all times. HOE are not to allow nonsensical situations to arise such as the fitting of a high standard of lock to a standard office door with glass panes, in order to score more points on the matrix, which would allow other normal security precautions to be dispensed with. Anomalies with the Matrix 05010. Anomalies may arise in the application of this new methodology which may require amendment in due course. Any apparent anomalies are to be notified by establishments to TLB PSyA for onward staffing to D Def Sy. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Reference Documents References in Manual 05011. A list of the documents referred to in this Chapter is at Annex A. Security Units 05012. Establishment security staff should use the services of their appropriate security units when required, in the implementation of the policy in this Chapter. It is not expected that all appointed ESyOs will have the specialist security knowledge and/or security staff to be able to implement, without specialist security unit advice, the instructions contained in the Chapter. The role of the appropriate single-Service security units/TLB PSyA staffs in the implementation process is, therefore, important. Conflict of Standards 05013. Where there is a conflict of physical security standards between JSP 440 and other security instructions, the more rigorous standard will prevail unless specifically notified otherwise. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-0-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION I TO CHAPTER 5 GENERAL PRINCIPLES Introduction General 05101. This section of Chapter 5 contains instructions for the physical protection of information and equipment against attempts to acquire them illicitly by surreptitious attack or theft. Defence in Depth 05102. Physical measures represent only one aspect of protective security and they need to be supported by sound personnel, document handling, communications and computer security. Sensible management of security risks involves finding the most effective (and cost effective) ways of countering the given threats by a combination of measures from each of these areas. Good physical protection, preferably built into any site or building from the beginning, is of fundamental importance. Risk Management and Minimum Baseline Objectives 05103. Risk management offers a high degree of flexibility in providing the levels of protection required to safeguard protectively marked assets. To ensure that there is some degree of consistency and mutual assurance about the way one establishment's assets are handled by another, certain minimum baseline objectives apply to all areas of protective security. They are intended to provide acceptable security at all levels of protection where the threat is assessed as 'Low'. Further information on risk management can be found in Chapter 3. The Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix (MBMM) Meeting Baseline Objectives 05104. The matrix and menu of minimum baseline measures for physical security at Annexes A and B provide a range of options which meet the baseline objectives. They are designed to help the management of security risks by offering a means for the identification and selection of the most suitable and cost-effective physical security measures to safeguard protectively marked material against attempts to acquire them illicitly by surreptitious attack or theft. Although many of the measures suggested will be helpful in a counter-terrorist context (and suitable counter-terrorist measures already in place may be taken into account in meeting the baseline measures), the weighting given to the measures in the matrix is not primarily intended to meet terrorist threats. The matrix and menu are intended as a guide and particular circumstances may require different solutions. The achievement of a minimum score cannot be taken to be a substitute for a sound assessment of security measures based on the importance of the assets, the conditions and layout of the site, the level of the threat and protection required. Local circumstances may dictate that, despite an adequate score, enhanced JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security measures or alternative combinations of measures should be considered. (See also para 05009.) Threat Levels 05105. The minimum baseline measures are those in the first column of the matrix (headed L). The remaining columns offer a means of deciding on the increased measures appropriate to levels of threat higher than Low. ESyOs are to keep themselves regularly up-to-date on the nature and levels of threat to their assets (by consulting their appropriate PSyA and local Service and civil police authorities); and are to decide for themselves on the proper response to increased levels of threat, in the light of local circumstances. About the Matrix 05106. The minimum baseline measures are set as numerical values within a matrix, which correspond to the level of protectively marked material and to the level of the threat. The matrix, as shown at Annex A, is supported by a menu of physical security measures (Annex B) from which measures can be selected so that the sum total of the value of the individual measures equals or exceeds the required numerical value of the appropriate minimum baseline measures. It is a fundamental principle that points are only valid when correct security procedures and practices accompany the selected measure. Numerical Values 05107. The numerical value of the baseline measures required for each level of the protective marking system is made up from different sections of the menu of measures: 2 from mandatory sections of the menu of measures and the remainder from any of the sections. This system of mandatory and additional measures is to ensure that a sensible balance of measures is achieved and allows HOEs flexibility in the measures they apply to reach the baseline position, taking into account the security facilities, equipment and manpower at their disposal. How the Matrix is Used 05108. The matrix is used by selecting the appropriate level of protectively marked material and then reading off the scores to be achieved against the mandatory and additional sections of the menu of measures. Having identified the points score required, the user should then turn to the menu of measures. A minimum baseline measures matrix points check sheet for use by ESyOs is at Annex C. A guide to the use of the minimum baseline measures matrix is at Annex D and a sample of how to complete the full documentation is at Appendix 1 to Annex D. Menu of Measures Sections 05109. The menu of measures is divided into 6 sections, each dealing with a particular aspect of security (or layer of 'defence in depth'). For ease of application, the menu is laid out as a proforma with scores (loading) provided for various options. Spaces are also provided for inserting the various points scores. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-2 RESTRICTED Physical Security Weighting of Measures 05110. Some measures are weighted in that their points score multiplies with that of another measure (eg containers and locks), whilst others are added (eg fences, Perimeter Intruder Detection Systems, lighting and CCTV). The value of zero is used as a multiplier where a fence has no control of entry at its entry/exit points. Where control of entry is provided, the multiplier of one will validate the points awarded to the fence. Selection of Measures 05111. In deciding what measures to select, the user is to include existing security measures and then fill in the score obtained. The results can then be compared with the requirements of the matrix. From the comparison it will be apparent whether the measures are excessive, adequate or need supplementing. Additional Measures 05112. If additional measures are required, establishments are to decide which measures to select in the light of the actual threats faced by them. If there is a threat from forcible attack, for instance, the strength of a container may be a higher factor than the Class of lock; conversely, if the threat is from surreptitious attack, a high class lock may be a more important factor than the strength of the container. Used in this way, with imagination and common sense, the menu will help ESyOs to find the measures most appropriate to their particular situation, the threats they face and the resources available. Physical Security Measures - Performance Standards & the MBMM 05113. The descriptions given below (and which are used in the menu to the MBMM) are a guide to the levels of performance offered by different Classes of equipment, buildings or precautionary measures. The 4 classes of performance standard used in these descriptions are based on those being introduced into certain European standards and do not relate to those previously used to designate the performance of approved UK security equipment. Details of the type and specification of approved security equipment falling within the classifications below and which have been tested against both surreptitious and forcible attack are contained in the 'Catalogue of Security Equipment'. Copies of this document are issued to PSyAs and other security staff. A summary of the names of approved containers, locks doors and other security equipment is at Annex E. Matrix Section 1 - Containers and Security Locks Security Containers 05114. Containers are classified according to the level of security they offer, Class 4 being the highest and 1 the lowest. The classifications of containers can be described as follows: a. Class 4 containers. These are HIGH SECURITY containers which: (1) Have a high degree of resistance to an attacker using force and fully equipped with hand and power tools. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-1-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (2) Offers resistance to the prising of doors, drawers or lids to facilitate a fishing or probing attack. b. Class 3 containers. which: These are MEDIUM SECURITY containers (1) Offer a degree of resistance to an attacker using force and having access to a limited range of hand tools. (2) Resist flexing, twisting or jolting that will distort the carcass and allow the insertion of probes or devices in order to gain access to the container. c. Class 2 containers. (1) These are SECURITY containers which are : Of substantial design and construction. (2) Offer resistance to the casual or opportunist attacker who has not been prepared for the attack and only has use of items that are readily to hand. d. Class 1 containers. These are general purpose containers which have no particular security design features but which are lockable and are judged to offer a level of privacy. Security Locks 05115. Security locks are classified according to the level of protection they offer, Class 4 being the highest and Class 1 the lowest level. a. Class 4 locks. These are HIGH SECURITY locks which have a high degree of resistance to expert and professional attack using exclusively developed skills and resources judged not to be available commercially. b. Class 3 locks. These are MEDIUM SECURITY locks which have a high degree of resistance to expert and professional attack using skills and resources that are available commercially to a professional locksmith. c. Class 2 locks. These are SECURITY locks which have a degree of resistance to a skilful attacker having minimal resources. d. Class 1 locks. These are QUALITY locks having a moderate degree of resistance to unauthorised opening. Note: All keys to security containers must be held securely in accordance with the instructions in Section XII. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-4 RESTRICTED Physical Security Matrix Section 2 - Rooms The Level of Protection 05116. The level of protection offered by a room will depend on the strength and structure of the walls, floor and ceiling/roof, the strength and quality of the door and its lock and the quality and protection given to any windows. The specifications and standards for strong and secure rooms are contained at Section XI; the names of the rooms by Class are shown at Annex E to this section. The types of room are described below: a. Strong room. A strong room is a windowless room which: (1) Is designed with a high degree of resistance to an attacker using force and equipped with an extensive range of hand and power tools. (2) Will normally have walls, floor and ceiling of concrete slab construction. (3) Has a door of steel with bolt work secured by Class 3 or 4 lock. b. Secure room. A room that meets the standard for a secure room is as follows: (1) Offers a degree of resistance to a forced attack in which a limited range of hand tools are used. (2) Offers a high degree of resistance to a surreptitious attack. (3) Has walls, floor and ceiling of lightweight brick or block construction or plywood and plasterboard on supporting frame. (4) Has a door of solid wood or laminate construction fitted with a lock that offers the required level of protection (normally a Class 2 or 3 lock). (5) Has windows fitted with laminated security glass in a suitable frame or be protected by window bars. c. Locked room. A locked room is a room or office that can be locked (when left unattended) and offers a degree of protection to its contents. If the room is required to offer protection against a surreptitious attack for long periods, such as overnight or at weekends, the standard of door and its lock and the standard and locking of windows should reflect the level of threat. Normally a Class 1 lock will provide adequate protection. Selection of Locks 05117. Locks, for use on rooms, are to be selected from the range of locks listed in paragraph 05115 above and detailed, by type, at Annex E. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-1-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Matrix Section 3 - Buildings Building Rating 05118. Buildings are rated according to their resistance to both forced and surreptitious attack. The method of construction, material used and the security of doors and windows will contribute to the overall assessment. The Classes of building are described below: a. Class 4 buildings. construction which: (1) A Class 4 building is one of substantial Offers a high degree of resistance to a forced attack. (2) Has walls, floor and ceiling/roof of reinforced concrete or concrete slab. (3) Has doors of reinforced steel or wood, faced with sheet steel. (4) Has windows kept to a minimum but where necessary are suitably protected. Their frame, fixing and glazing offers substantial resistance to a physical attack. b. Class 3 buildings. (1) A building which: Offers a degree of resistance to a forced attack. (2) Is of solid construction, normally brick or block, on cavity wall principles. (3) Has windows and doors of a standard equal to that of the building in its resistance to a forced attack. Modern building techniques of pre-cast or fabricated panels or steel frame and glass, may also rate Class 3. c. Class 2 buildings. (1) A building which: Has a resistance to a forced attack. (2) Is of lightweight construction normally single brick or lightweight block or be a substantial transportable office unit. (3) Has doors and windows of a standard equivalent to the structure in having a resistance to a forced and/or surreptitious attack. d. Class 1 buildings. A building that offers Class 1 standard of strength is normally a lightweight prefabricated structure intended simply to protect its contents and those who work in it from the elements. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-6 RESTRICTED Physical Security Matrix Section 4 - Control of Entry to Building, Area or Site Control of Entry 05119. Control of entry can be exercised over a site, a building or buildings on a site or to areas or room within a building. The control may be either electronic, electro mechanical, guard or receptionist control or physical barriers. More information on control of entry pass systems can be found in Section IX of this chapter and the requirements for Automated Access Control Systems (AACS) are detailed in Section X. The Classes of control of entry systems are described below: a. Class 4 system. An automatic access control system (AACS) which: (1) Offers a degree of inherent security requiring the minimum of guard oversight. (2) Is based on the use of a card or token in association with a user unique Personal Identification Number (PIN). (3) Is used in conjunction with an access barrier that prevents pass back and ensures "one transaction, one entry". b. Class 3 system. A Class 3 entry control system is an electronic AACS which: (1) Operates as a card and PIN. (2) Entry is controlled by a suitable barrier that may require direct supervision by a guard. c. Class 2 system. involving: (1) A Class 2 entry control system is one Security guards, custodians, or a receptionist. (2) Involves the use of a photograph or unique design pass entry system. Other identification documents, such as Defence Identity Cards are accepted for entry purposes. d. Class 1 system. A Class 1 entry control system is one based on a locked door with access allowed by either: (1) A mechanical or stand alone electronic push button code lock (PBCL). (2) 05120 Spare The issue of keys to "authorised key holders". JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-7 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security The Control of Visitors 05121. The control of visitors within a protected area where sensitive material is held or worked on or where special access control are exercised will depend on the level of security clearance of the visitor and on any special control requirements that the establishment may impose on non-staff personnel. The type of control exercised over visitors is described below: a. Escorted visitors. Visitors who are required to be escorted within a protected area are accompanied at all times by an appointed escort or by personnel they are visiting. If they need to visit a number of different departments or other members of staff, they are to be formally handed over from one escort to the next with, if required, the visitor's pass being annotated accordingly. b. Pass/badge. Visitors are allowed unescorted entry to a protected area, or parts of it. They are required to wear a badge/pass that identifies them as a visitor and not as a member of staff. It should be noted that a visitor badging system is only effective if all staff are also required to wear a pass. Note: Points for 'Escorted Visitors' within the MBMM can only be scored where all visitors (including MOD employees) to an establishment are escorted. Matrix Section 5 - Guards and Alarm Systems Guards 05122. The employment of guards to protect buildings or sites provides a valuable deterrent to criminals and to those who might plan a covert attack. The guards' duties and the need and frequency of patrols will be decided by considering the level of threat and security systems or equipment that might be in place. More detailed instructions on the employment of guards and patrols are contained in Section VIII to this chapter. The types of guarding are described below: a. Frequent internal patrols. A patrol that operates inside a building at random intervals, not exceeding 2 hours, is a frequent patrol. It is to follow a different route, on each patrol, so that the time and place of the guards' visit cannot be predicted. Guards are to have specific tasks to perform on the patrol such as checking locked doors and security furniture and checking external doors and windows to see that they are properly secured. b. Infrequent internal patrols. Internal random patrols at intervals not exceeding 6 hours allows for 2 or 3 patrols during the night and periodic security checks during a weekend or holiday period. The first patrol is to normally take place soon after cease work and is to be concerned with checking that the site or building is properly secure. Patrol routes are to be varied so that the timing and location of the guard cannot be predicted. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-8 RESTRICTED Physical Security c. External patrols. Patrols that are limited to the external areas of a site or building and which are carried out by guards who do not normally have access to the buildings are 'external patrols' only. The frequency of external patrolling will be dependent upon the particular requirements of the establishment. External patrols can be vehicle mounted or on foot and patrol the perimeter, inside or outside, and checking buildings that may be covered by an internal alarm system. The mobile patrol will also act as an immediate response force. d. Resident or on-site guards. Guards that are employed to man an incident control room or guard post/guardroom, but are not required to patrol are classed as 'Resident' or 'Site' guards. They can be required to survey the protected area or parts of it either visually or by using CCTV surveillance equipment. Responding to other building alarm or monitoring systems can also be included in their duties. e. Visiting guards. Guards who visit a site during the night and at weekends and carry out rudimentary perimeter checks are classed as 'visiting guards'. Such types of guard include those that may not normally be allowed to enter the site or building visited but respond by calling out the "Key Holder" in the event of a suspected intrusion. Note: There are a further 2 types of guarding used in the security of equipment matrix; these are described at para 051818. Intruder Detection Systems (IDS) 05123. IDS are used inside buildings in place of or to assist site guards. To be effective an IDS will have a response force that will react in the event of an alarm condition. Alarm systems have been graded according to the level of security they offer. A Class 4 system offering the highest level of security and Class 1 the lowest. More detailed information regarding IDS is contained at Section VII to this chapter. The Classes of IDS system are described below: a. Class 4 systems. A Class 4 IDS is one which: (1) Is intended for use in applications where security takes precedence over all other factors. (2) Offers a level of protection where the intruder has to plan the intrusion in detail and have a full range of equipment capable of substitution of vital system components. (3) Is supplemented with comprehensive physical security measures and security procedures. b. Class 3 systems. A Class 3 alarm system is one which: (1) Is used in premises where high value assets are held. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-9 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (2) Includes appropriate physical security protection. (3) Offers protection from intruders who are conversant with intruder detection systems and have available a comprehensive range of tools and portable electronic equipment. c. Class 2 systems. A Class 2 alarm system is one which: (1) Is used in premises where the security risks of a sophisticated attack are not high. (2) Intruders are expected to have a limited knowledge of alarm systems and have available only basic tools and portable instruments. d. Class 1 systems. A Class 1 alarm system is one which: (1) Is used in low risk premises where potential intruders have little knowledge of alarm systems and a limited range of readily available tools. (2) Does not normally have an appointed response force and relies on a public response to a local alarm sounder or strobe lights. Matrix Section 6 - Outer Perimeter The Perimeter 05124. A perimeter fence forms a useful barrier and identifies the boundary of a protected or restricted area. The level of protection offered by a fence depends on its height, construction, the material used and any additional security features used to increase its performance or effectiveness such as topping, PIDS, lighting or CCTV. The type of fence used on the perimeter of a site should reflect the type of threat, ie. terrorist, criminal, saboteur, vandals. Fences are graded according to the level of protection they offer, Class 4 offering the highest security and Class 1 the lowest. Instructions for external perimeter security measures are at Section III, CCTV at Section VI and security lighting at Section III to this chapter. The types of fence attracting a particular Class are shown at Annex E. The Classes of fence are described below: a. Class 4 fence. A Class 4 fence is a high security barrier which: (1) Is designed to offer the maximum deterrent and delay to a skilled and determined intruder who is well equipped and resourced. (2) Is designed and constructed to offer a high degree of resistance to a climbing or breaching attack. (3) Is normally supported by other perimeter security systems. b. Class 3 fence. A Class 3 fence is an intermediate security barrier which: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-1-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security (1) Is designed to deter and delay a resourceful attacker who has access to a limited range of hand tools. (2) Offers resistance to attempts at climbing and breaching. c. Class 2 fence. A Class 2 fence is an anti-intruder fence which offers a degree of resistance to climbing and breaching by an opportunist intruder not having particular skills and using material and breaching items that are readily to hand. d. Class 1 fence. A Class 1 fence is one which: (1) Is designed with no particular security requirements. (2) Is only intended to mark a boundary and to offer a minimum of deterrence or resistance to anyone other than a determined intruder. (3) Any type of construction material or hedging is used. Entry and Exit Searches 05125. Establishments may undertake entry searches as a condition of entry. In particularly sensitive areas, entry searching is to be designed to guard against the possibility of unauthorised electronic recording and transmitting equipment or copying equipment such as cameras or scanners being brought into the establishment. Such searches also guard against the possibility of an explosive device being carried into the establishment. Exit searches can only be undertaken in accordance with HOEs statutory powers, contracts of employment or the law relating to search (Police and Criminal Evidence Act). However such searches can act as a deterrent to the unauthorized removal of protectively marked or otherwise valuable assets from the establishment. Gates 05126. Gates are to be constructed to the same security standard as the fence and some form of entry control must be in place otherwise the security of the fence will be negated. Perimeter Intruder Detection Systems (PIDS) 05127. PIDS may be used on perimeters to enhance the level of security offered by the fence. PIDS may be installed as covert devices (although this is usually for aesthetic reasons) or overtly, to act as a deterrent. PIDS are inherently prone to false alarm and should therefore normally only be used with an alarm verification system such as CCTV. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 05128. CCTV is a useful aid to security guards in covering large sites or perimeters. The effectiveness of such a system however will depend on the selection of suitable equipment and its installation. Detailed professional advice via PSyAs is to be sought. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-1-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Security Lighting 05129. Security lighting can offer a high degree of deterrence to a potential intruder in addition to providing the illumination necessary for effective surveillance either directly by the guards or indirectly through a CCTV system. The standard of lighting is to meet the minimum requirement and its installation be appropriate to the site conditions. 05130. More information on the protective measures of buildings is detailed in Section II, Annex G and Section IV to this chapter. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-12 RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX A TO SECTION I TO CHAPTER 5 MINIMUM BASELINE MEASURES MATRIX TOP SECRET Mandatory - Sections 1 and/or 2, plus 3 Mandatory - Sections 4 plus 5 ** Additional - Any Sections Total SECRET Mandatory - Sections 1 and/or 2, plus 3 Mandatory - Sections 4 plus 5 * Additional - Any Sections Total CONFIDENTIAL Mandatory - Sections 1 and/or 2, plus 3 Mandatory - Sections 4 plus 5 Additional - Any Sections Total RESTRICTED Mandatory - Sections 1 and/or 2, plus 3 Additional- Any Sections Total L 10 6 2 18 L 8 4 2 14 L 8 2 10 L 2 2 M 10 6 4 20 M 8 4 4 16 M 8 3 11 M 2 2 S 10 7 4 21 S 8 5 4 17 S 8 2 3 13 S 2 1 3 H 12 7 5 24 H 10 5 5 20 H 8 3 4 15 H 2 2 4 VH 15 7 6 28 VH 12 6 6 24 VH 10 4 5 19 VH 2 3 5 Notes: ** = Each Section must score at least 2 points. * = Each Section must score at least 1 point. THREAT LEVELS VH H S M L - Very High - High - Significant - Moderate - Low JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-A-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-A-2 RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX B TO SECTION I TO CHAPTER 5 MENU OF MINIMUM BASELINE MEASURES Measure Loading Section 1 ­ Container 1. Container/casing: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 Sub-score (ss1) = a, b, c or d 2. Lock a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 Sub-score (ss2) = a, b, c or d Remarks Section score (S1) = ss1 x ss2 Measure Loading Section 2 ­ Room 3. Room: a. Strong Room 4 b. Strong Room 3 c. Secure Room 1 d. Locked Room 0 Sub-score (ss3) = a, b, c or d 4. Lock a. Class 4 4 b. Class 4 3 c. Class 3 2 d. Class 2 1 e Class 1 0 Sub-score (ss4) = a, b, c, d or e NB. Multiply Section score (S2) = ss3 x ss4 NB. Multiply JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-B-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Measure Section 3 ­ Building 5. Strength: a. Class 4 b. Class 3 c. Class 2 d. Class 1 Loading Remarks 5 3 2 1 Section score (S3) = a, b, c or d Measure Loading Section 4 ­ Control of entry to building, area or site 6. Control of entry: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss6) = a, b, c or d 7. Visitor control: a. Escorted 3 b. Pass/badge 1 c. None 0 Sub-score (ss7) = a, b, or c NB. One figure Remarks Section score (S4) = ss6 + ss7 NB. Add JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-B-2 RESTRICTED Physical Security Measure Loading Remarks Section 5 ­ Guards and IDS 8. Guards: a. Point Guard 10 b. Dog Patrol 8 c. Frequent Internal 5 Patrols d. Infrequent 4 Internal Patrols e. External Patrols 3 f. Resident/Site 2 Guard g. Visiting Guard 1 h. None 0 Sub-score (ss8) = [(a, b, c or d)* + (e or f)*] or g* or h * = if applicable. Resident/site guard will only score if there has been no other score for other guards or patrols 9. IDS: a. Class 4 5 b. Class 3 4 c. Class 2 3 d Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss9) = a, b, or c Section score (S5) = ss8 + ss9 Measure Loading Section 6 ­ Immediate dispersal/ parking/storage area 10. Fence: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss10) = a, b, c, d or e 11. Entry control: a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss11) = a or b NB. Add Remarks JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-B-3 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Measure Loading Random entry and/or exit searches: 12. a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss12) = a or b 13. PIDS: a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss13) = a or b 14. CCTV (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss14) = a or b 15. Lighting (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss15) = a or b Remarks Section score (S6) = (ss10 x ss11) + ss12 + ss13 + ss14 + ss15 Measure Loading Section 7 ­ Outer Perimeter 16. Fence: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss16) = a, b, c, d or e 17. Entry control: a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss17) = a or b Random entry and/or exit searches: 18. a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss18) = a or b 19. PIDS: a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss19) = a or b JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-1-B-4 Remarks RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security 20. CCTV (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss20) = a or b 21. Lighting (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss21) = a or b Section score (S7) = (ss16 x ss17) + ss18 + ss19 + ss20 + ss21 TOTAL SCORE is the sum of SECTIONS 1 to 7 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-B-5 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-B-6 RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX C TO SECTION I TO CHAPTER 5 MINIMUM BASELINE MEASURES MATRIX - POINTS CHECKSHEET Reference: Assessment 1. Asset assessed: 2. Protective marking: 3. Threat level: Points check 4. Mandatory points. Section 1. Pts required: Section 3. Pts required: Sections 4 & 5. Pts required: 5. Additional points. Any Sections. Pts required: Sections 6 & 7 6. Summary of points. Total Pts required: 7. Remarks. Pts achieved: Pts achieved: Pts achieved: Pts achieved: Pts achieved JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-C-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-C-2 RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX D TO SECTION I TO CHAPTER 5 GUIDE TO THE USE OF THE MINIMUM BASELINE MEASURES MATRIX First Actions 1. Produce a proforma that consists of the following documents : a. b. c. 2. A points checksheet (see Annex C). A minimum baseline measures matrix (Annex A). A menu of minimum baseline measures (Annex B). On the points checksheet fill in the following: a. Details of the asset to be assessed (for example 'Secret Docs in HQ Building'). b. The current Espionage threat (eg 'L'). 3. Using the matrix : a. Read off the total points required to protect the particular asset(s) at the current threat level and write the figure on the points checksheet (eg '14' for SECRET at Low; Low is the standard threat level unless otherwise directed from D Def Sy by PSyAs). b. Read off the mandatory points required for the sections and write the figures on the points checksheet (eg '8' for Sections 1 and/or 2 plus 3). 4. Turn to the menu of baseline measures to carry out the assessment. A sample assessment is at Appendix 1. Carrying Out the Assessment 5. Section 1 - container. Using the standards of containers detailed at para 05114 and shown, by type at Annex E, determine the Class of container that the protected assets are held in and write the 'loading' figure in the sub-score column (ss1), (eg a 5'x 2' security cabinet would give a sub- score of '3'). Likewise, the lock fitted to the cabinet should be allocated a loading ( insert at ss2) in accordance with the standards at para 05115 and shown, by type at Annex E. (eg a Mersey lock will give a score of '3'). The Section 1 score is achieved by multiplying the scores of the container and lock. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-D-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 6. Section 2 - Room. Determine the Class of the room that the asset is held in using the standards at para 05116 and shown, by type at Annex E, and insert the 'loading' figure in the sub-score column (ss3); for example an unlocked room would attract 0 points. Similarly ascertain the 'loading' for the type of lock fitted to the room using the standards at para 05115 and shown, by type at Annex E, and insert at (ss4); for example a Chubb Mortice lock would attract 1 point. The section score is achieved by multiplying the scores for the room and the lock. Notes: (1) Establishments are to follow the spirit of the baseline measures matrix at all times. Therefore, heads of establishments are not to allow nonsensical situations to arise such as fitting a Class 4 lock to a standard office door with glass panes, in order to score more points on the matrix, which in turn would allow other normal security precautions to be dispensed with. 7. Section 3 - Building. Using the standards at para 05118, determine the Class of the building (its strength) and insert the loading score in the Section score column (S3). For example a modern building of pre-cast panels can attract 3 points. 8. Section 4 - Control of Entry to Building Area or Site. Determine the Class of the control of entry to the building, area or site using the standards at para 05119 and insert in the sub-score column (ss6). Decide the loading for the visitor control and insert in the sub-score column (ss7). The Section 4 score is achieved by adding the two scores together. Example: A building where entry is allowed by the issue of keys to authorized personnel will attract 1 point. If the visitor control system is one where they are required to wear a pass identifying them from permanent staff, a further point would be gained. The total for the section would be 2 points. 9. Section 5 - Guards and Intruder Detection Systems (IDS). patrols and guarding procedures are described at para 05122: The type of a. Determine the type of patrols/guarding practices in the building, area and site and insert the 'loading' scores in the sub-score column (ss8). The points scores for guards are divided into 3 areas; internal patrols, external patrols and other (resident/site guarding). Points can be achieved for an establishment that has both internal and external patrols. Any additional resident/site guard will not attract any further points where a score has been achieved for internal or external patrols. Example: A particular building housing the protected asset may be the subject of 'Infrequent Internal Patrols' (gaining a loading score of 4) and be on an establishment that has 'External patrols' around the site (gaining a score of 3). The establishment may also have a 'Site Guard' at the incident room or guardroom; the latter would only attract points if there were no internal or external patrols. Hence the total sub-score (ss8) in this example would be 7 points. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-1-D-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security b. Determine the sub-score for the type of IDS on the establishment, area and/or site using the standards at para 05123 and shown, by type at Annex E, and insert at (ss9). The Section 5 score is obtained by adding the scores for Guards and IDS and inserting at (S5). 10. Perimeter. Decide what Class the establishment perimeter is using the standards at paras 05124 and shown by type at Annex E and insert the 'loading' into the sub-score (ss10); e.g. an approved 2.4m high chainlink fence with security topping would merit 2 points. If the establishment has entry control insert 1 point at (ss11); if it does not then no points are allotted. Similarly, insert the 'loading' figures for the 'yes/no' measures for searches (ss12), perimeter intruder detection systems (PIDS) at (ss13), CCTV (ss14) and lighting (ss15). The total score (S6) for perimeter measures is obtained by multiplying the 'loading' scores of the Fence and Entry control and then adding this figure to the total of the rest of the sub-scores. Example: An Establishment has a Class 2 fence (2 points), with entry control (1 point). Entry/exit searches are carried out by guards (1 point) but the establishment does not have any PIDS (0 points). It does not have any CCTV (0 points) or security lighting to the appropriate standards (0 points). The total points for Section 6 would be as follows: Fence 2 x x entry control 1 = = # 2 + + total of other sub-scores 1 = = # 3 Note: It is important to note that points for CCTV and lighting can only be obtained if the equipment reaches the appropriate approved standards. Completing the Points Checksheet and Further Action 11. Completion of the Checksheet. After completing the baseline measures menu, complete the points checksheet by inserting the total points achieved. In addition, insert the points obtained in the 'Mandatory' sections. 12. Action to be taken if points required baseline is exceeded. If all of these figures exceed the 'points required' then the protected asset has adequate security and no further action is required. However, there may be scope for the ESyO, in consultation with the head of establishment, to reduce some security measures, if desired, to the baseline position and this type of review is to be actively encouraged so long as expenditure is not wasted in the pursuit of lower standards when those in force are cost-effective already. Any agreed action could be written in the 'Remarks' column of the checksheet. 13. Action to be taken if the points required baseline is not reached. If the points achieved figures have failed to reach the points required for either the total or mandatory section scores, then the ESyO in consultation with the HOE must JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-D-3 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security re-examine the security measures implemented on the establishment and choose higher security measures accordingly to meet the baseline position. 14. Flexibility of the Matrix. The advantage of the baseline measures matrix is that it allows establishments the flexibility to choose their own security measures at a given threat level as long as the baseline measure is reached and certain mandatory measures are met. It also takes into account any enhanced security measures that the establishmentt may have invested in such as AACS, CCTV or security lighting thereby perhaps allowing the costs to be reduced in other areas of security. When to Complete a Matrix 15. General. The matrix is primarily intended to be used to assure the Confidentiality of protectively marked assets. Where similar protected assets are held in a particular type of building throughout the establishment only one menu may be required to be completed for each level of protective marking; e.g. In an establishment HQ building that houses a quantity of all 4 types of protectively marked material it may only be appropriate to complete a matrix for each type (RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET) at the current threat level. There may be no requirement to complete a matrix for each container in every building as the baseline may be able to be achieved for a particular building with a menu for each type of protectively marked material. 16. 'Standard' loading on the matrix. Much of the 'loading' on the matrix menu of measures will be the same for an establishment for each menu completed; for example, the perimeter fence, guarding/patrols posture, entry control etc may be standard for all menus on the establishment at a given threat level. 17. Change in threat level. If the threat changes, the ESyO should consult the completed points checksheet and menu of measures to see if the measures in force are still adequate or, in the case of a decrease in threat, whether certain measures can be changed or dispensed with. By trying differing options within the menu for a given protected asset, the ESyO should be able to obtain any new baseline position. Example: The threat increases from Low ('L') to Moderate ('M') and the number of points required to house TOP SECRET protectively marked material increases from 18 to 20. Assuming that a particular establishment has the minimum 18 points and meets the mandatory points (which would not change for such an increase in threat) it could meet the new baseline position by introducing 'frequent Internal Patrols' to the existing 'External Patrols' thereby gaining the 2 extra points required. Alternatively, it could choose to house all of its TOP SECRET assets in a higher Class container which when multiplied with the value of the lock would meet the new baseline. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-D-4 RESTRICTED Physical Security APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D TO SECTION I TO CHAPTER 5 MINIMUM BASELINE MEASURES MATRIX - POINTS CHECKSHEET Reference: STR/2031/6 Assessment 1. Asset assessed: 2. 3. Protective marking: Threat level: Docs in HQ Building SECRET L _Points check 4. Mandatory points. Section 1 and/or Pts required: Pts achieved: 8 12 2 plus 3 Sections 4 & 5. Pts required: Pts achieved: 2 16 5. Additional points. Any Sections. Pts required: 2 Sections 6 & 7 Pts achieved: 3 6. Summary of points. Total Pts required: Pts achieved 14 24 7. Remarks. COULD STORE SECRET DOCS IN LOWER CLASS CONTAINERS WITH LOWER CLASS LOCKS AND/OR REVIEW PATROL ACTIVITY WITH A VIEW TO REDCUCING IT JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-D1-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-D1-2 RESTRICTED Physical Security Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix TOP SECRET Mandatory - Section 1 and/or 2 plus 3 Mandatory - Section 3 Mandatory - Sections 4 plus 5 ** Additional - Any sections Total SECRET Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 3 Mandatory - Sections 4 plus 5 * Additional - Any sections L 1 2 6 9 18 L 1 2 4 7 14 L 1 2 3 4 10 L 1 1 2 M 1 2 6 11 20 M 1 2 4 9 16 M 1 2 3 5 11 M 1 1 2 S 1 2 7 11 21 S 1 2 5 9 17 S 1 2 3 7 13 S 1 1 1 3 H 1 2 7 14 24 H 1 2 5 12 20 H 1 2 3 9 15 H 1 1 2 4 VH 1 2 7 18 28 VH 1 2 6 15 24 VH 1 2 3 13 19 VH 1 1 3 5 Total CONFIDENTIAL Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 3 Mandatory - Sections 4 plus 5 Additional - Any sections Total RESTRICTED Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 3 Additional - Any sections Total Notes: ** * Each Section must score at least 2 points. Each Section must score at least 1 point. THREAT LEVELS VH H S M L - Very High - High - Significant - Moderate - Low JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-D1-3 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-D1-4 RESTRICTED Physical Security Menu of Minimum Baseline Measures Measure Loading Section 1 ­ Container/casing 1. Container/casing: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 Sub-score (ss1) = a, b, c or d 2. Lock a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 Sub-score (ss2) = a, b, c or d Remarks Lightweight Cupboard 3 Mersey 3 NB. Multiply Section score (S1) = ss1 x ss2 Measure Loading Section 2 ­ Room 3. Room: a. Strong Room 4 b. Secure Room 3 c. Locked Room 1 d. Unlocked Room 0 Sub-score (ss3) = a, b, c or d 4. Lock a. Class 4 4 b. Class 4 3 c. Class 3 2 d. Class 2 1 e Class 1 0 Sub-score (ss4) = a, b, c, d or e 9 Mortice 1 0 NB. Multiply Section score (S2) = ss3 x ss4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-D1-5 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Measure Section 3 ­ Building 5. Strength: a. Class 4 b. Class 3 c. Class 2 d. Class 1 Loading Remarks 5 3 2 1 Pre cast panels Section score (S3) = a, b, c or d Measure Loading Section 4 ­ Control of entry to building, area or site 6. Control of entry: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss6) = a, b, c or d 7. Visitor control: a. Escorted 3 b. Pass/badge 1 c. None 0 Sub-score (ss7) = a, b, or c NB. One figure 3 Remarks 1 1 NB. Add Section score (S4) = ss6 + ss7 2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-D1-6 RESTRICTED Physical Security Measure Loading Remarks Section 5 ­ Guards and IDS 8. Guards: Internal Patrols 10 a. Frequent 8 b. Infrequent 5 External Patrols 4 c Frequent d. Infrequent 3 Other e. Resident/Site 2 Guard f. None 0 Sub-score (ss8) = 7 [(a* or b*) + (c* or d*)] or e* or f * = if applicable. Resident/site guard will only score if there has been no other score for other guards or patrols 9. IDS: a. Class 4 5 b. Class 3 4 c. Class 2 3 d Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss9) = a, b, or c 0 Section score (S5) = ss8 + ss9 Measure Loading Section 6 ­ Perimeter 10. Fence: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss10) = a, b, c, d or e 11. Entry control: a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss11) = a or b NB. Add 7 Remarks Chainlink 2 1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-D1-7 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Measure Loading Random entry and/or exit searches: 12. a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss12) = a or b 13. PIDS: a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss13) = a or b 14. CCTV (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss14) = a or b 15. Lighting (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss15) = a or b Remarks 1 0 0 Section score (S6) = (ss10 x ss11) + ss12 + ss13 + ss14 + ss15 3 TOTAL SCORE is the sum of SECTIONS 1 to 6 24 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-D1-8 RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX E TO SECTION I TO CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY OF THE CLASSES OF SECURITY EQUIPMENT AND SECURITY MEASURES Security Equipment 1. Catalogue of Security Equipment - Change of Terminology. As a result of the 'Review of Protective Security' the terminology used to describe the security effectiveness of certain items of security equipment listed in the 'Catalogue of Security Equipment' has changed. Items are now allocated to a Class instead of a 'Category or 'Group'. The table below will act as a conversion table until an amendment to the catalogue is issued. 2. Reference to Security Equipment. In using the minimum baseline measures matrix and when making reference to security equipment, users are to refer to the lists contained in the table below to determine the Class of specific items and all references in the catalogue to security 'Category' and 'Group' are to be interpreted as 'Class'. The page number column in the table refers to the corresponding page in the Catalogue of Security Equipment. 3. Handbook of Physical Security. The 'Catalogue of Security Equipment' is held by all PSyAs and some other security staffs and is an integral part of the 'Handbook of Physical Security'. Containers Page No A3 A12 Description Grade 1A Safe: Sizes 1,2,3 & 4 Rosengren RCC Data Safe: RCC2, RCC3, RCC4 RCC5 & RCC6 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 Dual Combination Lock Safe Heavyweight GpII Cupboard: Large and Small Document Chest Lightweight GpIII Cupboard GpIII Cupboard: Large 4 door & small single door Elite Plan File 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 Class 4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5 -1-E-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security A10 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 A19 A20 A21 A11 A23 A24 A25 A26 Vertical Filing cabinet: 2 Drawer & 4 drawer Large Electronic Cabinet GpIII Small Electronic Cabinet Under Desk Electronic Cabinet GpIII CPU Tower Cabinet GpIII PC Processor Cabinet GpIV Network CPU Cupboard GpIII Barton Electronic Tempest Container GpIV Combination Lock Keybox Posting Keybox Document Box Switch cover: 30 Amp & 13 Amp Switch Box Security Plug Box Circulating (Despatch) Box Envopak security Pouch: sizes 1,2 & 3 Description Manifoil MkIV Combination Lock Medway Locking Unit Mersey Keylock Henderson Cypher Lock Codeguard Keypad Ingersoll Rim Automatic Deadlock: SC10, SC12 & SC71 Ingersoll Fire Security Lock: SC73/FS Ingersoll Mortice Hookbolt Deadlock: SC74 Double sided & SC76 Single Sided 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 Class 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 Locks Page No B3 B5 B6 D11 12 B8 B9 B10 B11 Assa Twin 6000 and Assa Twin Combi JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-1-E-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security B12 B15 B16 B17 B18 B19 B19A B20 B21 B22 B23 B24 Tamar Locking Unit Avon Locking Unit Chubb Mortice Locking Latch: 3R35 Chubb Hook Bolt Mortice Lock: 3M50 Chubb Upright Two-bolt Mortice Lock: 3K70 Chubb Horizontal Two-Bolt Mortice Lock: 3J60 Chubb 'Castle' Mortice Lock: 3G110 Ingersoll Impregnable Padlock: OS 711, Cs 712, & CS 700 Abloy Padlock: 3041 Chubb Ava 1K42 Padlock: with Normal & Extended Shackle Assa Class 2 Padlock: 8mm & 10mm Shackle Chubb Hercules Combination: 1K57 Padlock with 7B018 Locking Bar Simplex Digital locks (pbcl): NL/DL 100 NL/DL 200 & NS 3000 Unican Digital Lock (pbcl) Assa Codoor 2000 Lock (Electronic pbcl) Description Strong Room Type A Secure Room Lightweight Type A Secure Room Type B Secure Room Lightweight Type B Secure Room Type C Secure Room 5 -1-E-3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D9 1 1 1 Class 4 3 3 3 3 3 D10 D13 Rooms Page No C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security C9 Lightweight Type C Secure Room Description AC 12 IDS Control Panel CPA6 IDS Control Panel IDS Control Panel Aplex: 60 & 100 Zone IDS Control Panel Executive 1000 IDS Control Panel Genesis 1000: 15, 60 & 100 Zone Approved portable/transportable IDS system Approved electric fence incorporating an IDS 3 Class 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 IDS Page No E3 E6 E7 E8 E9 - Classes of Other Security Measures Control of entry See para 05119. Fences Description Approved weldmesh fence to a minimum height of 2.4m with approved security topping. Any approved Class 2 fence to a minimum height of 2.4m coupled with an approved electric fence to an approved design combination. (See note 1) Approved chainlink fence to a minimum height of 2.4m with approved security topping. Approved palisade fence to a minimum height of 2.4m. Approved steel profile fence to a minimum height of 2.4m with an approved security topping. Approved expanded metal (XPM) fence to a minimum height of 2.4m with an approved security topping. Class 3 3 2 2 2 2 225mm brick wall to a minimum height of 2.4m or 190-220mm block wall (min density 7KN) to a minimum height of 2.4m. Both types with approved topping and of an approved design. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-1-E-4 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Any other fence, hedge etc. Notes: 1 1. Depending on the design combination used, it is possible for this fence also to be considered as an IDS; thus, counting in 2 sections of the MBMM. 2. For new builds or replacements, see new CSE section. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5 -1-E-5 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-1-E-6 RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION II TO CHAPTER 5 SECURITY ASPECTS OF WORKS PROJECTS AND SERVICES General Security Advantages 05201. Significant security advantages can be derived from the proper positioning of buildings, roads and car parks within a site. Security requirements are to be considered at the earliest stages of planning new sites or buildings, or alterations to existing buildings, since physical security measures are invariably more expensive and less effective when introduced at a later stage. It is essential that a long-term view is taken on threats when buildings are planned and commissioned. Further Information, Advice and Guidance 05202. Where necessary, advice on the current threats and specialist counter measures may be obtained via TLB PSyAs who are to be consulted by establishments in accordance with para 05206, before detailed planning or building commences. Consideration should be given to the following: a. Terrorist threat and counter measures. TLB PSyAs can obtain specialist advice on both espionage and terrorist threats via D Def Sy. Direction on the principles and requirements for the physical security of nonnuclear establishments in GB is contained in JSP 436 (direction on the security of nuclear establishments is contained in JSP 440 volume 4). Additional guidance on counter-terrorist measures is also provided in the Manual of Counter-Terrorist Measures. Specialist advice on structures, building materials, window and door design, grilles and glazing materials, use of defensive landscaping etc, required to counter them can be obtained from Defence Estates (DE) Specialist Construction Group (SCG). b. Criminal threat and counter measures. Advice on local criminal threats and crime prevention may be obtained from the appropriate Service, MOD or civil police Crime Prevention Officer. Further advice is contained in the Home Office Crime Prevention Centre's guidance on Secured by Design (SBD) and the relevant Parts of BS 8220, TLB PSyA may obtain both documents from D Def Sy. c. Weapons and ammunition sites and buildings. The detailed requirements for sites and buildings housing weapons and ammunition are contained in Chapter 6. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Coordination of Works Projects and Services Background 05203. It is essential that security specifications for structures, systems and equipment needed for each project/work service are properly identified, defined and approved before contracts are let. Moreover, where systems and equipments are concerned, operational performance standards and maintenance requirements must also be included. Failure to do so may result in either inadequate or inappropriate security provision, and could lead to excessive expenditure. Minimum Military Requirements (MMR) 05204. When determining security measures for incorporation within works services, the principle of MMR should be followed (i.e. only those measures required to meet operational, statutory or other mandatory requirements should be specified). Responsibilities 05205. Responsibilities for providing specialist security advice for works projects and services are as follows: a. Directorate of Defence Security. D Def Sy is responsible for issuing departmental policy for security aspects of works projects and services. b. Top level budgets (TLB) holder TLBs are responsible for the provision of security works services and can obtain advice from their PSyAs. c. ESyO's responsibility to Head of Establishment. The ESyO is responsible to the Head of Establishment or the provision of security advice within work services through the production of the SSR and OR. To assist him with this task the advice and assistance of the PSyA or other specialist security staffs can be sought. d. MOD DE (SCG). DE are responsible for: (1) Maintaining a library of all relevant security works material including drawings developed elsewhere and making it available to the relevant PSyA when required. (2) Acting as the technical advisory service for works interfaces with security measures that could be any combination of physical, procedural and contractual measures. (3) Works technical policy. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security (4) Specialist advice on hardening buildings and services against attack. This will include glazing, robustness of buildings, location of services and bomb shelter areas. d. Special Services Group (SSG). The role of SSG and the services that it can provide to the MOD are detailed at Annex A. Procedures for Works 05206. Before a works project or service is undertaken, the Project Sponsor (PS), Project Staff Officer (PSO) or Property Manager (PROM) is to consult the ESyO who is to attend siting boards as required and who will, if necessary, consult the appropriate PSyA. The PSyA may wish to obtain further specialist advice. The security involvement in work services can be summarised as follows: a. Security involvement in works projects. A works project is any single item of work costing more than £240,000 (excluding VAT and fees). The stages of works implementation and the associated security tasks and responsibilities for project work are set out at Annex B. b. Security involvement in property management. A property management (PROPMAN) works service, is any single item of work costing less than £240,000 (excluding VAT and fees). The stages of works implementation and the associated security tasks and responsibilities for PROPMAN work are set out at Annex C. c. Security involvement in works related private finance initiatives (PFIs). PFI is a procurement approach, based upon a set of principles and techniques, aimed at determining the feasibility and cost effectiveness of allowing the private sector to provide the MOD with certain capabilities and services. The stages of works implementation and the associated security tasks and responsibilities for works related PFIs are set out at Annex D (to be issued). d. Statement of security requirement (SSR). The need for a SSR within the overall statement of requirement (SOR) for a project, PROPMAN or PFI work is detailed within Annexes B, C and D. Guidance on the completion of the SSR is at Annex E. The SSR will be developed in the OR and inserted into a project brief (PB) for projects or works order for PROPMAN work. e. Operational requirements (OR). An OR must be completed once approval has been given by the budget holder for any security related works project or service, or for the procurement of security equipment. Within project work, the PS requires as much detail as possible in order to provide the best estimate of costs for the option study. Therefore consideration should be given to drafting an immature OR based on available information. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Guidance on the completion of the OR is at Annex E. Specific details to be addressed in ORs for CCTV, IDS and AACS are given in Sections VI, VII and X respectively. f. Request for initial SSG advisory service. A proforma for use by TLB PSyAs to request an initial SSG advisory service in respect of security requirements at a Defence site is at Annex F. Individual establishments are not to make contact with SSG without the consent of their Security Authority. Procurement of Security Equipments/Systems Requirement for PSyA Approval 05207. The initial decision on the requirement for security equipments/systems will invariably be taken at establishment-level. However, for all projects involving fences (including PIDS), CCTV, IDS, security lighting or AACS, TLB PSyAs are to be consulted to ensure that the equipment is: a. Of an acceptable standard, quality and design. b. Capable of utilising existing technology available to the Defence estate. c. Capable of further exploitation/upgrading in line with planned Defence utilisation of technology. d. Good value for money throughout the life of the system (i.e is not just the cheapest option that subsequently proves to have expensive maintenance costs). e. Part of a coordinated approach towards security equipments/systems for the Defence estate. Central Monitoring 05208. a. Coordinated approach. In order to avoid an 'ad-hoc' approach to the procurement of security equipments and systems throughout the Defence estate, centralised monitoring of the process must take place. The above requirements, leading to a coordinated and strategic approach can only be achieved centrally by the involvement of TLB PSyAs from the very beginning; they are part of the policy making machinery which is centred on D Def Sy for deciding the security equipment requirements of the Defence estate. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security b. Named security products. Exceptionally, named security products may be specified by TLB PSyAs, as clauses in contracts, provided that the specific approved equipment/item is justified on security grounds. Maintenance. 05209. To ensure any system continues to provide its optimum performance, performance testing, servicing and preventative maintenance is needed. These tasks should keep costs down and maintain acceptable performance. The frequency for each task is to be determined after consideration of the possible threat, the manufacturer's recommendations, the technical requirements of the equipment, the effort required to complete each task and the cost of carrying out the task compared to the benefits to be gained. If maintenance is not carried-out on security equipments and systems then they will fail to be regarded as one of the menu of security measures that make-up the Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix. Specific recommendations for maintenance of PIDS and IDS are contained within Sections III and VII respectively. Pre-Acceptance Board Testing 05210. It is essential that an audit of the security system is carried out, by a security specialist qualified to do so, prior to acceptance. The requirement for a security audit should be specified in the SSR and incorporated in the PB or PROPMAN works order. Where an audit finds an unacceptable fault, it is for the PS or PROM to consider whether this is a breach of the contract for the contractor to correct. a. Purpose. The purpose of the audit, which must be carried out prior to the acceptance of the facility by the Establishment, is to ensure that the security requirements specified in the PB or works order have been fully met. b. TLB PSyAs. ESyOs are to consult PSyA staff about the choice of security specialist to be employed to carry out the audit of the system. Counter Terrorist Physical Security Measures for MOD Buildings 05211. Counter terrorist physical security measures are to be applied to all MOD owned or occupied buildings; the purpose of which is to limit damage to the building fabric and injury to the occupants. It is the responsibility of TLB PSyAs to ensure that the measures applied are appropriate and take into account the location and function of the building. The minimum physical security measures are given in Annex G. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Site Selection Factors to Consider 05212. Where a choice of locations exists for a new facility, the security advantages and disadvantages of each are to be evaluated. Factors to consider are: a. The effect of topographical features and landscaping on perimeter security, overlooking, ease of access and communications. b. The existence and proximity of public rights of way and neighbouring buildings. c. d. The proposed use(s) of the facility. Access arrangements for emergency services. Site Layout Security Perimeter 05213. Facilities used for work on protectively marked material are to have a defined perimeter; a physical barrier such as a security fence, wall, or hedge; or a psychological barrier designed to make any intruder feel vulnerable and exposed (for details of perimeter security measures, see Section III). Open Space 05214. The measures that apply for open spaces within the site layout are as follows: a. Open space between any outer security perimeter and the buildings it surrounds is to be planned so as to help patrolling, but hinder overlooking and deprive intruders of cover. b. For similar reasons there is to be open space between buildings. c. The foliage of tall trees should be kept well clear of the ground and of any fence. Account is also to be taken of shadows they may cast. Car Parks and Road System 05215. The road system and car parks inside the perimeter are to be designed to reduce the need for (or eliminate the possibility of) parking vehicles near living or working accommodation. To allow continuous use during periods of enhanced terrorist threat, where possible, car parks are to be sited at least 25m from such buildings. In addition, consideration (if possible and appropriate) should be given to constructing an earth bund (as close as possible to the car park) between the car park and those buildings normally occupied. If possible, a separate visitors' car park is to JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security be provided away from living and working accommodation. Where underground car parks are used, access control measures must be rigidly enforced. In addition, the effects of blast in a closely confined space must be taken into account and compensatory measures taken. Vehicle Waiting Area 05216. An area can be provided outside the main site entrance for vehicles waiting to enter. Traffic congestion can distract the guards. However, as with car parks, due consideration is to be given to the potential terrorist threat. In these circumstances, for Service establishments, waiting areas are normally to be located outside the establishment close to the point of entry. Consideration should be given to landscaping these areas to minimise the effects of the blast. Ancillary Facilities 05217. Ancillary facilities are to be sited away from or at worst be on the periphery of areas used for protected work. Public access routes, eg for maintenance work, for the delivery of supplies or removal of refuse, are not, as far as possible, to pass through areas used for work on protected material. Buildings with Public Access 05218. Buildings with public access should be outside the security perimeter. If such buildings have to be inside, they are to, where feasible, form part of the security perimeter. Access through them, to the rest of the site, is to be controlled. Number of Entrances 05219. The number of entrances to a building or perimeter is to be kept to a minimum (see also Section III to this Chapter). In the case of establishments in urban areas any entrance directly off a busy street is to be avoided. There are to be separate entrances for pedestrians and vehicles. A separate goods entrance should be arranged so that vehicles can be supervised while loading and unloading. Lighting at Entrances 05220. Adequate lighting is to be provided at entrances so that vehicles and people and their passes are clearly visible to the guards. The types of lighting are detailed in Section III to this Chapter. Guard Accommodation 05221. Accommodation for guards is to give an unobstructed view of surrounding areas. The accommodation is to be equipped with domestic facilities; and any outdoor guard-point is to be weather proof (see Section VIII to this Chapter). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Working and Living Accommodation 05222. Working and living accommodation is to be sited well back from the perimeter and, where possible, at least 25 metres from a car park or road. Armouries and Ammunition Stores 05223. Armouries and ammunition stores are to conform to the standards detailed in Chapter 6. The authority for ammunition stores is the Explosives Storage and Transport Committee (ESTC) or the relevant Chief Inspector of Explosives; for works aspects it is DE SCG. Likewise the works authority for armouries is DE SCG under instruction from the relevant PSyA. Security Control Centre (SCC) 05223a. HOEs should seek to have all of their security systems fully integrated into one central command location. However, unit security plans should specify locations for emergency use if the primary location is rendered inoperable. Where considered necessary, and if manpower permits, a permanent manned SCC should be established separate from the guardroom. The SCC or guardroom should have an appropriate communications suite (e.g. radios, telephones and a PA system). Public Address (PA) System 05223b. A PA System, which can be used by the guard force or security personnel, should be installed, where appropriate, throughout the establishment. This will allow personnel to be alerted and respond quickly and correctly to differing levels of threat or attack. Building Finishes 05223c. Where appropriate, the inner face of perimeter walls and the lower part of building exteriors should be finished in a light coloured material to aid detection of intruders and/ or IEDs. Accommodation Planning Layout of Accommodation 05224. In addition to site planning, careful layout of accommodation within a building significantly enhances security. The Project Manager (PM), Establishment Works Consultant (EWC) or Works Service Manager (WSM) (in the case of PROPMAN work) should be briefed in detail by the PS or PROM, as appropriate, having been advised by the relevant PSyA. Formally and contractually all instructions to contractors must be issued by the PS or PROM, as appropriate. Throughout this process it must be remembered that due consideration needs to be made of statutory fire regulations. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Briefing of PM or WSM 05225. For each project/PROPMAN works service, the PSyA is to brief the PS/PROM on the following: a. The location of secure rooms or secure zones. b. The types of protection required for windows, skylights, doors and other access points. c. Any special requirements for installations such as IDS, AACS, mechanical document transfer (MDT) or mail screening systems. d. The security problems arising out of the installation of lifts (see para 05232), air conditioning and other ducting. e. Where to position bulk destruction facilities if it is proposed to dispose of large quantities of protectively marked waste on site. f. The need to minimise the risks of overlooking and overhearing (see Section V). The PS/PROM is to brief the PM/WSM accordingly. Protectively Marked Material 05226. The following principles are to be applied when allocating accommodation to staff working on protectively marked material: a. Ground floor. The use of the ground floor is, wherever possible, to be avoided for work on SECRET or TOP SECRET material as upper floors are less vulnerable to intrusion, overhearing and overlooking. b. Communications and computers. Communications centres, large computer installations, and equipment requiring TEMPEST protection is, wherever possible, to be located near, at, or below ground level. The requirements for the siting of communication and computer equipment should include the avoidance of water pipes and other sources of flooding. c. Registries and other areas. Registries, workshops or other areas which may contain protected material are not to constitute passageways to or from less secure areas. d. Public areas. Segregated accommodation is to be provided for members of the public eg waiting or interview rooms. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security e. Electronic and audio counter measures. Planning is to consider the requirement to prevent electronic and audio eavesdropping from areas outside the establishment's control. f. Locally employed staff overseas. At establishments overseas, arrangements are to be made to segregate locally employed staff without security clearance from areas in which protectively marked material is used. Secure Zones General 05227. When different degrees of security protection are required in various parts of the building, the more sensitive areas are to be concentrated into a secure zone (or zones). These are parts of a building to which entry is separately controlled. Secure zones are not to be confused with secure rooms (see Section XI of this Chapter). Reason for Secure Zones 05228. A secure zone is established for one of the following reasons: a. To concentrate work on protected material in one area of a building that does not itself have access control. b. To give additional protection to an area where particularly sensitive work takes place in a building which already has a secure perimeter and to which entry is controlled. Building alterations are only required in order to provide access control to a secure zone. Strengthened walls and doors may not be required, but security furniture or a secure room of an approved standard may be required for the custody of higher levels of protected material within the secure zone. Inner Compartments 05229. Where an entire building or group of buildings is made into a secure zone, a series of inner 'compartments' may be created with entry to each controlled separately in one of the following ways: a. b. c. By guards. By the authorised occupants themselves. By the use of an access control system. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Adjoining Rooms 05230. Several adjoining rooms can be made into a secure zone if the rooms are inter-communicating. A secure zone is to have one entrance/exit only, although additional emergency exits may be required on safety grounds. All other doors giving access to the secure zone are to be permanently secured. Whole Floors as Secure Zones 05231. Where whole floors of a building are made into secure zones the following measures apply: a. b. Lifts 05232. When access to a secure zone, comprising several floors, is by lift, the following applies: a. The lifts are to be programmed not to proceed beyond the lowest floor of the secure zone, where a control point is to be established. b. Lift entrance doors on the higher floors are to be kept locked. The secure zone is to be established on the uppermost floor or floors. Roofs of such areas are to be made secure. Secure Zones Housing Protected Material 05233. Where secure zones are established to house registries of protected material the measures below apply: a. Entry is to be confined to those who work in the registry. b. A reception counter is to be provided near the entrance for the delivery and collection of material. c. A separate room within the registry is to be provided where authorised staff can see and work on specially sensitive material. Security in Open Plan Offices Introduction 05234. The use of open plan offices creates particular problems in respect of the security of protectively marked material and the preservation of the "need to know" principle. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security General Principles 05235. The threat of espionage will always exist and the risk of information becoming known to unauthorised personnel will increase in open plan offices. The following general principles apply: a. Staff authorised to handle protectively marked material are to ensure that the "need to know" is rigorously enforced. b. No-one may be permitted access to protectively marked information unless specifically authorised to receive it. c. Individuals are responsible for the material with which they are entrusted at all times, and are to be aware of the risk of overhearing and overlooking, taking precautions as necessary. d. It is permitted to work routinely on documents/material protectively marked up to SECRET. e. Documents marked TOP SECRET and those bearing special markings are to be handled and worked upon in accordance with specific instructions. f. Visitors are to be escorted at all times. g. Meetings in which protectively marked information is to be discussed should not normally be held in open plan offices but be held in secure conference facilities where practicable. Sensitive Special Projects 05236. Groups dealing with special projects of a sensitive nature are to be segregated from those groups which do not need to know; however, segregation should only take place where the amount and sensitivity of material justifies separate working areas. These separate secure areas are to be subject to access control measures. Where practicable, such areas are to be in the less accessible parts of a floor or building i.e. located away from general access doors or transit corridors. The type of access control is to depend on a group size and any specific local requirements. Desk and Seating Arrangements 05237. Desk and seating arrangements are to be such as to ensure that access to protectively marked material by others without "a need to know" is difficult. This applies to both hard copy information and that displayed on computer screens. The arrangements are to take into account both overhearing and overlooking, internally and externally. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-12 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Unattended Workspace Overseen 05238. Where clear working groups can be identified, an individual can leave his working space for short periods (less than 30 minutes) providing his desk area is within view of an individual with the same access who can satisfactorily watch the desk. This arrangement does not relieve responsibility for the material entrusted to an individual who must ensure the material is adequately protected at all times. Unattended Workspace not Overseen or Vacated for more than 30 Minutes 05239. In instances where a desk area is vacated for less than 30 minutes but a second individual is not available to oversee or in the event the desk is vacated for more than 30 minutes then the following measures apply: a. Protectively marked material (including removable hard disk drives), CONFIDENTIAL or above are to be removed from sight and secured in security approved containers. b. RESTRICTED material with or without descriptor markings is to be held under lock and key. c. Security keys are not to be taken off site. d. VDUs are to be switched off and any protectively marked removable media secured. Special Handling Material 05240. There will be occasions when some individuals will hold small quantities of protectively marked material subject to special handling arrangements and to which access is limited. Such material is to be secured in document boxes with Manifoil Mk IV combination locks to prevent others having access. When not in use these boxes should always be held in another approved security container. Sensitive Conversations 05241. a. Care should be taken not to discuss sensitive matters in the presence of other people; consequently such conversations should not take place in open plan offices. b. Additional restrictions apply to telephone conversations. These are detailed in Chapter 9. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Siting of Electronic Office Equipment 05242. In open plan offices the siting and supervision of computer printers, faxes and photocopiers is important. The following rules apply: a. Computer printers are to be sited either adjacent to an individual's desk if connected to a stand-alone computer, or within a group area if connected to a networked system. b. Faxes and photocopiers are to be under the direct control of their nominated supervisors. c. Existing departmental security regulations are to apply. Duty Security Checker 05243. Open plan offices are to employ a duty security checker system to ensure that all protectively marked material is secured at cease work. Alternatively, defined working group areas within the open plan offices can ensure that the last person leaving each area conducts a security check. This check should be certified on a check list which clearly indicates the extent of the area to be checked. Key Security 05244. Within open plan offices the reduction in suitable wall space restricts the use of combination key boxes for the secure storage of keys. Key security arrangements are to be reviewed to ensure that an effective system is established utilising security containers and taking account of the requirements of authorised late workers. Visitors 05245. Open plan offices make it more difficult to control the movement of visitors and contractors e.g. maintenance staff. Uncleared personnel are always to be escorted. Cleared personnel do not require escorts and staff should be alert to unknown personnel in their work areas. Strangers should be challenged. Security Measures Checklist 05246. The following is a list of points to be covered when planning security measures in an open plan environment. a. Identify those groups dealing with similar subjects and with similar access to protectively marked material and try and ensure they are adjacent to each other. b. Arrange for the more sensitive material to be compartmentalised, where there is justification, or to be furthest from points of general access to prevent overhearing or overlooking of material by unauthorised personnel. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-14 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security c. Define boundaries of small working groups. The boundaries are to be used for determining supervision and cease work close down procedures. These procedures should be recorded. d. Within these groups consider the arrangements for controlling protectively marked material, security containers, PC's and terminals, printers, photocopiers and faxes. e. Ensure staff are aware of their responsibilities, and the need for care when handling or discussing sensitive matters in an open plan environment. f. Check that a suitable system exists for securing protectively marked material and keys at cease work. g. Establish either a last man out system for working areas or a duty security checker system to ensure the security of areas at the close of work. h. Ensure that the last man out or duty security checker is aware of the checks to be conducted and form to be completed. Security of Documents and Activated IT Systems in Unattended Offices 05247. Protectively marked documents must be secured in appropriate security containers when offices and rooms are vacant. Security Authorities may waive this requirement, where appropriate, only during normal working hours where the room or compartment is fitted with a lock (including digital push button locks), the key or combination to which has always been controlled as a security key or combination, and the following conditions apply (comparable rules apply to IT systems which are activated, see Volume 3 Chapter 2): a. Periods of time. The maximum lengths of time that documents may be left unattended in locked offices are: (1) (2) (3) TOP SECRET - 30 minutes. SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL - 4 hours. RESTRICTED - 8 hours. Note: Special Handling material will continue to be subject to specific guidance issued by originators. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-15 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. Security requirements. The following security requirements are to be applied for all protectively marked documents left in unattended offices, except for RESTRICTED documents when only the requirements of Subparas (1) to (3) inclusive apply: (1) All windows, doors and other means of entry to the vacated office are to be secured. Where doors have 2 means of locking (eg digital push button lock and normal key lock) and the absence is in excess of 30 minutes, both means of locking should be utilised (2 means of locking need not be utilised for RESTRICTED documents). (2) It must not be possible to view documents (including computer screens) from a window, glass door or any other means such that it is possible to identify the protective marking of the document or view its contents (including by the use of image intensifying or photographic equipment). (3) The key to the door is to be held by the office occupant at all times except when it is deposited with an authorised holder. (4) (5) unit. Other personnel must occupy the building at all times. There must be control of entry to the building, establishment or (6) The period of absence is not to be a matter of regular routine or predictable pattern (absences over the lunch period need not necessarily be included here, provided that the Security Authority is satisfied that the overall security measures are adequate). 05248. Separate rules exist for open plan offices (see paras 05234-05246). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-16 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX A TO SECTION II SPECIAL SERVICES GROUP (SSG) General 1. The purpose of this Annex is to describe the role of SSG in supplying services to MOD, and the arrangements for funding and the control of funding those services. SSG provides in-Government expertise in most aspects of physical security for employment by MOD. In setting its charges, SSG will minimize costs but is under HM Treasury remit to achieve full recovery. 2. SSG is organised into two separate parts: a. b. The SSG Authority, providing an advisory service. The SSG Executive, providing a security implementation service. 3. The services that SSG provide for the MOD are described in a Supply and Services Agreement (SSA). MOD sponsors are as follows: a. b. SSG Authority SSA ­ the point of contact is DD Def Sy(Phys). SSG Executive SSA - the point of contact is DE Contracts SSG Authority 4. The SSG Authority provides an advisory service that is currently free to MOD customers at the point of delivery. Application for this service is to be made through and supported by, PSyAs using the request form at Annex F. Tasking of the SSG Authority is to be restricted to seeking advice on technical aspects that are beyond the scope of available in-house security expertise. Examples are those services detailed at sub-paras 7a and 7b. Wherever possible, the costs of security advice for major projects, future major projects and the services described in subparas 7c, d and e should be included within the budget of the project. 5. Where the SSG Executive are contracted to carry out the work, security advice for the work, and any costs incurred, will be on a repayment basis and charged to the contract. Funding Management for SSG Authority Work for MOD 6. Under the terms of the SSA, SSG will send a monthly invoice to D Def Sy for payment, for completed SSG Authority services. A copy of the invoice will be sent by SSG to each PSyA. It is the PSyAs responsibility, within one month of receipt of each monthly invoice, to advise D Def Sy in writing if invoiced work has not been satisfactorily completed. In the event of a dispute over a service provided by the SSG Authority, resolution will be carried out under normal works service procedures. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security SSG Authority Services 7. The SSG Authority will provide, on request (and in accordance with given timescales), the following services: a. A security survey report describing the overall security strategy with outline proposals (a brief), quantified performance standards and parameters and an order of cost estimate. b. An independent evaluation of the detailed design to ensure that the security requirement has been met. c. Expertise in testing or observation of tests on behalf of the PS or PROM as appropriate. d. A 'troubleshooting' service to examine and report on specific problems with installed security systems and equipment. e. Maintenance of security equipment database and trials reports. SSG Executive 8. The SSG Executive can be employed by PSs/PROMs either in competition with commercial firms or where the Security Authority has directed that SSG should be used; PSs/PROMs should note the following: a. Where it has been so directed, PSs and PROMs should ensure that SSG's responsibilities are defined within the management system of the works in general and are consistent with any regulations. Specifications and documentation should be similar to those under which contractors or sub-contractors are retained using WSMs or PMs. b. The management of services carried out by the SSG Executive and its construction, design and management regulation aspects, should be defined in the PM's contract documents for projects or in the order placed on the WSM for PROPMAN work. c. All aspects of SSG Executive service for MOD will normally be carried out on a repayment basis, including advice given by the Executive. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX B TO SECTION II SECURITY ADVICE - CAPITAL WORKS PROJECTS STAGE 1 Statement of Requirement (SOR) ESyO as stakeholder, to formulate SSR element of SOR, taking advice if appropriate, from Sector Security Authorities or other specialist security staffs. SSR to include, as a minimum: 1. 2. Vulnerability of Project facility to threats (high/medium/low). Identify what is being protected. 3. Possible alternatives which would reduce security requirement (eg could protectively marked material be stored elsewhere?) As much detail as possible should be provided to identify security implications. Further advice on drafting the SSR can be found at Annex E. STAGE 2 SOR Staffing PSyA to note and comment on content of SOR. PSyA to commence formulating checklist of security needs in order to inform the Options Study. STAGE 3 Option Study (OS) Preparation/Staffing of draft OS PSyA to provide a detailed check-list of security requirements for each option under consideration (for example: robustness, glazing, locks, fencing, IDS and lighting standards). As much detail as possible should be provided in order to ensure that all appropriate security measures are incorporated and subsequent OS costings are JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security accurate. To assist with this process it may be appropriate for the ESyO to start developing the OR seeking assistance from specialist security staffs (in exceptional circumstances the PSyA can request assistance from SSG). Further advice on the drafting of the OR can be found at Annex E. STAGE 4 OS STAGE 5 Approval by Budget Holder ESyO to attend Siting Board (Siting Board may have been convened earlier). Any further comments on security requirements to be passed to PS and PSyA. STAGE 6 Project Brief (PB) Preparation 1. The PB is the basis on which the appointment of the commercial Project Manager (PM) is made. 2. As required, PSyA attends Project stakeholders meeting. 3. PSyA decides whether further specialist security input is required (eg by specialist security staffs or SSG). 4. PSyA oversees preparation and completion of detailed OR (further advice on the drafting of the OR can be found at Annex E)). Note: It is important to ensure that the security scope of work in the PB is fully defined. It should include only the essential security features (to MMR)* which must be incorporated within the Project. Any changes to the scope of work after the appointment of the Project Manager will not be affordable. * In this context, MMR means only those measures which are necessary to meet operational or other military need. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security STAGE 7 Appointment of Project Manager STAGE 8 Preparation of Design Brief PSyA: 1. Attends design meetings as required. 2. Maintains a constant dialogue with Project Sponsor (PS) during design development to ensure that scope of security work identified in the PB is being properly interpreted. STAGE 9 Design PSyA approves final design. STAGE 10 Appointment of Contractor STAGE 11 Construction STAGE 12 Hand-Over ESyO attends Pre-Acceptance Board Testing and Handover Boards. PSyA attends (if required). Certificates of acceptance to be provided to PS. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-B-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-B-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX C TO SECTION II SECURITY ADVICE - WORKS SERVICES (PROPMAN) STAGE 1 Works Request ESyO should routinely comment on new works proposals. He is to provide an OR, taking advice, if appropriate, from PSyA or other specialist security staffs and attend siting boards (further advice on drafting the OR can be found at Annex E). STAGE 2 Maintenance of the Forward Maintenance Register ESyO to ensure Property Manager (PROM) includes security-related works and takes account of need to replace CCTV, IDS etc in future years. STAGE 3 Annual LTC Process PSyA to provide advice to TLB work staffs during the validation process. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security STAGE 4 Approval by Budget Holder (Work listed in Pre-planned Maintenance Programme) ESyO to attend siting board. TLB specialist to comment upon Forms 2. STAGE 5 Design ESyO to review Work Service Manager (WSM) sketch plans and working drawings. STAGE 6 Construction Phase ESyO to implement necessary vetting procedures if appropriate. STAGE 7 Completion of Works ESyO attends Pre-Acceptance Board Testing and handover boards. Certificates of acceptance to be provided to the PROM. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX D TO SECTION II SECURITY INVOLVEMENT IN WORKS RELATED PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE To be issued. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-D-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-D-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX E TO SECTION II DRAFTING THE STATEMENT OF SECURITY REQUIREMENT (SSR) AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT (OR) Statement of Security Requirement 1. The SSR (also known as a brief or high level OR) forms part of the work service SOR. It is a high level statement which indicates the assets to be protected, the threat assessment, the perceived vulnerabilities to the threat, the security level required, and the reliability and availability required of any proposed systems. The SSR is developed by the ESyO, in consultation with the PSyA, when a security requirement has been identified. The PROM/PS provides (via the ESyO) the Security Authority with the basis against which the threat and security concept is set. The threat appreciation is to incorporate any relevant local factors; eg a risk assessment of the site and a summary of possible methods of attack. Operational Requirements for Security Measures General 2. An OR is a statement of needs based on a thorough and systematic assessment of the problems to be solved and the hoped for solutions. The important thing to remember is that the OR will be used to guide the eventual design process for any recommended security measures. It must be clear as to what is required so that there are no surprises in the future; any changes after contract-let may not be affordable. The OR will outline in some detail the requirements in terms of deterrence, detection, physical delay, surveillance and response. The OR is the critical document that provides the link between the high level need and the system procurement process. Every step on the road to an installed system should be directed at achieving the OR. Without an OR the performance criteria cannot be agreed; without performance criteria it will be difficult to reliably test and commission the completed installation and there will be no mechanism for rejection of an inadequate system. 3. SSG have produced, on behalf of EDICTS, a guide to producing ORs for protective security measures. Copies of the document can be obtained from TLB PSyA staffs. The methodology of the checklist is summarised below: a. Content of the OR. The following list is the realistic minimum of points that must be addressed in the OR: (1) (2) Assets to be protected. The threat. 5-2-E-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Consequences of compromise. Probability and frequency of occurrence. Level of security required - based on the classes in Section I. Areas of concern. Function of any proposed measures. Environmental conditions expected. Success criteria. In addition it is useful to include: (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) Responses. Information transmission. Information handling. Operators tasks. Training needs. b. Producing the OR. Using the SOR (incorporating the SSR), the OR is written by the ESyO with assistance, if necessary from the TLB PSyA staffs, a facilitator (such as SSG) and other stakeholders. There must be communication with ALL the stakeholders during the production of the OR. The stakeholders are everyone who has an interest in the operational security of the site or building. This includes security managers, building owners, building user representatives, budget holders, and the operators of any technical security systems, current or proposed. There are 5 steps to be followed in producing the OR: (1) Step 1. concern. (2) (3) (4) (5) Agree and list the assets and physical areas of Step 2. Complete the OR checklist. Step 3. Produce a checklist summary. Step 4. Consider possible solutions. Step 5. Write the OR statement. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-E-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX F TO SECTION II RESTRICTED (When completed) REQUEST FOR INITIAL SSG ADVISORY SERVICE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AT A DEFENCE SITE (SECTIONS 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 TO BE COMPLETED BY ORIGINATING UNIT AND FORWARDED TO SECTOR SECURITY AUTHORITY (SSA). SECTION 4 (APPROVAL) TO BE COMPLETED BY SSA AND FORWARDED TO SSG (COPIED TO DDEF SY ) File Reference : From: eg. DNSyICP / HQ Land / HQ STC / CB Sy / DLO / DPA To : Head of Branch, Room 9/42, Special Services Group, SSG, St Christopher House, Southwark Street, London SE1 OTE. (Fax No: 0207 921 3802) Copy to: DDef Sy-Phys(Tech) (Fax No: 0207 218 3993) References (See Note 1): Section 1 - Location of Site -------------------------------------------------------------Grid reference : Postal address : Type of site: urban/rural, shared/sole occupant. Type of work (See Note 2): new build/ refurbishment/ IDS/ PIDS/ CCTV/ AACS/ SAMS/ lighting/ building construction/ fences/ blast protectio RESTRICTED (When Completed) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-F-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security RESTRICTED (When Completed) Area of advice (See Note 3): option study/ pre-project advice/ initial project advice/ audit established system/ audit newly installed system/ trouble shooting/ other (please specify). Section 2 - Primary Establishment -------------------------------------------------------------Title : Role : Security category of establishment: Highest level of protection: TOP SECRET / SECRET / CONFIDENTIAL / RESTRICTED POINT OF CONTACT Name: Appointment: BT Tel No: BT UNCLAS Fax No (See Note 4): Section 3 - Security Section/Unit -------------------------------------------------------------POINT OF CONTACT Name: Appointment: BT Tel No: BT UNCLAS Fax No: RESTRICTED (When Completed) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-F-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security RESTRICTED (When Completed) Section 4 ­ Approval from TLB PSyA Staffs -------------------------------------------------------------POINT OF CONTACT Name : Appointment: BT Tel No: BT UNCLAS Fax No: Section 5 ­ Advisory Input Requirements -------------------------------------------------------------Timsecale (See Note 5): Contacts (See Note 6): Distribution for SSG Advisory Report Name: Appointment: Address: No. of copies: BT Tel No: BT UNCLAS Fax No: Section 6 ­ Work Services Information ------------------------------------------------------------The following items are attached for information (See Note 7) Operational Requirement: Yes/ No Threat/ Risk Assessment: Yes/ No RESTRICTED (When Completed) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-F-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security RESTRICTED (When Completed) Other Plans and Documentation (please specify): Distribution: External: Action (See Note 8): Information (See Note 9): Notes: (1) (2) References as necessary e.g. G2 HQ LAND Control No. Description of problem/ project/ area of advice/ work required. (3) The following services cannot be obtained through the D Def Sy funded SSG Advisory Account: installation, maintenance, commissioning, detailed project advice, purchase of equipment, examining tenders. If in doubt, speak to your PSyA Staffs or DDef Sy-Phys(Tech). (4) (5) SSG Burtonwood is not connected to the Military Telephone Network. Start/ end dates, particular dates to note i.e. meetings. (6) Initial point of contact for SSG Adviser to discuss work service particulars or arrange site visit. (7) As Operational Requirement and Threat/ Risk assessment should be attached to this request form. If not, then an explanation should be given as to why these documents have not been generated. Plans of the site/ establishment/ building (preferably A3 size) will be of assistance to SSG in completing their report. (8) Request form to be forwarded to relevant PSyA Staffs for action unless command instructions in place that state otherwise. (9) Complete as appropriate e.g. HQ G2/G4, Area Sy Team, P&SS Unit, MI Bn DLO/DPA Sy Staff etc RESTRICTED (When Completed) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-F-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX G TO SECTION II COUNTER TERRORIST PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES FOR ALL MOD OWNED OR OCCUPIED BUILDINGS Introduction 1. This Annex details the minimum counter-terrorist physical security measures which are to be applied to all MOD owned or occupied buildings. 2. The physical security measures, adapted for the MOD, are based on Cabinet Office guidelines on robustness measures for buildings. The purpose of these measures is to limit damage to the building fabric and injury to the occupants, whatever the level of threat. Given the varying function and location of MOD buildings, physical security measures should be applied on the basis of vulnerability of the site. 3. It is the responsibility of PSyAs to ensure that the measures applied are appropriate. Accordingly, ESyOs and/or PSyAs, in consultation with DE SCG, TLB works advisers and the Project Sponsor or Property Manager, are to assess the vulnerability of buildings as either HIGH, MODERATE or LOW taking into account the following: a. b. c. Location ie whether or not the building is within a secure perimeter. Perimeter security and access by the public. The building aspect in relation to the perimeter. d. The protection afforded by other buildings, other features and/or landscaping. e. Whether or not the building is normally occupied. f. Building usage e.g. housing departments involved in the fight against terrorism. 4. When determining building vulnerability, due account should be taken of the following general rules (together with the considerations at sub-paras 3b to f above): a. Buildings that are not located within a secure perimeter or are located within 100 metres of a secure perimeter will be HIGH unless other factors afford protection from bombs/mortars. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-G-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. Buildings that are normally occupied by personnel, are located beyond 100 metres within a secure perimeter, will be MODERATE unless other factors afford protection from bombs/mortars. c. 5. Buildings that are not normally occupied by personnel will be LOW. The physical security measures fall into two distinct categories: a. Standard measures. Those measures that cannot be applied or removed quickly in line with a changing threat. There are two sections of Standard Measures, those for new construction and those for existing construction; and b. Enhanced measures. Those measures which can be applied or removed as the threat changes. It is important to carry out a security survey to establish the appropriate Enhanced Measures which are to be included in any contingency plan. Standard Measures 6. These measures are to be applied to all new MOD buildings being constructed, leased for MOD use or refurbished. When applying these measures, PSyAs should exercise common sense and give consideration to omitting certain standards in the case of buildings deep within the perimeter or with low occupancy, domestic facilities such as housing and sporting facilities such as squash courts. a. SM.1 - Construction Standard (1) The building should be of framed construction using either structural steel or in situ reinforced concrete. (2) The structural frames should be designed to the "degree of robustness" required by the relevant British Standards, whatever the number of storeys (ie all buildings less than 5 storeys high should be designed as a 5 storey building for robustness only). (3) If structural steelwork is used, the beam/column connections are to be designed to carry load reversals and where possible the facade columns and beams should be concrete encased. (4) The floors and roof slabs should be constructed with in situ reinforced concrete, or with pre-cast concrete slabs with a structural topping suitably tied into the structural frame. (5) Cladding should be either pre-cast concrete panels or solid masonry. If pre-cast systems are used the fixings of the panel back to the structure are to be robust, easily accessible and repairable. Further the cladding system should be designed so that each panel may be removed without affecting the surrounding panels. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-G-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security b. SM.2 - Bomb shelter area (BSA) accommodation (1) High vulnerability. BSA accommodation should be provided and must be sufficient for the maximum number of people likely to be occupying the building. BSA provision may be achieved by careful planning of cores constructed in reinforced concrete, or by robust basement construction. (2) Moderate vulnerability. BSA accommodation may be provided for people likely to be vulnerable. An alternative of emergency evacuation planning may be preferred. (3) Low vulnerability. An emergency evacuation plan is to be in place. c. SM.3 - Glazing protection. Glazing protection minimises the injuries to personnel and damage to assets by reducing the quantities of flying glass. (1) High vulnerability. This protection is achieved by the installation of laminated glass in frames which are securely fixed to the surrounding structure. The plastic interlayers within the laminated glass must be polyvinyl butyral (pvb) for the glazing to offer blast resistance. If a better level of protection is required, then 7.5mm laminated glass in purpose designed frames should be specified. If a double glazing system is to be used, then the outer leaf should be 6mm toughened glass of the appropriate thickness to suit the standard design requirements; and the inner pane should be 6.8mm laminated glass for standard frames or 7.5mm thick laminated glass in enhanced frames. (2) Moderate vulnerability. If single glazing is specified, then the laminated glass should be a minimum of 6.8mm thick in standard frames. (3) Low vulnerability. As above or consideration should be given to the use of anti-shatter film. d. SM.4 - Access control. A good access control system should be installed at all pedestrian and vehicular entrances; this will minimise the opportunity for the deployment of a device within the building. A device placed inside a building would cause greater damage and potentially more injuries that a similar sized device deployed outside the building. e. SM.5 - Counter terrorist contingency plan. Current Health and Safety legislation requires an employer to have established appropriate procedures to be followed in the event of serious or imminent danger. Actions to be taken in the event of an attack are given in Chapter 7. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-G-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security f. SM.6 - X-Ray Screening of delivered items. Where X-ray screening of mail and delivered items is to be carried out, a purpose designed room should be constructed so as to minimise the consequences of an explosion and offer a degree of protection to operators and staff. 7. For buildings currently occupied. a. SM.1 - Construction standard. Any of the measures noted in SM.1 for new construction which are provided by the existing structure will minimise the consequences of an explosive device. b. SM.2 - Bomb shelter area (BSA) accommodation. If the building is of framed construction it may offer BSA accommodation. Structural engineering advice should be sought to ensure that the building construction is suitable and the Shelter Area construction meets current guidance. If the building is not framed or does not provide suitable BSA accommodation, external evacuation will be required as part of the contingency planning from the threat of explosive devices. c. SM.3 - Glazing protection. Where the glazing is being renewed or refurbished consideration should be given to replacing the glazing in accordance with the recommendations in SM.3 for new construction. In all other cases anti shatter film (ASF) should be fitted in the internal surface of all external glazing, whatever the height of the building. Bomb blast net curtains (BBNC) may be fitted where appropriate. In the case of timber framed 'Georgian' windows ASF and BBNC should be fitted. d. SM.4 - Access control. See SM.4 for new construction. See SM.5 above for See SM.6 above for e. SM.5 - Counter terrorist contingency plan. new construction. f. SM.6 - X-Ray screening of delivered items. new construction. Enhanced Measures 8. Enhanced measures are those measures that are to be implemented, or removed, as the Alert States increase, or decrease. 9. Each Alert State requires a certain set of measures to be implemented. A comprehensive set of measures for each of the Alert States is to be incorporated into the contingency plan. 10. Not all the measures will necessarily be appropriate for a particular establishment. It is, however, important to undertake a Security Survey examining such aspects as location, exposure, activity, site conditions, etc so as to identify those measures that are appropriate and then incorporate them into the contingency. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-2-G-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION III TO CHAPTER 5 EXTERNAL PERIMETER SECURITY MEASURES Introduction Perimeters 05301. A perimeter may be defined by a natural boundary, by free-standing fences or walls, by the outer walls of a building or by divisions within it. Its function is to provide a degree of physical, psychological or legal deterrence to intrusion. Its effectiveness as a security measure can be enhanced by the deployment of perimeter intruder detection systems (PIDS), closed circuit television (CCTV), security lighting and guard forces. Further Information, Advice and Guidance 05302. Further information and direction on perimeter security measures can be obtained from the following sources: a. Where establishments are considering the installation of perimeter security measures Command security staff are to be consulted to provide specialist advice and any appropriate policy input; Section II to this Chapter provides information and direction on the procurement of major security equipments and systems. In addition, where such work constitutes a works service project, the procedures detailed in Chapter 5, Section II, Annex A are to be adhered to. b. The PIDS 'Family of Documents' (full title; 'Family of Documents to Establish Optimum External Security Systems - Volume 3 - Perimeter Intruder Detection Systems (Ref 94066)) produced by the Security Equipment Assessment laboratory, under the auspices of EDICTS provides detailed advice, guidance and instruction on the deployment of PIDS. The document is the authoritative publication for the use by MOD establishments. Fences General 05303. A perimeter fence forms a barrier and identifies the boundary of a protected or restricted area. The level of protection offered by a fence depends on: a. b. c. The height of the fence. The construction of the fence. The material used in the fence. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-3-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security d. Any additional security features used to increase its performance or effectiveness such as topping, PIDS, lighting or CCTV. The type of fence used on the perimeter of a site is to reflect the type of threat, i.e. terrorist, criminal etc. Purpose of Fences 05304. Fences are not always to be regarded as being a major obstacle in themselves. They are primarily a means of: a. b. Delineating a boundary/area hence protecting against casual intruders. Channelling visitors to legal points of entry. c. Deterring and delaying unlawful intruders who are normally loathe to operate with an obstacle behind them, particularly if they have no guarantee of getting back to their point of entry. d. Assisting guard patrols and easing the employment of guard dogs. Effectiveness of a Fence 05305. The effectiveness of a fence as a barrier to or deterrent against intruders can be increased by the following: a. b. c. Surveillance of the fence by members of the guard force. The alarming of the fence with some form of PIDS. The addition to fences of suitable security lighting. d. Ensuring that fences are inspected frequently to ensure that they are in good condition, have not been tampered with and that they and the immediate area are clear of vegetation. Classes of Fences 05306. The Classes of fences are at para 05124 and the types of specific barriers that fall into each Class are shown at Section I, Annex E. Working and Operational Areas 05307. Ideally, a fence should enclose the entire working or appropriate operational areas within an establishment. When this is not practicable, individual key areas are to be enclosed where possible. Careful planning will ensure that such installations are grouped together and subjected to coordinated security control. The aim is to draw as tight a ring as possible around the key area and to apply the main security effort there. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-3-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Outline Specification for Fences 05308. The following design features for security fences apply: a. Height and construction. The height and construction of a security fence is to be commensurate with the degree of physical deterrence required. Defence Estates (DE) has details of the approved types of fence. Of these, the current minimum Defence Standard is the 1.80m high barrier fence (DE SD50/1-5). However, this type of fence should be replaced by a 2.4m security fence, BS 1722 Part 101990 (Weldmesh), during refurbishment or on life expiry of the barrier fence. In some establishments existing fences or walls of the buildings themselves and/or pallisade fencing may provide a similar degree of protection. Whenever toppings on a 1.80m high need to be replaced, the advice of DE should be sought. b. Access through the fence. Access is not to be possible under the fence, or through drains and culverts beneath it. Points such as drains and culverts should be identified as weak points and due for special attention. c. Line of fence. The following considerations are to be taken into account in regard to the line of fences: (1) The fence is to, wherever possible, run in straight lines for ease of surveillance and erection. (2) Junctions where the fence changes direction are usually easier to climb and are therefore be kept to a minimum. (3) Advantage is to be taken of existing or natural features so as to increase the protective value of the fence. (4) Using natural or existing features may help minimise the use of material in the fence. (5) The manpower that will be needed for the surveillance of the fence. d. Siting of fences. A Security/Barrier fence should be sited around vulnerable areas to permit economic patrolling or surveillance. However it should be built at least 25m away from any work, Mess or accommodation block, where possible, to provide protection against an explosive device being placed against the fence or a satchel type IED being thrown over the fence to reach the buildings. Where possible, ground on both sides of the fence is to be cleared to remove cover for potential intruders. Therefore, the fence should, if possible, be at least 10m back from the marked boundary of MOD land. This will facilitate the creation of a sterile zone, both to allow the installation of certain types of PIDS and also to allow space for lighting and cameras to cover the fence face and the approaches to it, if the use of JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-3-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security PIDS is envisaged. Careful planning and the selection of the best line for the fence using natural features will increase the protective value of the fence, and minimise the use of material and manpower required for construction and subsequent security coverage. Where a security area abuts an external boundary, additional security measures should also be considered and applied. e. Visibility. Wherever possible, the whole of the fence area is to be visible to resident or patrolling guards. The perimeter can be shortened in places to avoid pockets in the fenced area which would otherwise be out of sight. Closed circuit television (CCTV) may also help to improve visibility at particular establishments. JSP 436 Chapters 3 and 10 provide more information on fence surveillance. f. Anti-climbing devices. Anti-climbing devices such as barbed wire or barbed tape concertinas are to be used at the top of the fence. A barbed wire or barbed tape concertina laid inside the fence at its base can discourage burrowing; JSP 436 Chapter 3 provides diagrams of such devices. As there may be legal implications where such devices are used in areas to which the public have access, advice on the matter is to be sought from Command security staff. g. Gates. The following measures apply to gates: (1) (2) Gates are to be of comparable standard to the fence. The number of gates is to be reduced to a minimum. (3) Locking is to be achieved by padlock and locking bar being welded to the gate and frame, or to both leaves of a double gate. (4) The bottom of gates are not to have a ground clearance in excess of 50 mm. (5) Unmanned gates are to be kept locked with approved padlocks, included in patrol beats and inspected regularly. (6) Manned gates are to have adequate communications to Guardroom or Central Security Control. h. Compatibility. Fences are to be compatible with the terrain and with any requirement for IDS and/or for CCTV. Types of Fence 05309. Transparent fences should normally be preferred to opaque fences where there is a need for guards to see outside the protected area. They are to be constructed of the following: a. Welded mesh. 5-3-4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security b. c. d. Steel palisades. Expanded metal (XPM). Chain link. Detailed specifications can be obtained from SSG via Command security staff. Opaque Fences 05310. Where an opaque fence is needed the following applies: e. Steel profile fences. Steel profile fences are generally recommended. They are made of galvanised steel sheets bolted to the framework of a steel fence. f. Walls. Walls are not usually recommended for security purposes because, although comparatively difficult to penetrate, they are expensive to construct. However there will be occasions where walls are essential for a specific requirement that has to be met. Advice from Command security staff is to be sought by establishments in such circumstances. g. Wood fencing. Wood fencing of any kind is comparatively weak and not recommended for security use other than for screening purposes. Selection of grade of fence for a site. 05311. The selection (and therefore the expenditure required) of a particular Class of fence for a site must be justified in relation to the threat that an establishment faces or is expected to face taking into account a risk assessment of the site. Establishments are to consult Command security staff prior to a major procurement of fencing. Entrances and Exits 05312. Heads of establishment are to designate points of entry and exit to/from their establishment and promulgate conditions concerning their use in establishment standing orders (security). Such entrances and exits are to be kept to a minimum although at least one alternative entrance/exit must be able to be used when required. Further instructions for control of entry are at Section IX of this Chapter; additional guidance is in Chapters 3, 5 and 10 of JSP 436. Security Notice Boards 05313. Prohibited Place notices are to be displayed on operational sites at official points of entry, such as gates or access roads, whereas playing fields, married quarter estates etc are to have signs reading 'MOD Property. Keep Out'. Prohibited Place Notices are to be worded as follows: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-3-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security THIS IS A PROHIBITED PLACE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS - UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS ENTERING THE AREA MAY BE ARRESTED AND PROSECUTED. 05314. Except for notices indicating that police/military working dogs are on patrol, those indicating MOD property, Official Secrets Acts notices and those instructing visitors to report to the Guardroom/Control of Entry Point. Security notice boards are not to be used to indicate boundaries or perimeters. Units Overseas 05315. Overseas units are to follow the spirit of para 05313, tailoring the notice to the requirements of local law and of Status of Forces agreements. Perimeter Intruder Detection Systems (PIDS) Definition 05316. PIDS are electronic devices for detecting the entry or attempted entry of an intruder across the external perimeter of an installation and signalling an alarm. Use of PIDS 05317. In securing assets requiring a high level of protection, the use of PIDS can be considered. They can usefully enhance the effectiveness of other perimeter defences (such as fences and guard forces) but they are prone to false alarms (which need to be verified by CCTV or a guard force) and, if unsuitably sited, their probable rate of detection may be low. See para 05302 for information on the PIDS 'Family of Documents'. Operational Requirement 05318. PIDS are expensive and care is to be taken in the selection, application and installation of a PIDS to prevent it being circumvented or its usefulness being impaired by a high incidence of technical problems or false alarms. An Operational Requirement (OR) is to be compiled by the establishment after consultation with and approval by Command security staff. Establishments are to define clearly what they expect of a PIDS and to be aware of its limitations. In setting the requirements for a PIDS installation the following is to be specified: a. The area/equipment to be protected. b. Any special requirements affecting the areas concerned and the degree of security protection necessary. c. Whether linkage to other electronic systems such as CCTV or AACS is required. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-3-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security d. The overall security plan and details of all related measures relevant to the design of the system. e. The type of reaction force or monitoring arrangements required. f. The position of the alarm display panel and details of related security procedures. Site Survey 05319. Following approval of the OR, a site survey is to be arranged by Command security staff (who may task their single-Service security organisation, or SSG. The site survey is to consider: a. b. The type of fence or wall requiring coverage. The length of each perimeter requiring coverage. c. Whether there is sufficient ground available to establish sterile detection zones (if appropriate) on the attack side of each perimeter. d. e. Local soil and ground surface conditions. Prevailing weather and local wild life. f. The resources, including CCTV and guards, available for alarm verification. See also Chapter 5, Section II, Annex A for co-ordination of security aspects of works services. System Audit 05320. An audit of the PIDS system is to be carried out by professional security staff. System Maintenance 05321. To ensure any system continues to provide its optimum performance, performance testing, servicing and preventative maintenance is needed. These tasks should keep costs down and maintain acceptable performance. The frequency for carrying out each task should have been determined after consideration of the possible threat, the manufacturer's recommendations, the technical requirements of the equipment, the effort required to complete each task and the cost of carrying out the task compared to the benefits to be gained. Because PIDS consist of electronic devices operating in an outdoor environment system confidence and availability can only be maintained through regular maintenance, it is therefore recommended that systems receive at least 4 maintenance visits per year. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-3-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Security Lighting Effective Use of Lighting 05322. Lighting can make an important contribution to physical security but to be effective it should be used in association with guards. If incorrectly applied, it can assist intruders more than guard forces. Security lighting is to: a. b. c. Allow guards to see intruders before they reach their objectives. Conceal the guards from intruders. Deter intruders or hinder them in their purpose. 05323. Security lighting acts as a particularly good low cost deterrent. Even a low level of illumination can deter potential intruders. Lamps which require long warmup periods are unsuitable for certain security lighting applications. Time switches, movement sensors or photo-electric sensors can be useful for the control of security lighting, but the latter are vulnerable to deliberate interference. Types of Security Lighting 05324. The following types of security lighting meet particular applications: a. Perimeter lighting. Perimeter lighting is to be designed to cast a uniform light on the perimeter. This is to be provided by overhead lamps or by low mounted lamps which will create a glare effect to dazzle and deter intruders. If the latter are used, they are not to create a nuisance or hazard outside the perimeter. The lighting is to be so designed so that it does not reveal the position of patrolling guards. Brightly lit guard posts or reception rooms where the guards are clearly visible or silhouetted are to be avoided. b. Area lighting. Area lighting is to illuminate areas inside the perimeter which intruders must cross in order to reach their objectives. The following measures apply: (1) Area lighting increases the guards' ability to detect intruders and acts as a powerful deterrent. (2) The illumination is to be even and without shadows. (3) Every part of each area to be illuminated is to be lit by at least two lights to guard against lamp failure. c. Local lighting. Local lighting illuminates areas inadequately covered by area lighting and which could conceal an intruder. The following applies: (1) Small bulkhead lights, tough and resistant to interference, are preferred. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-3-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security (2) Fluorescent or tungsten-halogen lamps can be used as miniature flood-lights. (3) All dark spots are to be eliminated. (4) Roofs, fire escapes and emergency exits should be illuminated by such local lighting. d. Flood lighting. Flood lighting may be used to illuminate surfaces (eg buildings and fences) which intruders must pass in front of to reach their objectives. The following applies: (1) At the low illumination levels typical of security lighting the eyes rely mainly on ability to recognise outline shapes. (2) As a moving silhouette can readily be seen against an illuminated/light coloured wall, buildings can be painted white or some other light colour. Physical Protection of Lighting Installations 05325. The physical protection afforded to lighting installations is to be related to the threat. The following measures apply: a. The fitment of robust fittings, armoured cables and protected switchgear where appropriate to the threat. b. The electrical supply is to be separated from that of the normal power supply. c. There is to be a standby electrical supply with auto start and changeover in the event of mains failure. d. Lighting circuits to be linked with intruder detection systems so that tampering sets off an alarm. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-3-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-3-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 5 THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF BUILDINGS General Further Advice on Threats and Counter Measures 05401. Advice on the current threats and specialist countermeasures can be obtained from the following sources: a. Espionage/terrorist threats and their counter measures. For espionage/terrorist threats and their counter measures the following sources are available: (1) Advice on both surreptitious and terrorist threats can be obtained from PSyAs who are advised of current threats by D Def Sy. (2) Advice on structures, building materials, window and door design, grilles and glazing materials etc, required to counter them can be obtained from PSyAs who may consult MOD Defence Estates (DE) Specialist Services as necessary. b. Criminal threat and counter measures. Advice on local criminal threats may be obtained from the crime prevention officer and the architectural liaison officer of the local civil police force via the Service police/MDP. Some Service police units also have architectural liaison officers. c. Works services. Where establishments are considering the installation of physical security measures, PSyAs are to be consulted to provide specialist advice and any appropriate policy input. In addition, where such work constitutes a works service project, the procedures detailed in Chapter 5, Section II, Annex A are to be adhered to. d. DE Specialist Construction Functional Standard - Glazing Standards for MOD Buildings subject to Terrorist Threat. e. DE Specialist Construction Design Guide - Robustness Measures for Buildings of Conventional Construction. Classification of Buildings 05402. The Classes of buildings are at para 05118. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-4-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Building Surveys 05403. When a building requires additional security measures, it is to be surveyed by professional security surveyors as detailed by PSyAs. Key Point Surveys 05404. Establishments designated as Key Points (KPs) are to be surveyed by specialist security personnel from the Services' security organisation as detailed by PSyAs to determine the security measures required to protect them. Points of Entry 05405. In any building housing protected material there are to be as few points of exit and entry as the functions of the site and safety considerations allow. Securing Access Points 05406. Buildings housing protected material are to be surveyed with a view to securing all possible access points. These include the following: a. All doors and other entrances (including inter-connecting doors with other parts of the building under separate occupancy). b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. Windows on the ground floor and other accessible windows. Sunken outside areas. Fuel chutes. Manhole covers. Parking/loading bays. Electrical installations. Drain pipes. Roofs and openings. Use of Security Measures 05407. Various physical security measures, such as window bars, grilles, shutters, security doors etc, can be used to protect accessible openings in the fabric of a building. Their effectiveness can be enhanced by the use of the following: a. b. Intruder detection systems; see Section VII of this Chapter. CCTV systems; see Section VI of this Chapter. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-4-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security c. d. Lighting systems; see Section III of this Chapter. Guard forces; see Section VIII of this Chapter. Factors to Consider 05408. When choosing from the many security options available, the following points are to be taken into consideration: a. Deterrence. The primary purpose of protective barriers is to deter intruders. They must also impose difficulty and delay on intruders who are not deterred by them, compelling the attackers to use tools, and cause noise in overcoming them. Ultimately, no practicable barrier is impenetrable given sufficient determination and the right tools. b. Solid barriers. Where ventilation is not a factor a solid, rather than an 'open', barrier is preferable; a solid door will provide greater security than a grille gate. c. Fixed barriers. A fixed barrier is preferable to a movable (hinged or sliding) one. Doors External Door Construction 05409. The following measures apply to external doors: a. External doors are to be of solid hardwood, solid laminated core or solid multiply constructions, at least 44 mm thick. b. Solid softwood doors ,where already fitted, can be strengthened by fitting a steel plate over the outer face of the door. The steel plate is to be of at least 18 gauge thick and is to be wrapped around the edges of the door and frame and secured on the edges and inside frame by woodscrews, countersunk and spaced not more than 100 mm apart. c. External doors are to open outwards, because these are more difficult to force. d. Special attention is to be paid to hinges which are to be supplemented by dog bolts. e. Doors are to be close-fitting and equipped with suitable locks (see Section XII of this chapter). f. Locking bars across the back of the door offer an extra layer of protection. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-4-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security g. h. i. Where necessary, glass fan lights are to be barred or grilled. Letter boxes are to be sealed or otherwise protected. The use of an IDS can also be considered. External Doors No Longer in Use 05410. External doors which are not used and which are not emergency exits are to be bricked up or permanently secured by screwing a steel sheet across the inside of the door frame which should be ragbolted to the fabric of the building. External Keyholes 05411. The external keyholes of seldom used external doors are to be filled in. Padbolts (barrel bolts secured by padlocks) or heavy locking bars on the inside give further protection. Strengthening Panelled Doors 05412. Added protection can be given to panelled doors by facing them with steel sheet, dressed round and fixed to the edges of the door. Glazed Doors 05413. Glazed or semi-glazed doors can be strengthened by fitting a steel mesh grille to the doors. Alternatively expanding grille gates or steel roller shutters can be installed behind the doors. If it is a prestige door where unobtrusive protection is desirable, the glass can be replaced by security glazing material. Double Doors 05414. Double doors are to be fastened by bolts attached to the first closing leaf of the door (at the top and bottom) and a security deadlock, preferably fitted with a hook-bolt attached to the other leaf. Double doors which are not final exit doors can also be fitted with internal cross bars and the second closing leaf secured with barrel bolts. Inter-communicating Doors 05415. Doors communicating with other parts of a building under separate occupancy should in general provide a degree of security similar to that of external doors. Internal Doors 05416. Where there is a requirement to keep doors to the basement, ground or first floor rooms locked, the keys to the locks on such doors are to be held under secure conditions but are to be readily accessible to authorised persons. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-4-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Emergency Exit Doors Security of Exit Doors 05417. Most emergency exit locks including those of the bar release type are not fully secure and consideration is to be given where appropriate, to the fitting of intruder detection devices. Emergency Exit Standards 05418. British standards for emergency exit devices are contained in BS 5725; those recommended for buildings holding protected assets are detailed in the Catalogue of Security Equipment held by PSyAs and other security staff. Door frames 05419. The following applies to door frames: a. The security of a door depends, in part, on its frame and consideration is to be given to strengthening the frame and its attachment to the surrounding building fabric. b. Where required, doorsteps are to be reinforced by replacing wooden sills with concrete. c. Where frames are secured by nails driven into the brickwork they can, for greater security, be fitted with steel supports to both sides of the frame and attached by steel brackets to the masonry; alternatively, expanding bolts can be used provided that they are set deep into the brickwork. d. Where the building fabric is not suitable for bolts or steel brackets, the advice of PSyAs is to be sought regarding a satisfactory alternative. Door Bolts 05420. The following applies to door bolts: a. Door bolts are to be used in conjunction with security locks and fitted in pairs (at the top and bottom of the door). b. Bolts must not be capable of being opened from outside the door and the fixing and strength of the staple are to be adequate. c. Where the bolt engages into the floor it must engage fully and the hole in the floor is to be kept free from obstruction. d. For securing doors on a more permanent basis padbolts with security padlocks should be used. e. Bolts for double doors require careful selection. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-4-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security f. For double rebated doors, flush bolts should be let into the edge of the first closing half of the door so that they are completely covered by the half of the door. For double doors without rebates, flush bolts with turnover levers should be fitted in the same way. Hinges and Dog Bolts Accessibility 05421. Hinge pins are not to be removable from outside the door neither should the hinge fixing screws be accessible from either side when the door is closed. Reinforcement 05422. Hinges can be reinforced by fitting dog bolts near each hinge. The male half of each dog bolt is to be fitted to the hinged edge of the door and the female half to the door frame. The 2 halves interlock when the door is closed, thereby preventing the hinged edge of the door being levered away from the frame even if the hinges have been removed. Grilles and Shutters Use of Grilles and Shutters 05423. Expanding grille gates, roller grilles or roller shutters may be used in door-ways, passages or other openings. These may also be useful as a second layer of defence behind existing external doors, especially where there is a threat of forcible attack. Grilles may be useful in hot climates where a closed solid door is undesirable. Frames 05424. The frames of grilles or shutters should be well secured to the surrounding structure of the building and preferably should be inaccessible from the outside of the building. Wide Angle Optical Viewers 05425. Where it is necessary for a guard to be able to identify visitors without opening the door, or to inspect the interior of a room without entering it, wide angle optical viewers are to be fitted in preference to apertures fitted with security glass. The fitting of a convex mirror, for use in conjunction with such a viewer, may enable hidden spaces to be seen. There is to be adequate lighting to illuminate the area on the other side of the door; guards are to have access to the switch. Windows 05426. The following security points regarding windows apply: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-4-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security a. All accessible non-essential windows should be bricked up or otherwise made secure. b. All basement, ground floor and other windows which are readily accessible are to have secure fittings. c. Dormer windows are sometimes easily accessible from the roof of a building. d. Window catches are to be examined and defective catches replaced. e. Consideration is to be given to providing protection by means of intruder alarms (see Section VII of this Chapter). f. Responsibility for securing windows at close work is to be clearly laid down in Establishment's Security Instructions. Window Locks 05427. Some windows will require more positive protection by fitting them with window locks. The most vulnerable windows are usually those at basement or street level, those near fire escapes or verandas, or those immediately below the roof. Use of Bars and Grilles 05428. Where it is necessary to secure a window more effectively than by the use of a lock, catch or bolt, the use of bars, grilles or shutters should be considered. The installation of intruder detection sensors should also be considered. Details of specifications for such equipment can be obtained from SSG via PSyAs. Glazing 05429. The various types of glazing and the standards they should meet are detailed in the 'DE Specialist Construction Functional Standard - Glazing Standards for MOD Buildings subject to Terrorist Threat.' This provides an element of blast and antibandit protection, but not small arms or high level of intruder protection for which further advice should be sought. Double Glazing Advantages 05430. The following advantages accrue from double glazing: a. Double glazing can provide excellent protection against surreptitious attack and a modicum of protection against forcible attack. b. It is unobtrusive and can draw less attention to a sensitive area. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-4-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c. It is aesthetically more acceptable than bars and grilles. d. Double glazing can be alarmed and has the further advantage of thermal insulation and noise reduction. Care To Be Taken 05431. Care is to be taken with all glazing to ensure that the glazing bead or the material used to secure the glazing material to the window frame is not accessible from the outside and therefore to surreptitious attack. Roofs Access 05432. The following applies to roof accesses, primarily for establishments in urban areas or buildings housing sensitive information or equipment: a. Roofs are to be surveyed to see whether there is access on from adjoining buildings, nearby buildings, trees, fire escapes, cleaning equipment etc. If there is, it may be necessary to erect barriers. If access is necessary, eg as part of a fire escape route, alarms can be fitted. to them window suitable intruder b. Access to a building may be possible via an attic or roof space. Suitable measures to protect such means of access are to be incorporated. c. Access from a roof into a building can in some cases be made via a chimney. If this is so, suitable measures are to be taken to block off such access by, eg, inserting a grille. Roof Doors 05433. If the roof is accessible from neighbouring buildings or from the ground, roof access doors should be secured in the same way as other external doors. Skylights, Fanlights, Rooflights 05434. It is possible to secure skylights, fanlights and rooflights with locks or bolts. When more protection is needed, however, one of the following is to be considered: a. b. Replacing the glass with security glazing material. Fitting bars or grilles. c. Screwing the frames in place and covering the glass with steel mesh secured to the frame on the inside. d. The Installation of intruder detection devices. 5-4-8 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Downpipes 05435. Access to the upper floors of a building or from the roof may often be afforded by way of rainwater or soil downpipes. Such access can be restricted by boxing in the pipes or by treating them with anti-climb paint (a compound which permanently retains the consistency of thin grease). It should only be applied at heights above 2.4 m to avoid accidental contact by passers-by. Sunken Outside Areas 05436. Buildings, not within the confines of an establishment boundary, can have sunken external areas at basement level which are accessible from the street. These can provide cover for persons seeking to gain entry through basement windows and afford convenient sites for depositing explosive or blast incendiary devices. The following is to be considered for the establishment's security: a. The need for protection with steel grilles or steel mesh screens secured from below, providing that these do not enable easy access to the building. b. Vents into sunken areas or vents emerging at street level are also vulnerable and may need to be fitted with internal steel grilles. c. Access through service tunnels, fuel chutes or coal-holes can be prevented with padbolts or padlocked crossbars fitted on the inside. d. The installation of intruder detection sensors. Parking/Loading Bays 05437. The following is to be considered for parking or loading bays under a stand alone building in an urban area: a. Outside working hours, they are to be closed with roller shutters or sliding shutters secured on the inside. b. During working hours, the bays are to be under the care of a custodian or, if the threat is high, closed with electronically operated shutters which are only opened when the incoming vehicle has been identified and, if necessary, searched. Public Utilities Vulnerable Access Points 05438. Gas, electricity and water supply installations within buildings may offer potentially vulnerable access points, particularly in stand alone buildings in urban areas. Where possible cables and pipes are to enter the building underground. Public service meters should be so sited that access to them does not require entry JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-4-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security into sensitive areas. Advice on siting services entry points from the point of counter terrorist measures is given in the 'DE Specialist Construction Design Guide Robustness Measures for Buildings of Conventional Construction.' This also gives advice on location of services within the building. Air Conditioning and other 'Life Support' Systems 05439. Where air conditioning is essential to the operating of equipment (such as computer installations), the electricity and water supply for the air conditioning system must be given adequate protection. The measures described in Section XIII for the protection of mechanised document transfer systems are generally applicable to air conditioning systems as well. If sabotage is considered a threat, additional security measures may be required and appropriate advice is to be sought from PSyAs. Protection measures should also be assessed for other 'life support' systems such as uninterruptible power supply (UPS) and compressed air. Based on what systems are essential and under what circumstances, together with the defined threat, the works organisation and DE can determine what life support systems are then predicated. See the `DE Specialist Construction Design Guide - Robustness Measures for Buildings of Conventional Construction'. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-4-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION V TO CHAPTER 5 PRECAUTIONS AGAINST OVERLOOKING AND OVERHEARING General Introduction 05501. The instructions in this part relate to the threat from direct visual or photographic overlooking and non-technical overhearing only. Working accommodation and discussion areas or equipment such as VDUs or printers must be sited in order to minimise the risks of deliberate or fortuitous overlooking and overhearing. Further Information, Advice and Guidance 05502. Information on the measures to counter the threat from electronic technical attacks such as audio-eavesdropping and the exploitation of radiation from information processing systems is detailed in Chapter 15. Overlooking Optical and Photographic Equipment 05503. Modern optical and photographic equipment is capable of obtaining intelligence from documents or other assets overlooked from a very oblique angle. The effective range depends on the equipment used and the prevailing atmospheric conditions but it is possible to read, or produce legible photographs of text or diagrams, at distances of 50 metres. Precautions to be Taken 05504. Where there is a risk from overlooking the following precautions are to be taken: a. Personnel handling protected papers or other assets are to be located out of the direct line of sight from windows or neighbouring buildings. b. Where possible, such staffs are to be accommodated on the higher floors of multi-storey buildings. c. Where this is not possible, the windows of overlooked rooms are to be fitted with net curtains or a translucent plastic film fixed to the glass on the inside to reduce the range from which fine detail such as typescript can be read with optical aids. It should be noted that translucent film is not effective at night if internal lights are left on. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-5-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security d. Net curtains are to have a fine mesh. e. Net curtains are to be at least double the width of the window it is required to protect. f. Net curtains are to be hung in folds. g. Where net curtains do not provide adequate protection because the light inside a room is brighter than that outside, opaque curtains or blinds are to be fitted. Positioning of Vulnerable Equipment 05505. The information held-in or displayed or printed by some items of equipment can be compromised by deliberate or fortuitous overlooking. Precautions are to be taken to prevent the following: a. b. Anyone overlooking the opening of a combination lock. The logging-in to a password protected IT terminal. c. The overlooking of VDUs or wall charts displaying sensitive information and printers or fax machines (siting and screening may overcome this). Overhearing Considering the Risk 05506. Under normal urban conditions, ordinary speech is not intelligible beyond the range of about 15 metres. In conditions of exceptional quietness or with technical aids this range may be exceeded. However, in considering the risk of overhearing, account is to be taken of other sounds, such as traffic noise, which tend to mask speech. The risk of fortuitous overhearing is obviously increased when windows are open or when voices are raised. Non-technical Overhearing 05507. Where there is perceived to be a real risk of non-technical overhearing, whether deliberate or fortuitous, consideration is to be given to keeping windows closed and fitting air extractors or ventilator discs to windows. At ground level, overhearing may be prevented by the erection of a fence (not necessarily a security fence) to keep potential eavesdroppers at a sufficient distance from vulnerable windows. Ancillary Staff 05508. Care is to be taken to prevent ancillary staff, eg cleaners or contractors, from overhearing sensitive discussions. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-5-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION VI TO CHAPTER 5 CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION General Use of Closed Circuit Television for Surveillance 05601. The use of closed circuit television (CCTV) for surveillance may save manpower, especially when used in conjunction with intruder detection (IDS) and automated access control systems (AACS). It may also supplement, extend and make more effective an existing security system. CCTV enhances the effectiveness of perimeter security, particularly if used to verify the alarms signalled by a perimeter intruder detection system (PIDS). Further Information, Advice and Guidance 05602. Further information, advice and guidance on CCTV can be obtained from the following sources: a. Where establishments are considering the installation of a CCTV system, PSyA security staff are to be consulted to provide specialist advice and any appropriate policy input; Section II to this Chapter provides information and direction on the procurement of major security equipments and systems. In addition, where such work constitutes a works service project, the procedures detailed in Chapter 5, Section II, Annex B are to be adhered to. b. Advice on the completion of an Operational Requirement (OR) should be sought from PSyA security staff. Additionally, further information on how to write an OR can be found in the 'CCTV Operational Requirements Manual', published by the Police Scientific Development Branch (PSDB) (Publication no 17/94). PSyA security staff should hold copies of the document. c. DE Technical Bulletin - Uninterruptible Power Supply Requirements for CCTV Security Systems. d. Further information may be obtained from SSG or PSDB, via PSyA security staff. Requirement for Command Security Staff Approval 05603. Whilst the initial decision on the requirement for a CCTV system is taken at establishment level, it is essential that the quality of system ultimately procured for the establishment is of an acceptable standard and design. This is ensured by the involvement of PSyA security staffs monitoring and approving ORs from establishments to ensure that appropriate standards are maintained. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-6-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Range of CCTV Systems 05604. CCTV systems range from simple indoor or outdoor systems to complex multi-camera, low light level systems. Type of Systems 05605. The following basic systems exist: a. Simple system. In the simplest system, a camera is cabled to its own monitor, which is normally located in a manned control centre. A camera fixed to a building or some other exterior fitment provides a field of view to allow a guard to monitor, for example, control of entry into a building or secure area. b. Complex system. More complex systems include cameras fitted with zoom lenses and pan and tilt facilities (normally referred to as mobile cameras), and the use of artificial lighting (either visible or infra- red) to provide 24-hour surveillance. Applications of CCTV 05606. The possible applications of CCTV include: a. b. Area monitoring; eg monitoring establishment car parks. Perimeter monitoring, in conjunction with a PIDS system. c. Pin-point monitoring, eg surveillance of equipment or entry points that could not otherwise be covered. d. e. Supplementing IDS, eg verification and checking of alarms. Monitoring of 'lock and leave' premises. f. Equipment monitoring, eg video motion detectors would allow a static scene to be monitored passively and alarm only when an intrusion takes place. System Considerations Operational Requirement 05607. It is essential that before any purchasing action is commenced, establishments define clearly what they expect a CCTV system to do by preparing an OR. The OR is to specify the following (further guidance is to be found at Section II Annex E): a. The areas to be monitored and the purpose for which monitoring of each area is required, eg for access control, alarm assessment etc. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-6-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security b. The picture definition required in each area monitored, eg the ability to identify people and passes may be required for access control; much less detail may be acceptable for other purposes. c. d. Whether linkage to an IDS is required. The proposed monitoring requirements. e. Any other performance requirements, eg meets ROTAKIN standards or ability to operate in low light. f. Maintenance requirement/contract arrangements. g. System security measures such as anti-tampering, lightning protection or un-interruptible power supply. ORs are to be agreed by PSyA security staff before being used as the basis for any system procurement. Site Survey 05608. A site survey is to be carried-out under the auspices of the PSyA security staff utilising professional security staff (e.g. SSG staff ­ Annex A refers) by day and by night (if night surveillance is required) and is to include the following points: a. Terrain. Differing backgrounds give widely differing results from the same camera, eg asphalt, open grassland, hangars, red brick buildings, etc. b. Climate and environment. Heat, ice, high rainfall, condensation, dust, etc can adversely affect camera performance. Cameras may be blinded by snow, fog, heavy rain or smoke. Special features, eg sun shades, wipers, heaters may be required; c. Existing light sources. Existing light sources must be identified; those which may impair camera performance must be screened or cameras sited to avoid them; these may include street lights, security lights, sunrise, sunset, reflection of sun from water, windows, etc. Camera Trials 05609. Following, or as part of the site survey, recorded camera trials are to be carried out to ensure that proposed camera positions and equipment (fences, lighting etc) meet the OR in appropriate lighting and weather conditions. ESyOs are to maintain a Record of View for each installed camera so that following maintenance/replacement, the same field of view is achieved. The ROTAKIN is to be used in such trials. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-6-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Audit of System 05610. An audit of the CCTV system is to be carried out by professional security staff. Uninterruptible Power Supply 05611. Where there is a requirement for a CCTV system to have an un-interruptible power supply, the provisions of the 'DOE Technical Bulletin ­ Un-interruptible Power Supply Requirements for Closed Circuit Television Security Systems' may apply. The document is advisory only and is held and used by Property Managers, Defence Land Agents, Establishment Works Consultants, Works Service Managers, Project Staff Officers, Project Sponsors and Project Managers. Television security systems associated with cameras operating in critical security positions should have a facility that enables it to continue operating under all mains failure conditions. Television cameras in less critical security positions will need to have their power supply requirements assessed on an individual basis. The ROTAKIN 05612. The ROTAKIN is a test target, which has been designed by PSDB to simplify the job of establishing and maintaining an effective CCTV system. It is essentially a silhouette of a person 1.6m high. On it are high contrast patterns. It is used to: a. b. c. Ensure complete coverage of the area required. Assess the system coverage and image size. Perform repeatable tests of picture quality. System Security Policies and Security Operating Procedures 05613. Where CCTV is computer-controlled, appropriate system security policies (SSPs) and security-operating procedures (SyOPs) must be issued for the system. Video and Disc Recording 5614. Time lapse video tape recording enables pictures covering periods of up to 300 hours to be recorded on a single reel. The ability to record and play back is a useful feature for recording and investigating alarms. Loop framestores are available using discs which continually over-write onto a disc; when a alarm is triggered, it commences recording frame by frame including retrieving pictures a specific time before the alarm activated. Loop framestores are especially useful if control room operators have duties that can stop them responding immediately to alarms. For loop framestores to be useful, alarm and CCTV systems have to be working well. If the false alarm rate is high, or if CCTV coverage is incomplete, then a loop framestore will not help. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-6-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Video Movement Detection Systems General 05615. Video movement detection (VMD) equipment monitors the video signal for movement or changes in light intensity in the picture and provides an alarm to the reaction force (normally an audible signal to alert the guard coupled with a visual indication on the monitor). The sensitivity of the equipment to motion or light changes needs to be adjusted for site conditions. Range of Systems 05616. Systems range from a single camera processor and monitor system to groups of cameras whose video signals are constantly assessed by a single processor. Devices are available which can cope with the widely varying light conditions encountered in the open; many are technically limited and suitable for interior use only. Limitations 05617. Video movement detectors have considerable limitations in practice. Video movement detector cameras, although providing reasonable cover for external scenes, may be blind in adverse weather conditions, and are ineffective where there is a high level of legitimate movement. However, it is possible with some systems to block out areas where movement occurs. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-6-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page left intentionally blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-6-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION VII TO CHAPTER 5 INTRUDER DETECTION SYSTEMS General Aim of Intruder Detection Systems 05701. Intruder detection systems (IDS) are designed to detect the entry, or attempted entry of an intruder into a protected area, to identify the location of the intrusion and to signal an alarm to a reaction force. Correctly installed, performance tested and employed IDS can result in savings in security manpower. To be effective, an IDS must have a response force that will react in the event of an alarm condition. Further Information, Advice and Guidance 05702. Further information, advice and guidance on IDS can be obtained from the following sources: a. Where establishments are considering the installation of an IDS system, PSyA security staff are to be consulted to provide specialist advice and any appropriate policy input; Section II to this chapter provides information and direction on the procurement of major security equipments and systems. In addition, where such work constitutes a works service project, the procedures detailed in Chapter 5, Section II, Annex B are to be adhered to. b. Advice on the completion of an Operational Requirement (OR) should be sought from specialist security staffs. c. Further information may be obtained from Special Services Group (SSG), via PSyA security staff. d. The use of an IDS to support or as an alternative to guards, is covered in the minimum baseline measures for physical security (see Section I). Requirement for Command Security Staff Approval 05703. Whilst the initial decision on the requirement for an IDS is taken at establishment-level, it is essential that the quality of system ultimately procured for the establishment is of an acceptable standard and design. This is ensured by the involvement of PSyA security staffs monitoring and approving ORs from establishments to ensure that appropriate security equipment standards are maintained. Intruder Detection Systems IDS systems have been graded according to the level of security they offer with a Class 4 system offering the highest level of security and a Class 1 the lowest. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-7-1 5704. RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. Class 4 systems. An alarm system for use in applications where security takes precedence over all other factors. It is intended to give a level of protection where the intruder is expected to plan the intrusion in detail and have a full range of equipment capable of substitution of vital system components. A Class 4 system requires to be supplemented with comprehensive physical security measures and security procedures. b. Class 3 systems. An alarm system used in establishments where high value assets are held. Such a system is to include appropriate physical security protection. The system is to offer protection from intruders who are conversant with IDS and have available a comprehensive range of tools and portable electronic equipment. c. Class 2 system. An alarm system where the risks of sophisticated attack are not high. Intruders are expected to have a limited knowledge of alarm systems and have available only basic tools and portable instruments. d. Class 1 system. An alarm for use in low risk establishments where potential intruders have little knowledge of alarm systems and a limited range of readily available tools. The SEAP approved IDS panels are at Section I, Annex E. Uses of IDS 05705. The following factors concerning IDS are to be considered: a. An IDS provides continuous surveillance over the protected area and may help to reduce guarding requirements. b. In certain circumstances it can substitute for guards or alternatively, when used in conjunction with guards, may extend coverage into areas not normally accessible to guard patrols eg roof space or locked rooms. c. It is to be fully integrated into the other security measures on an establishment in order to apply the principal of 'Defence in Depth'. Operational Requirement Compilation 05706. IDS are expensive and care is to be taken in the selection, application and installation of an IDS to prevent it being circumvented or its usefulness being impaired by a high incidence of technical problems or false alarms. An Operational Requirement (OR) is to be compiled by the establishment after consultation with and approval by PSyA security staff. Establishments are to define clearly what they expect of an IDS and to be aware of its limitations. In setting the requirements for an IDS installation the following is to be specified: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-7-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security a. b. c. The area/equipment to be protected. The detection performance required and how it should be tested. Acceptable false alarm rate. d. Any special requirements affecting the areas concerned and the degree of security protection necessary. e. Whether linkage to other electronic systems such as CCTV or AACS is required. f. The overall security plan and details of all related measures relevant to the design of the system. g. The type of reaction force or monitoring arrangements required. h. The position of the alarm display panel and details of related security procedures. Further guidance on the production of the OR is to be found at Section II, Annex E. Site Survey 05707. Following approval of the OR, a site survey is to be arranged by PSyA security staff (who may task their single-Service security organisation, or SSG). The site survey is to consider: a. b. The type of asset requiring coverage. The perimeter length requiring coverage. c. Whether there is sufficient ground available to establish sterile detection zones on the attack side of each area. d. e. Type of building, where appropriate, that the IDS is to be provided for. Prevailing weather, topography and local wild life. f. The resources, including CCTV and guards, available for alarm verification. See also Section II for co-ordination of security aspects of works services. Audit of System 05708. An audit of the IDS system is to be carried out by professional security staff. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-7-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security System Components 05709. An IDS installation is to include some or all of the following system components: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. Detection sensors. A control panel with optional event recorder and printer. An alarm display. Installation wiring. An alarm signalling link between the control panel and alarm display. A reaction force. An independent, uninterrupted power supply as appropriate. Detection Sensors 05710. Detection sensors are designed to detect an intrusion within the area they cover and to provide an indication to the control panel of the alarm condition. Various types of sensors can be used in combination, particular at high-risk sites, to cover technical vulnerability, reduce the incidence of false arms, and provide against failure. IDS sensors are to be fitted on the points of entry, i.e. doors and windows. Further coverage inside rooms and of security containers provides a second-line of defence. Types of Sensor 05711. The types of detection devices available are divided into the following categories: a. Contact sensors. Contact sensors cover various switching devices such as micro-switches, magnetic reed switches, pressure pads and some types of vibration sensors. b. Spatial or volumetric sensors. Spatial or volumetric sensors are designed to detect movement within their field of view and are used to cover rooms, corridors, roof spaces and other open areas or entry routes. c. Ultrasonic sensors. Ultrasonic sensors use high frequency sound waves and the Doppler effect of radiated and reflected transmissions. d. Passive infra red sensors. Passive infra red sensors (PIR) monitor the infrared heat profile of an area and detect changes caused by human intrusion. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-7-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security e. Microwave sensors. Microwave sensors use high frequency radio transmissions and reflection to detect movement. f. Beam interruption devices. Beam interruption devices are usually of the active infra-red type which use a transmitter and receiver and sometimes reflecting devices to project a beam across an opening such as a door or window. When the beam is broken either by the opening door or window or by a person passing through it an alarm is raised. g. Vibrations. Vibrations can be detected by various devices or technologies. The Inertia switch reacts to vibration or impact by a contact ball bouncing or lifting off its contacts and producing an alarm condition; a Geophone detects movement by a suspended magnet moving inside a detector coil; and the properties of Piezoelectric Crystal in producing an electric current from structural pressures can be used to detect vibrations and raise an alarm. h. Dual technology sensors. Dual technology sensors are devices that combine two sensor technologies (PIR and microwaves) in one housing and where they work together before signalling an alarm. In this way the likelihood of false alarms is greatly reduced. Control Panel 05712. The main functions of a control panel are to: a. b. c. d. Monitor the state of the detection sensor(s). Detect tampering. Provide the means for setting and un-setting the system. Signal an alarm state. Event Log Electronic Log 05713. Control panels built around a microprocessor are to include an electronic log or event recorder that can be linked to a hard copy printer. The log is to provide a record of all alarms and operational instructions, such as "setting" and "un-setting" of the system. It will also provide an aid to monitoring the security of the system and providing an audit trail. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-7-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Location of Event Log 05714. Unless the control panel is situated at a permanently manned guard point, it is to be located at the heart of the IDS installation where it is given maximum protection by the system itself and by other physical security measures. Alarm Display Alarm Signalling 05715. Currently, alarms may be signalled in the following manner: a. Audible/visible. Flashing beacons and/or gas powered hooters on buildings eg a Patrol Warning System as used on aircraft storage or explosive storage buildings within a secure perimeter. However, this type of alarm should not be considered for new builds or as part of refurbishment programmes. b. Remote sites. An alarm may be signalled to a permanently manned control position and may indicate a loss of power, tamper or open door. These alarms allow a controlled response force reaction. Alarm Signalling for Remote Sites 05716. Some form of remote alarm communication signalling to an alarm monitoring station is to be provided where the protected site is not permanently guarded. Alarm signalling can be by means of: a. Hard wired/fibre optic cabling. Where there are existing hard wired/fibre optic cabling, the viability of using them or their cableways should be examined. b. Private lines. Private lines are direct telephone lines used exclusively for alarm signalling and monitoring. This system provides protection against 'shorting out' or cutting the lines, which will cause an immediate alarm. c. Auto dialling. Auto-dialling uses a standard exchange telephone line and equipment that, when an alarm is raised, automatically dials an emergency call number and relays a pre-recorded message. d. Radio links. Radio-links provide a multi-path communications system, which can incorporate a number of features such as automatic paging, data encryption and two-way, interrogation and response, protocol. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-7-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Installation Wiring 05717. The installation wiring in a high security system is to be monitored, automatically, at all times, i.e. there should be continuous electronic examination of the circuit connections to ensure that they are in working order and are not being tampered with. There should be an immediate alarm if a fault occurs or line tampering is detected. Reaction Force and Response Time 05718. Provision is to be made by the establishment for a reaction force drawn from an approved guard force (eg establishment guards) or in certain circumstances, with TLB staff approval, local police forces may provide a response force. System Management 05719. The IDS system manager is to have TORs issued by the HOE. System Security Policies and Security Operating Procedures 05720. Where IDS or PIDS are computer-controlled, appropriate system security policies (SSPs) and security-operating procedures (SyOPs) must be issued for the system. Installation and Maintenance Secure Installation and Maintenance 05721. The security of an IDS depends on secure installation and maintenance. To ensure any system continues to provide its optimum performance, performance testing, servicing and preventative maintenance is needed. These tasks should keep costs down and maintain acceptable performance. To ensure that appropriate safeguards in relation to installation and maintenance, are put in place, establishment security staff are to ensure that the following is actioned: a. Circuit diagrams, manuals and spares for IDS installations are to be kept under secure conditions. b. All installation and maintenance work is to be carried out by authorized personnel and supervised by establishment security staff. c. Any modifications to the system are to be agreed by the system manager and Security Authority. A record of the modification is to be held with the original specification or diagrams. d. Class 4 systems are to receive at least 4 maintenance visits per year and Class 1 to 3 systems are to receive a minimum of 2 visits. The high maintenance requirements for Class 4 reflects that the system is protecting JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-7-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security high value/ sensitive assets and the Head of Establishment must have confidence in the system's integrity and be aware of the need to maximise the system's availability. e. Defence Estates has negotiated a Supply Services Agreement with SSG for the maintenance of Class 4, AC12 based, alarm systems. AC12 systems, if not maintained by SSG, will not be allowed to maintain Class 4 status. Standby Power 05722. The following measures apply to standby power: a. A standby power supply is to be available to enable the IDS to continue operating in the event of the main power supply failing or being disconnected. b. Float charge batteries can be used for standby power. They should have a sufficient capacity to cope with foreseeable contingencies. c. The condition of batteries is to be regularly checked by authorized personnel. Alternatively, the installation of an un-interruptible power supply (UPS) can be investigated. 05723. Spare. Access Control Panel Access 05724. The following applies: a. An IDS is only to be "set" or "unset" by authorized personnel. b. The control panel is to be positioned and protected such as to deny access to all but nominated personnel. c. Where a control panel is key operated the key is to be treated as a security key and afforded the appropriate protection. d. Operating codes are to be protected in the same way as combination lock settings or system passwords. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-7-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security e. Where the control panel is sited within an area that is not permanently supervised it is to be secured in an approved security container. The container is to be kept locked and protected by the IDS. f. Unauthorised personnel are not to have access to installed IDS sensors. g. The tamper alarms are to be monitored 24 hours and the correct operation of all sensors is to be checked at regular intervals. Testing 05725. The testing of IDS is to be by the activation of a sensor to check that an alarm has been raised. IDS installed in high security sites are to be tested at least once a day. Where this is not possible, they are to be tested regularly at intervals to be prescribed in establishment security regulations and reporting action for malfunctions specified accordingly. For testing of IDS on armouries and ammunition stores, see Chapter 6. Event logs 05726. Where event recorders are fitted the following applies: a. The log is to be examined regularly by establishment security staff and compared where appropriate with reports submitted by the guard force. b. Personnel are to be trained to recognise the development of a suspicious sequence of events and have the authority to investigate incidents such as mains failure. c. Where a hard copy print out of events is obtained, it is to be stored for a period of 3 years to allow for retrospect analysis and investigations. Investigation of Alarms 05727. In the event of an attack being mounted on an IDS, a sensor may give only one warning before it is circumvented. Therefore each alarm is to be thoroughly investigated by the establishment security staff and every attempt made to establish the cause. Personnel are to be made aware that a sequence of unexplained alarms occurring over a prolonged period of time can indicate that probing attacks are being carried out or that an attacker is attempting to undermine confidence in the system. Refurbishment of Buildings 05728. When a building or individual suite of offices is refurbished after an IDS has been installed, the rearrangement of partition walls and the re-positioning of security JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-7-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security containers or protected equipment can reduce the level of protection originally provided by the IDS. ESyOs are to ensure the following: a. Where necessary a survey is carried out, and the IDS installation adapted to the new accommodation arrangements. b. Building works are to be prevented from having unsupervised access to components of the IDS, and a thorough check of the system is to be carried out once the work is completed. c. Where major alterations are involved, consideration is to be given to the de-commissioning of the IDS altogether. Portable Intruder Detection Systems 05729. Portable or transportable IDS can be a cost effective method of providing security for large items of equipment in the open such as aircraft, ships in dock or armoured vehicles and can be used inside buildings to protect equipment or provide an extra layer of security on an establishment. They also have the advantage that they can be deployed on Out-Of-Area (OOA) operations to assist the detachment guard force JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-7-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX A TO SECTION VII THE AC12 INTRUDER DETECTION SYSTEM Defence Estates (DE) and SSG have an agreement regarding the installation and maintenance of the AC12 IDS and all questions on these topics should be referred to DE through establishment property managers. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-7-A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-7-A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION VIII - GUARDS AND PATROLS General 05801. These instructions are for use only at non-nuclear sites. Separate instructions for the protection of nuclear sites are contained in JSP 440, Volume 4. The following instructions are mandatory, unless otherwise stated in the text, and any measures relating to the arming of guards, patrols or QRFs (including those provided by the MDP) may not be the subject of waivers or exemptions without the written authority of the TLB. If TLBs elect to delegate this authority it is not to go below 2-star level (Divisional/District Comd or equivalent). Under these circumstances, the TLB is to be informed on each occasion that a decision to grant a waiver/exemption is taken. The TLB is then to inform DGS&S. Notification is to be accompanied by the rationale for the decision. This is to include an explanation on what measures have been taken to minimise the risk. Procedures to be followed by HOE seeking waivers/exemptions and for TLB Principal Security Advisors (PSyA) staffs when processing such applications, are contained in JSP 440 Volume 1, Chapter 2, Section 5. 05802. Further information, advice and guidance on guards and patrols can be obtained as follows: a. Further guidance on the use of patrols and guarding in the Counter Terrorist context can be found in JSP 440, Volume 1, Chapter 7. b. MOD Instructions for the Use of Commercial Guard Forces in Great Britain are contained in JSP 440, Volume 1, Chapter 18. c. Guidance on the arming of guards can be found in The Carriage of Arms Directive to CINCs - DCDS(C)/06/04/01 dated 19 Nov 98 and JSP 440, Volume 1, Chapter 7. d. Guidance on the Issue and Use of Batons by Service personnel can be found in JSP 440, Volume 1, Chapter 7, and in Card E of JSP 398, the compendium of UK National ROE. e. Advice on the preparation of Guards' Orders can be obtained from the TLB Principal Security Advisers (PSyAs). f. The use of guards within the minimum baseline security measures is covered in JSP 440, Volume 1, Chapter 5, Section 1. g. Card B of JSP 398 gives guidance for Service personnel dealing with trespassers on MOD property. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security h. Card A of JSP 398 gives guidance for opening fire for Service personnel authorised to carry arms and ammunition on duty in the UK. Definitions 05803. The following definitions apply throughout this chapter: a. Armed Guard. An armed guard is a guard, armed with an official issue firearm, on duty. Only Service personnel and the MDP are permitted to carry firearms. b. Guard with baton. A guard equipped with a defensive weapon such as a Baton (Paragraph 05802 d. refers). Only single-service/CCMDP approved batons are to be issued for the purpose of self-defence. c. Unarmed Guard. An unarmed guard is a guard on duty at a specific point, not equipped with a firearm or baton. d. Quick Response Force (QRF). A QRF is a formed body whose duty is to respond to any security incident at any establishment within their area of responsibility. Their duties and responsibilities are to be clearly defined in their orders. Clear instructions must be given regarding Command and Control aspects, which must have been agreed in writing between the HOE and the person in charge of each element of a combined service QRF if they are not under command of the HOE. The QRF, which may be located either on or off site, must be capable of responding to an incident in time to be effective. If armed guards are on duty at the establishment, the QRF must also be armed, and must, therefore, be found from either Service police or personnel, MDP or a Civil Police Force (CPF). The size and geography of the site being protected will determine the size of the QRF but if armed, it must comprise at least two people. QRFs are not to comprise a mix of armed and unarmed personnel. The objectives of an armed QRF are: (1). To provide an immediate armed response to incidents where life is threatened. (2). To provide initial containment at such an incident pending the arrival of support unless exceptional circumstances necessitate immediate action (within the limits of the Rules of Engagement) to save life or prevent harm or injury to any person. e. Patrols. Definitions of patrols and their frequency in the context of the Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix (MBMM) are at Section I, paragraph 05122. Further definitions of Point Guards and Dog Patrols in the context of the security of equipment MBMM are at Section 18. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Principles of Guarding and Patrolling Guard Forces 05804. Guards within the MOD are drawn from the following sources: a. b. c. d. e. Service police. Service personnel. Ministry of Defence Police (MDP). Ministry of Defence Guard Service (MGS). Commercial Guard Forces (CGF). Security Duties 05805. The main security duties of a guard force are as follows: a. To deter unauthorised intrusion to the site being protected. b. If deterrence fails, to detect intrusion as early as possible and to detain the intruders until the arrival of the police or other support. c. d. To react to any security incident which may occur. To conduct the following specific tasks: (1) (2) (3) Access control. Supervise the arrival and departure of vehicles. Undertake patrols. (4) Monitor intruder detection systems (IDS), site access management systems (SAMS) and automatic access control systems (AACS), including closed circuit television (CCTV). (5) (6) Control and issue keys. Establish a security control centre for the establishment. (7) Inspect and check perimeters, security communications, IDS and perimeter lighting. (8) If appropriate, provide a nominated QRF, armed if armed guarding has been ordered. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Arming Policy 05806. Arming policy is currently laid down in CDS 21/90. The related Arming Directive is at DCDS(C)/06/04/01 dated 19 Nov 98 and JSP 440, Volume 1, Chapter 7. Weapons 05807. Only SA80 (IW/LSW) or 9mm SLP with standard ball ammunition may be issued to Service personnel or MDP on general security duties, unless written authority from CINCs (or delegated 2-star authority) or CCMDP is held for the use of other weapons. When weapons with an automatic fire capability are issued, only the single shot mode is to be used. Weapons must be correctly zeroed. 05808. Before Service personnel or MDP are issued with arms and ammunition for employment on general security duties they must receive adequate training in weapons handling, safety, marksmanship and the Rules of Engagement as laid down by CINCs, and CCMDP. 05809-05810. Spare. Categories of Defence Establishments for Guarding Purposes and Composition of Guard Force 05811. Defence Establishments are categorised for guarding purposes; the category will determine the mandatory minimum guarding requirement for that establishment. This categorisation does not include Cadet Units, to whom Chapter 6 of Volume 1 refers, or nuclear establishments, the security policy for which is covered by JSP 440, Volume 4. In order to avoid confusion with the categorisation used in JSP 440 Volume 1, Chapter 2, Section 2 for general security purposes, the numbers are preceded by the letter P (for Priority)1: a. P1. Buildings and areas (excluding Service Families Accommodation (SFA) areas) in which identifiable and/or uniformed Service personnel live overnight on a regular basis, or are permanently occupied for work (examples are barracks, communication sites manned over 24 hours). These establishments must, at all times, be protected by a guard force capable of being armed. If armed guarding has been ordered, an armed guard is to be posted at each active entrance/exit (for more detail on Control of Entry see JSP 440, Volume 1, Chapter 5, Section 9) and an armed Quick Response Force (QRF) must be permanently available. Armed personnel guarding 1 Armed Forces Careers Information Offices are not included in this categorisation. Separate instructions are contained in Chapter 7, Paragraphs 07069 to 07076 and Annex M. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security gates may be included in the QRF provided their gates can be closed and secured for the duration of the alert. At least one gate will need to remain in operation for possible access of emergency services. b. P2. The following buildings and areas: (1) Those in which identifiable and/or uniformed Service personnel work on a regular basis, e.g. normal working hours on weekdays (frequently in conjunction with MOD civilian employees). (2) Those where weapons, ammunition and explosives considered to be Attractive to Criminals and Terrorist Organisations (ACTO)2 are stored. These establishments must at all times be covered by a QRF capable of being armed. QRFs found from MOD sources must be armed if armed guarding has been ordered. If the QRF is found from a CPF, decisions on arming will rest with the police chain of command. Permanent static armed guards at entrance/exits are not required. c. P3. Other buildings and areas: (1) Those in which people live and work on a part-time, irregular basis, e.g. certain training camps.3 (2) SFA areas and buildings and areas, outside the scope of P1 and P2, which are recognised MOD/Service social centres, e.g. NAAFI Clubs, Recreation Clubs or Messes in which people are not accommodated. (3) Wholly or predominantly civilian manned Defence establishments. This will include the majority of retained DERA (DSTL) and DPA sites. Service personnel employed at these sites should wear civilian clothing, unless their function demands that uniform be worn (in line with the guidance on the wearing of uniform in public, contained in JSP 440, Volume 1, Chapter 7 and local orders/instructions). Security advisory staff will then advise whether the establishment should be categorised as P2. 2 3 For definition of ACTO see Chapter 6, Section I, Paragraph 06004b. Some training camps are used so extensively that they need to be treated as if they were regularly occupied. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Armed guards and QRFs will not normally be deployed at these establishments except at BIKINI alert states AMBER or RED. Heads of Establishments (HOE) are to make appropriate contingency plans for periods of increased alert state. Duties of Guards 05812. The specific duties of guards vary with circumstances but will include the following: a. During working hours. (1) Control entry. (2) Supervision of maintenance staff working in places where protectively marked material is kept. (3) Dealing with and reporting any security incidents to the establishment's security advisers. (4) Monitoring any CCTV, AACS, SAMS and IDS and responding to alarms. (5) b. Carrying out mobile, foot and dog patrols where appropriate. At cease work. (1) Ensuring that all windows, doors, skylights, gates, etc are secure. (2) Checking that all security containers are properly locked and that no protectively marked material (including waste) has been left out. (3) Carrying out mobile, foot and dog patrols where appropriate. c. Outside working hours. (1) Carrying out mobile, foot and dog patrols where appropriate. (2) Supervising cleaners, maintenance and other ancillary staff in the building or area (where so detailed). (3) (4) Monitoring any CCTV, AACS and IDS; responding to alarms. Dealing with visitors and deliveries. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Control of Entry 05813. All in-use entrances/exits to/from establishments are to be guarded by at least one person. In P1 establishments, if armed guarding has been ordered, at least one of these guards is to be armed. Where circumstances permit, an armed guard may undertake control of entry duties on his own. At busy entrances with a number of vehicle checkers an armed cover guard is to be posted (and this guard may constitute the sole armed presence). Internal control of entry to sensitive buildings/areas need not include an armed element unless local circumstances or other MOD directives require otherwise. If an Automatic Access Control System is in use, the HOE is to decide whether a guard is required or not (with advice from the PSyA). The decision will depend upon the prevailing alert state and local threat assessment. Internal Patrols 05814. Internal patrols are to be mounted to cover those areas that are considered likely terrorist targets (e.g. barracks accommodation, messes etc) which are not covered by electronic surveillance systems or static point guards. In category P1 establishments, patrols should have an armed element if armed guarding has been ordered. In daylight hours, patrols may consist of one person, but during the hours of darkness the need for 2 man patrols should be considered. Emphasis should ideally be placed on foot patrolling during the hours of darkness. The number and frequency of these patrols is to be decided by the HOE. External Patrols 05815. Off-base patrolling by armed Service personnel or MDP may only be undertaken with the express written agreement of the Chief Constable of the local CPF4, who is responsible for the policing and security outside the perimeter of a Defence establishment. Search 05816. Powers of search. HOE are to issue clear concise orders on Powers of Search in their Establishment's Orders for the Guard. Guard Commanders are to ensure that their subordinates are aware of their orders. The MOD policy for searching is at Annex C to this Chapter. 05817. Spare. 4 External patrols by MDP officers are authorised by the Consolidated Policing Protocol which is an agreement between CCMDP and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) for England and Wales and ACPOS in Scotland. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Trespassers 05818. Specific guidance for Defence personnel on dealing with trespass on MOD property is at Card B of JSP 398. This guidance was developed primarily to deal with demonstrators but the direction it contains can equally be applied to dealing with suspected terrorists or other intruders. HOE are to ensure that all personnel employed on security duties are familiar with the requirements of Card B. COs/HOE are to ensure their personnel understand their powers of arrest and, where applicable, the local bylaws and Acts of Parliament which give additional powers of arrest to Defence personnel. Response Plan 05819. Each unit/establishment is to have a response plan. There must be a nominated QRF (see Paragraph 05803d above) which, in Category P1 and P2 establishments must be capable of being armed and be armed, if armed guarding has been ordered. The QRF can be found from a unit/establishment's own resources, a neighbouring establishment, the MDP or local CPF. The QRF must be capable of mounting a swift5, effective response to either a terrorist attack, a request for assistance from a member of the guard force or to an Intruder Detection Alarm activation. The duties and responsibilities of the QRF must be clearly stated in their orders. It should be noted that the initial response by a CPF might well be provided by unarmed police officers. Static Posts 05820. In addition to the static posts at the control of entry points, further static guard posts may be established at the discretion of the HOE. In Category P1 establishments, these posts should have an armed component if armed guarding has been ordered. Cadet Units 05821. Members of Cadet Forces are authorised to carry out the following security duties: a. Officers and Adult Instructors (AI) may carry out general security duties, including protection of arms and ammunition stores, but they may not be armed with firearms. They may be equipped with batons for self-defence, provided they have received adequate training in their use in accordance with policy on the use of batons. Except at camps, they should only carry out 5 As a guide, a `swift, effective response' will not normally exceed 10 minutes to mount. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security security supervisor duties, in addition to any necessary action to search and secure premises on initial occupation or to check vehicles before use. b. At cadet camps, cadet officers and AIs must expect to carry out duties which may include the duties of sentry/prowler guard in accordance with Cadet Force regulations. c. Cadets may carry out guard duties during daylight hours only (and normally not later than 2200hrs) in accordance with Cadet Force regulations. They may not be armed and must not be issued with batons, pick-helves or any other type of weapon. Cadets are not to guard armouries or ammunition stores. Use of Regular Defence Training Camps Alone 05822. Whenever Cadet units use Regular Defence Training Camps alone the guarding requirement will cause a dilemma. The officer in charge is to draw up security standing orders based on the same general counter measures as those in force with Regular and Reserve Forces units. There is no requirement to provide armed guards for the protection of cadet force personnel. Their presence as cadets is to be well advertised. It is possible that Cadet Force units' own resources will be insufficient to give the required degree of protection. In such circumstances they are to be supplemented as necessary under arrangements made by the appropriate formation headquarters. The following supplementary resources should be considered: a. Regular Service personnel who may, in any case, be provided to assist with cadet training. Where they are not already being provided, their provision specifically for guarding should be considered. Wherever regular personnel are provided for guard duties, they are to be armed for their own protection, if armed guarding has been ordered. b. Contract security personnel may be used to supplement other categories of guard so long as they are under command of military or adult Cadet Force personnel. c. MDP (armed if appropriate). In particular the use of Area Policing Teams is advised. The APT should be requested to make frequent, irregular visits to the establishment and its surrounds. d. MGS. Guard Funding 05823. There are no funds specifically allocated for contract guards or temporary civilian patrolmen for Cadet Force security. Where regular Service personnel, MDP JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security or established recognised guard forces cannot be made available, the appropriate formation headquarters will decide whether cadet training is to proceed or not. Use of Ranges and Training Areas 05824. When using ranges and training areas, Cadet Force units are to follow the following guidelines: a. Entry points such as gates, firing points, target galleries, huts and tents etc are to be thoroughly checked on arrival by an AI, secured throughout the period they are in use, and checked again by an AI immediately before departure. b. Transport is to be parked in a secure area or guarded. c. On departure, the doors and window shutters (if fitted) are to be locked and the keys returned to the relevant authority. 05825. Spare Accommodation and Equipment Guard Force Efficiency 05826. To ensure the efficiency of the establishment guard force, the following applies: a. Adequate, properly equipped and scaled accommodation is to be provided in accordance with JSP 315. b. Accommodation is to include an incident control room and suitable accommodation and rest areas. c. Guards are to be suitably equipped with vehicles, communications equipment, torches, etc. d. The force size is to be adequate to cover detachment, leave, courses and sickness. Access to Protectively Marked Material by Guard Forces 05827. The following principles apply to access to protectively marked material by the guard force: a. Guards will not normally have access to protectively marked material or to keys giving access to such material. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security b. Normally they will not enter secure rooms or strong rooms unless supervised by someone with authorised access. Nevertheless they are to check the doors of such rooms (and any other locked rooms) during their normal patrols. c. Guards are to be permitted access to restricted areas out of work hours to check for possible security breaches. Where this is not possible, arrangements are to be made to cover the restricted area by the use of alarm sensors or CCTV surveillance. Security Clearance for Defence personnel 05828. Defence personnel guarding protectively marked material or patrolling inside security areas are to be appropriately cleared for the highest protective marking to which they might inadvertently have access. The rules for commercial guard forces are described below. Commercial Guard Forces Commercial Guard Forces in GB 05829. Commercial guard forces (CGF) may be employed by the MOD in GB. JSP 440 Volume 1, Chapter 18 contains mandatory security instructions for MOD authorities directly or indirectly concerned with the employment of CGF. All members of CGF employed by the MOD are to have a Basic Check (BC) and Counter Terrorist Check (CTC) carried out on them. All unarmed guarding tasks may be undertaken by CGF (see JSP 440 Volume 1, Chapter 18, Paragraph 1807). The use of CGF in Category A establishments must be carefully considered, with due regard being paid to the tasks the CGF will be required to undertake and the appropriate levels of security clearance required. Other Considerations 05830. Transition to war (TTW)/war role, or likely changes in the future use of the site, may render it unwise to employ CGF on some tasks irrespective of the level of protection provided for physical security purposes. The PSyA should also seek advice on the likely impact of European legislation on employment conditions, e.g. TUPE, and the Working Time Regulations (and its associated entitlements) in force in GB. Such considerations may have an impact on the decision to employ CGF at all, and could introduce long term financial penalties. Commercial Guard Forces Outside GB 05831. Whilst the MOD security instructions referred to in para 05829 are mandatory in GB, they may also be useful as guide lines for MOD authorities outside GB when considering the employment of CGF. In such circumstances, the appropriate PSyA is to be consulted at the outset. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 05832 - 05835. Spare. Supervision of Guards 05836. Supervisors are to make unannounced daytime/out of hours visits to ensure that guards are undertaking their duties correctly, understand their orders and have, if necessary, submitted written reports in respect of incidents. Supervisors should initial the Daily Occurrence Book (DOB) and personal notebooks (if issued) during visits to guards. Instructions Written Orders 05837. Mandatory instructions, in the form of written orders and SOPs are to be provided to Guards and QRFs and are to: a. Be clear and concise, and up to date. b. State the buildings, rooms and security containers to be inspected by patrols. c. Provide the details of names, addresses, and telephone numbers of personnel to be informed of incidents. d. Where appropriate, give orders on how to secure buildings out of hours including a list of doors, windows, fire escapes, skylights etc. that need to be checked. e. f. State the frequency of patrols. Detail the action to be taken: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Whenever a breach of security is discovered. When mail is received out of hours. Whenever an intruder is discovered. When a fire, bomb alert, hoax call or other emergency occurs. When calling out reaction forces. g. Detail the use of firearms, including ROE, including the responsibility for the issue of arms and ammunition to the guard force. h. Detail the maintenance records and production of security reports. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-12 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security i. j. Detail the safekeeping of keys. Detail the supervision of maintenance and other ancillary staff. The orders are to be reviewed on a frequent basis and are to be available for inspection by the PSyA. Signing of Orders 05838. A record sheet is to be maintained on which each guard signs as having read and understood the orders. Guards are to sign such a record in the following circumstances: a. Prior to a 'set' of duties, in the case of Service personnel employed occasionally on guard duties. b. Every 6 months (or more frequently at the direction of local commanders) for personnel permanently engaged on duties which include guarding. c. Following the inclusion of amendments to the orders. The record is to document the person's rank, number, name, signature and date of signature. The records are to be kept for a period of 12 months following the date of signature. 05839. Spare. Patrols General Principles Consideration for Use 05840. COs/HOEs are to consider the use of security patrols, depending on the security category of the establishment, and the minimum baseline measures for the protection of protected material (see Section I) and the BIKINI alert state. Arming of Patrols 05841. Patrols will be armed if armed guarding has been ordered by CinCs. DCDS(C) is responsible for issuing an Arming Directive which CinCs may further amplify. Nature of Patrols 05842. The nature and extent of the patrols will depend on the other security measures that are in force within the establishment as part of the minimum baseline measures methodology. Where a large area is to be protected, 'beats' should be JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security considered to separate patrols, each responsible for its own area. In determining the tasks of the patrols, paragraphs 05812 and 05813 inclusive apply. Patrol Procedures Inside Buildings 05843. Guards patrolling inside buildings are to ensure the following: a. On the first round after cease work. (1) There are no intruders in any part of the buildings, the identity of all personnel is known and their right to be in the buildings is confirmed. (2) All security containers are properly locked. (3) No protectively marked documents/material/disks/waste have been left out. (4) All doors and windows and any other possible means of entry are secure and intact. b. On subsequent rounds. (1) (2) All containers are checked on a random basis. There are no intruders in the parts of the buildings visited. (3) Checks are made that those doors, windows and other possible means of entry on the route of the patrol are secure and intact. They should be selected so that all are checked at least once every three rounds. External Patrols 05844. External guard patrols are to carry out occasional patrols around buildings selected at random as follows: a. First patrol. On the first patrol after close of work they should ensure that all buildings are properly secured and, at sites secured by a perimeter, that there are no intruders. b. Subsequent patrols. On subsequent rounds they are to ensure that a check is made of the areas surrounding some of the buildings, selected on a random basis, so that all surrounding areas are checked regularly. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-14 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Timing of Patrols 05845. The timing of patrols is not to be made public and the guards themselves are to be warned of this. Guards are not to be aware of the exact timing of patrols until they come on duty. Breaches of Security 05846. On each round they are to ensure that any breaches of security and incidents receive immediate corrective action and are recorded and reported to the establishment security staff. Any recovered protectively marked material is to be secured in an approved security container. The full procedures to be taken for breaches of security are laid down in JSP 440, Volume 1, Chapter 2. Recording Action by Patrols 05847. In addition to the mandatory security check sheet which is signed by the occupant of a room, the following mandatory and optional recording action to record patrol activity applies: a. Mandatory. The details of all security rounds are to be entered into a log or DOB. The details recorded are to show the buildings visited, times of the patrol, and rank(s)/name(s)/callsign of the patrol. Records are to be kept for 12 months. If mechanical or electronic patrol monitoring equipment is available the requirement for a written record may be dispensed with. b. Optional. (1) Container and room check sheets. In addition to the mandatory recording action described above, establishments can optionally position container check sheets in each room where protectively marked material is kept. The check sheet is signed by the patrol and the time of check of container(s) also entered on the sheet for each check out of hours. An example of such a form is at Annex A. Records are to be kept for 3 months. (2) Patrol recorder points. Patrol recorder points (PRPs) can be sited in places where it is important for patrols to visit. Various methods of providing evidence of patrol activity are available e.g. Recorder points may require signing by the guard, a card 'clocked' or electronic information to be input by the guard to provide evidence of irregular patrol activity. Clocking records or logs are to be examined by the ESyO and where necessary, irregularities investigated. Records are to be kept for 3 months. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-15 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Dogs Effectiveness and Deterrent 05848. Dogs are an effective intruder detection system when used to protect installations where there is little or no human traffic at night. They are a particularly effective deterrent to intruders. Security Notice Boards 05849. Where guard or Service/MDP police dogs are in use on an establishment, appropriate warning signs are to be displayed at entrances and at regular intervals around the perimeter warning (or words to the effect that) WARNING - RAF POLICE/POLICE/GUARD(as appropriate) DOGS ON PATROL In addition, standard pictorial warning signs (yellow triangle with a black silhouetted dog's head) are to be displayed at regular intervals around the perimeter. Units abroad are to have the signs in the local language. Guard Dog Act 1975 05850. The use of guard dogs is governed by the Guard Dogs Act 1975 and advice is to be sought from Command security staff before their first use. Rules of Engagement 05851. The Rules of Engagement for the release of dogs by Defence personnel on duty in the United Kingdom are contained in JSP 398, the Compendium of ROE, at Card C, and are reproduced at Annex B to this Section. Additional Security Measures Checks at Cease Work 05852. All rooms and compartments are to be checked by their authorised occupants before they are left vacant at cease work to ensure that all protectively marked material, including waste has been put away in security containers and that these are properly locked and all security keys mustered. Room Security Check List 05853. A security check list showing that all security containers have been locked, windows closed, facsimile machines, photocopiers and computers secured is to be signed by the last person out of the area. A sample copy of such a check sheet is at Annex B to Chapter 4. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-16 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Clear Desk Routine 05854. Surfaces of desks and other office furniture are to be cleared of all papers, whether protectively marked or not, to facilitate security checks by both the occupier prior to leaving and thereafter by independent checkers. Checks by the ESyO 05855. In addition to the patrol activity described in this part, surprise percentage checks are to be made by the ESyO out of normal working hours covering the internal and external security of offices, buildings and installations. Occasional checks of offices left unoccupied during lunch or other break periods are also to be made. Action to be taken for Unsecured Protectively Marked Material 05856. The actions to be taken when unsecured protectively marked material is discovered by the guard force is to be detailed in their orders. Guidance is also given at Annex C to this Chapter. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-17 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-18 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX A TO SECTION VIII SECURITY PATROL ROOM CHECK SHEET Mon/Yr / Branch Building Room No I have signed below to certify that: a. b. c. d. Date All protectively marked material has been secured. All security containers are locked. All windows are security closed. There are no apparent fire or other safety hazard. Ceasework Check Check 1 Time Signature Time Independent checks Check 2 Signature Check 3 Time Signature Time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Signature JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX B TO SECTION VIII GUIDANCE FOR THE RELEASE OF DOGS BY SERVICE PERSONNEL ON DUTY General 1. Dogs may be used to assist with a lawful arrest or to prevent crime following Rule 680. A dog must be used only in appropriate circumstances. The release of a dog for the purpose of apprehending a person must only be used as a last resort, other than the use of firearms, in the specific circumstances detailed below. Patrol Arm True dogs, which are used for special roles, are highly suited for this task. Challenging 2. A challenge MUST be given before the release of a dog unless: a. To do so would increase the risk of death or injury to you or any other person; OR b. 3. You or others in the immediate vicinity are under attack. You are to challenge by shouting: "NAVY, ARMY, AIR FORCE, (as appropriate). HALT OR I WILL RELEASE MY DOG". The Release 4. You are only to release the dog, should no other means be available to apprehend a person, if, on reasonable grounds you believe: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. A person is committing or about to commit an act likely to endanger life (e.g. firing a weapon or placing an explosive device). OR b. You, the handler, come under attack. OR A person is causing injury to others. OR d. A person is threatening to cause injury to others. OR e. A person has just killed or injured someone or attempted or threatened to kill or injure someone. OR f. A person is breaking into an armoury or ammunition/explosives store or ammunition/explosives storage area. OR g. An unauthorised person is attempting to make off with arms, ammunition or explosives. OR h. It is necessary to do so to protect property, equipment or vehicles belonging to the Ministry of Defence, or in the care of MOD personnel, against serious acts of sabotage, theft or vandalism. c. You may then release the dog using the appropriate command. Upon release, you are to follow the dog and order the person to stand still. When they are still, you are to command the dog to "leave", regain control of the dog and initiate the arrest procedure. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX C TO SECTION VIII SEARCHING Introduction 1. This document sets out the MOD's policy on searching, and is directed at non ­ police Guard and Security Forces, including Service personnel, MGS and civilian contract guard forces, on MOD property (MOD sites, establishments, premises and land) in Great Britain. In general, a search may be carried out only where a person consents to being searched. Members of a guard or Security force do not have any specific powers in relation to search. The Civilian Police Forces (CPF) and MOD Police (MDP) have certain other powers to carry out searches in other circumstances, either under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), or under Scottish Law. The procedures and powers for searches carried out by Service police are set out in JSP 484 (Service Instructions for Search). Reasons for Search 2. The reasons for a search may include: Searching may be conducted to a. On Entry to an Establishment. prevent and deter terrorists or other extremists from seeking to gain access to attack an establishment or its occupants. It may also be conducted to prevent and deter unauthorised equipment, such as electronic or recording equipment, from being brought onto an establishment, thereby countering the espionage threat. b. On Exit from an Establishment. Searching may be carried out to prevent and deter the illegal or unauthorised removal of property, including protectively marked material, from an establishment. c. Within an Establishment. Exceptionally, other circumstances may arise where a search is required, for example where persons acting suspiciously are apprehended. This refers to the apprehension of intruders or individuals where there are reasonable grounds for believing that they may present a danger to the establishment, rather than those who are the subject of a crime related investigation. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security MOD Policy on Searching 3. It is MOD policy that on MOD property all persons, their belongings and their vehicles are liable to be searched on entry, during their stay or when they leave MOD property, as stated in Vol 7 of the MOD Personnel Manual. It is recommended to Heads of Establishments that a record of searches be maintained. In circumstances of dispute, refusal to consent to be searched or upon making a find, a record must be made. An example of an appropriate form for use in such circumstances, that TLBs / Commands may wish to replicate, is at Appendix 1. 4. Everyone entering an MOD site is to be informed, or reminded, that they are liable to be searched. Notices to this effect are to be prominently displayed at any of the following: pass offices, entry points or guardrooms through which access is given to MOD property. An example of appropriate wording for notices is at Appendix 2. In addition, everyone potentially affected is to be informed that all personal effects left unattended and unsecured in offices or on MOD property are liable to be searched. Line managers are regularly to brief all persons working on MOD premises and land that this policy exists and practical methods of bringing this policy to the attention of all persons entering MOD property are to be considered, eg including it on passes issued to personnel. 5. If a person consents to be searched, then they may be searched either by Police (Service, MOD or civil), or by any member of the establishment Security Force. This Security Force may be Service Personnel, MOD Guard Service (MGS) or civilian contract guard force personnel. Searches with Consent 6. It is a Condition of Service for MOD employees and a standard condition for contracted and subcontracted personnel that their person and belongings or transport on MOD property are liable to search. The Department therefore takes the view that they have given their implied consent to be searched at any time when on MOD property, including at the point of exit. Despite this, personnel are still to be asked to give their consent before being searched. 7. If a person does not consent to being searched on entry to MOD property, access may be denied; they themselves have the option not to enter MOD property if they object to searches taking place. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Searches without Consent 8. A person may refuse to be searched when asked, in which case a search without consent may not be undertaken unless the person carrying out the search is a member of the CPF, MDP or the Service Police, using one of the specific powers vested in them. 9. If it is suspected that a person within, or in the immediate vicinity of MOD property or premises, constitutes an immediate and substantive threat to life, they may be arrested and, if they still present a danger to themselves or others, they may be searched by any member of the establishment Security Force with or without consent. Search Criteria 10. The term `search' means the search of a person (the individual), their personal belongings (eg baggage) or their vehicles. This includes the search of unattended personal belongings on MOD property, for example briefcases or bags left in offices, or unlocked desk drawers. a. Person searching. (1) A search of a person may be conducted only by a member of the same sex, except where an immediate and substantive threat to life is believed to exist, and no member of the same sex is immediately available, in which case a search may be carried out by a member of the opposite sex. (2) Only cursory searches involving the examination of outer clothing are to be carried out. b. Personal belongings. A person of either sex may search personal belongings. However, if the owner is present and requests that a search be carried out by a member of the same sex, arrangements for this are to be made, provided a suitable searcher is readily available. If a suitable searcher is not readily available, the search may proceed only with the individual's consent, or if the search is carried out by a police officer with appropriate constabulary powers. c. Vehicles. Persons of either sex may search vehicles. Guidelines. 11. The need for training of personnel assigned to searching duties will vary, depending on the type of guard force and the categorisation of the establishment. As JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-C-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a minimum, these personnel assigned to searching duties are to be made aware of the following guidelines: a. Consent. Irrespective of the circumstances, all personnel are to be asked to give their consent prior to a search commencing. b. Reasons for search. Those carrying out searches must be able to explain the reasons why they intend to carry out a search, as the person to be searched may well ask the reason. Searchers should be able to explain that the search is, for example, for security purposes (to deter or detect terrorists or espionage), or to combat and deter theft. c. Use of force. The use of force will not normally be justifiable. Force may be used only by the CPF, MDP or the Service Police where they have the necessary powers. In circumstances where an immediate and substantive threat to life is believed to exist, personnel other than police officers may carry out a forcible search - but only as a last resort. Searching personnel are to be warned that the use of force when not justified, or an excessive use of force when use of reasonable force is justified, may expose the searcher to allegations of assault and possible criminal prosecution. d. Searching techniques. Searches in public must be restricted to a superficial examination of outer garments, usually by running hands over the outside of a person's clothing. A person may be asked to remove an outer jacket, headgear or gloves voluntarily. A person may be asked to remove all items from their pockets; searching personnel are not to place their hands in any pockets. e. Personal belongings. A search of personal belongings, for example a bag or a briefcase, may be carried out to ensure that it does not contain unauthorised material, or dangerous or prohibited items, such as an explosive device, a weapon, or protectively marked material. For instance, an unattended briefcase, left unsecured in an accessible cabinet or drawer, is liable to be searched. However searching does not extend to an examination of personal items such as diaries, personal papers or notebooks, beyond the point necessary to establish that the item is indeed personal, whereupon the examination of it is to stop. Thus studying such material to look for passwords, combinations or other compromising material is unacceptable. This applies to all personal belongings, whether they be accompanied by the owner or left unattended and unsecured elsewhere. f. Action upon making a find. Guards who have no constabulary powers should, on finding something suspicious, including MOD property being removed without authorisation: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-C-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security (i) Ask the person for an explanation and, if unsatisfied with the response, ask the person to wait while the police are called to investigate. (ii) If the person refuses to offer an explanation or refuses to wait, guards should not detain them but should report the matter immediately and if necessary summon police assistance. . (iii) Should something be found that a guard believes may constitute an immediate threat to life, for example a weapon, the guard may detain that person by using citizens' powers of arrest. CPF, MDP or Service police should be summoned immediately. (iv) Should an unattended item be found in a room, its presence there indicating a breach of security, then that item may be locked away and the person responsible for it notified of where to find it. (v) In all cases, guards should consider the need to preserve evidence and should handle an item only if it is necessary to do so to prevent further danger, or prevent the continuation of a breach of security. g. Instigation of, and selection for Search. Entry and Exit searches will ordinarily be instigated by the Commanding Officer of the unit or by the HoE. Where searching is conducted for deterrent value and not in response to threat or specific information, personnel and / or vehicles are to be selected for searching in an entirely random manner. Searching Policy Overseas. 12. The principles of this policy apply equally to overseas establishments, in that the underpinning tenets are; the reasoning behind searching, the jurisdiction within which to search, and consent to search. The question of jurisdiction is a key issue and must be verified locally, taking account of regional cultures and laws. The powers of establishment security forces may well be different overseas, depending on their composition and status (eg where locally recruited staff are employed). MOD personnel on bases abroad will be subject to searching as if they were in the UK. Clarification 13. Legal advice should be sought in any case of need for clarification, or in any case of uncertainty regarding this sensitive and potentially contentious subject. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-C-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-C-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO SECTION VIII RECORD OF SEARCH DATE: INDIVIDUAL CONDUCTING SEARCH: Name Service / ID number Parent organisation Male / Female * SUBJECT OF SEARCH: Name Service / ID number Parent organisation Male / Female * Do you consent to a search*? Searched*: Person Yes Baggage No Vehicle All details to be printed LOCATION: Signature of Individual searched: Comment (if individual wishes to comment): Time: Signature of Searcher: Signature of witness: Indicate as appropriate* (if present) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-C1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO SECTION VIII Appropriate wording for advertising a liability to search whilst on MOD property: All persons wishing to enter this site/establishment/building* are to be aware that they, their possessions or vehicles are liable to search at all times. This includes on entry, whilst in the site/establishment/building* or when leaving. *Delete as appropriate JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-8-C2-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5­8-C2-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Control of Entry SECTION IX TO CHAPTER 5 CONTROL OF ENTRY Pass Systems and General Regulations This Section is being completely revised by D Def Sy and will be the subject of a Defence Council Instruction published in Oct 01 and issued in a DSO Guidance Note. Paras 05901 ­ 05969 under review. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-9-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-9-2 RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION X TO CHAPTER 5 AUTOMATIC ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEMS (AACS Introduction General 051001. This section deals with policy concerning the installation, effective use and management of automatic access control systems (AACS) within the Defence estate. The Principle of AACS 051002. The principle of AACS is that entry to a building, or area within a building, is controlled by the use of a card/token and Personal Identification Number (PIN), carried and known only by authorized personnel which, when used together, activate an access barrier. Use of AACS 051003. Establishments are to be encouraged to consider the security benefits that may be achieved by the installation of AACS to buildings or zones within buildings. The benefits may be most applicable to establishments located in a single building in an urban area where an AACS system could provide increased efficiency in controlling access and a reduction in the guard force. Such a reduction may provide significant long term cost savings. 051004. Further information, advice and guidance. Further information, advice and guidance can be obtained from the following sources: a. Where establishments are considering installation of an AACS system, consult TLB PSyA security staff to provide specialist advice and appropriate policy input (eg. AACS readers should be compatible with Watermark® technology used in the current version of the Defence Identity Card (DIDC)). Section II provides information and direction on procurement of major security equipment and systems. In addition, where such work constitutes a works service project, the procedures detailed in Chapter 5 Section II Annex A are to be adhered to. b. Advice on the completion of an operational requirement (OR) is also to be sought from TLB PSyA staff. c. See Section IX for more information on ID Cards and AACS. 051005. Requirement for TLB PSyA approval. Whilst the initial decision on the requirement for a AACS is taken at establishment level, it is essential within the Defence estate that the quality of system ultimately procured for the establishment is of an acceptable standard and design. This is achieved by the involvement of TLB JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-10-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security PSyA staffs monitoring and approving ORs from establishments to ensure that appropriate standards are maintained throughout the Defence estate. Responsibility for AACS 051006. The following responsibilities are as shown: a. Central policy. D Def Sy is responsible for the issue of central policy on the design and types of AACS to be installed within the Defence estate. D Def Sy is advised by the Defence Identity Card and Access Control Working Group, a working group of the Security Policy Advisory Group. b. Installation. The installation of AACS is the responsibility of the TLBs implemented through the normal works project or property management chain. Operational Requirement 051007. It is essential that before any purchasing action is commenced, establishments define clearly what they expect an AACS to do by preparing an OR. The OR is to specify the following: a. b. c. d. e. The area/building in which the AACS is to be installed. Any manpower considerations and/or savings. Whether linkage to CCTV/VMD or IDS is required. Proposed monitoring requirements. Any other performance requirements. Special Note: Within MOD, AACS must at present, use a PIN and `Watermark'. Site Survey 051008. Following approval of the OR, a site survey is to be arranged by TLB PSyA security staff (who may task their single-Service security organisation, and/or SSG). Audit of System 051009. An audit of the IDS system is to be carried out by professional security staff in accordance with the direction given at Section II to this Chapter, para 05210. Definitions 051010. The following definitions apply: a. AACS. An electronic system which can restrict entry/exit from a controlled area. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-10-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security b. Controlled area. An area which may be entered after the presentation of valid recognition data. c. Access control point (ACP). The place at which access is controlled by a guard, door, booth, turnstile or other barrier. d. Token. A device containing encoded recognition data, which may include biometric detail of an individual; a token in the Defence estate is usually an ID card, pass or permit. e. Keypad. A data entry point for the input of a code into an AACS. f. Personal identification number (PIN). A sequence of characters allocated to the user of a keypad. A PIN must never be portrayed on a token. g. Reader Unit. Equipment for the extraction of recognition data from a token. h. Local control unit (LCU). A device which processes recognition data to enable a usable output. i. Central control unit (CCU). Equipment directing and monitoring the functions of 2 or more LCUs. j. Trigger. The use of a token to actuate a secondary AACS. A secondary system is the electronic version of the "Tally or Exchange pass". Classes of AACS 051011. The Classes of AACS are described at para 05119. Types of AACS 051012. There are 3 types of AACS, namely: a. Hands on. This requires the bearer of a token to use it physically as an item of equipment. b. Proximity. A proximity (hands free) is one where the bearer carries a passive/active radio/infra-red token which uses a coded signal to release the barrier. c. Biometrics. This is where identity is checked by some physiological feature offered at the point of entry against the record of the same feature held in a computer memory. In general, intrusive/active physiological feature reading such as retina scanning should be avoided. 051013. In higher security installations it is mandatory for a PIN to be used if a "hands free" system is in place. It is policy for "hands on" systems only to be used JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-10-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security within the MOD estate for personnel; "hands free" systems may be used for vehicles. Biometric systems are not to be installed without the prior approval of the appropriate TLB PSyA and D Def Sy. Installation Criteria 051014. When considering the installation of an AACS, a study of the minimum baseline measures is necessary. Whenever it appears that a substantial saving in manpower or a marked improvement in protective security will occur then AACS should be considered for installation. The advantages and disadvantages which should be considered in relation to the proposed installation are as follows: a. Advantages. The advantages of AACS are: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) b. Continuous controlling of entry even in the absence of guards. Cannot be distracted, suborned, persuaded or threatened. Installation expenditure is a one-off outlay. Upkeep and maintenance costs are low. Can be programmed to detect unauthorised users. Provides a barrier against forced entry. Gives protection to guards operating the system. Will maintain a record of token holders' movements. Disadvantages. AACS has the following disadvantages: (1) Human supervision is still needed for visitors, trades people, breakdowns, etc. (2) Collusion by unauthorised and authorised persons cannot be prevented. (3) Controls entry/exit only; does not safeguard protectively marked material. Security Criteria 051015. Where an AACS is installed to control direct access to an area housing protectively marked material it is to comply with the following: a. Have a standby source of power. b. Have a "fail shut" device which ensures that the area to which the system gives access is secure in the event of a failure or emergency. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-10-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security c. Be fitted with a mechanical override on the secured side of the barrier to permit exit in an emergency. d. e. f. g. Be fitted with security locks for use when shut down. Be proofed against manipulation or tampering. Be fitted with an alarm to signal failure or abuse of the system. Be able to reject tokens which are notified as invalid. h. Be able to lock out a PIN using token after 3 unsuccessful attempts at entry. i. Prevent tailgating and passback. System Security 051016. When a AACS has been installed its reliability and security must be maintained by good management, supervision and regular servicing. This includes: a. Ensuring that access to the computer and its software is restricted to authorized personnel. b. All cards lost, stolen or no longer required should be programmed out of the system as quickly as possible. c. Consideration is to be given to making special arrangements, such as withdrawing cards or programming them out of the system, for staff who, for a prolonged period, are on leave, sick leave, detached duty or abroad. System Security Policies and Security Operating Procedures 051017. Where AACS are computer-controlled, appropriate system security policies (SSPs) and security operating procedures (SyOPs) must be issued for the system. System Criteria Incorporation of Watermark® Technology 051018. An increasing number of establishments are installing or planning to install AACS. It is MOD policy that new systems should be compatible with Watermark® technology. In addition, to being a tried, tested, approved and secure technology, Watermark® systems can utilise the Tri-Service Defence ID card (DIDC) and permanent passes manufactured using Site Access Management Systems. This limits the number of cards carried by an individual on an establishment. Accordingly, Sector Security Authorities need to ensure that establishments install only Watermark® compatible systems (the use of Special Services Group for system surveys should ensure that this requirement is complied with). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-10-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Watermark® Specification 051019. Copies of the Watermark® specification can be obtained from SSG. The names of approved 'Systems Houses' can also be obtained from SSG. Effective use Components 051020. There are 3 components which together determine the effectiveness of an AACS, namely: a. b. The barrier which permits access. The token which is used to seek admittance. c. The control unit which accepts or rejects the token and orders the barrier accordingly. Barriers 051021. Barriers for the admittance of personnel can be doors, turnstiles or booths. They are classed as "higher" or "lower" security installations. Higher Security Barrier 051022. Where monitoring of an ACP is from a distance, a higher security barrier is to be installed. This involves a structure allowing no space between barrier and ceiling/roof or adjoining walls/fences; entry is to be restricted to one person at a time and extra precautions, such as weight sensors or metal detectors, are to be incorporated if the assessed threat determines the need. Lower Security Barrier 051023. Where 'on site' monitoring of an ACP occurs, a lower security barrier such as waist high turnstiles, may be used; this class of barrier is suitable for use at a permanently manned ACP. CCUs and LCUs 051024. Where more than one ACP is to be used to access a location, a CCU must be provided; it is not acceptable, except in very special circumstances which are approved by the TLB PSyA, for unconnected LCUs to admit access to the same location. Siting of LCUs and CCUs 051025. LCUs and CCUs are to be sited within the protected area unless encrypted communications are provided. LCU/CCUs are to be housed in RESTRICTED areas under the supervision of the ESyO. Battery power for data storage at LCUs should have an 8 hour and for CCUs a 12 hour endurance. Batteries must be capable of being fully recharged within 8 hours. LCU Records 051026. An LCU must be able to record the following: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-10-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security a. b. c. d. Times of events. All entries and exits. Entries denied with the reason. Any alarms actuated. CCU Capability 051027. In addition to the records required of an LCU, a CCU must be able action the following: a. Store all PINs in use and be able to accept updates at intervals not exceeding 12 hours. b. Provide a correlation of PINs with users to specified system managers. c. Store sufficient information to provide an audit trail of user events, including alarm records, for a minimum of one week. Management 051028. System manager. Every AACS is to have a system manager and deputy with requisite support personnel nominated. The system manager and deputy are to: a. Be appointed by the HOE and receive written instructions regarding their duties. b. Be responsible to the ESyO for overall supervision of the system. c. Control the issue of token access and PINs, including the validation and deletion of access right. d. e. f. Examine system logs on a regular basis. Investigate all alarms and malfunctions. Have faults attended to at once. g. Ensure that only they have access to the programming facilities of the system. Servicing of System 051029. The reliability of an AACS depends on regular servicing and correct use. The system manager is to ensure that operating and maintenance staff receive adequate training before the system commences operation and before system updates occur. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-10-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Maintenance Contracts 051030. Establishments are to ensure that an effective maintenance contract is in place through the life of the system which allows for repair to the system to be actioned within 24 hours of the system failing. Doors 051031. An AACS may be considered for use in conjunction with a conventional door (for example, to restrict access to a room or area inside a building). However, the level of security provided is dependent on the security standard of the door. A door is more vulnerable to being circumvented than a properly designed barrier, particularly by tailgating, therefore a strong adjustable door closer is to be fitted. Secondary systems Biometric Systems 051032. Biometric systems verify a user's identity by checking some physiological feature offered at the point of entry against the record of the same feature held in the computer database. Biometrics systems are currently under trial by D Def Sy. An approved list of systems will be issued in due course. Advantages and Disadvantages of Biometric Systems 051033. The main advantage of a biometric system is its verification of the identity of the person rather than the token. Disadvantages are the relatively high installation costs and, sometimes, the high level of sensitivity needed to guarantee prevention of unauthorized entry; this can result in a large proportion of authorised users being denied access. It is for these reasons that all systems need to be approved by the centre. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-10-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION XI TO CHAPTER 5 SECURITY CONTAINERS AND SECURE ROOMS Security Containers General Level of Protection 051101. Protectively marked material is to be given a level of direct protection appropriate to its value so that those without authority do not gain access to it. The first line of protection is a container or room. Further Information, Advice and Guidance 051102. The following information, advice and guidance on security containers can be obtained: a. All personnel with a responsibility to safeguard protectively marked material should refer to the minimum baseline measures of physical security (Section I) for guidance in applying appropriate protection. b. Chapter 3 concerning risk management should be consulted in conjunction with this part. c. PSyAs may be contacted to advise on the application of the minimum baseline measures matrix, risk management and any additions to the list of approved containers. d. Section I Annex E provides a summary of security equipment and security measures including a full listing of all the Classes of security equipment. e. f. Section XII concerning locks and security keys. Chapter 4 concerning document security. Approved Containers 051103. Approved containers are designed to provide resistance to surreptitious attack and are allocated to a Class (1 to 4) according to the degree of protection they offer (Class 4 offering the highest level of protection and Class 1 the lowest). A measure of protection against forcible attack is, in addition, offered by containers in Classes 4 and 3. Containers used to house protectively marked material are to be fitted with an appropriate lock (see Section XII of this Chapter). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-11-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Classification of Containers 051104. Containers are classified according to the level of protection they offer from both forced and surreptitious attack. A list of classifications is at para 05114. Security Equipment Assessment Panel (SEAP) approved containers are listed at Section I, Annex E. Standards Responsibility for Standards 051105. SEAP is responsible for producing the standards for assessing the quality and level of protection offered by security containers. Specialised Storage Requirements 051106. Where specialised storage requirements cannot be met by a container in the existing range advice is to be sought from PSyAs. Modifications 051107. Establishments are not to modify or design their own security containers. Requirements for a new type of security container are to be staffed through PSyAs who will assess the requirement prior to consulting DDef Sy for assessment and approval. Assessment of Commercial Containers 051108. PSyAs may carry out their own assessment of commercial containers to meet a Class 1 requirement (consulting D Def Sy if necessary). The standard is given in the Handbook of the Manual of Protective Security. The standard will be used to assess the suitability of commercial containers according to Defence needs. Details of items for consideration as Class 1 security containers are to be forwarded to DDef Sy through PSyAs. Care of Security Containers Surface Finish 051109. The surface finish on Class 2 to 4 security containers has been specially selected. When damaged in a surreptitious attack it is difficult to restore without leaving discernible traces. Establishments are not to arrange for containers to be repainted or resprayed other than to the original standard. This standard of repainting cannot be carried out on site and it is necessary to arrange for the work to be done in a properly equipped factory facility. Details of security container refurbishing is included in the Handbook of the Manual of Protective Security or as provided by PSyAs by way of security instructions for container refurbishment. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-11-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Comments 051110. The following other precautions are to be taken with containers: a. Holes are not to be drilled in the body of security containers of Classes 2 to 4. This does not apply to containers that incorporate design features to allow then to be drilled and bolted to the floor, such as approved document chests. Holes may be drilled in the body of security containers for the purpose of fixing to walls or floors but this may limit their future use as security containers once removed from their fixings when they become Class 1 only. b. Attachments are not to be fitted to containers which might be used by an attacker to camouflage a surreptitious attack. c. Labels or notices are not to be stuck to the outside of security containers. Control of Security Containers Numbering of Containers 051111. Every container is to be allocated a number by the ESyO and a record kept of its history that show: a. b. c. Location of the container. Details of any repairs and maintenance carried out on the container. The unique number of the lock on the container. Disposal of Security Containers 051112. When returning or disposing of security containers the following action is to be carried out: a. A thorough check is to be carried out to ensure that all protectively marked material has been removed. Particular attention should be paid to filing cabinets where checks should be made that material has not fallen down the backs of drawers or into the base of the container. b. Prime responsibility lies with the person handing over the container. On completion of the search, a MOD Form 425 (Certificate of Inspection) is to be signed and attached stating: ' I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEARCHED CONTAINER (SER NO...) AND ALL OFFICIAL PAPERS AND EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN REMOVED.' A locally produced certificate may be used in lieu of MOD Form 425. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-11-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c. Containers that are fitted with combination locks are to have their number reset to the manufacture's number. Full instructions for the disposal of furniture are contained in JSP 384. Review of Security Containers 051113. Holdings and usage of security equipment are to be reviewed at no less than annual intervals to maximise the economic use of the equipment. Easily Removable Containers 051114. Security containers which can be removed without difficulty can be secured to a wall or floor (NB. In ships, all security containers are securely fixed to the ships structure). Fixings are to be arranged so that the container conceals them and renders them inaccessible. Key Boxes 051115. Key boxes are not to be fixed to plasterboard partition walls. If there is no firm fixing available, e.g. into brick or concrete, key boxes are not to be used and keys are to kept in other appropriate security containers. Holes are not to be drilled in other containers for the purpose of fixing a key box to them. Container Records Mandatory Information 051116. The following mandatory information is to be displayed inside the container: a. b. c. Date of last combination change. Signature and details of person affecting combination change Date next combination change due. d. Address and contact telephone number of custodian in case the container is found open. Additional Information 051117. Where so required, the following information can be displayed inside the container: a. b. List of permanent musterable items. Priority of destruction of material in an emergency. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-11-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security c. Fire preparedness plan. Action in the Event of Suspected Tampering Immediate Action 051118. The following action is to be taken in addition to any administrative action required under the provisions of Queens Regulations: a. The suspected tampering is to be reported immediately to the ESyO who is to inform the head of establishment without delay. b. When the circumstances are suspicious the appropriate security unit is to be requested to investigate following consultation with PSyAs. The suspected theft of protectively marked documents and the collection and preservation of physical evidence are matters which should involve the Service police jointly with the relevant security organisation. c. As further handling may destroy evidence, the container is to be preserved for examination by the investigator. d. Whenever there is reason to suspect compromise of any or all of the contents, immediate action is to be taken under the provisions of Chapter 2. e. DDef Sy is to be informed, by the PSyA, where appropriate in accordance with the policy at Chapter 2. If espionage is suspected and it is perceived that there is a need to inform Ministers, PSyA advice is to be sought without delay. Secure Rooms General Introduction 051119. Where there is a need to house large quantities of protectively marked material, it may be convenient and economical to store the material on open racking in a specially protected room. The room is to be designed to offer the same level of protection as the security containers it replaces. Further Information, Advice and Guidance 051120. Further Information, Advice and Guidance is available as follows: a. Establishments considering the conversion of such rooms are to seek advice and obtain approval from their PSyA prior to detailed planning at establishment level begins. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-11-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. Detailed advice on structural standards for rooms can be obtained from SSG via PSyAs. c. Details of SEAP approved locks and security doors quoted in this section can be found in the Catalogue of Security Equipment: A summary of the approved equipment is at Annex E to Section I. d. Implementation should be via the property management system, except for some programming of software aspects. Classes of Room 051121. The Classes of room identified as suitable for use instead of security containers of Class 2 to 4 are described at para 05116. The rooms by type are shown at Section I, Annex E. Choosing a Room Considerations 051122. When considering which type of room to construct the following is to be considered: a. The quantity and protective marking of the material to be housed. b. The level and type of threat and whether protection against a surreptitious or forced attack is needed. c. The extent of control which may be exercised over the accommodation adjacent to, above and below the room. Types of Room 051123. Where a room is used as a security container, ie protectively marked material is kept therein without security furniture, the standards below apply. Strongrooms 051124. A strong room giving protection equivalent to a Class 4 security container is of permanent construction, is an integral part of a building, and has only one point of entry fitted with a combination locked strong room door. Its floor, walls and ceiling are otherwise unbreached and constructed of ferro-concrete. Advice on construction details can be obtained via Command security staff. Secure Rooms 051125. A secure room is designed to afford the same level of protection as the security containers it replaces. There are three types of secure room designed for the storage of protectively marked material. Types A and B are designed to combine JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-11-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security protection against surreptitious attack with a measure of protection against forcible attack, and may be used for the storage of protectively marked material on open racking on non-approved containers. Type C has been devised to protect protectively marked material held on certain fixed disk computer systems and electronic equipment against surreptitious attack. The level of security provided by a type C secure room is less than that provide by a type A or B room and for this reason is not approved for the storage of protectively marked documents. Command security staff should be consulted before considering the use of a type C secure room. The details of secure rooms are at Annex A; detailed specifications can be obtained from SAFE/SSG via Command security staff. A secure industrial type building adapted for the purpose in accordance with the standard drawing will also qualify as a secure room. a. Construction. Exterior walls, party walls, floors and ceilings should not normally form part of the Room. There should ideally be only one entrance, and any ventilation or cable ducting should be adequately protected against unauthorised access. If emergency exits are necessary they should be fitted with approved doors, emergency exit devices and wired into any installed intruder detection system, to the same standard as that required for the Room. b. Access to Secure Rooms. Guards, cleaners and maintenance staff are not to be permitted unsupervised access to strong or Secure Rooms. The door to a Secure Room which is not in use or under close supervision is to be kept locked. Locked Room 051126. A locked room is any room or office that can be locked (when left unattended) and will offer a degree of protection to its contents. All material protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL or above must be stored in approved security containers in locked rooms subject to the provisions of para 05248. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-11-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-11-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX A TO SECTION XI TO CHAPTER 5 SECURE ROOMS Standard Type A Secure Room 1. Introduction. There should be only one entrance in Type A Secure Room, but if emergency exits are necessary they must be fitted with approved doors and emergency exit devices and be wired into any installed intruder detection system. Windows are not permitted. Air vents and ducts must be fitted with steel grilles or bar sets. Protectively marked material may be held on open racking or in non-SEAP approved containers in a Type A Secure Room. A lightweight version of the Type A Secure Room is available for use when the standard structure is too heavy for the building. 2. Specification. a. Walls. 150mm (min) reinforced concrete or in existing buildings, 340mm solid brick, cement rendered on both sides. b. c. d. Floor and roof. 150mm solid reinforced concrete. Door. Oxford or Cambridge door. Lock. Medway Locking unit or Fraser Bar, for emergency exists. Lightweight Type A Secure Room 3. Introduction. The lightweight Type A Secure Room is designed for use where the standard Type A specification structure would be too heavy for the building. It can also be used in buildings to upgrade existing walls to a Type A standard. Windows are not permitted in a Type A Secure Room. When upgrading an existing building, windows must be bricked up or fitted with bar sets and covered with the lightweight structure. 4. Specification. a. Walls. A double sandwich of 18mm plywood, expanded metal (XPM) - 2073F and plasterboard finish, constructed each side of a timber studding framework. b. Floor and roof. Layers of plywood and XPM ­ 2073F, furnished to the required standard may overlay existing floor and ceiling which do not reach the required standard. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-11-A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c. d. Door. Cambridge door. Lock. Medway locking unit or Fraser bar, for emergency exits. Standard Type B Secure Room 5. Introduction. There should be only one entrance in a Type B Secure Room, but if emergency exits are necessary, then they must be fitted with approved door and emergency exit devices and be wired into any installed intruder detection system. Windows should be bricked up or protected by fixed steel grilles or bars, as should air vents and ducts. Protectively marked material may be held on open racking or in non-approved containers in a Type B Secure Room. A lightweight version of the Type B Secure Room is available for use when the standard structure is too heavy for the building. 6. Specification. a. Walls. 225mm brick or 200mm dense concrete block, cement rended inside and out. b. c. d. Floor and Roof. 100mm (min) solid reinforced concrete. Door. Ashford. Lock. Medway locking unit, Fraser bar for emergency exit. Lightweight Type B Secure Room 7. The Lightweight Type B Secure Room is designed for use where the standard Type B specification would be too heavy for the building. It may also be used to upgrade the standard of walls in an existing building to meet the required specification. 8. Specification. a. Walls. A sandwich of 18mm plywood, XPM ­ 2073F and plasterboard finish constructed each side of a timber studding framework. b. Floor and Roof. Layers of plywood and XPM ­ 2073F finished to the required standard may overlay existing floor and ceiling which do not meet the required standard. c. d. Door. Ashford. Lock. Medway locking unit, Fraser bar for emergency exit. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-11-A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Standard Type C Secure Room 9. Introduction. A Type C Secure Room has been designed to protect protectively marked information held on fixed disc computer system and certain electronic equipment against surreptitious attack. There should be only one entrance but if emergency exits are necessary, then they must be fitted with approved doors and emergency exit devices and wired into any installed intruder detection system. Windows should be bricked up or protected by fixed steel grilles or bars as should air vents and ducts. Material protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL and above may NOT be held on open racking in a Type C Secure Room, but must be stored in approved security containers. A lightweight version of the Type C Secure Room is available for use when the standard structure is too heavy for the building. 10. Specification. a. Walls. 112mm brick or 100mm dense concrete block, cement rendered both sides. b. c. d. Floor and Roof. Any reinforced concrete slab. Door. Croydon. Lock. Any Class 2 lock or approved emergency exit device. Lightweight Type C Secure Room 11. Introduction. The lightweight Type C Secure Room is designed for use when the standard Type C structure is too heavy for the building. It may also be used to upgrade the standard of walls in existing buildings to meet the required specification. 12. Specification. a. Walls. A sandwich of 18mm plywood, XPM ­ 2073F and plasterboard finish fixed to the outside of a timber studding framework. b. c. d. Floor and Roof. Existing solid floor and ceiling. Door. Croydon. Lock. Any Class 2 lock or approved emergency exit device. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-11-A-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-11-A-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION XII TO CHAPTER 5 LOCKS AND SECURITY KEYS Locks General Introduction 051201. Security locks used for the direct protection of protectively marked material at levels of CONFIDENTIAL or above are to conform with SEAP approved standards. For the purpose of assessing and countering security risks, security locks are classified according to the level of protection they offer; Class 4 being the highest security and Class 1 the lowest. Further Information, Advice and Guidance 051202. Full details of SEAP approved locks are contained in the Catalogue of Security Equipment (CSE). Classification of Locks 051203. The classification of locks is shown at para 05115. SEAP approved locks are listed at Section I, Annex E. Combination Locks Operating Principle 051204. Combination locks which operate on the principle of rotating tumbler wheels generally offer a greater degree of protection against surreptitious attack than key locks. Overlooking 051205. Security containers fitted with combination locks are not to be sited where there is a possibility that the dial of the lock can be overlooked by unauthorised persons (this includes siting containers away from windows where telephotography may be a threat). Where it is not possible to change the position of a container vulnerable to overlooking, dial masks are to be fitted to the lock. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-12-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Initial Supply 051206. Locks are supplied set on the manufacturers setting. When received, they are to be safeguarded and there is to be no unauthorised access to them. Recording of Settings 051207. The following applies to the recording of combination settings: a. Settings are to be committed to memory and are not to be recorded (even in cryptic form) except as per para 051207b below. b. The setting of a combination lock is to be written down for emergency use and that record wrapped in metal foil laminated or opaque paper. The wrapper is then to be placed in a sealed envelope marked on the outside with the following information: (1) Brief details of the related security container and location. (2) The names and titles of the custodian and other persons authorised to have access to the written record. It is best practice, but not mandatory, for the envelope to be protectively marked to the same level as the highest protective marking of the material held in the container itself. The user of the container is to sign across the flap and add the date after the envelope is sealed. The signature and flap are then to be oversealed with clear cellulose tape of at least 19mm width. The duplicate combination is to be passed to the ESyO, or in special circumstances the HOE, for safe custody. Selection of Numbers 051208. When choosing combinations, the following are to be observed: a. Combination settings are to be chosen only after reference to the manufacturer's operating instructions issued with the lock. b. The numbers should be selected at random however if, for reasons of convenience eg in a registry, a mnemonic is necessary, it is to be of a kind which cannot be easily deduced i.e. not a telephone or obvious number. Scrambling of Lock 051209. Combination locks are to be fully scrambled whenever a container is closed by turning the dial anti-clockwise at least five times. 051210. Spare. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-12-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Changing Settings 051211. The setting numbers are to be changed in the following circumstances: a. When a container first comes into service or is taken over by a new user. b. c. Every 6 months. If a setting is known or thought to be compromised. d. Whenever a lock has been repaired, serviced or inspected by a person who does not have authorised access to the contents of the container to which it is fitted. e. When one of several persons who has access to a single container ceases to have authorised access eg on posting. Manifoil Combination Locks (MCL) not in Use 051212. Security containers with MCLs that are not in use and that are not being returned to the manufacturer or disposed of are NOT to be locked on the manufacturer's combination setting. The ESyO can select one standard combination for all out of use containers and the record of the setting(s) are to kept by the ESyO at protectively marked SECRET level. The regulation for containers being returned or for disposal is at para 051112. Vulnerabilities of Combination Locks Attack Techniques 051213. Combination locks are vulnerable to a number of surreptitious attack techniques. All Class 4 locks will offer a degree of protection against an attack by drilling and manipulation; however personnel are to be aware of the potential threat of the following types of attack: a. Use of fingerprints. Fingerprints of thumb or finger which, if aligned, will give an indication of the combination setting, may be left on the dial and bezel ring if the finger or thumb of one hand is used to steady the dial while the other hand is turning the knob. Those personnel who use this method of opening combination locks are to be encouraged to open them using one hand. Alternatively dial masks can be fitted to the locks. b. Rigging. Rigging is possible if access can be gained to the back of the lock when in the unlocked position. Specially prepared parts can be substituted so that an attacker will be able to open the lock at will, regardless of its setting, while the authorised user will be unaware of any change in the lock. For this reason the following safeguards are to be observed: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-12-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (1) The manufacturer's setting is to be changed immediately the container is received by the user. (2) Unauthorised persons are not to be permitted access to a container and its lock. (3) The locks on security key boxes sited in corridors are to be fully scrambled at all times. (4) Combination locks held as spares are to be stored under secure conditions by the ESyO. (5) Locks despatched to addresses in the UK by normal channels should bear no description of the contents on the outer cover. (6) A faulty lock is to be serviced only by approved Service personnel or an approved civilian locksmith. c. Radiography. Radiography is a sophisticated attack which if access can be gained to both sides of a container, or door fitted with a combination lock, may reveal the combination setting. Action in the Event of a Malfunction 051214. If a combination lock fails to open, personnel are to report the fact to the establishment security staff who will take appropriate action to rectify the situation. Non-security personnel are not to attempt to gain entry using tools. Action in the Event of Suspected Compromise 051215. In the event of suspected compromise to a combination, the measures detailed at para 051238 are to be followed. Maintenance and Repairs 051216. Repairs to combination locks are only to be carried out by an approved locksmith or trained members of security units and all transactions involving locks are to be carried out by the establishment security staff under the provisions of JSP 384. When the services of a UK locksmith are required overseas, authority is to be obtained from the relevant PSyA. 051217. Sites located in remote areas, or where a high level of security must be maintained, are advised to hold a limited supply of new or rebuilt locks, for use in emergency. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-12-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Vulnerabilities of Key Locks Surreptitious Attack 051218. Key locks are vulnerable to surreptitious attack because they have a keyway into which probes and picks can be inserted, and a key which can be compromised or lost. Selection of Door Lock 051219. When selecting a lock for fitting to a door it is important to consider where the lock will be used i.e. internally or externally, the type and size of the door it will be used on, the state of the door, hinges and frame. Selection of Lock Mechanism 051220. When selecting the lock mechanism which will be the most appropriate, the following principles apply: a. Single-sided locks are more secure than double-sided locks, although the incorporation of a throw lock does not detract from the security of a single-sided lock.. b. Mortice locks, which rely for strength on the door surrounding them, are not suitable for use on doors of less than 44mm thickness. c. Rim locks depend for their strength on the nature of the fixings to the door. Degree of Security 051221. A lock cannot offer any higher degree of security than the door to which it is fitted. It is pointless to fit an approved lock to a door which is weak or ill fitting. Security Keys Definition 051222. Security keys are those which operate locks fitted to: a. b. Security containers used to house protectively marked material. Doors of secure buildings, rooms or areas. c. Security containers (boxes, pouches, briefcases etc) used for the transmission of protectively marked material. d. Doors of rooms given special protection (i.e.'swept') against technical eavesdropping. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-12-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security e. Armouries and ammunition stores. Unauthorised Persons 051223. Keys can be easily copied from an impression, a photograph or a radiograph. Unauthorised persons are not to be given the opportunity to handle or examine security keys. Security of Security Keys 051224. The security of security keys is to be maintained as follows: a. They are to be issued against signatures in a key register to authorised members of staff. b. c. The daily issue of keys is to be recorded in a key register The number of keys issued for any lock is to be kept to the minimum. d. A record (master key register) is to be maintained by establishment security staff or by branches, showing the following: (1) The location of each key, together with a record of the lock to which it belongs. (2) The date the working key (but not the duplicates) was signed out to the custodian. (3) The identifying features of each key i.e. type registered number and number of duplicates. (4) The printed names and ranks of the persons allowed to have access to the key. e. The keys are to be mustered by the establishment security staff, at intervals not exceeding six months. They are also to be subject to spot checks. A certificate showing the results is to be rendered to the HOE. f. When used to directly protect material marked CONFIDENTIAL and above, the keys are to be checked at the end of each working day and housed, when not in use, in approved containers or approved key boxes. g. The keys are not to be accessible to persons who do not have authorised access to the material or to the room which the lock protects. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-12-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security h. Security keys are not to be removed from an establishment without the specific authority of the EsyO. i. In-use security keys are to attract the same protective marking as the most sensitive material that they protect and are to be stored, protected and handled accordingly. Spare Keys 051225. The following conditions apply to spare keys: a. Spare keys to security locks are to be held centrally, in approved security containers, by the EsyO, or a designated member of staff. b. They are not to be held in the same container as the working key. c. The spare keys are only to be issued to persons with authorised access to the material the lock protects, on receipt of documentation proving that the working key has been mislaid or lost. The keys are only to be issued to allow for the contents of the container/secure room to be removed and placed in appropriate secure conditions. The container/secure room is then not to be used to house protectively marked material until such time as the locks have been changed or all the keys have been located and compromise is not suspected. d. Details of the issue of spare keys are to be recorded and the security staff informed, if the keys have been issued at 'branch' level. e. Additional keys are only to be supplied on the written authority of the establishment security staff. f. A record is to be kept by the establishment security staff of the number of keys issued, to facilitate control and mustering. g. Each set of keys is to be held, either, on a special to type keyboard within an appropriate security container or be sealed in a separate envelope, marked on the outside with the following information: (1) (2) The key numbers. Brief details of the related security container and location. (3) The names of the persons authorised to have access to the spare keys. It is best practice, but not mandatory, for the envelope to be protectively marked to the same level as the highest protective marking of the material held in the container itself. The user of the container is to sign across the flap and add the date after the JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-12-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security envelope is sealed. The signature and flap are then to be over-sealed with clear cellulose tape of at least 19mm width. Note: Each key issued with a lock is to be used in rotation as the in-use key for a maximum period of 6 months. Mustering 051226. In addition to the requirement for a 6 monthly muster of all security keys on an establishment, security keys in regular use are to be mustered daily at close of work. Identification 051227. Keys are to be labelled to facilitate their daily issue and muster. The labelling is to be such that it does not readily identify the container to which the key belongs. Key rings are to be checked frequently to ensure that keys cannot become detached. Transmission 051228. Keys are to be transferred by hand of one authorised person to another, but where this is not possible, they are to be transmitted under safeguards appropriate to the highest protected marking to which the relevant lock gives access. Key Security in Offices 051229. Whenever a room or building is left unoccupied, keys are to be secured. They are never to be put into furniture that does not conform with the security standards laid down within the minimum baseline measures matrix. Promulgation of Security Key Procedures 051230. The procedure for all aspects of the handling of security keys and combinations is to be promulgated by heads of establishment in establishment standing orders. Security Containers Returned to Store 051231. Whenever a security container is issued from or returned to store, all keys are to be tried in the lock. Keys are not to accompany the container; they are to transmitted under separate cover. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-12-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Security Containers not in Use 051232. All security keys for containers not in use are to be withdrawn and taken on charge by the ESyO. The security containers are to be locked shut pending issue of the container and key to another person. Local Replacement or Manufacture 051233. Security keys are not to be manufactured under local establishment arrangements e.g. to replace a lost key or to create a new one. Issue of Duplicate Keys 051234. In the event of a security key being lost or mislaid, the container must be assumed to be compromised and the duplicate key must not be used. Ordering of Security Locks through Sub-contractors 051235. When it is necessary to order approved security locks through sub-contractors, the individual ordering the lock is to ensure that the sub-contractors annotate the order form to indicate that the lock and keys are to be sent direct to the ESyO. Change of Appointment 051236. On change of appointment, key custodians who signed for the keys are to return them to the ESyO who will then issue them to the new custodian. Other keys 051237. The locks and keys to non security containers or to intruder detection panels etc are not in themselves security keys but they are used to secure items and equipment in need of protection. Such keys are to be held and treated in a manner appropriate to the material they protect. Action in the Event of Suspected Compromise or Loss of Security Key or Combination Setting Immediate Action 051238. The following action is to be taken in addition to any other disciplinary action required under the provisions of QRs: a. The loss or suspected compromise of a security key is to be reported immediately to the ESyO who is to inform the head of establishment without delay. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-12-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. When the circumstances are suspicious the relevant security unit is to be requested to investigate following consultation with the PASyA. c. As further handling may destroy evidence, the container is to be preserved for examination by the investigator. d. Whenever there is reason to suspect compromise of any or all of the contents, immediate action is to be taken under the provision of Chapter 4. e. DDef Sy is to be informed, by the PSyA, where appropriate in accordance with the policy at Chapter 2. Liability for Cost of Replacement 051239. The person held responsible for the loss of a security key may be liable for the cost of the replacement of the lock. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-12-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION XIII TO CHAPTER 5 MECHANICAL DOCUMENT TRANSFER SYSTEMS & AUTOMATED DOCUMENT ACCOUNT SYSTEMS Mechanical Document Transfer (MDT) Systems Introduction Description of MDT Systems 051301. Mechanical document transfer (MDT) systems include those employing rails, tracks or pneumatic tubes for the carriage of documents within buildings. Further Information, Advice and Guidance 051302. Guidance on the design and procurement of MDT systems is available from D Def Sy through PSyA staff. Authority to install a MDT system is to be sought from PSyA staff prior to detailed planning taking place at an establishment. General Security Measures Assessment 051303. Before the installation of a MDT is considered an assessment is to be made of the security implications in running the system or during installation, maintenance or repair. The cost-effectiveness of installation must also be justified. Preventing Unauthorised Access 051304. The security concerns are to be concentrated on ensuring that unauthorised persons do not gain access to any protectively marked material which it is being carried by a MDT. Access is to be denied to: a. The document carriers. b. The tubes, tracks or rails, especially those running between buildings or through isolated or infrequently used parts of buildings. c. The electric power or compressed air supplies for the system. d. The system control panel (some systems have their controls on the carrier).Detailed Security Measures Level of Physical Security Protection 051305. The level of physical security protection required will depend on: a. The threat. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-13-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. The level of protectively marked material carried. c. Whether or not the system is used exclusively within a secure area. Covers and Lids 051306. Covers or lids on carriers may need to be designed so that they can be locked during transit and when they arrive at a destination where authorised staff may be temporarily absent. This may not be necessary if the system is routed exclusively through a secure area. Design of Hinges on Lids 051307. The hinges on the lids of carriers are to be designed so as to prevent their removal when the lid is closed and locked. Ventilation 051308. Where motor ventilation is necessary care is to be taken to ensure that this does not allow access to the documents being carried. Ducting Design of Ducting 051309. Ducting through which the MDT runs is to be designed so that it is not possible to halt or remove carriers while they are in transit. Access to control panels which, on some systems, are situated on the outside of the carrier, is to be denied as these control the route and destination of the carrier. Location of Ducting 051310. Ducting may be run between buildings providing the buildings are within a secure perimeter and any maintenance access panels are designed so as to prevent unauthorised access to the track and the carriers. Unauthorised Entry to Building 051311. The ducting is not to be capable of providing a means of unauthorised entry to the building or secure area during silent hours or when the MDT system is not in operation. Security Supervision 051312. Arrangements are to be made to ensure that terminals are properly supervised and given suitable protection when left unattended. Security of Carriers 051313. Where carriers containing protectively marked documents are held at terminals outside working hours the following is to be ensured: a. The carriers and contents are to be secured to an appropriate standard. 5-13-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security b. Precautions are to be taken to ensure that no carrier is left between terminals or routed to an unmanned or unprotected terminal. c. The control system is to be designed to indicate, at the central control panel, whether any carriers are still in transit. Protection of Despatch Control Unit 051314. Where there is a central despatch control unit it is to have protection during silent hours, it is not within a secure area, either by securing the room or by installing intruder detection devices. Emergency power 051315. Provision is to be made for a standby power supply. Transmission between Secure Zones 051316. When MDT systems are used for the transmission of protectively marked documents between two secure zones in an otherwise insecure building, the normal rules for enveloping and receipting should apply (see Chapter 4; Transmission of Protected Assets). However, in systems working solely between two areas where all operating personnel at both terminals are authorised to see the material and where the tube or track between the terminals has adequate physical protection, protectively marked documents may be transmitted un-enveloped in unlocked carriers. Automated Document Accounting Systems (ADAS) Introduction 051317. Automated systems may be used in place of manual systems to account for protectively marked documents. Further Information, Advice and Guidance 051318. Guidance on the design and procurement of ADAS systems is available from D Def Sy through PSyA staff. Authority to install an ADAS system is to be sought from PSyA staff prior to detailed planning taking place at an establishment. Efficiency 051319. Where an ADAS is part of a larger electronic office project, it has the potential to improve efficiency. Although there may be little saving in staff time spent on the initial registration of documents, an ADAS has the potential to reduce the time devoted to the subsequent movement of paper where they pass regularly between different locations. Facilities 051320. An ADAS which is intended to replace manual accounting of protectively marked documents must be capable of: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-13-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. Recording and where necessary creating a receipt (with appropriate details) of each document or file. b. Registering the location of each document or file. c. Recording the temporary and the final disposal of each document or file, eg. document to file, despatch, destruction etc. d. Produce a list of each entry on the system to facilitate audit trails, routing lists, file lists etc. e. Providing a regular back-up of the system. Security Measures Access to the ADAS System 051321. Access to the ADAS system is to be limited to those authorised to use it and the establishment security staff; the following software security measures are to be applied: a. No data deletions are to be permitted; however, a facility is to be included to annotate incorrect entries. b. All data alterations are to be recorded after initial data entry and verification. Additional Security Measures 051322. In certain circumstances, security measures in excess of those detailed above may be required. Factors affecting the extent of additional security measures include: a. The level of protection required by documents controlled by the ADAS. b. The number and location of terminals. c. The physical protection afforded by the environment within the establishment. d. The requirement for 'need-to-know' separation. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-13-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION XIV TO CHAPTER 5 ACCOMMODATION MOVES General Introduction 051401. This Section gives information about accommodation moves involving protectively marked assets. To ensure that a move is successful, it is essential that adequate planning of the security aspects of the move is undertaken at an early stage. All personnel involved are to be made aware of their responsibilities. Further Information, Advice and Guidance 051402. Further advice on any aspect of a move may be obtained from Command security staff. Planning Involvement of Security Officers 051403. The ESyO and/or other sub-unit security officer is to be involved in the security planning of the move at the commencement of arrangements being formulated. They are to be fully aware of and contribute to the plans of senior management. Responsibilities of Security Officers 051404. The ESyO and other sub-unit security officers involved have the following responsibilities: a. To obtain structural plans of the new accommodation, and become familiar with any inherent problems that may require action, if possible before the move is undertaken. b. Check the effectiveness of any security measures that may already exist in the new accommodation. c. Ensure that the allocation of accommodation takes full account of any requirement for secure zones or registries and secure communications, and that whenever possible SECRET and TOP SECRET material is located away from the ground floor (see Section II of this Chapter). d. Identify occupants of adjacent buildings especially when considering the possibility of overlooking, overhearing and the TEMPEST threat. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-14-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security e. Ensure that funding is allocated for any alterations, or additional security measures that may be necessary. f. Monitor proposals for any structural alterations, and check that they do not adversely affect security. g. Establish a close liaison with other personnel with security responsibilities where the accommodation is shared with another establishment and agree on security responsibilities. The Move Actions to be Taken 051405. In planning the move it is necessary to consider the distance involved and the amount of protectively marked assets to be moved. All moves of protectively marked assets are to be in accordance with a movement plan agreed in advance by the ESyO. Personnel are to be made aware of their responsibilities during the move. All stages of the move are to be supervised by security staff or appropriately cleared personnel who are to be fully briefed on the details of the move plan. In addition the following is to be actioned: a. At all stages of the move. Adequate security is to be provided for the protectively marked assets at all stages of the move. This includes at the vacated premises, in transit and at the new accommodation. b. Transit crates. Protectively marked assets are not to be transported in security containers. Unless the amount of such material is small, approved transit crates are to be used; The following rules apply to transit crates: (1) Transit crates that can be effectively sealed are to be filled by those responsible for the protectively marked assets. (2) The lid is to be secured and sealed using only recommended seals. (3) Those crates that need to be protected are to be identified, and their destination in the new building clearly marked. (4) Crates are to contain packing lists to facilitate subsequent checking. (5) Labels on crates are not to indicate the protective marking of the contents. (6) Crates are to be redistributed in accordance with staff location requirements; seals are to checked and the contents transferred into approved security containers. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-14-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security (7) On completion of unpacking, all crates are to be checked to ensure that they have been emptied of their contents. (8) An appropriately vetted escort is to accompany crates containing material protectively marked SECRET and above. c. Commercial companies. The use of commercial companies to transport protectively marked assets is acceptable; however, a security escort, is to remain with the vehicle whenever it contains material bearing a protective marking and/or a descriptor. d. Additional movement actions. apply: The following additional actions (1) It may be advisable to inform the police of the route of the move, particularly if a number of vehicles are involved. (2) Times of moves are to take account of likely traffic conditions. (3) Contingency plans are to be prepared to cover accidents, breakdowns or diversion of load or other emergencies. e. Security containers. The following actions in respect of security containers are to be carried out: (1) Security containers are to be transported with their shelves stacked securely at the bottom of the container. (3) The doors are to be locked. (3) Combination locks are to be set to manufacturers' settings and locked. (4) The keys for key-locked security containers are to be carried separately under secure arrangements. f. Accommodation checks. Thorough checks under the control of the ESyO are to be made of the vacated accommodation to ensure that nothing has been left behind. Where premises are to be handed over to Defence Land Agents, the ESyO is to seek the advice of the appropriate PSyA and request the help of the appropriate Security Unit. g. Overseas moves. When material is to be moved overseas, PSyAs are to be consulted. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-14-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Closure of Establishments 051406. Establishments are to seek the advice of their PSyA/security unit in the event of the establishment being scheduled for closure and the estate being sold. In particular, the following criteria are to be considered: a. Plans are to be made for the disposal of security installations such as the AC12 IDS. The cabinets for AC12 are to be removed from the walls and returned to SSG. Documents and drawings for the facility are to be destroyed or otherwise securely disposed of. b. Logs/records for access control systems are to be destroyed or otherwise securely disposed of. c. Security or operational fittings and fixtures that could compromise the mode of operation of other establishments if disclosed should be removed. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-14-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION XV TO CHAPTER 5 REPROGRAPHIC MACHINES General Definition 051501. The term reprographic machine is defined as any type of machine capable, by any process, of producing copies of a document (eg photocopiers, facsimile machines, joint fax/photocopiers, laser printers, etc). Further Information, Advice and Guidance 051502. The following information, advice and guidance on reprographic machines can be obtained: a. Advice on the suitability of all types of reprographic machinery including new technologies - for use with protectively marked material can be obtained from D Def Sy via appropriate PSyA staffs. b. Advice on problems arising from the application of the policy contained in this Chapter is to obtained from PSyA staffs. c. Advice on machines with AACS (restrictive use system) can be obtained from D Def Sy or the Catalogue of Security Equipment (CSE). Control of Use Control of Access 051503. Access to reprographic machines is to be strictly controlled to prevent unauthorised copying of protectively marked material. Methods of Control 051504. Where the risk of unauthorized disclosure is high, or when SECRET and TOP SECRET material is involved, the following methods of control apply: a. Dedicated personnel. Whenever possible, only dedicated personnel are to be authorised to carry out copying. Alternatively, personnel are to seek permission to use the machine on each occasion. b. Use of AACS. The use of an AACS (restrictive use system) is to be encouraged; many photocopiers have an integral system of control, or alternatively, 'add-on' machines are available. It is MOD policy that all AACS are to incorporate WatermarkR technology. Where selecting an 'add-on' system, those which combine a card with personal identification number (PIN) offer the greatest level of security. Most systems (should it be required) have the facility to provide a print out of details such as the number JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-15-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security of copies made against a PIN or entry code, together with time and date. Such systems control who has had access only, and not what has been copied. c. Switch box cover. When not in use, power supplies are to be protected by an approved switch cover (Order Code 24.55.0015 - 13 amp or 24.55.0022 - 30 amp as appropriate) which is secured by an approved padlock. d. Removal of key counter. Where so fitted, the detachable 'key counter' on photocopiers is to be removed and stored securely. e. Siting. Wherever possible, machines are to be sited: (1) In a locked room. (2) Away from windows so that reproduction cannot be overlooked. f. Use of F102. The reproduction of SECRET and TOP SECRET information (including drafts) is to be recorded in MOD F102 which are to be administered in accordance with the instructions in Chapter 4. Potential Risks 051505. Reprographic machines can suffer faults or be vulnerable to attack in the following ways: a. Operators of reprographic machines may fail to clear the machine of original and copy material after use. b. Copies may become trapped in the machine, only being revealed during servicing. In the event of a machine malfunction, users are to ensure that any trapped copies are identified and removed for secure disposal. c. Parts of certain machines such as memory chips, drums, belts and cartridges, may retain images of previous copies. Maintenance and Disposal 051506. The following procedures apply for maintenance and disposal of reprographic machines: a. Machines are to be thoroughly examined for trapped copies prior to servicing or maintenance. b. Where possible all such work is to be supervised. c. In particularly sensitive areas, special arrangements to prevent compromise of information are to be made. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-15-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security d. Photo receptor belts and drums. Photo receptor belts and drums may contain protectively marked information. If it becomes necessary to dispose of the machine or to have the belt/drum removed for repair the maintenance engineer should not be allowed to remove them from the establishment until the measures detailed below are followed: (1) If it is possible to operate the machine, the lid of the photocopier should be closed and five blank copies produced. This procedure will clean the drum or belt of any images that may be retained and any markings on the paper will cease to appear. (2) When it is not possible to operate the machine, the belt/drum should be removed from the machine by the maintenance engineer and wiped clean with a suitable non-abrasive cleaning material such as Isopropyl Alcohol. This procedure is only required if the last copying procedure contained information protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL or above, or in the event that the protective marking of the last procedure could not be established. e. Digital reprographic machines. In the case of reprographic machines that have a memory facility, it should be established whether the memory is volatile or non-volatile; (1) A machine that has a volatile memory can have the memory erased simply by switching off the power supply. (2) If the memory is non-volatile it is possible to overwrite any protectively marked information by running 5 non-protectively marked documents through immediately afterwards. When it is not possible to operate the machine, advice should be sought from the Sector Security Authority regarding safeguarding any protectively marked information that may be retained in the memory. Power Supply 051507. The machine should be permanently connected to the building electrical power supply via a non-detachable power supply cord, protected by a control box. Both 1 phase and 3 phase photocopiers may be hardwired however, to satisfy Health and Safety Legislation (EN 60950), they are to be hardwired into an isolator and it must be possible to lock off or remove the in-line fuses to the isolator. Where permanent connection is not possible, the machine must be able to be isolated from the power supply by a locking device such as a security plug box (Catalogue of Security Equipment - 24.55.0039) or an AACS. At ceasework, keys are to be stored in a security container. Tempest 051508. Establishments intending to install electronic reprographic machinery in areas requiring TEMPEST consideration are to obtain advice from PSyA staffs. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-15-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-15-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION XVI TO CHAPTER 5 DESTRUCTION OF PROTECTIVELY MARKED WASTE General Introduction 051601. Care is to be taken of all protectively marked waste material until it has been thoroughly destroyed in accordance with the regulations set out below. Further Information, Advice and Guidance 051602. The following further information, advice and guidance can be obtained: a. Details of all SEAP approved destruction equipment and destruction facilities are contained in the Catalogue of Security Equipment (CSE). b. Establishments are to contact their Command security staff for details of the equipment and facilities. General Principles 051603. The following general principles apply: a. Protection. Pending destruction by an approved method, protectively marked waste retains its sensitivity, and is to be given the appropriate protection. b. Separation. Protectively marked waste, before destruction, is to be clearly identified and kept separate from other waste. c. Authorised access. Personnel not authorised to have access to protectively marked material are not to be allowed direct access to waste that is so marked. At units overseas, all protectively marked waste is to be destroyed by UK personnel who are cleared to the appropriate level of access. d. Accumulation. No unnecessary accumulation of waste is to occur. Administrative Procedures 051604. The administrative procedures detailing the rank of personnel able to undertake the destruction and associated documentary requirements are contained in Chapter 4. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Rules for Destruction 051605. Destruction of protectively marked waste is to follow the rules below: a. RESTRICTED. RESTRICTED waste is to be destroyed by a method approved for each particular waste type (see Annex A). There is no requirement to use SEAP approved equipment. The rules for RESTRICTED waste are as follows: (1) Small quantities of paper waste may be disposed of as unclassified waste, eg in waste paper bins, provided it is torn into small pieces and mixed with other unprotected paper waste prior to disposal. (2) Waste may be sent to, or collected by, an approved commercial company that has been contracted for this purpose. Approval for the use of a commercial contractor is to be obtained by establishments from Command security staffs. b. CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET. Waste marked CONFIDENTIAL and above is to be destroyed by a method approved for each particular waste type (see Annex A), using SEAP approved equipment or methods. The principal methods of destruction are: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Incineration. Disintegration. Hammer-milling. Shredding. Pulping. Acid and chemical techniques. c. Certification. The destruction of TOP SECRET and SECRET material is to be witnessed and certified by two suitable vetted persons, one of whom must be an officer not below the rank of Warrant Officer (or a Senior NCO nominated by the Commanding Officer), Administrative Officer or equivalent. The destruction of material marked CONFIDENTIAL, where recorded in a MOD F 102, may be undertaken by one authorised member of the Armed forces or Civil Service. The methods are described in more detail below. In addition to destroying waste on site, approved destruction facilities can be used to destroy all waste types. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Collection, Handling and Storage of Waste Handling prior to Destruction 051606. The following rules are to be observed for the handling of protectively marked material prior to its destruction: a. The waste is to be held in an appropriate container according to its protective marking. b. General rubbish such as cans, bottles, food and broken glass is not to be included with protectively marked waste. c. The waste sacks, when filled, are to be secured before being taken to the central destruction or collection point by appropriately cleared personnel. d. Personnel not authorised to have access to protectively marked material may be employed as messengers provided they are supervised by a suitably cleared person. e. Bags of protectively marked waste, awaiting bulk destruction, should be sealed in such a way that tampering will be immediately apparent. Waste Sacks 051607. Waste sacks for the collection of protectively marked waste are to be sufficiently strong (Eg. double-lined) to withstand rigorous handling. Where required, special Kraft paper sacks identified by HMSO code numbers are available as follows: a. b. Code 971-003 multiwall printed in red for burning. Code 971-004 multiwall printed in black for pulping. Records 051608. The following recording action in a permanent notebook is to be taken with respect to sacks of protectively marked waste: a. A record of the number of sacks collected is to be kept by those responsible for safeguarding protectively marked waste (e.g. registry staff). b. When the sacks are stored pending destruction, a record is to be kept of the number received into store, and of the number subsequently destroyed or handed over to, or sent for destruction by a commercial company. c. When handing sacks to a commercial company, receipts are to be obtained. d. The records of sacks received, stored and destroyed is to be checked regularly by establishment security officers. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Methods of Destruction Incineration 051609. Incineration is the most effective method of destroying large quantities of most types of protectively marked material. Criteria for the equipment is to be as follows; it is to: a. Be lockable so that, once loaded, the waste cannot be removed by unauthorized personnel. b. flue. Have a trap to prevent readable pieces of material being carried up the c. Incinerate to a fine ash residue, which is capable of being sifted to ensure that the destruction process is complete. d. Be so designed that, if there are moving parts such as chain grates, the material being incinerated cannot escape from the combustion chamber. e. Comply with existing environmental legislation and the manufacturers' operating instructions. It is to be maintained correctly, and the manufacturer is to be consulted in the event of any operating difficulties. 051610. Spare. The Destruction of Paper and Paper-based Waste Shredding Baseline Measures for Shredding Protectively Marked Material 051611. Protectively marked paper, carbon paper, card, and tape is to be shredded in accordance with the following baseline measures before it may be treated as non-protectively marked waste: a. Material marked RESTRICTED may be destroyed on any shredder. b. Material marked CONFIDENTIAL or above is to be shredded using equipment which ensures that no more than two adjacent characters are legible in the shred size. The waste must: (1) (2) (3) Be cross-cut shredded. Be shredded to a size of no greater than 60 sq mm. Have a shred width not exceeding 4mm. c. Papers are to be inserted as whole pages into the shredder with the lines of print at right angles to the direction of shredding. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security Additional Measures 051612. The following additional measures are to implemented: a. Examination of shreddings. Shreddings are to be examined periodically by establishment security staff to ensure that the maximum permissible shred size specification is not being exceeded. b. Maintenance and servicing of equipment. Before maintenance work or servicing is undertaken on a shredding machine, it is to be examined to ensure that it does not contain any un-shredded or partially shredded material. c. COMSEC and codeword. COMSEC and codeword material are: The standards to be achieved for (1) With the exception of paper tapes, paper is to be crosscut, with the lines of print at right angles to the direction of shredding. (2) The maximum shred width is to be 1 mm and length of crosscut 20mm. (3) The shreddings are to be the product of 12 or more A4 size sheets (or equivalent) of the same colour and thickness. The shreddings of codeword and COMSEC material can be mixed with shredded material originally of another protective marking. Pulping 051613. Pulping machines are effective in destroying most paper and card and, with certain provisos, waterproof and wet strength paper, flat photographic film and laminates. Pulping is not to be used for the destruction of plastic materials, lithoplates, paper tapes or films in rolls. Disintegrators & Hammer-mills 051614. Hammer-mills and disintegrators can be used for the destruction of protectively marked paper and paper based materials. Baseline Measure - CONFIDENTIAL or Above 051615. A grille size of no larger than 6mm is to be used when destroying waste marked CONFIDENTIAL or above. RESTRICTED Waste 051616. Waste marked RESTRICTED may be destroyed using any grille size. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security The Destruction of Magnetic Media Definition 051617. The term magnetic media is used to cover all forms of electronic, audio and some types of optical media such as hard and floppy disks, microchips and audio tapes, etc. Incineration 051618. All forms of magnetic media may be destroyed by incineration (see para 051609). Due to the toxic nature of certain substances used in some forms of magnetic media, current regulations regarding the disposal of waste are to be complied with. Disintegrators 051619. Disintegrators and hammer mills can be used for the destruction of all forms of magnetic media. Baseline Measure 051620. When destroying waste marked CONFIDENTIAL or above, a grille size of no larger than 6mm is to be used. RESTRICTED Waste 051621. Waste marked RESTRICTED can be destroyed using any grille size. Use of Pre-breaker 0516182. Printed circuit boards (PCBs) and microchips can damage the blades of disintegrators. When destroying large quantities of these materials a pre-breaker is to be used. Hammer-mills are specifically designed to deal with such materials. Noise Levels 051623. Disintegrators and hammer-mills are noisy in operation and are not suitable for use in offices or quiet locations. Sanding 051624. When the quantities of hard disks to be destroyed are small, the magnetic media bearing surface of the disks may be removed by emery paper, a disc sander or emery wheel. The remaining metal platter is then to be disposed of as non-protectively marked waste. Appropriate Health and Safety precautions must be applied when using this method. Shredding 051625. Floppy disks can be destroyed using approved shredders, providing the rules described in paras 051611 and 051612 are followed. Due to the high density of JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security information contained on floppy disks, it may be possible to retrieve information from surviving fragments. Care is to be taken when disposing of shredded disks. Acid and Chemical Techniques 051626. Acid and chemical techniques may be used to destroy all levels of protectively marked magnetic media. Details of approved commercial facilities are listed in CSE. Establishments are to obtain details from Command security staff. The Destruction of Microform General 051627. Protectively marked microform i.e. microfiche and microfilm, is to be destroyed by equipment, processes or facilities approved by SEAP. Microform contains a very high density of protectively marked information. The approved methods detailed below are divided into those which provide total destruction, and those where it may be possible to retrieve information from surviving fragments, that is partial destruction. However, the threat to such waste in the UK is considered to be very low and these methods may be used by establishments in the UK providing microform is destroyed using approved equipment. Details of approved equipment can be obtained from the CSE held by Command security staff. Total Destruction Incineration 051628. Microform is to be incinerated as follows: a. Fed into the incinerator whole, i.e. not cut, shredded or disintegrated beforehand. b. Strictly accounted for right up to the point where the ash or dust has been examined for total destruction. Microform Destructor 051629. Microform may be destroyed using a SEAP approved microform destructor. Commercial Services 051630. Details of commercial destruction services approved to destroy protectively marked microform can be found in the CSE, obtained via Command security staff. Partial Destruction Shredding 051631. Microform destroyed using this method is to conform to the following rules: a. Be destroyed using SEAP approved microform shredders. 5-16-7 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. c. The manufacturer's operating instructions are to be followed. The residual waste is to be thoroughly examined. d. The waste is to be disposed of in such a way as to minimize the chance of retrieval. Disintegrators and Hammer Mills 051632. Microform may be destroyed using SEAP approved hammer mills and disintegrators, using a screen size no greater than 2mm. The microform is to be mixed with paper when fed into the disintegrator or hammer-mill. Emergency Destruction Overseas Theatres 051633. The need for emergency destruction of protectively marked material should only arise in operational theatres overseas (see also Chapter 14 on Operational Security). The following precautions are to be taken: a. The quantity of SECRET and TOP SECRET material held is to be kept to a minimum. b. An order of priorities detailed in the form of written instructions for destruction is to be established and kept in a location known to personnel, to which access can be obtained without delay in an emergency, eg on the back of a strong room door. c. A plan is to be prepared for using all the available destruction equipment. Periodic checks are to be made to see that the equipment is serviceable and that staff know where it is and how to operate it. d. An officer is to be appointed IC emergency destruction. UK Establishments 051634. HOEs are to ensure that simple emergency plans are in existence which stipulating the following: a. b. c. d. Which categories of document are to be destroyed. The persons responsible for destruction. The precise action required. Destruction priorities. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security The plans are to be checked and reviewed at regular intervals. The emergency destruction plan is to be built into establishment operational emergency plans. Emergency exercises should include destruction drill exercises. Emergency Destruction on Ships 051635. In addition to the instructions in this part, ships are to comply with the extra regulations at Annex B. Emergency Destruction in Aircraft 051636. There will be little time in an aircraft emergency in which to destroy protectively marked material. However, if possible, an attempt is to be made to prevent material falling into the hands of hostile forces. Where possible, documents are to be torn into pieces as completely as possible and dispersed. Where possible, protected equipment should be smashed beyond use and dispersed as widely as possible. Methods of Emergency Destruction Approved Equipment 051637. Full details of approved emergency destruction equipment are to be found in the CSE. Emergency Destruction on Military Operations Overseas 051638. Instructions for emergency destruction on military operations overseas will be promulgated by the relevant operational HQ at the time of deployment; Chapter 14 gives further advice in this area. Sodium nitrate emergency destruction kits (EDK) can be obtained through supply sources on the authority of Command security staff for the destruction of TOP SECRET documents overseas, which because of their nature cannot be destroyed in advance. The kits are classified as explosive items and must be handled accordingly. Other Emergency Methods 051639. It is not possible to lay down standard methods of emergency destruction since these will depend on the prevailing conditions; Headquarters may possess shredding machines, whereas other establishments may have to rely on open fires. In general, the method used is to be as simple as possible and plans are to recognise what is likely to be available in emergency circumstances. For example an establishment which uses only diesel fuel will have to have a 'starter' for igniting the fuel (such as detonators) or arrange to carry a special supply of petrol if this cannot be done. Planning Points 051640. Further points to consider are as follows: a. Since fires will not burn without oxygen, the brazier or other container must have enough holes in it to allow sufficient air to enter. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. Where possible, a wire cage is to surround the incinerator to prevent loose pages being carried away by the wind or thermal up-draught. c. The mass of ash should be constantly stirred and lifted with a long poker to ensure that no pages are left and that the ash is broken up. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX A TO SECTION XVI TO CHAPTER 5 METHODS OF DESTRUCTION Material Preparation Incineration Shredding Pulping Disintegration Hammer Milling Notes Paper Remove paper clips when pulping or shredding Remove paper clips when pulping or shredding Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Carbon Paper Yes (a) Yes Yes (b) Yes Yes (a) Mix with paper. (b) Potential of discolouring, if mixed with paper. Punched paper tape and cards Remove paper clips when pulping or shredding None Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Film (unmounted) Film (Reels) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Mix with paraffin to assist pulping. Remove from reel before shredding None Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Film (Plate or mounted) Microform Litho printing plates Yes No No Yes Yes None Break into small pieces Yes Yes Yes (a) No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes (a) Mix with paper. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Material Preparation Incineration Shredding Pulping Disintegration Hammer Milling Notes Printed circuit boards Magnetic core stores Magnetic Disks None Yes No No Yes Yes Break into small pieces Dismantle & break into small pieces Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes See JSP440, Vol 3, Chapters 4 & 5. Magnetic tape (digital) Magnetic tape voice & video (analogue) Floppy discs Printer ribbons Radial saw cut before incineration Radial saw before incineration None Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes (a) No Yes Yes (a) Mix with paper. When using hammer mills, mix with paper. None Yes No No Yes Yes Plastic materials None Yes No No Yes No JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX B TO SECTION XVI EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION OF PROTECTIVELY MARKED MATERIAL IN SHIPS Introduction 1. Section XVI to Chapter 5. Section XVI, Chapter 5. This Annex is to be read in conjunction with 2. Contingency plan. Commanding Officers are to have a contingency plan for the rapid destruction of all TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL information and material in ships in an emergency. The plan is to be ready to be put into operation at any time should hostilities break out or there is another necessity for it to arise. 3. Quick and effective destruction. All departments within a ship are to plan for the quick and effective destruction of their protected information and material. 4. Pre-positioning of equipment. Equipment required for the destruction of the information or material is to be pre-positioned and on-hand should the need arise. 5. Training exercises. Training exercises are to be conducted regularly to ensure that all personnel know how to carry out their tasks in an emergency. Operations in High Threat Environments 6. Staff planning. The CINC may direct that ships having to operate in a high threat environment (HTE) are to carry a reduced set of documents. The senior officer ordering an operation or movement involving ships in a HTE is to include orders to the ship concerned to comply with these instructions by landing their surplus documents before sailing or, if already at sea, by destroying their surplus documents. 7. Planning prior to sailing. When ships are about to sail into a HTE in shallow waters, the commanding officer is to action the following: a. Arrange that only those documents that are essential to the operation are carried. b. TOP SECRET documents necessary for the operation are to be bagged and weighted before the start of the operation. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c. All other protectively marked documents are to be landed before sailing and placed in the custody of a UK diplomatic or military official. d. The documents are to be securely stowed in security chests or sealed bags to be moved ashore when the occasion arises; receipts are to be obtained for them. The name of the ship is to be clearly marked on the outside of the chests or bags. 8. Action if at sea. Where the ship is already at sea when ordered to enter a HTE, the following applies: a. Orders may be given by the relevant command authority for all protectively marked documents and material not essential for the operation, to be destroyed. b. Destruction is to be by shredding or burning, or throwing overboard in weighted and eyeletted sacks where no facilities exist. c. Where no orders have been received for the disposal of surplus documents, the Commanding Officer may order the action detailed at para 8a where he believes it is necessary; He is to report the action taken to the necessary authorities at the earliest opportunity. d. Instructions for the disposal of superseded communications publications are to be rigidly enforced. crypto and e. Officers are to use their discretion in ordering the destruction of protectively marked documents in an emergency, and no risk is to be taken of any of them falling into the hands of a hostile force. Emergency Destruction in Ships 9. Priorities for destruction. Documents and equipment are to be destroyed in order of priority as assessed by the head of department. 10. Priorities. Priorities for destruction include the following: a. b. c. d. e. Keying material. Cypher tables. Machine settings. Superseded crypto. TOP SECRET documents. f. Cryptographic material not needed for encrypted communications during danger periods. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security g. The scrambler box mechanism of cryptographic machines. After the destruction of other protectively marked information, where time permits, inserts, permits, rotors machines, drums and adaptors are to be destroyed by hammer or other suitable tool. Wiring is to be torn out and the separate parts thrown overboard in different directions. 11. Use of security containers. All protectively marked documents that are operationally essential are to be stored in appropriate containers. In the event of the ship sinking. These documents are to be left in position to go down with the ship. Emergency Destruction Reports 12. The following applies to the reporting of emergency destruction: a. When documents are lost or destroyed under emergency conditions, every effort is to be made to report the fact and the manner of disposal of the documents. b. An initial report (i.e. by signal) is to be sent to the relevant command authority giving sufficient detail to allow a decision to be made whether the documents have been compromised. c. A full written report is to be forwarded by the Commanding Officer or senior surviving officer, to the relevant command authority detailing how all the protectively marked material was disposed of. Action in the Event of an Emergency 13. Should an emergency arise, such as a collision at sea, sinking or fire, action is to be taken to safeguard protectively marked material; where there is a necessity for emergency destruction procedures to be initiated due to the ship being in a HTE, the directives on emergency destruction contained within this Annex are to apply. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-B-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-16-B-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION XVII TO CHAPTER 5 CONFERENCE SECURITY General Aims 051701. The aims of conference security are as follows: a. b. c. To prevent unauthorised access to protectively marked information. To protect persons from violence and intimidation. To protect property from damage. Further Information, Advice and Guidance 051702. The following information, advice and guidance on conference security can be obtained: a. Further advice on the security procedures required for conferences either on Defence establishments, or where they are held in commercial premises, can be obtained from appropriate PSyA staffs or from the Services' specialist security units: the Area Security Team for the Navy, the Local MI Bn unit for the Army, local P&SS unit for the RAF. b. For information on technical and non-technical inspections, see Chapter 15. c. For further precautions on overlooking and overhearing see Section V to this Chapter. Conference Security Officer Appointment of CSO 051703. A conference security officer (CSO) is to be appointed by the head of establishment. The CSO is to be responsible for all security in the conference area. Consequently, the CSO is to have a sound working knowledge of protective security. Where the CSO is not the ESyO, he/she is to briefed by the establishment security staff on the procedures to take. Location of CSO 051704. The CSO is to be provided with an office or appropriate area near the main entrance and be provided with supporting personnel and equipment as necessary. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-17-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Security Plan 051705. The CSO is to prepare a security plan for the conference, based on an assessment of the risks involved. This is to take into account: a. The nature of the threats including, where appropriate, any specific to foreign personnel. Requests for threat assessments are to be made through PSyA security staff. b. What needs to be protected - eg Classified/sensitive discussions, documents, people. c. Whether any special security considerations apply, such as the need to conform with NATO requirements. d. What additional protective security measures may be necessary - eg conference venue (within protected area/establishment perimeter/off establishment commercial building), technical security inspections, protection of communications equipment, provision of a separate secure zone for delegations. e. Whether close protection of VIPs is required and what arrangements should be made beforehand with the local Service/civil police and Service security team as appropriate. f. Guarding/reinforcements requirement. g. The need for a contingency plan against terrorist attack, including the identification of bomb-safe areas within the building. Access Control 051706. The CSO is responsible for arranging control of access to and within the conference building. The number of entrances to the conference building is to be kept to a minimum. Passes 051707. The following applies with regard to passes: a. The best practice is for access to the conference to be pass-controlled, this can be by locally produced passes that are different to any other pass in use on an establishment and that can be easily cross-checked against a master list of delegates. b. Conference passes are to clearly indicate the dates of validity of the pass. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-17-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security c. Passes are to be large enough to be easily checked by the guards and designed so that they can be worn at all times i.e. fitted with a chain or clip. Secure Zones 051708. Where so required, the CSO is to decide which are to be secure zones i.e. those areas within the conference building to which only certain delegates, authorised officials and security staff will have unescorted access. They must be clearly defined and access to them controlled. Their number will depend on the level of protectively marked information to be discussed, the lay-out of the building and the requirements of the conference organisers. Controlled Areas 051709. Outside the secure area but within the conference site/building there may be other areas that may need to be pass controlled. Document Security 051710. Document security within each delegation is the responsibility of the delegation. The CSO is responsible for document security for any conference secretariat and is to make arrangements for the typing, collation and reproduction of protectively marked documents to be done in one secure area. At the end of the conference the CSO may need to make arrangements to forward protectively marked documents to delegates parent establishment using the correct channels. Protectively marked waste 051711. The following applies with regard to protectively marked waste: a. Where facilities are so required, the CSO is to ensure that there are adequate facilities for the collection and disposal of protectively marked waste. b. Where necessary, an approved shredder is to be installed for use by the delegations and where required another for the secretarial staff. c. The CSO is to ensure that the shreddings are given adequate protection. Security Containers 051712. Where required, suitable security containers are to be provided for the storage of protectively marked material. The CSO is to make provision for key security if containers with key locks have been issued. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-17-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Tape Recorders 051713. Tape recorders are not to be taken into the conference without the prior written permission of the CSO. Tapes are to be appropriately protectively marked and accounted for. Technical Security 051714. When highly protectively marked information is to be discussed, consideration is to be given to taking measures against eavesdropping. Simultaneous Interpretation Equipment (SIE) 051715. SIE for use at official conferences is held by SAFE/SSG and can be requested by establishments via PSyA staffs. There are two types of SIE: a. Secure equipment. For use only at conferences where the subject matter is SECRET or above. b. Non-secure equipment. For use at all other conferences. Integrity of Equipment 051716. Establishments will be required to satisfy SAFE/SSG that suitable arrangements have been made to ensure the integrity of the equipment while it is under their control. Arrangements by CSO 051717. The CSO is to ensure the following procedures are actioned in respect of SIE: a. No unauthorised person has access to the equipment after it has been installed. b. The rooms in which the equipment is installed are to be locked when unoccupied and maintained to a standard agreed with SAFE/SSG. c. There are suitable arrangements for the supervision of cleaning and maintenance. d. The recording and transcription of any tapes during the conference will only take place in approved conditions. e. No headphones or other equipments are removed from the conference room or interpreters' booth during the conference. Special Features 051718. The CSO will be told by SAFE/SSG of any special features that will indicate that the equipment may have been tampered with. If tampering is suspected or there JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-17-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security has been unauthorised access to the equipment, PSyA security staff and SAFE/SSG are to be informed without delay. Room Security 051719. The CSO is to implement the following: a. b. c. That all personnel are aware of the need for proper room security. Door keys are not removed from the conference building. The routine silent hours patrolling requirement. d. Doors of those rooms that have not been technically inspected are to be left open after working hours. e. Maintenance and cleaning staff who do not hold appropriate passes are to be supervised. Security Breaches 051720. Security breach reports are to be forwarded by the guard force to the CSO and ESyO, if different, without delay. Security and Emergency Instructions 051721. Where required the CSO is to issue security and emergency instructions for delegations and others attending the conference. Separate specific instructions may be required for the guard force. Counter Terrorist Measures 051722. When the threat from terrorism is assessed as significant, the CSO, or EsyO if different, is to consult PSyA security staff on any extra precautions deemed necessary for the conference. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-17-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-17-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION XVIII TO CHAPTER 5 SECURITY OF EQUIPMENT General Introduction 051801. The aim of this Section is to provide advice that allows heads of establishment sufficient flexibility to decide on the protective measures to be applied to the security of equipment according to the following: a. b. c. The assessed threat. The level of protective marking. Any specific vulnerabilities. Further Information, Advice and Guidance 051802. The following information, advice and guidance on security of equipment and matrices can be obtained: a. Establishments should seek advice, where required, on any aspects of the use of the security of equipment minimum baseline measures matrix from PSyAs. b. PSyAs should contact DDef Sy for policy clarification on any matters arising from the security of equipment. c. Further information regarding equipment deployed on operations can be found in Chapter 14 of this manual. d. More information on matrices is contained in Section I to this Chapter. e. Further information on risk management can be found in Chapter 3. Definition of Equipment 051803. The definition of equipment in the context of applying security measures is divided into the following categories: a. Small items of equipment that could be housed inside security containers or secure/strong rooms. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-18-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. Large items of equipment that could be kept inside special-to-type buildings such as garages or hangars. c. Large items of equipment that would be kept in the open on a parking, dispersal or storage area. The Use of a Matrix Methodology 051804. The security of equipment minimum baseline measures matrix follows the same methodology of the matrix and menu system for the security of protectively marked documents detailed in Section I to this Chapter. Small Items of Equipment 051805. Small items of equipment follow the same rules as for protectively marked documents. The matrix in Section I to this Chapter is to be used to assess small items of equipment in the same way as if they were documents; however, larger items of equipment are catered for under different arrangements using the matrices in this Section. The Security of Equipment Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix The Threat 051806. The security of equipment minimum baseline measures matrices are designed to provide an appropriate level of protection for equipment against the ESPIONAGE rather than the terrorist or sabotage threats; however by their very nature, many large items of equipment are very valuable in financial and operational terms and the matrix provides for these factors. The system is aimed to be flexible enough to cover operational deployments and not only protection at the home base. The assumed threat level for the use of the matrix is LOW (L) unless otherwise directed by PSyAs having been so advised by DDef Sy e.g. The threat level for Special Armour is set at SIGNIFICANT. Risk Management and Minimum Baseline Objectives 051807. Risk management offers a high degree of flexibility in providing the levels of protection required to safeguard protectively marked equipment. To ensure that there is some degree of consistency and mutual assurance about the way one establishment's assets are handled by another, certain minimum baseline objectives apply to all areas of protective security. They are intended to provide acceptable security at all levels of protection where the threat is assessed as Low, with enhanced security at levels above this baseline. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-2 RESTRICTED Physical Security Matrices 051808. There are 2 separate matrices corresponding to the categories of large items of equipment kept in special-to-type buildings and large items of equipment kept in the open; when assessing small items of equipment the minimum baseline measures matrix shown in Section I to this Chapter is to be used. The matrices for large items of equipment are at Annexes A and B. The matrices share a common menu of measures which is at Annex C. Range of Options 051809. The security of equipment matrices and menu of minimum baseline measures provide a range of options which meet the baseline objectives. They are designed to help the management of security risks by offering a means for the identification and selection of the most suitable and cost-effective physical security measures to safeguard protectively marked equipment against attempts to acquire them illicitly by surreptitious attack or theft. Although many of the measures suggested will be helpful in a counter-terrorist context (and suitable counter-terrorist measures already in place may, of course, be taken into account in meeting the baseline measures), the weighting given to the measures in the matrices is not primarily intended to meet terrorist threats. Threat Levels 051810. The security of equipment minimum baseline measures are those in the first column of each of the matrices (headed L). The remaining columns offer a means of deciding on the increased measures appropriate to levels of threat higher than Low. Establishment security officers (ESyOs) are to keep themselves regularly up-to-date on the nature and levels of threat to their assets (by consulting their appropriate PSyAs and local Service/civil police authorities); and are to decide for themselves on the proper response to increased levels of threat, in the light of local circumstances. About the Matrix 051811. The security of equipment minimum baseline measures are set as numerical values within each matrix, which correspond to the level of protectively marked equipment and to the level of the threat. The matrices, as shown at Annexes A and B, are supported by a menu of physical security measures (Annex C) from which measures can be selected so that the sum total of the value of the individual measures equals or exceeds the required numerical value of the appropriate minimum baseline measures. It is a fundamental principle that points are only valid when correct security procedures and practices accompany the selected measure. Numerical Values 051812. The numerical value of the baseline measures required for each level of the protective marking system is made up from different sections of the menu of measures; some from mandatory sections of the menu of measures and the remainder from any of the sections. This system of mandatory and additional measures is to ensure that a sensible balance of measures is achieved and allows ESyOs flexibility in the measures JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-18-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security they apply to reach the baseline position, taking into account the security facilities, equipment and manpower at their disposal. How the Matrix is Used 051813. Each of the matrices, depending on the category of equipment, is used by selecting the appropriate level of protectively marked equipment and then reading off the scores to be achieved against the mandatory and additional sections of the menu of measures. Having identified the points score required, the user should then turn to the menu of measures. Minimum baseline measures matrix checksheets for use by ESyOs are at Annexes D and E (depending on where the equipment is stored). A guide to the use of the security of equipment minimum baseline measures matrix is at Annex F and samples of how to complete the full documentation are at Appendices 1 and 2 to Annex F. Security of Equipment Menu of Measures Sections 051814. The menu of measures is divided into 7 Sections, each dealing with a particular aspect of security (or layer of 'the defence in depth)'. For ease of application, the menu is laid out as a proforma with numerical allocations provided; there are also spaces for inserting the various points scores. Weighting of Measures 051815. Some measures are weighted in that their points score multiples with that of another measure (eg containers and locks), whilst others are added (eg fences, perimeter intruder detection systems, lighting and CCTV). The value of zero is used as a multiplier where a fence has no control of entry at its entry/exit points. Where control of entry is provided, the multiplier x 1 will validate the points awarded to the fence. Selection of Measures 051816. In deciding what measures to select, the user is to include existing security measures and then fill in the score. The results can then be compared with the requirements of the matrix. From the comparison it will be apparent whether the measures are excessive, adequate or need 'topping up'. Additional Measures 051817. If additional measures are required, establishments are to decide which measures to select in the light of the actual threats faced by them. If there is a threat from forcible attack, for instance, the strength of a container/casing may be a higher factor than the Class of lock; conversely, if the threat is from surreptitious attack, a high Class lock may be a more important factor than the strength of the container/casing. Used in this way, with imagination and common sense, the menu will help ESyOs to JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-4 RESTRICTED Physical Security find the measures most appropriate to their particular situation, the threats they face and the resources available. Physical Security Measures - Performance Standards 051818. The performance standards to be used in the security of equipment minimum baseline measures matrix are those detailed in para 05113 - 05128. However the following differences should be noted. a. Guards and IDS (security of equipment matrix section 5). In addition to the types of patrols detailed in para 05122, the security of equipment has 2 further types as follows: (1) Point guard. A person specifically detailed to guard a particular building or individual piece of equipment continuously. The guard must be in the immediate vicinity and carry out continuous surveillance of the building or equipment to be guarded. The guard must be in possession of or have immediate access to communication equipment linked to the response force. (2) Dog patrol. A patrol comprising a trained handler and trained military/Police guard dog who have successfully completed instruction at a recognised dog training school (i.e the Defence Animal Centre or MDP Wethersfield). The patrol must work within a pre-determined patrol area that is known to the guard force, and is no larger than can be reasonably expected to be covered by a single dog team. The patrol should remain continuously on their designated area until relieved or a designated time. Patrols are to be in accordance with the accepted norms for patrol durations. The handler must be in possession of communication equipment linked to the response force. Note: The MBMM points attracted by dog patrols may not be a constant factor throughout a given period eg the patrols may only operate at night. b. Immediate dispersal/parking/storage area (security of equipment matrix section 6). This is an additional section required for the security of equipment matrix; however the standards detailed in paras 05124 - 05128 apply. c. Outer perimeter (security of equipment matrix section 7). The standards that apply to this section are also detailed in paras 05124 - 05128. Movement of Protectively Marked Equipment Movement Security Plan 051819. A movement security plan is to be drawn up prior to moving protectively marked SECRET or above large items or consignments of equipment, or other equipment with national caveats. This does not apply to equipment being carried on the JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-18-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security person. The movement security plan is to be drawn up by the relevant Movements Authority in conjunction with, and approved by, the consignor's PSyA in consultation with appropriate security staff and is to cover the following, as appropriate: a. Description of the equipment, together with protective marking. b. Details of the consignor or other authority responsible for initiating the move. c. d. Name and address of the consignee. Anticipated date of despatch and arrival. e. Proposed method of movement, including details of the route where necessary, overnight storage arrangements and the name of the carrier. f. g. Storage on the route. Requirement for supervision of loading and unloading. h. Contingency procedures to be adopted in the event of accident, breakdown, diversion or other delay. i. j. k. l. m. n. Unusual features requiring special handling or storage. Measurements and weight of consignments. How packed. Arrangements for customs examination and sealing. Details of guards. Method of transmission of keys. Periodic movement of similar equipment between the same parties on the same route can be incorporated in one movement security plan, but otherwise a separate plan is to be made for each movement. Distribution of Plan 051820. A copy of the movement security plan is to be sent in advance to the consignee. Relevant extracts from the plan are to be provided to the driver of the consignment. Packaging 051821. Equipment marked CONFIDENTIAL or above is to be concealed, as far as practicable, in an anonymous covering or container. The protective marking is not to be disclosed on the covering or container. Where practicable, the equipment and its JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-18-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security covering/container should be in the locked body of the vehicle. When being transported in conjunction with UNCLASSIFIED or RESTRICTED material, equipment marked CONFIDENTIAL or above is to be physically separated from it by an inner lockable cage or similar barrier. Escorts 051822. In addition to the driver, an escort is to be provided on each vehicle carrying protectively marked material of CONFIDENTIAL or above. An escort or driver is to remain with the vehicle at all times. Communication 051823. Each vehicle on which material protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL or above is being carried, is to have a two-way communication system easily accessible to the driver/escort for use in emergencies. Vetting 051824. Drivers and escorts of equipment protectively marked SECRET or above are under the control of a person who is suitably cleared. Rail Movement 051825. TOP SECRET equipment is not to be transported by rail. Otherwise, the principles underlying the regulations for road movement are to be applied by the PSyA in consultation with appropriate security staff when discussing the rail movement plan with the movement staff. Sea Movement 051826. The principles underlying the regulations outlined for road movement are to be applied by the PSyA in consultation with appropriate security staff when discussing the sea movement plan with the movements staff. In addition, so far as is practicable, British owned and crewed ships should be used for the movement of CONFIDENTIAL or above material. Where this is not possible the PSyA's advice is to be sought. In any event, unescorted access to the equipment by the crew is not permitted. Air Movement 051827. Protectively marked equipment should normally be carried in RAF or RAF chartered aircraft. The handover requirement and the requirement for escorts during the flight should be discussed with PSyAs as required. Where this is not possible, the use of diplomatic/non-diplomatic couriers should be considered. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-7 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-8 RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX A TO SECTION XVIII TO CHAPTER 5 MINIMUM BASELINE MEASURES MATRIX FOR LARGE ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT KEPT INSIDE SPECIAL-TO-TYPE BUILDINGS TOP SECRET Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 3 Mandatory - Sections 4 plus 5 ** Additional - Any sections # Total SECRET Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 3 Mandatory - Sections 4 plus 5 * Additional - Any sections # Total CONFIDENTIAL Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 3 Mandatory - Sections 4 plus 5 Additional - Any sections # Total RESTRICTED Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 3 Additional - Any sections # Total Notes : ** * # Each Section must score at least 2 points. Each Section must score at least 1 point. Except Section 2 - Very High - High - Significant - Moderate - Low L 1 2 6 9 18 L 1 2 4 7 14 L 1 2 3 4 10 L 1 1 2 M 1 2 6 11 20 M 1 2 4 9 16 M 1 2 3 5 11 M 1 1 2 S 1 2 7 11 21 S 1 2 5 9 17 S 1 2 3 7 13 S 1 1 1 3 H 1 2 7 14 24 H 1 2 5 12 20 H 1 2 3 9 15 H 1 1 2 4 VH 1 2 7 18 28 VH 1 2 6 15 24 VH 1 2 3 13 19 VH 1 1 3 5 THREAT LEVELS VH H S M L JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-A-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-18-A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX B TO SECTION XVIII TO CHAPTER 5 MINIMUM BASELINE MEASURES MATRIX FOR LARGE ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT KEPT IN THE OPEN TOP SECRET Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 4 Mandatory - Sections 5 & 6 ** Additional - Any Sections # Total SECRET Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 4 Mandatory - Sections 5 & 6 ** Additional - Any Sections # Total CONFIDENTIAL Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 4 Mandatory - Sections 5 & 6 ** Additional - Any Sections # Total RESTRICTED Mandatory - Section 1 Additional - Any Sections # Total Notes: ** # L 2 2 8 6 18 L 1 1 8 4 14 L 1 6 3 10 L 2 2 M 2 2 8 8 20 M 1 1 8 6 16 M 1 6 4 11 M 2 2 S 2 2 8 9 21 S 1 1 8 7 17 S 1 1 6 5 13 S 2 1 3 H 2 2 8 12 24 H 1 1 8 10 20 H 1 1 6 7 15 H 2 2 4 VH 2 2 8 16 28 VH 1 1 8 14 24 VH 1 1 6 11 19 VH 2 3 5 Each Section must score at least 2 points. Except Sections 2 and 3 VH H S M L - Very High - High - Significant - Moderate - Low THREAT LEVELS JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-B-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-18-B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX C TO SECTION XVIII TO CHAPTER 5 MENU OF MINIMUM BASELINE MEASURES FOR SECURITY OF EQUIPMENT Measure Loading Section 1 ­ Container/casing 1. Container/casing: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 Sub-score (ss1) = a, b, c or d 2. Lock a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 Sub-score (ss2) = a, b, c or d Remarks Section score (S1) = ss1 x ss2 Measure Loading Section 2 ­ Room 3. Room: a. Strong Room 4 b. Strong Room 3 c. Secure Room 1 d. Locked Room 0 Sub-score (ss3) = a, b, c or d 4. Lock a. Class 4 4 b. Class 4 3 c. Class 3 2 d. Class 2 1 e Class 1 0 Sub-score (ss4) = a, b, c, d or e NB. Multiply Section score (S2) = ss3 x ss4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-18-C-1 NB. Multiply RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Measure Section 3 ­ Building 5. Strength: a. Class 4 b. Class 3 c. Class 2 d. Class 1 Loading Remarks 5 3 2 1 Section score (S3) = a, b, c or d Measure Loading Section 4 ­ Control of entry to building, area or site 6. Control of entry: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss6) = a, b, c or d 7. Visitor control: a. Escorted 3 b. Pass/badge 1 c. None 0 Sub-score (ss7) = a, b, or c NB. One figure Remarks Section score (S4) = ss6 + ss7 NB. Add JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-C-2 RESTRICTED Physical Security Measure Loading Remarks Section 5 ­ Guards and IDS 8. Guards: a. Point Guard 10 b. Dog Patrol 8 c. Frequent Internal 5 Patrols d. Infrequent 4 Internal Patrols e. External Patrols 3 f. Resident/Site 2 Guard g. Visiting Guard 1 h. None 0 Sub-score (ss8) = [(a, b, c or d)* + (e or f)*] or g* or h * = if applicable. Resident/site guard will only score if there has been no other score for other guards or patrols 9. IDS: a. Class 4 5 b. Class 3 4 c. Class 2 3 d Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss9) = a, b, or c Section score (S5) = ss8 + ss9 Measure Loading Section 6 ­ Immediate dispersal/ parking/storage area 10. Fence: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss10) = a, b, c, d or e 11. Entry control: a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss11) = a or b NB. Add Remarks JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-C-3 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Measure Loading Random entry and/or exit searches: 12. a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss12) = a or b 13. PIDS: a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss13) = a or b 14. CCTV (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss14) = a or b 15. Lighting (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss15) = a or b Remarks Section score (S6) = (ss10 x ss11) + ss12 + ss13 + ss14 + ss15 Measure Loading Section 7 ­ Outer Perimeter 16. Fence: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss16) = a, b, c, d or e 17. Entry control: a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss17) = a or b Random entry and/or exit searches: 18. a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss18) = a or b 19. PIDS: a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss19) = a or b JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-18-C-4 Remarks RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security 20. CCTV (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss20) = a or b 21. Lighting (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss21) = a or b Section score (S7) = (ss16 x ss17) + ss18 + ss19 + ss20 + ss21 TOTAL SCORE is the sum of SECTIONS 1 to 7 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-C-5 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-C-6 RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX D TO SECTION XVIII TO CHAPTER 5 MINIMUM BASELINE MEASURES MATRIX - POINTS CHECKSHEET FOR LARGE ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT KEPT INSIDE SPECIAL-TO-TYPE BUILDINGS Reference: Assessment 1. Asset assessed: 2. Protective marking: 3. Threat level: Points check 4. Mandatory points. Section 1. Pts required: Section 3. Pts required: Sections 4 & 5. Pts required: 5. Additional points. Any Sections. Pts required: Sections 6 & 7 6. Summary of points. Total Pts required: 7. Remarks. Pts achieved: Pts achieved: Pts achieved: Pts achieved: Pts achieved JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-D-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-D-2 RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX E TO SECTION XVIII TO CHAPTER 5 MINIMUM BASELINE MEASURES MATRIX - POINTS CHECKSHEET FOR LARGE ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT KEPT IN THE OPEN Reference: Assessment 1. Asset assessed: 2. Protective marking: 3. Threat level: Points check 4. Mandatory points. Section 1. Pts required: Section 4. Pts required: Sections 5 & 6. Pts required: 5. Additional points. Any Sections. Pts required: Sections 7 6. Summary of points. Total Pts required: 7. Remarks. Pts achieved: Pts achieved: Pts achieved: Pts achieved: Pts achieved JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-E-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-E-2 RESTRICTED Physical Security ANNEX F TO SECTION XVIII TO CHAPTER 5 GUIDE TO THE USE OF THE MINIMUM BASELINE MEASURES MATRICES AND MENU FOR THE PROTECTION OF PROTECTIVELY MARKED EQUIPMENT First actions 1. Produce a proforma that consists of the following documents: a. A minimum baseline measures matrix (either Annex A or Annex B as appropriate for where the equipment is stored). b. A menu of minimum baseline measures (Annex C). c. A points checksheet (either Annex D or Annex E as appropriate for where the equipment is stored). 2. On the points checksheet fill in the following: a. Details of the asset to be assessed (for example 'Secret aircraft in hangar'). b. 3. The current espionage threat (eg 'L'). Using the appropriate matrix: a. Read off the total points required to protect the particular asset(s) at the current threat Level and write the figure on the points checksheet (eg '14' for SECRET at Low). b. Read off the mandatory points required for the sections and write the figures on the points checksheet (eg '8' for Sections 1 and/or 2 plus 3). 4. Turn to the menu of baseline measures to carry out the assessment. Sample assessments can be found as follows: a. Appendix 1 to this Annex for large items of equipment kept inside special-to-type buildings. b. Appendix 2 to this Annex for large items of equipment kept in the open. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Notes: (1) Small items of equipment. Small items of equipment are assessed in exactly the same way as if they were documents; therefore, assessment for them is to be carried out using the minimum baseline measures matrix at Section I to this Chapter. (2) Summary of the classes of equipment and security measures. Annex E to Section I of this Chapter details the Classes of security equipment, by type. Carrying out the assessment 5. Section 1 - container/casing. The aim of this section is to equate the degree of protection afforded by the casing (ie skin/fabric) and locking mechanisms of the piece of equipment to that of a security container. By comparing the piece of equipment with the standards of containers detailed at para 05114, determine the class of casing that the piece of equipment equates to and write the 'loading' figure in the sub-score column (ss1); likewise, the lock/locking mechanisms fitted to the equipment should be allocated a loading (insert at ss2) in accordance with the standards at para 05115. The Section 1 score is achieved by multiplying the scores of the container and lock. It is likely that most scores will be low, unless there are special security provisions, and that most scores for casing and lock will only achieve one point. 6. Section 2 - room. If applicable, determine the class of the room that the equipment is held in using the standards at para 05116 and insert the 'loading' figure in the sub-score column (ss3); for example an unlocked room would attract 0 points. Similarly ascertain the 'loading' for the type of lock fitted to the room using the standards at para 05115 and insert at ss4; for example a Chubb Mortice lock would attract 1 point. The section score is achieved by multiplying the scores for the room and the lock. Note: (1) Establishments are to follow the spirit of the baseline measures matrix at all times. Therefore, heads of establishment are not to allow nonsensical situations to arise such as fitting a Class 4 lock to a standard office door with glass panes, in order to score more points on the matrix, which in turn would allow other normal security precautions to be dispensed with. 7. Section 3 - building. Using the standards at para 05118 determine the class of the building (its strength) and insert the loading score in the Section score column (S3). For example a modern building of pre-cast panels can attract 3 points. 8. Section 4 - control of entry to building, area or site. Determine the class of the control of entry to the building, area or site using the standards at para 05119 and JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-18-F-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security insert in the sub- score column (ss6). Decide the loading for the visitor control and insert in the sub-score column (ss7). The Section 4 score is achieved by adding the 2 scores together. Example: A building where entry is allowed by the issue of keys to authorized personnel will attract 1 point. If the visitor control system is one where they are required to be escorted at all times then 3 further points would be gained. The total for the section would be 4 points. 9. Section 5 - guards and intruder detection systems (IDS). The type of patrols and guarding procedures are described at para 05122 and 051818: a. Determine the type of patrols/guarding practices in the building, area and site and insert the 'loading' scores in the sub-score column (ss8). Points can be achieved for an establishment that has both internal and external patrols. Any additional resident/site guards will not attract any further points where a score has been achieved for internal or external patrols. Example: A particular building housing the equipment may be the subject of 'frequent Internal Patrols' (gaining a loading score of 5) and be on an establishment that has 'external patrols' around the unit (gaining a score of 3). The establishment may also have a 'Site Guard' at the incident room or guardroom. The latter would only attract points if there were no internal or external patrols. Hence the total sub-score (ss8) in this example would be 8 points. b. Determine the sub-score for the type of IDS on the establishment, area and/or site using the standards at para 05123 and insert at (ss9). The Section 5 score is obtained by adding the scores for guards and IDS and inserting at (S5). 10. Section 6 - Immediate dispersal/parking/storage area. Decide what Class the fence is using the standards at paras 05124 and shown by type at Section I, Annex E and insert the 'loading' into the sub-score (ss10); eg an approved 2.4 metre high chainlink fence with security topping would merit 2 points. If the establishment has entry control insert 1 point at (ss11); if it does not then no points are allotted. Similarly, insert the 'loading' figures for the 'yes/no' measures for searches (ss12), perimeter intruder detection systems (PIDS) (ss13), CCTV (ss14) and lighting (ss15). The total score (S6) for perimeter measures is obtained by multiplying the 'loading' scores of the fence and entry control and then adding this figure to the total of the rest of the sub-scores. Example: Armoured vehicles are located in a storage area without any measures other than security lighting. The total points for section 6 would be 2. 11. Section 7 - Outer perimeter. Decide what grade the establishment outer perimeter fence is using the standards at para 05124 and shown by type at Section I Annex E and insert the 'loading' into the sub-score (ss16); eg an approved 2.4 metre JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-18-F-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security high chainlink fence with security topping would merit 2 points. If the establishment has entry control insert 1 point (ss17); if it does not then no points are allotted. Similarly, insert the 'loading' figures for the 'yes/no' measures for searches (ss18), perimeter PIDS (ss13), CCTV (ss14) and lighting (ss15). The total score (S7) for outer perimeter measures is obtained by multiplying the 'loading' scores of the fence and entry control and then adding this figure to the total of the rest of the sub-scores. Example: An establishment has a Class 2 fence (2 points), with entry control (1 point). Entry/exit searches are carried out by guards (1 point) but the establishment does not have any PIDS (0 points). It also does not have any CCTV (0 points) or security lighting to the appropriate standards (0 points). The total points for Section 7 would be as follows: Fence (2) x x Entry Control (1) + + Total of other sub-scores (1) = = 3 3 Note: It is important to note that points for CCTV and lighting can only be obtained if the equipment reaches the appropriate approved standards. Completing the points checksheet and further action 12. Completion of the checksheet. After completing the baseline measures menu, complete the points checksheet by inserting the total points achieved. In addition, insert the points obtained in the 'Mandatory' sections. 13. Action to be taken if 'points required' baseline is exceeded. If all of these figures exceed the 'points required' then the equipment has adequate security and no further action is required. However, there may be scope for the ESyO, in consultation with the head of establishment, to reduce some security measures, if desired, to the baseline position; this type of review is to be actively encouraged so long as expenditure is not wasted in the pursuit of lower standards when those in force are cost-effective already. Any agreed action could be written in the 'Remarks' column of the checksheet. 14. Action to be taken if 'points required' baseline is not reached. If the points achieved figures have failed to reach the points required for either the total or mandatory section scores, then the ESyO in consultation with the HOE must re-examine the security measures implemented on the establishment and choose higher security measures accordingly to meet the baseline position. 15. Flexibility of the matrices. The advantage of the baseline measures matrices is that they allow establishments the flexibility to choose their own security measures at a given threat level as long as the baseline position is reached and certain mandatory measures are met. They also take into account any enhanced security measures that the unit may have invested in, such as AACS, CCTV or security lighting, thereby perhaps allowing the establishment to reduce its costs in other areas of security. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F-4 RESTRICTED Physical Security When to Complete a Matrix 16. General. A matrix must be used for all protectively marked equipment on the establishment. Where similar items of equipment are held under similar circumstances throughout the establishment only one matrix may be required to be completed for each level of protective marking. Additionally, if items of different protective markings are housed in the same special-to-type building then as long as the requirements are adequate for the highest level of protective marking, matrices for the lower levels would not be required. 17. 'Standard' loading on the matrix. Many of the 'loadings' on the matrix/menu of measures will be identical, throughout an establishment, for each menu completed; eg, loadings which might be standard are those for the perimeter fence, entry/exit checks, entry control, guarding/patrol patterns. 18. Change in threat level. If the threat changes, the ESyO should consult the completed points checksheet and menu of measures to see if the measures in force are still adequate or, in the case of a decrease in threat, whether certain measures can be changed or dispensed with. By trying differing options within the menu for a given protected asset, the ESyO should be able to obtain any new baseline position. Example: The threat increases from Low ('L') to Moderate ('M') and the number of points required to house TOP SECRET protectively marked material increases from 18 to 20. Assuming that a particular establishment has the minimum 18 points and meets the mandatory points (which would not change for such an increase in threat) it could meet the new baseline position by introducing 'Infrequent Internal Patrols' to the existing 'External Patrols' thereby gaining the extra points required. Alternatively, it could choose to house all of its TOP SECRET equipment in a higher class of building which would meet the new baseline position. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F-5 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F-6 RESTRICTED Physical Security APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX F TO SECTION XVIII TO CHAPTER 5 MINIMUM BASELINE MEASURES MATRIX - POINTS CHECKSHEET FOR LARGE ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT KEPT INSIDE SPECIAL-TO-TYPE BUILDINGS Reference: STR/2032/6 Assessment 1. Asset assessed: 2. 3. Protective marking: Threat level: Armoured Vehicles SECRET L _Points check 4. Mandatory points. Section 1. Pts required: Section 3. Pts required: Sections 4 & 5. Pts required: 5. Additional points. Any Sections. Pts required: Sections 6 & 7 6. Summary of points. Total Pts required: 14 7. Remarks. 1 2 4 7 Pts achieved: Pts achieved Pts achieved: Pts achieved: Pts achieved: 2 3 16 5 26 STANDARD OF SECURITY REQUIRED WILL VH MEET THREAT TO VH LEVEL JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F1-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F1-2 RESTRICTED Physical Security Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix for Large Items of Equipment kept inside Special-to-Type Buildings TOP SECRET Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 3 Mandatory - Sections 4 plus 5 ** Additional - Any sections # Total SECRET Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 3 Mandatory - Sections 4 plus 5 * Additional - Any sections # Total CONFIDENTIAL Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 3 Mandatory - Sections 4 plus 5 Additional - Any sections # Total RESTRICTED Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 3 Additional - Any sections # Total L 1 2 6 9 18 L 1 2 4 7 14 L 1 2 3 4 10 L 1 1 2 L 1 2 6 11 20 L 1 2 4 9 16 L 1 2 3 5 11 L 1 1 2 S 1 2 7 11 21 S 1 2 5 9 17 S 1 2 3 7 13 S 1 1 1 3 H 1 2 7 14 24 H 1 2 5 12 20 H 1 2 3 9 15 H 1 1 2 4 VH 1 2 7 18 28 VH 1 2 6 15 24 VH 1 2 3 13 19 VH 1 1 3 5 Notes: ** * # Each Section must score at least 2 points. Each Section must score at least 1 point. Except Section 2 THREAT LEVELS VH H S M L - Very High - High - Significant - Moderate - Low JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F1-3 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F1-4 RESTRICTED Physical Security MENU OF MINIMUM BASELINE MEASURES FOR SECURITY OF EQUIPMENT Measure Loading Section 1 ­ Container/casing 1. Container/casing: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 Sub-score (ss1) = a, b, c or d 2. Lock a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 Sub-score (ss2) = a, b, c or d Remarks Vehicle panels 2 Vehicle locks 1 Section score (S1) = ss1 x ss2 Measure Loading Section 2 ­ Room 3. Room: a. Strong Room 4 b. Strong Room 3 c. Secure Room 1 d. Locked Room 0 Sub-score (ss3) = a, b, c or d 4. Lock a. Class 4 4 b. Class 4 3 c. Class 3 2 d. Class 2 1 e Class 1 0 Sub-score (ss4) = a, b, c, d or e NB. Multiply 2 applicable Not applicable Section score (S2) = ss3 x ss4 NB. Multiply JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F1-5 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Measure Section 3 ­ Building 5. Strength: a. Class 4 b. Class 3 c. Class 2 d. Class 1 Loading Remarks 5 3 2 1 Pre cast panels Section score (S3) = a, b, c or d Measure Loading Section 4 ­ Control of entry to building 6. Control of entry: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 E None 0 Sub-score (ss6) = a, b, c or d 7. Visitor control: a. Escorted 3 b. Pass/badge 1 c. None 0 Sub-score (ss7) = a, b, or c NB. One figure 3 Remarks Key issue 1 3 NB. Add Section score (S4) = ss6 + ss7 4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F1-6 RESTRICTED Physical Security Measure Loading Remarks Section 5 ­ Guards and IDS 8. Guards: a. Point Guard 10 b. Dog Patrol 8 c. Frequent Internal 5 Patrols d. Infrequent 4 Internal Patrols e. External Patrols 3 f. Resident/Site 2 Guard g. Visiting Guard 1 h. None 0 Sub-score (ss8) = 8 [(a, b, c or d)* + (e or f)*] or g* or h * = if applicable. Resident/site guard will only score if there has been no other score for other guards or patrols 9. IDS: a. Class 4 5 b. Class 3 4 Approved Approved System c. Class 2 3 d Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss9) = a, b, or c 4 Section score (S5) = ss8 + ss9 Measure Loading Section 6 ­ Immediate dispersal/ parking/storage area 10. Fence: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss10) = a, b, c, d or e 11. Entry control: a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss11) = a or b NB. Add 12 Remarks 0 0 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F1-7 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Measure Loading Random entry and/or exit searches: 12. a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss12) = a or b 13. PIDS: a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss13) = a or b 14. CCTV (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss14) = a or b 15. Lighting (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss15) = a or b Remarks 0 0 0 2 Section score (S6) = (ss10 x ss11) + ss12 + ss13 + ss14 + ss15 Measure Loading Section 7 ­ Outer Perimeter 16. Fence: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 D Class 1 1 E None 0 Sub-score (ss16) = a, b, c, d or e 17. Entry control: a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss17) = a or b Random entry and/or exit searches: 18. a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss18) = a or b 19. PIDS: a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss19) = a or b JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Remarks 2 Chainlink 2 1 1 0 RESTRICTED 5-18-F1-8 RESTRICTED Physical Security 20. CCTV (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss20) = a or b 21. Lighting (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss21) = a or b 0 0 Section score (S7) = (ss16 x ss17) + ss18 + ss19 + ss20 + ss21 3 TOTAL SCORE is the sum of SECTIONS 1 to 7 26 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F1-9 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F1-10 RESTRICTED Physical Security APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX F TO SECTION XVIII TO CHAPTER 5 MINIMUM BASELINE MEASURES MATRIX - POINTS CHECKSHEET FOR LARGE ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT KEPT IN THE OPEN Reference: STR/2033/6 Assessment 1. Asset assessed: 2. Protective marking: 3. Threat level: Aircraft on dispersal SECRET L Points check 4. Mandatory points. Section 1. Pts required: Pts achieved: 1 Section 4. Pts required: Pts achieved: 2 Sections 5 & 6. Pts required: Pts achieved: 4 5. Additional points. Any Sections. Pts required: 7 Sections 7 Pts achieved: 3 6. Summary of points. Total Pts required: Pts achieved 14 20 7. Remarks. Standard Standard of security provided will meet threat up to and including HIGH. 1 3 13 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F2-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F2-2 RESTRICTED Physical Security Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix for Large Items of Equipment kept in the Open TOP SECRET Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 4 Mandatory - Sections 5 & 6 ** Additional - Any Sections # Total SECRET Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 4 Mandatory - Sections 5 & 6 ** Additional - Any Sections # Total CONFIDENTIAL Mandatory - Section 1 Mandatory - Section 4 Mandatory - Sections 5 & 6 ** Additional - Any Sections # Total RESTRICTED Mandatory - Section 1 Additional - Any Sections # Total Notes: ** # L 2 2 8 6 18 L 1 1 8 4 14 L 1 6 3 10 L 2 2 M 2 2 8 8 20 M 1 1 8 6 16 M 1 6 4 11 M 2 2 S 2 2 8 9 21 S 1 1 8 7 17 S 1 1 6 5 13 S 2 1 3 H 2 2 8 12 24 H 1 1 8 10 20 H 1 1 6 7 15 H 2 2 4 VH 2 2 8 16 28 VH 1 1 8 14 24 VH 1 1 6 11 19 VH 2 3 5 Each Section must score at least 2 points. Except Sections 2 and 3 VH H S M L - Very High - High - Significant - Moderate - Low THREAT LEVELS JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F2-3 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F2-4 RESTRICTED Physical Security Menu of Minimum Baseline Measures for Security of Equipment Measure Loading Section 1 ­ Container/casing 1. Container/casing: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 Sub-score (ss1) = a, b, c or d 2. Lock a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 Sub-score (ss2) = a, b, c or d Remarks Aircraft skin 1 Aircraft lock 1 Section score (S1) = ss1 x ss2 Measure Loading Section 2 ­ Room 3. Room: a. Strong Room 4 b. Strong Room 3 c. Secure Room 1 d. Locked Room 0 Sub-score (ss3) = a, b, c or d 4. Lock a. Class 4 4 b. Class 4 3 c. Class 3 2 d. Class 2 1 e Class 1 0 Sub-score (ss4) = a, b, c, d or e NB. Multiply 1 Not applicable Section score (S2) = ss3 x ss4 NB. Multiply JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F2-5 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Measure Section 3 ­ Building 5. Strength: a. Class 4 b. Class 3 c. Class 2 d. Class 1 Loading Remarks 5 3 2 1 Pre cast panels Section score (S3) = a, b, c or d Measure Loading Section 4 ­ Control of entry to building, area or site 6. Control of entry: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d. Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss6) = a, b, c or d 7. Visitor control: a. Escorted 3 b. Pass/badge 1 c. None 0 Sub-score (ss7) = a, b, or c NB. One figure 3 Remarks 0 3 NB. Add Section score (S4) = ss6 + ss7 3 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F2-6 RESTRICTED Physical Security Measure Loading Remarks Section 5 ­ Guards and IDS 8. Guards: a. Point Guard 10 b. Dog Patrol 8 c. Frequent Internal 5 Patrols d. Infrequent 4 Internal Patrols e. External Patrols 3 f. Resident/Site 2 Guard g. Visiting Guard 1 h. None 0 Sub-score (ss8) = 11 [(a, b, c or d)* + (e or f)*] or g* or h * = if applicable. Resident/site guard will only score if there has been no other score for other guards or patrols 9. IDS: a. Class 4 5 b. Class 3 4 c. Class 2 3 d Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss9) = a, b, or c 0 Section score (S5) = ss8 + ss9 Measure Loading Section 6 ­ Immediate dispersal/ parking/storage area 10. Fence: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss10) = a, b, c, d or e 11. Entry control: a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss11) = a or b NB. Add 12 Remarks _Barbed Wire 1 0 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F2-7 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Measure Loading Random entry and/or exit searches: 12. a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss12) = a or b 13. PIDS: a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss13) = a or b 14. CCTV (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss14) = a or b 15. Lighting (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss15) = a or b Remarks 0 0 0 2 Section score (S6) = (ss10 x ss11) + ss12 + ss13 + ss14 + ss15 Measure Loading Section 7 ­ Outer Perimeter 16. Fence: a. Class 4 4 b. Class 3 3 c. Class 2 2 d Class 1 1 e None 0 Sub-score (ss16) = a, b, c, d or e 17. Entry control: a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss17) = a or b Random entry and/or exit searches: 18. a. Yes 1 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss18) = a or b 19. PIDS: a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss19) = a or b JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Remarks 2 Chainlink 2 1 1 0 RESTRICTED 5-18-F2-8 RESTRICTED Physical Security 20. CCTV (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss20) = a or b 21. Lighting (to appropriate standards): a. Yes 2 b. No 0 Sub-score (ss21) = a or b 0 0 Section score (S7) = (ss16 x ss17) + ss18 + ss19 + ss20 + ss21 3 TOTAL SCORE is the sum of SECTIONS 1 to 7 20 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F2-9 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 5-18-F2-10 RESTRICTED Physical Security SECTION XIX TO CHAPTER 5 SITE ACCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS General Introduction of Site Access Management Systems to the Defence Estate 051901. A number of events have focused the attention of the MOD on the need to explore all the options to improve the security of access, particularly in relation to visitors and contractors, within the Defence Estate. Allied to the need to incorporate greater use of technical security systems due to limited guarding resources, terrorist attacks and other non-terrorist incursions, the Department's security staffs have closely examined the extension of Site Access Management Systems (SAMS) within the Defence Estate. 051902. In addition, there is a need to upgrade the MOD's control of access systems. Control of access security, other than on a number of establishments that have installed SAMS, is at present predominantly based on the issue of paper passes to visitors and contractors. The passes do not have a photographic image of the bearer and the details of the visitor/ contractor are not entered on a database which can be used locally or via a network. The widespread introduction of SAMS may go some way to meeting our current and future security challenges and will put into place technology enhanced computer-based image capture systems that will serve the MOD into the digital age. Definition 051903. A Site Access Management System (SAMS) is defined as a computer based control of access system, which incorporates digital image capture (of personnel/ vehicle registration number plates) and a database with a pass production system. SAMS Applications 051904. SAMS computer-based digital capture products cover many security applications that are appropriate to Defence establishments and can considerably enhance the security at many of those establishments. The range of products available encompasses simple stand-alone, self-operated units for the production of a range of imaged passes (with database) to highly sophisticated wide-area network systems. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-19-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Benefits of Adopting SAMS. 051905. The introduction of SAMS, as a stand-alone system or as part of a Local or Wide Area Network (LAN or WAN), provides the following benefits: a. Increased Efficiency. (1) Reduced contractor costs by streamlining access to a site. (2) Establishment of a database of visitors reduces processing time for initial (if notified) visits and revisits. (3) Increased efficiency by not having to check as many people by telephone or other means. Cost savings attributable to administration of visits and contracts, reduction in the number of vetting enquiries (BC/CTC), and reduction in escort requirements. (4) Provides potential manpower savings through possible combination of existing arrangements for producing permanent passes and for processing visitors. b. Deterrence Through Image Capture. SAMS provides significant deterrence value, as visitors will have their image digitally captured. With the advent of biometric systems such as face verification there may be the perception that the captured image will be cross-referred with police and other Government databases. This will also reduce the incidence of contractor substitution and impersonation. c. Improved intelligence and information. Details of where a person has visited or worked will be recorded as well as their clearance details (if any). d. Local and Wide Area Networks. The potential exists (if required) to share data amongst user establishments via a central database. e. Reports and Post Incident Investigative Action. SAMS has the ability to provide a wide range of reports in differing formats that are particularly useful in post-incident investigative procedures. f. Technological Integration With Other Systems. It has the ability to be technologically integrated with security applications such as pedestrian turnstiles, access control, vehicle barriers and automatic number plate recognition. This allows data and images entered into the SAMS to pass seamlessly in real time to other systems. This eliminates the unnecessary rekeying of information that has already been entered into another system and JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-19-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security helps to overcome inconsistencies that can sometimes occur through human typographical errors. g. Corporate Image. The widespread extension of SAMS will considerably improve the corporate image (both in the security and nonsecurity context) of individual establishments and the Department as a whole. The current (predominantly paper-based) system is seen as giving an outdated and inefficient image. SAMS presents a modern high-tech corporate image compatible with the digital age. Networking SAMS Introduction 051906. A large number of visitors to Defence Establishments have no clearance and, in the event of any requirement for investigation, there is little or no information gathered with traditional paper systems. Even those with some form of clearance are often put through the control of access process several times for different establishments, and cross-referencing of information is impossible. This is inefficient resulting in a duplication of effort, unnecessary escorting and resulting in a lack of structured administrative and security information. Benefits 051907. Existing SAMS users benefit from the information held on a local database as it provides a history, as well as clearance details, personal data and image for verification on each visit to a site. The information is, however, limited to each user or organisation, and there is still a large amount of duplication of effort and replication of data when one considers the number of separate databases. By having a central database which is updated by all SAMS users, each time a new visitor or contractor visits a site for the first time, staff will be able to check if there is a record elsewhere, as well as on their own database. If the benefits detailed at Para 051905 above are true for a single establishment's database then economies of scale and enhanced benefits may be achievable through aggregating all the data collected throughout the MOD. Creation of MOD Central Database 051908. To address this situation a MOD central database has been established at DERA Farnborough. This will give HOEs an option to draw-upon and contribute to a centrally held database. Access to the database will be dependent on the user having access to a suitably configured PC, running Windows NT and with a connection to Restricted LAN Interconnect (RLI). There will be a joining fee for each terminal requiring access to the central database, together with a monthly service cost. This option can be obtained through the DGICS Catalogue (051910 refers). 051909. HOEs are encouraged to consider the introduction of networked SAMS as both a cost-effective security enhancement for the establishment, and as a contribution to a MOD-wide co-ordinated approach to control of access. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-19-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security System Procurement Requirement for Command Security Staff Approval 051910. Whilst the initial decision on the requirement for SAMS is taken at establishment level, it is essential that the quality of system ultimately procured for the establishment is of an acceptable standard and design. This is ensured by the involvement of PSyA security staffs monitoring and approving ORs from establishments to ensure that appropriate security equipment standards are maintained. To assist with this procurement, DGICS have identified the only authorised supplier of systems to the MOD and placed their products within the DGICS Catalogue. Systems on offer from the supplier range from basic permanent pass production systems through to systems with full functionality that have the capability to be networked and which can access the MOD central database. SAMS are not to be purchased from sources other than DGICS as there will be no guarantee that they will be compatible with the MOD central system. Compilation of Operational Requirement 051911. An OR is to be compiled by the ESyO after consultation with and approval by PSyA security staffs. The ESyO is to define clearly what is expected of the system. As part of the process to identify the preferred supplier of SAMS to the MOD a `Technical Specification for the Supply Site Access Management Systems and Associated Goods and Services' (CAT/104341 - Version 2). This document is available through Special Services Group (SSG) and will asssist with the compilation of the OR and performance specification. Establishments may also call upon the assistance of TLB security specialists or SSG. Site-Specific Surveying 051912. Before procuring any system, regardless of functionality, it is important that the ESyO arranges for a site-specific survey to be conducted. This process should use basic template designs as a basis for the survey with site-specific requirements tailored to produce the optimum system for the site within defined resources. Personnel with an engineering/security background, not merely a security background must undertake the `technical survey', in order to fully appreciate the technical requirements site-by-site. Audit Procedures 051913. A full audit of an installed SAMS is to be carried-out prior to commissioning. The audit is to be carried-out by professional security staff. Special Services Group 051914. SSG are available to assist with compilation of the OR, performance specification, site survey and audit. Costs for such taskings will be borne by D Def Sy through the MOD SSG Advisory Account. Requests for SSG assistance are to be made in accordance with the instructions at Chapter 5 Section II Annexes A and F. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-19-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Physical Security System Management Terms of Reference (TORs). 051915. 051916. The SAMS system manager is to have TORs issued by the HOE. Appropriate SSPs and SyOPs must be issued for the system. System Security Policies (SSPs) and Security Operating Procedures (SyOPs) Consumables, Maintenance, Servicing and Training 051917. When procuring SAMS, the ESyO is to ensure that budgetary provision has been made for the provision of consumables and also takes account of the need to replace the system in future years (SAMS has an estimated system life of 8 years). In addition, he is to ensure that the Property Manager (PROM) includes the requirement to maintain/ service the SAMS in the establishment's Forward Maintenance Register. It is calculated that maintenance/ servicing currently represents 13.5% annually of capital outlay. Consideration is also to be given for the requirement to provide initial and periodic continuation training. Pass Production Pass Designs 051918. SAMS is a computer based control of access system, that also has the capability to produce passes. Whilst a variety of pass types can be produced, dependent on the user's needs and requirements, the following pass system template is recommended for all SAMS equipped establishments. a. Permanent Establishment Pass. This will be a plastic card with a bar code facility and Watermark stripe. It is to conform to the design standards stipulated in Section IX. b. Daily Visitors Pass. This will be a paper pass issued for very shortterm visitors to an establishment. It will have an adhesive backing that will allow it to be attached to a coloured background which can stipulate whether the visitor is to be escorted (red) or unescorted (green). The background to the pass itself will be unique to the establishment and will have a barcode facility. The bearer's image will be in monochrome. There is the facility for the production of a vehicle permit with this pass. c. Longer Term (also called Event or Contractor's) Pass. This will be a paper-based pass with the bearer's image in colour. It will be used for longer term visitors (and for opertional detachments where required) to an establishment. It will have a unique design incorporating a barcode facility. The pass can either be hot or cold sealed. There is the facility also for the production of a vehicle permit with this pass. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-19-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Retention of Passes for Contractors and Visitors 051919. All passes for contractors and visitors to MOD establishments, produced on SAMS, are to be retained on the issuing establishment. This is to be effected by the relevant guard/pass office retaining the pass and issuing them to the contractor/visitor as they come on site. The passes are to be handed back to the guard/pass office when the contractors/visitors leave the site. Approval of Pass Design 051920. All establishment pass designs require ultimate approval from DDef Sy in accordance with the procedure laid down in 05916. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 5-19-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security CHAPTER 6 SECURITY OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES Chapter 06 Section I - General instructions Introduction Definitions The Threat Responsibilities Security instructions Basic security principles Keys Response force Patrols Issue and return Registers Checks Losses and recoveries Materials on loan Drill Purpose (DP) and Replica weapons Annex A. Subjects to be covered in establishment security instructions for the protection of arms, ammunition and explosives. 6-0- 1 06001 06004 06005 06006 06013 06016 06028 06031 06034 06035 06036 06037 06040 06043 06044 Para Page 6-1-A-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Annex B. Report format for the loss, recovery or attempted theft of complete arms, ammunition or explosives. Format for reporting loss or compromise of keys to armouries or magazines. 6-1-B-1 Annex C. 6-1-C-1 Section II - Movement of arms, ammunition and explosives Introduction Planning of movements Guiding principles for the carriage of arms, ammunition and explosives byindividuals Bulk (non-individual) movement by road - general Bulk (non-individual) movement by road ammunition and explosives Bulk (non-individual) movement by road - arms Bulk (non-individual) movement by rail Bulk (non-individual) movement by sea Bulk (non-individual) movement of air Annex A. Security aspects to be considered in making a movement plan or providing instructions or briefings Annex B. Specimen form of instructions for security escort/driver for movement of arms Annex C. Specimen form of authority to be carried by security escort/driver for movement of arms 06201 06204 06208 06220 06223 06224 06235 06247 06253 6-2-A-1 6-2-B-1 6-2-C-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-0- 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Section III - Minimum standards for the storage of arms, ammunition and explosives Introduction Storage of weapons Storage of protectively marked arms, ammunition and explosives Explosive materiel on display Weapons on display Weapons, ammunition and explosives in laboratories, test chambers and process buildings Arms issued to individuals Security of demountable weaponry Handling and firing of MOD weapons by civilians Storage of privately owned firearms and ammunition on MOD property Storage of MDP owned firearms and ammunition 06301 06305 06307 06309 06310 06312 06314 06314 06315 06316 06318 Security of arms, ammunition and explosives during range practices and exercises 06321 Annex A. Physical security standards for armoury buildings Annex B. Minimum physical security standards for buildings containing ACTO stores Annex C. Approved locks and devices for armoury buildings 6-3-A-1 6-3-B-1 6-3-C-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-0- 3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Section IV - Security of cadet forces arms and ammunition Introduction Security of arms and ammunition Dispensations for cadet forces Matrix for the storage of arms and ammunition within cadet forces premises Withdrawal of weapons and ammunition Certificate of security for armouries Inspections of armouries by security units Inspections by cadet force HQs Registers Keys Liaison between cadet force units and the civil police Alarm system Private weapons Losses and recoveries of firearms Physical security of cadet force secure storerooms Security of weapons Security of ammunition Security of rifle bolts and other weapon parts Mini-armouries 06401 06402 06403 06406 06409 06410 06414 06415 06416 06417 06419 06420 06421 06430 06431 06434 06435 06437 06438 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-0- 4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Annex A. Security standards at cadet forces premises Annex B. Indices for the storage of arms and ammunition within cadet forces premises 6-4-A-1 6-4-B-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-0- 5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-0- 6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives SECTION I - SECURITY OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS Introduction 06101. This chapter defines the minimum standards of physical security to be applied to the storage and movement of conventional arms, ammunition and explosives held by, or under the control of the MOD Defence Estate through its Crown Servants. Heads of Establishments (HOE) should be aware that if they contemplate contracting out management of armouries/ammunition stores, Crown immunity no longer applies and they will be required to comply in full with the Firearms Act 1968 and the physical standards for storage will be determined by the Civil Police. Any HOE considering this move is strongly advised to seek advice and guidance from their Principal Security Adviser (PSyA) before proceeding. This chapter does not apply to the protection of special nuclear materials (SNM) and other radioactive materials (ORM), nor does it apply to nuclear weapons, nuclear or radioactive munitions or reactor plant in the custody of the Services. It does not detail the standards for the protection of biological and chemical defence materials, advice on the protection, movement and storage of which must be obtained from DD Def Sy Phys Sy. 06102. Logistics, engineering, weapon and movement staffs have important roles in respect of the security and safety of arms, ammunition and explosives. PSyAs and their staff are to work closely with them in order to ensure that all relevant legislation and other regulations are complied with as far as is practicable in any given circumstances. To this end these instructions take account of the publications detailed below, but clearly cannot repeat them in their entirety. These publications are anyway subject to update and it is essential, therefore, that close liaison is maintained with appropriate branches. a. Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Sea (JSP445). b. The requirements contained in The Joint Service Manual of Movements (JSP 327). c. The minimum Health and Safety Executive (HSE) physical security safety standards. d. The physical security safety standards detailed in MOD Explosive Regulations. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1- 1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security e. Relevant single-Service explosive safety regulations, arms and ammunition accounting and store-keeping regulations. f. The Firearms Acts 1968 and 1988. 06103. Where arms, ammunition and explosives merit protective marking on the basis of confidentiality the rules in Chapter 5 for the security of equipment apply. Definitions 06104. The following definitions when used in this document apply: a. Ammunition and explosives. In this chapter the term includes all forms of ammunition, explosives including detonators, pyrotechnics and anti-riot agents. Inert items on their own (eg, those components of ammunition which do not contain explosive, such as empty cartridge cases, links and chargers) are not included in this definition. b. Arms/Weapons and Weapon Components. Arms man-portable weapons, including: (1) (2) consist of all Weapons removed from armoured fighting vehicles/helicopters. Infantry mortars. (3) Man-portable surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile systems. (4) Full bore rifles, pistols, automatic fire weapons, shotguns and .22 rifles. (5) Drill purpose (DP) weapons including permanently de-activated weapons and MOD owned replica weapons. (6) Privately owned weapons and ammunition stored on MOD property. (7) (8) Flare and pyrotechnical pistols. Component or working parts of any arms, eg: (a) (b) (c) Barrels. Bolts/Bolt Heads. Breech Blocks. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1- 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) Firing Pins. Firing mechanisms. Springs. Feed mechanism. Magazines. Magazine housings. Bayonets. c. Attractive to criminal and terrorist organizations (ACTO) stores. ACTO stores are those items considered to be of immediate value to a terrorist or criminal. ACTO items are defined as follows: (1) All arms under 20mm and associated ammunition; (2) All single man-portable missile and rocket systems and associated missiles and rockets; (3) All mortars less than 120mm and associated ammunition; (4) All mines, anti-personnel grenades, explosives, explosive charges and accessories including detonation devices. At times of AMBER and RED BIKINI Alert, extra security measures may be imposed by security staff to protect the movement of ACTO items. d. Non-ACTO stores. Those other arms, munitions and explosive stores which are not defined or covered by sub-para c above. e. Small Arms Trainer (SAT) weapons. The Home Office has agreed that Proof Marked SAT weapons are neither live nor DP weapons, but fall into a separate category of their own. Each PSyA is responsible for laying down the protection standards for his area of responsibility, based on the overall policy agreed with the lead PSyA on SAT (HQ Land Command G2). This means that Proof Marked SAT weapons are to be afforded protection based upon compromise affecting availability and integrity. f. Secure armouries and ammunition stores. A secure armoury or ammunition store is one which complies with the minimum approved Defence Estates (DE) or Explosive Storage and Transport Committee (ESTC) structural JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1- 3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security standards, or which has been strengthened to comparable standards, and is either: (1) Visited externally by a guard or patrol at random intervals of not more than 1 hour when unoccupied, or (2) Fitted with a Chief Inspector of Engineers (CIE)/Command Security Staff approved intruder detection system (IDS), backed by an effective response force. DE Standard Drawings should be used for new builds and upgrades. g. Structurally approved armoury. A structurally approved armoury is one which complies with the minimum approved DE structural standards, but is: (1) (2) (3) Not fitted with an approved IDS. Not visited hourly by the guard force. Not permanently occupied. DE is the approving authority. h. Bolt box. A bolt box is a container approved by PSyAs as sufficiently secure for the storage of bolts/working parts. Boxes are to be secured by a security pattern mortise lock or a security padlock and robust hasp and staple. They must be bolted to the floor or wall. (A similar box, bolted to the structure of a building, may be used for the storage of .22 ammunition when approved by the command security staff.) i. Establishment Armament Officer (EAO). This is a generic term that includes: (1) Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO)/Senior Ammunition Technical Officer (SATO) or equivalent. (2) OC Armament Engineering/OC Weapon Engineering (OC Arm Eng/OC Wpn Eng) or equivalent. (3) (4) Establishment Safety Officer (ESO) or equivalent. ESO/Explosive Responsible Officer (ERO) or equivalent. j. Responsible person. A responsible person, in the context of arms, ammunition and explosive checks is one of either categories shown below: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1- 4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (1) At least an NCO, civilian equivalent or civilian contractor nominated by the HOE. (2) Armoury/ammunition and explosives store personnel judged to be competent by the EAO. k. Arms chest. An arms chest is an approved container for the storage of arms or ammunition. These containers are mainly used in Reserve and Cadet Forces establishments. The approved arms chests and physical security measures to be applied are detailed in Section IV. The Threat 06105. The threat to arms, ammunition and explosives stores comes from: a. Terrorist, nationalist, extremist and dissident organizations, groups or individuals desiring to obtain them to further their aims. b. Criminals who wish to acquire them for profit or criminal activities. c. Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) seeking to acquire details of protectively marked high technology and manufacturing processes. d. Other persons seeking to acquire them for unauthorized purposes such as sale, private collection or personal use. e. Authorized persons who abuse the trust placed in them, for whatever reason. The security threat is promulgated in periodic and specific threat assessments by D Def Sy. Responsibilities 06106. D Def Sy. D Def Sy is responsible for security policy for arms, ammunition and explosives. 06107. PSyAs. PSyAs are responsible for the implementation of security policy for arms, ammunition and explosives within their respective areas of responsibility. 06108. C-in-Cs/TLB Holders. C-in-Cs/TLB Holders are responsible for ensuring that the minimum standards required by this chapter are enforced within their Commands/areas of responsibility. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1- 5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 06109. Heads of Establishments (HOE). HOE are to ensure that minimum standards required by this chapter are enforced at establishment level and that any additional measures required by TLB Holders are introduced. ESyOs are responsible at establishment level for advising the HOE of the interpretation and implementation of the policy for the security of arms, ammunition and explosives. 06110. Reserve and Cadet Forces. HQs of Reserve and Cadet Forces through their officers commanding, are responsible for ensuring that at least the minimum standards for the security of arms, ammunition and explosives are enforced by Reserve and Cadet personnel, in furtherance of instructions issued by PSyAs. 06111. Small arms associations. Honorary Secretaries/Chairmen of Service small arms associations, through officers in charge of Service shooting clubs, are responsible for ensuring that where appropriate, at least the minimum standards required by this chapter are strictly enforced by members of the Services small arms associations. 06112. Chief Inspectors of Explosives (CIEs). CIEs are responsible for explosives safe practices. Security instructions 06113. Promulgation of security instructions. Each establishment having control of materiel covered by this chapter is to publish Security Standing Orders/Instructions detailing the procedures to be followed. The instructions are to be issued by the HOE. A suggested format is at Annex A. 06114. Reviews and briefings. Security instructions are to be regularly reviewed and promulgated by means of periodic briefings. The briefings are to emphasize the threat and its likely forms, and stress the need to report any suspicious matter, loss, find or security weakness. 06115. Displaying of instructions. Establishment Security Instructions relating to arms, ammunition and explosives are to be displayed as required to ensure all staff are informed. Basic security principles. 06116. Location of arms, ammunition and explosives. The location of arms, ammunition and explosives and the storage buildings in which they are secured must be known to, where appropriate, the ESyO, Senior Police Officer (MDP), Head of Guard Force or Civil Police where they are the response force. Priority of patrolling and response force planning is to take into account the categories, relative attractiveness, and sensitivity of the respective materials. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1- 6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives 06117. Records. Full records of holdings, use, expenditure and disposal of arms, ammunition and explosives are to be maintained in the establishment to enable accurate periodic accounting and spot checks to be carried out. 06118. Access. Access to all materials is to be controlled and permitted only to those who have a need for such access in the performance of their duties. 06119. Delay. Physical security measures are to provide sufficient delay to allow for the arrival of an appropriate response force. 06120. Alarm systems. Alarm systems are to provide warning of an attack. 06121. Supervision of arms, ammunition and explosives. The fundamental principle for the security of arms, ammunition and explosives is that when they are outside secure stores they are never to be left unattended or in the care of unauthorized persons or taken home. 06122. Armoury doors. Armoury doors are to be kept locked or bolted on the inside when individuals are working inside, and should only be opened to allow authorized entry or exit. Outward looking door viewers must be installed. There is to be a means of external communication for those working inside when the doors are locked. 06123. Storage of arms and ammunition. Ammunition is not to be stored in the same room as arms, except in the case of a Response Force where members of that force may hold a small quantity with the weapons. 06124. Guard, Fire Services and Response Force communication. Guards patrolling armouries, ammunition and explosive stores or Fire Services and Response Forces attending incidents at armouries, ammunition and explosive stores are only to use communications approved by CIEs as presenting acceptable RADHAZ and EMC hazards. 06125. Review of holdings. Holdings of weapons, ammunition and explosives are to be reviewed by HOE periodically and whenever the operational roles or training requirements change. Holdings are to be kept to the minimum consistent with the role of the establishment. 06126. Security clearance. All personnel - whether military, civilian or contract whose duties involve regular unsupervised access to weapons, ammunition or explosives are not to be permitted to assume such duties until they have been subjected to a BC and full CTC clearance. Where, however, the responsible PSyA considers it justified, the vetting requirement may be increased to SC level. Where persons currently engaged in such duties do not hold at least BC and full CTC clearance, priority action should be initiated to achieve that level of security clearance. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1- 7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 06127. Key control. Key control is to be used as the basis of strict control of access to arms, ammunition and explosive store holdings. Keys 06128. Issue. Keys for armouries or ammunition stores may only normally be issued to personnel authorised in writing by the HOE to draw the keys, the same person should not have access to the keys to both the armoury and ammunition store. Armoury or ammunition store keys are not normally to be issued to any individual to allow him to draw arms or ammunition alone or unsupervised. 06129. Safeguarding of keys. Instructions for safeguarding and recording the movement of keys are given in Chapter 5; these apply to keys of armouries, ammunition and explosive stores and alarm control boxes. Keys for ammunition holdings should be stored in a separate container from keys for arms stores. Combinations of digital key pads must be safeguarded to similar standards. Keys should either be secured in an appropriate security container or held in the possession of the authorised person. Response force 06130. Related Instructions. Paragraphs 06131 to 06134 below are to be read in conjunction with Chapter 5 Section VIII (Guards and Patrols). 06131. Regular Service Establishments. All Regular Service establishments with armouries and/or ammunition and explosive stores are to provide a response force that is capable of being armed (which must be armed if arming has been ordered) and that will react in sufficient time, taking account of the delay provided by the building construction and other physical security measures, to prevent the loss of or damage to the weapons, ammunition or explosives being protected. 06132. Other MOD Establishments. All other MOD establishments with armouries and /or ammunition and explosive stores not guarded by Service Personnel or MDP are to have contingency plans which provide a response force capable of being armed that may include the Civil Police, and which will react in sufficient time, taking account of the delay provided by the building construction, to prevent the loss of or damage to the weapons, ammunition or explosives being protected. The decision as to whether the response force is to be armed, if provided by the Civil Police, will rest with the Chief Constable of the force involved. 06133. Preparation and practice of plan. The contingency plan is to be prepared by the establishment in consultation with the Civil Police, who are to hold copies of the plan. The plan is to be practised at least annually. Notification to the correct Civil Police agency is essential, and they should be invited to attend or send a liaison officer, although their absence is not to stop the practice from taking place. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1- 8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives 06134. Spare. Patrols 06135. In addition to checks being made at prescribed intervals with the occupants of the stores/armouries when in use, (the precise timings to be decided by the HOE), regular armouries and ammunition and explosive stores are to be externally patrolled with the following frequency when they have ACTO items stored in them: a. Buildings with IDS. Not required where an approved IDS is installed unless a higher alert state exists. b. Buildings without IDS. At intervals not exceeding one hour. To be covered by a portable IDS c. Temporary storage on vehicles. or guarded. Issue and return 06136. A record is to be maintained of all arms issued from armouries and small arms stores and ammunition and explosives from store. A signature or tally is to be obtained from the recipient of any weapon or ammunition and explosive that is issued. On return, receipt is to be acknowledged by the person receiving the weapon or ammunition or explosive into the armoury/store as appropriate. Records of issue and return of arms and ammunition or explosives are to be retained for at least 36 months after the last entry. Registers 06137. All arms and ammunition and explosives on charge to an establishment are to be listed in the appropriate registers and ledger. Records are also to be kept of all daily issues and receipts and these records are to be retained for at least 36 months after the last entry - these records will be subject to checking during protective security inspections. Checks 06138. Principles. The following principles apply for the checking of arms, ammunition and explosives: a. PSyAs are responsible for issuing instructions for the physical checking of stocks of arms, ammunition and explosives. Checks are to be recorded in dedicated logs which are to be inspected every 6 months and kept for 36 months. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1- 9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. All checks are to be carried out by a responsible person (as defined at 06104j above). The responsible person is to be someone other than those allowed unsupervised access. Thus, the armourer or arms storeman must not carry out these checks. The orderly officer of the day or similar is an appropriate person. c. Those involved in checking are to ensure that, where bulk stocks are involved, the seals on boxes are inspected. If discrepancies are confirmed, the fact is to be immediately brought to the attention of the ESyO (see Annex B). d. Arms, ammunition and explosives in loose form are to be accurately counted, the quantities agreed with the stock record cards and, where possible re-sealed in containers. e. Issues, receipts and expenditure documentation are to be examined to ensure they are accurate and that transactions have been correctly authorized. f. All arms and main stockholdings of ammunition and explosives are to be subject to regular audit and unannounced 'spot checks' by individuals other than arms/ammunition storeman. 06139. IDS. Functional checks of armoury and ammunition and explosive store IDS are to be carried out as follows: a. Daily checks. A daily functional check of the IDS is to be carried out. b. Weekly checks. 25% of the IDS sensors (on rotation) are to be activated by on-site personnel each week. A record of these checks is to be maintained and these records inspected during protective security inspections. Note: The above will apply to establishments where the alarm terminates internally, ie on the establishment. Where the alarm terminates externally, ie at a central monitoring unit, an appropriate checking system must be included in the contract. 06140. Spare Losses and recoveries 06141. Arms, ammunition and explosives. All losses or recoveries of arms, ammunition and explosives and attempts to steal from or break into armouries or vehicles containing arms, ammunition and explosives (whether successful or not) are to be reported, by the fastest means available, in accordance with Annex B to: a. The ESyO (who is to notify the MDP/Civil Police where appropriate). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1- 10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives b. The HOE. c. Appropriate security unit (Area Security Team, MI Bn, RAF P&SS, CBSy, DLO or DPA security organisation). d. e. f. g. Appropriate PSyA. For the Navy & Army only; CCRIO RMP. For the Royal Marines only; CGRM. EAO/SATO. This requirement includes any confirmed deficiencies or surplus discovered during checks. 06142. Keys. The loss or compromise of armoury/magazine keys is to be reported in accordance with Annex C to the following: a. b. c. d. e. The ESyO. The HOE. Appropriate PSyA and appropriate local security unit. For the Royal Marines only; CGRM. EAO/SATO. 06143. The PSyA will decide whether an investigation is required and the agency best suited to conduct it. Investigation reports are to be forwarded to the PSyA for further action or case closure. Materials on loan 06144. Loans of material between establishments or to industrial firms are to be formally approved by line management responsible for the material. The loan must be documented and must specifically state the period of loan and the responsibility of the recipient to provide security protection on delivery. The appropriate officer is to be satisfied that effective safeguards exist and that the transfer is correctly authorized and documented. Where loans are to be for long periods (one year or more) the recipient is required to confirm that the materials are still held by him and correctly stored on a 6 monthly basis, or that the materials have been expended. 06145. Spare. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1- 11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Drill Purpose (DP) and MOD owned Replica weapons 06146. Drill Purpose (DP) and MOD owned replica weapons are to be stored securely as detailed at sub-para 06134i below. They are not normally to be stored in Service Armouries. (When large numbers are involved a Class 3 or Class 4 IDS is to be fitted). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1- 12 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives ANNEX A TO SECTION I TO CHAPTER 6 SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED IN ESTABLISHMENT SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES 1. 2. 3. 4. Name, location and telephone no of the Establishment Security Officer. Scope of the instructions. The security threat. Security responsibilities: Security Officer, Explosives/Safety Officer, Armament Officer, Production Manager, Transport Officer, heads of Departments, Stores/Supply Officers, Foreman in Charge of Operations/Accounting/Movement, Explosives Workers. 5. Security procedures to be followed in production/process areas, storage servicing, processing, trials, quality assurance, climatic and other tests or other activities in respect of arms, ammunition and explosives. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Control of access to buildings, areas, compounds. Control of security keys - in use and duplicate. Accounting - audit and spot checks. Security education and briefings of staff. Action on discovery of a loss/surplus. 11. Details of response force arrangements (e.g. size, response time, orders, activation and deployment). 12. Actions to be taken in response to activation of alarms (e.g. duress situations). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1-A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-A-1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives ANNEX B TO SECTION I TO CHAPTER 6 REPORT FORMAT FOR THE LOSS, RECOVERY OR ATTEMPTED THEFT OF COMPLETE ARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES A B C D E F G H Establishment, name of person reporting, contact telephone number. Item identification: type, calibre, make, nature, description. Quantity: numbers or weight. Serial numbers (arms), batch numbers (ammunition/explosives) or other identifying marks (e.g. packing and labelling details). Place of loss/recovery: map sheet, grid reference, number of building or bunker. Outline of circumstances of loss, or recovery. When loss occurred and when loss was discovered. Action taken. Person investigating loss, the nearest Security Unit (Area Security Team, MI Bn, RAF P&SS, CBSy, DLO, DPA security organisation (who and location)). Action being taken to prevent a further loss. Where crime is suspected, the Service/MDP/civil police POC involved. I Notes: 1. For addressees see para 06040, Section 1, Chapter 6. 2. When sent by signal, it is to be sent under SIC YAL with a minimum PRIORITY precedence. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1-B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1-B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives ANNEX C TO SECTION I TO CHAPTER 6 FORMAT FOR REPORTING LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF KEYS TO ARMOURIES AND MAGAZINES Subject: Loss/compromise of armoury/magazine keys A. B. C. D. Notes: 1. For addressees see para 06040 Section 1, Chapter 6. Establishment, name of person reporting, contact telephone number. Contents of armoury/magazine. Brief statement of circumstances. Remedial action taken. (Temporary security arrangements made such as removal of arms/ammunition to secure area.) 2. When sent by signal, it is to be sent under SIC YAL with a PRIORITY precedence. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1-C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-1-C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives SECTION II - MOVEMENT OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES Introduction 06201. These instructions are to be read in conjunction with other relevant JSPs, statutory instruments, bye-laws and other forms of delegated legislation, and explosives regulations that apply to movements of ammunition and explosives. 06202. All weapons in transit are to be treated as if they are classed within Section 5 of the Firearms Act 1968. Arms, ammunition and explosives are at greater risk when they leave the protected facilities of an establishment and are particularly vulnerable when they are being transported off main roads, during the hours of darkness and at stopping points whilst enroute. 06203. Communications giving details of the movement of arms, ammunition and explosives are to be handled on a strict 'need to know' basis and all personnel involved must be reminded of the need for discretion. Planning of movements 06204. General. All details of the move must be protected until the latest possible moment. Normally, movement of arms, ammunition and explosives should be by the most direct authorised route, however, when regular deliveries between the same two locations are made movement arrangements should be regularly reviewed and varied, even if this could result in administrative inconvenience or additional financial cost. Details of the movement regulations for arms are held in JSP 327. Regulations for the movement of ammunition and explosives are in JSP 445. Details of procedures to be followed by Service shooting clubs and cadet forces when moving small amounts of arms and ammunition are at Section IV of this chapter. 06205. Movement plans. There is to be consultation between the officer or consignor responsible for the move and the appropriate Establishment armament and security staffs in the preparation of the movement plan. All changes to the plan are to be notified to the appropriate Security Officer. 06206. Regular moves. When arms, ammunition and explosives stores are to be moved on a regular basis and it is not possible to change routes or the pattern of movements significantly, as per para 06058 above, then PSyAs are to be consulted in the preparation of security plans. This includes any movement of such materiel to Northern Ireland. Plans should consider the following: a. Split consignments. Whether the material can be sent in split consignments (i.e.weapons in one vehicle, and barrels or firing mechanisms in JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security another vehicle. Both vehicles dispatched at different times and via different routes). b. Civil Police assistance. Notifying Civil Police forces along route. 06207. Movement of ACTO stores during BIKINI Alert States AMBER and RED. At BIKINI Alert States AMBER and RED no movement of ACTO stores (see paragraph 06004b) is to take place without first consulting Command Security Staff for advice on appropriate additional security measures. This may include delaying nonessential moves until the Alert State has decreased. Guiding principles for the carriage of arms, ammunition and explosives by individuals 06208. The following principles are the minimum requirements to be adhered to when carrying arms and ammunition and deviations from them are only to take place in exceptional circumstances. Before implementing these principles, security staff should consult with other relevant staff branches such as movements, logistics and engineering. Security or other staffs may wish to impose tighter regulations to reflect local laws and/or the prevailing security situation. Arms and ammunition carried by individuals, whether on foot or in Service, public or private transport are never to be left unattended in any circumstances. Arms issued to individuals remain the responsibility of the individual until a recognised change of responsibility takes place. In principle, personal weapons should only be carried openly whilst on duty at Service establishments, whilst training on recognised military training areas or public or private land being used for approved training, or whilst engaged in public duties or taking part in Service displays. In all other circumstances weapons are to be handled in a manner which will not alarm the civil population and should be kept out of sight and should not be displayed in public places, eg motorway service areas, so far as is consistent with the overriding need for security of personal weapons. a. Service transport. in Service transport. Arms and ammunition are normally to be carried (1) This includes Service vehicles with civilian registration plates and contract hire vehicles. (2) This also includes charter aircraft and ships and rail. When these are to be used, both security and movements staff are to be consulted for detailed instructions as to how arms and ammunition are to be loaded/carried. b. Escorts. If an individual is to carry more than a personal weapon in a vehicle, at least one other person is to be an escort. Armament personnel carrying out maintenance at outlying armouries and cadet force units may carry up to 4 weapons and 2Kg (NEQ) of Hd 1.4 SAA in an oicial vehicle without an escort. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives c. Disabling of weapons. Whenever possible weapons are to be disabled and working parts stored separately, although they may be in the same vehicle as the parent weapon. d. Visibility. Weapons, weapon parts and ammunition are to be stowed in such a way that they are not visible or identifiable from the outside of the vehicle. Ideally weapons should be locked in the boot of the vehicle and/or be locked inside an anonymous container. e. Vehicle security. All vehicle doors and, where appropriate, the boot are to be locked at all times. f. Separation of arms and ammunition. Arms and ammunition are not to be carried in the same vehicle. g. Authorization for carriage of arms, ammunition and explosives. (1) Whenever a civilian registered vehicle, (including military vehicles with civilian registration), is used for transportation of arms and/or ammunition, written authority must be obtained from the HOE (for official transport), or PSyAs (for privately owned vehicles). This authority is to contain as a minimum requirement, the details of the move, the name of the vehicle driver, the vehicle registration number and the address and telephone number of the despatching unit, the type of ammunition/weapon and its serial number. A copy of this authorization together with an official identity card is to be held by the driver of the vehicle and should be presented on demand to Police or Service personnel. (2) In exceptional circumstances when there is an urgent need to move explosive materiel and no MOD transport is available, up to 2Kg mass of explosive or explosive devices may be authorized to be carried in a privately registered vehicle by the HOE. Larger quantities may be authorized by PSyAs. A copy of the authorization, which is to include the name of the person authorized to carry the materiel, the quantity to be carried, the route to be taken, the method of transport and vehicle registration number, and a contact number in the despatching unit, is to be held by the driver and is to be presented on request to police or Service personnel. h. Carriage on public transport. Unless authorized by PSyAs individuals, whether in uniform or not, are not to carry Service arms and/or ammunition on public transport. This includes trains, buses, taxis, ships and aircraft. If there is a necessity to use public transport, movements staff should be consulted in order that correct official movement channels are used rather than individuals. Dispensation from this rule will be given by PSyAs only in JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security exceptional circumstances and normally only after consultation with relevant police forces. i. Securing of materiel. All explosive materiel should be secured out of sight in an approved container in accordance with JSP 445. 06209. In private transport. When PSyAs authorize the carriage of arms and/or ammunition in privately owned transport the following rules are additionally to be applied: a. No more rounds of ammunition than are necessary may be carried in the same vehicle as weapons that could fire those rounds. b. c. If both arms and ammunition are carried in the same vehicle, there must be at least one person accompanying the driver. The validity of private insurance policies is to be confirmed. 06210. The minimum standards detailed above for the carriage of arms and ammunition by individuals is to be reviewed regularly by PSyAs, and whenever the BIKINI alert state changes. 06211. Detailed instructions are to be drawn up for action by individuals carrying arms and ammunition when involuntary delays (such as road traffic accidents) occur on journeys. 06212. Arms and explosives search (AES) teams. Team explosive samples are to be held in approved containers. Where the size and design of the vehicle allow it, the container should be securely attached to the vehicle either by bolts or steel cable and a security padlock. When operations require an overnight stay away from parent Service premises, the vehicle must be parked in an overnight staging area as defined in Paragraph 06082. 06213. Travel to/from Northern Ireland. In exceptional cases, agreed by HQNI, personnel may travel to NI with a weapon. An individual travelling to or from Northern Ireland by commercial sea/air routes is to declare his possession of weapons and weapon parts to the movement control representatives in charge of the embarkation. Secure stowage for the weapon and weapon parts will then be arranged. 06214 -06219. Spare Bulk (non-individual) movement by road - general 06220. Emergency notice. A card or notice should be carried within the cab of each vehicle informing the Civil Police of an official contact should both driver and escort be injured in an accident. In addition an authority is to be carried informing the police that the driver is not permitted to leave his vehicle unattended. The driver is to take the vehicle to the nearest police station if requested to do so by the police. The relevant JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives documents for ammunition and explosives are as appropriate; F Mov 773, F Mov 936 a-e and authorised 'Tremcard'. 06221. Additional measures. Establishments involved in frequent or movement of ACTO items are to consider additional measures as follows: a. b. The installation of an audible vehicle alarm approved by the CIE. The fitment of an approved tracking device approved by the CIE. regular 06222. Need to know. The driver and escort are to ensure that they do not discuss the nature of their journey or duties with anyone who is not authorized to know and they should report as soon as possible any suspicious or untoward incident or questions raised by a member of the public. Bulk (non-individual) movement by road - ammunition and explosives 06223. The necessary regulations are in JSP 445. Bulk (non-individual) movement by road - arms 06224. Vehicles. All movements by road should be made in vehicles under the control of MOD or approved contractors. The vehicles should not be left unattended at any time. 06225. Contractors. Only approved contractors (who, for UK movements, hold a Section 5, Firearms Act clearance) are to be used. It is the responsibility of the establishments to consult with Command security staffs to ensure that the firm/driver/escorts have been appropriately security checked. 06226. Securing of loads. Materials carried by road vehicles should where possible be boxed or secured in lockable containers and when possible loaded in such a way as to inhibit their removal except by mechanical means. The use of MOD 'Powder Wagons' or similar enclosed box commercial vehicles, secured by approved padlocks is particularly advised. Where open flat-bed trailers are used, sheeting is recommended as screening. Consignments should be stowed in the vehicle in such a way that their contents are not obvious to the casual observer. 06227. Duplicate security keys. When regular consignments are carried by road and there are no safety requirements to check the load periodically, the following applies: a. ISO containers are to be sealed using approved security seals. b. Where containers with padlocks are used, duplicated security keys should be held at both the point of departure and point of delivery. However, JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security when access to the load is required for any safety reason and security keys must therefore accompany the load, they are to be secured on a chain and carried by the driver or escort. No additional copies of keys are to be made. 06228. Instructions and briefings. Detailed instructions and briefings are given to both driver and escort for each movement. Annexes B and C respectively provide details of points to be covered. Annex D is a specimen form of authority to be carried by the security escort/driver. 06229. Escorts. The following applies to the use of escorts: a. Other than as indicated in this chapter an escort must always be provided for movements of arms. This means an escort in each vehicle if not travelling in an organised convoy. In organised convoys escorts are only necessary in the leading and last vehicles and in the fifth and each successive fifth vehicle. Driver or escort must carry written authority for the movement (see Annex D). b. Where only weapon or munition 'component parts' are being carried, and the items in isolation would be of no value to a criminal or terrorist then no escort is necessary. c. An escort is to travel in the cab of the vehicle with the driver. He is to be particularly alert to the possibility of tampering with the vehicle/load when the vehicle is stationary. Either the driver or escort is to remain with the vehicle when it is stopped. d. A sign will be carried by the escort indicating that the occupant will not open windows or doors and showing the hazard and other details of the load but if necessary will follow a police car to the nearest police station. A contact number will also be on the sign, for police to use in case of emergency. e. To obviate the need for escorts and enhance general security, consideration should be given to consignments of materiel being broken down to component parts and despatched separately. 06230. Communications. All vehicles and convoys involved in the bulk movement of arms are to have two-way communications easily available to the driver/escort to summon assistance in case of emergency. Following an accident to the vehicle note should be taken of the radio hazard limitations. 06231. Breakdown and accidents. If a vehicle breaks down, the civil police, the nearest Service unit and consignor are to be informed without delay. Should the vehicle be involved in an accident and the load, packaging or seals appear to be damaged, an authorized armament officer/contractor is to be called to inspect the load before anything is moved or handled. Repairs are not to be carried out in any garage until the vehicle has been unloaded under Service supervision. If it is necessary during the JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives course of conveyance to transfer the contents from one road vehicle to another, an authorized armament officer/contractor will be required to attend. 06232. Overnight staging. Vehicles carrying arms must be staged at Service establishments or civil police stations. Arrangements for staging are to be made by consignors before the start of a road movement. The establishments listed in JSP 445 are able to provide adequate security protection for loaded vehicles. In the event of an unscheduled overnight stop at an unlisted establishment through breakdown or other unplanned events, it is the driver's responsibility to ensure that his vehicle and contents is properly safeguarded as per sub-para 06033c above. 06233. Large/attractive consignments. The dispatching unit is to advise the appropriate single-Service security unit of the movement by road of a large or attractive consignment. The consignor will arrange for civil or Service police escorts if necessary. 06234. Routing of vehicles and arming of escorts. The routing of vehicles should, where possible and subject to safety requirements, be via Motorways and 'A' class roads. Stops for rest and food should be taken at MOD or Service establishments. Where this is not possible and stops are made at public service areas, the vehicle must be parked to allow continuous observation. Outside of MOD or service establishments an escort must stay with the vehicle at all times and be locked in the cab of the vehicle. The person absent from the vehicle must carry the vehicle keys. Normally escorts will not be armed. If the threat is such that arming of escorts is considered necessary, guidance is to be sought from PSyAs. Bulk (non-individual) movement by rail 06235. General. Specific regulations for the movement by rail of ammunition and explosives are covered in JSP 445. All movement by rail must be by 'through' wagons and under the 'controlled service' operated by the Defence Transport and Movements Agency, Movement Control Centre (DTMA MCC), Andover, Hampshire. Rail wagons are not to be dispatched until confirmation has been given that the delivery can be made during the same working week. 06236. Packaging and loading. Within wagons materials should be packaged and where possible the wagon loaded so that it can only be unloaded by mechanical means. 06237. Alarmed wagons/containers. Rail operators may be able to provide alarmed wagons/containers. These wagons should whenever possible be used. Each wagon is to be sealed by approved security seals under the supervision of the consignor. 06238. Small consignments. All consignments under 250Kg gross should be sent by escorted Service transport; for such small quantities, a sealed rail wagon should be used only when Service transport cannot be provided. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 06239. Marking of consignments Wagon-load consignments of small arms, ammunition and explosives for delivery in the UK are not to carry externally a copy of the wagon consignment note. Wagons carrying shipping consignments are to continue to carry the consignment note externally and, in such cases, the form should show only the leading shipping mark number and should not disclose details of the contents. 06240. Notification of consignee. Consignors are to advise consignees by telephone, priority signal or teleprinter message, followed by a letter sent by first class mail, of the following details: a. b. c. d. Issue voucher no. Brief description of consignment. Consignment note no. Method and the date of dispatch. 06241. Notification of DTMA MCC. In addition, consignors are to advise the DTMA MCC by telephone, priority signal, teleprinter or telex on the day prior to dispatch giving the following details: a. b. c. d. Railhead from which dispatched. Railhead to which dispatched. The 'ready to move' date of the special train. The number of wagons in each rail marshalling category. e. The rail wagon number for single wagon consignments and at least 2 rail wagon numbers for each marshalling category when the consignment is more than 1 wagon. f. The title and address of the consignee. 06242. Delivery and collection at railheads. Consignments will be delivered into consignee's rail sidings where possible. Where this is not possible because the consignee is not rail served, Rail operators will advise the consignee (as shown on the wagon label) that collection should be made. This is to be effected on the same day to avoid consignments remaining in sidings overnight. Consignments will be released only to properly authorized representatives presenting a letter of authority signed by an officer, clearly impressed with the unit's stamp and dated. The Rail operator's advice to consignees mentioned in this paragraph is in addition to the advice sent by DTMA MCC which will normally be received first. Consignees should not wait for the Rail operators advice before initiating action. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives 06243. Restriction on dispatch. a. For security reasons it is undesirable that consignments of arms, ammunition and explosives should stand in railway sidings at weekends and during public holidays. Therefore, consignors should arrange dispatch of such traffic so that consignments arrive at their destinations and are received by consignees before weekends or public holidays. Local Rail operator representatives will advise on this matter. b. The DTMA MCC controls the call-forward of consignments despatched to ports for overseas shipment and, in the light of up-to-date information, avoids such consignments standing in port areas longer than necessary. On receipt of call-forward instructions, consignors are to telephone the DTMA MCC for the dates of dispatch from depot or railheads. 06244. Loss or discrepancy. The following procedure is to be carried out when consignments sent by rail are not received within the time shown: a. If the consignment has not been received by the consignee within one hour after the time advised by the DTMA MCC the latter will then take action to trace the wagon through the Rail operator and subsequently advise the consignee to take the further action shown in b. below if necessary. If the consignment has not been traced within 24 hours the consignee's superior HQ and nearest security units are to be informed. b. When rail-wagon load consignments have not been received within 3 days of the date of despatch and cannot be traced by the DTMA MCC the consignee is to take further action as follows: (1) Inform the nearest Civil Police Force. (2) Make full reporting action as shown at Part 1, Paragraph 06040. 06245. Checks of consignment. On despatch and immediately on receipt rail wagons are to be examined to ensure that they are correctly locked and/or sealed. On receipt loads are also to be subjected to a 100% check and a record made of this action. Any discrepancies are to be reported to DTMA MCC. 06246. Security considerations in establishments. The location of loaded wagons within an establishment is to be reported to the Guard Force. Wagons should be positioned in the best location to facilitate security protection, checking and supervision. Consideration must be given to the adequacy of security lighting, guard dogs and 'stand alone' alarms. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Bulk (non-individual) movement by sea 06247. General. Specific regulations for the movement by sea of ammunition and explosives are covered in JSP 445. Whenever possible arms, ammunition and explosives should be carried in Service shipping or, when this is not possible, in British Shipping operating under the British Flag. If difficulties are encountered in meeting this requirement then the DTMA MCC and the Security staff are to be consulted. 06248. Responsibilities. a. The consignor or responsible movements authority is responsible for the supervision of loading and despatch of the material. The movement of materials from the port to destinations within the United Kingdom either by road or rail is to accord with the provisions of this chapter. b. The DTMA MCC in the United Kingdom or movements organizations overseas are responsible for providing the consignee with full details of the load, the name and type of ship, the arrival port and the estimated time of arrival. 06249. Escorts. Provision of escorts should always be considered. 06250. Sealing. Holds are to be sealed using approved seals in the presence of an authorized representative of the consignor, and opened at the destination in the presence of an authorized representative of the consignee, who is to be responsible for the supervision of the unloading and the dispatch of the consignment to the unit location. In certain circumstances the master of the vessel may require access to the sealed hold and when this occurs the authorized representative of the consignee is to ensure afterwards that the consignment has not been tampered with. Lockup stowage is always required for small arms. 06251. Personal weapons. Personal weapons taken on board vessels are normally to be labelled, stored under collective secure arrangements in the ship's armoury during the voyage and only re-issued just before disembarkation. 06252. Responsibilities. On commercial ships, the responsibility for the security and storage of arms lies with the Master of the vessel in consultation with the Commanding Officer of the embarked unit. For short voyages, individuals may retain weapons in their possession throughout the voyage. For longer voyages weapons should be stored in the most secure locker or compartment made available under arrangements of the ship's master, the Service embarkation authority and the Commanding Officer of the embarked unit. In such circumstances guarding arrangements must be considered. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Bulk (non-individual) movement by air 06253. General. Specific regulations for the movement by air of ammunition and explosives are covered in JSP 335. Ideally materiels should be carried in RAF Aircraft (and accord with Security regulations set out by the RAF) or British chartered aircraft on contract to the MOD. Where this is not possible UK civil air lines or those of the consignee's country may be used. (Civil aircraft must be registered in either the consignor's or the consignee's country). The Captain should also normally be a British national or a national of the recipient country. Flights must be direct wherever possible and must not be over communist or other countries which present a threat. 06254. Responsibilities. Where the consignor is not the Ministry of Defence it is the responsibility of the appropriate PSyA in conjunction with the consignor to determine whether air consignments need to be escorted by security escorts, and the PSyA will give guidance. A decision will be made after considering the nationality of the aircrew, the route of the flight and the current political situation in any country in which the aircraft expects to land, overfly or to which it may be diverted. 06255. Security measures. The following measures are to be taken: a. Material delivered to the aircraft must be loaded immediately or be returned to the consignor or kept at the airfield under appropriate security protection. b. At intermediate routine stops the material must remain in the aircraft and the department has to be satisfied that adequate safeguards are provided. c. For an emergency landing, or prolonged delay at an intermediate stop, such effective measures for the protection of the material where possible are to be taken. d. The aircraft must be met as it lands at its destination, and the materials delivered to the consignee (or his agent). Where this is not possible the material must be stored under acceptable and agreed security protection. e. Where a consignment cannot go by direct flight, and trans-shipment will be necessary on route, the consignment must not be despatched until proper arrangements have been made for secure trans-shipment - eg, unloading and guarding on the ground, storage, and onward loading. Such arrangements must have the approval of PSyAs. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-12 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives ANNEX A TO SECTION II TO CHAPTER 6 - SECURITY ASPECTS TO BE CONSIDERED IN MAKING A MOVEMENT PLAN OR PROVIDING INSTRUCTIONS OR BRIEFINGS 1. 2. Date and time of move. (Not at night unless operationally vital) Date and time of arrival. (Consider changing routes with consecutive 3. Route to be followed. consignments). 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Planned stops for food and rest. Planned stops for overnight security. Provision of escorts. Telephone numbers (consignor, consignee, breakdown, accident, MDP etc). Procedure to be followed after breakdown or accident. 9. Reporting of movement and arrival (must report back within specified times and on arrival at destination). 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. Name of person responsible to receive consignment. Ensuring consignment is checked, and signed for on arrival. Procedure for receipt of materials on route. Immobilization of vehicles. Protection of security keys. 15. Need to request assistance from MDP or Civil Police for any particularly vulnerable part of the journey. 16. . Communications requirement 6-2-A-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives ANNEX B TO SECTION II TO CHAPTER 6 SPECIMEN FORM OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR SECURITY ESCORT/DRIVER FOR MOVEMENT OF ARMS 1. You have been appointed a security escort/driver in charge of a consignment of stores to be moved as in the attached authorization. The following paragraphs describe your responsibilities during the journey and are in addition to those required by JSP 445. 2. The route to be followed and the measures planned to safeguard the consignment will be explained to you. You will be given written details of: a. Route. b. Approved stopping places. c. Destination and delivery point. d. Accident routine. e. Hand-over arrangements. a. Identification of persons who may have access or who will take delivery. g. Reporting procedures both routine and emergency. 3. You (or senior escort if a convoy is used) will be responsible for the security of the consignment until it has been handed over to the consigned, or his authorities representative, and a receipt obtained. In the event of unforeseen circumstances arising during the journey, you must institute whatever measures you may consider necessary to protect the consignment. To assist in such circumstances you will be provided with a form of written authority which should be shown to the Civil Police or Service Authorities in support of any request for assistance or additional security protection. 4. Your duties are to: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. Take care to avoid incidents which might jeopardise the safety of the consignment. b. Take immediate action to safeguard the consignment in the event of: (1) (2) (3) (4) Delay en route, Damage, any accident, any unplanned circumstances. c. Ensure that no opportunity is given for unauthorized inspection, theft or malicious damage to the consignment. 5. The following specific points are brought to your attention: a. You must examine the consignment before departure and satisfy yourself that it is complete, that it is securely packed and that its markings do not disclose the contents beyond those required when such stores are being moved. b. You must not permit any unauthorized person to have access to the consignment or vehicle particularly when stationary or at an authorized stopping point etc. Accompanying movement documents must not leave your possession and may not be shown to unauthorized persons. Should the Civil Police wish to inspect the vehicle then they must be told to contact your establishment to obtain safety advice before doing so. c. You must not leave the consignment unattended unless it is under constant guard by Police or Armed Forces or within the protected area of a Government establishment or on premises approved by the Authority. d. In the event of unforeseen delay the consignor and the consignee must be informed at once. If necessary you should seek help from the authorities mentioned at c. above. e. You must ensure that the consignment is delivered to only the consignee or his duly authorized representative. If unforeseen circumstances make it necessary to transfer the consignment, or part of it, to other than the authorized recipient you must first obtain authority to do so from the consignor. f. On handing over the consignment you must obtain a signed receipt which must be returned to the consignor. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives 6. If you are in any doubt about your duties or responsibilities as a security escort you must obtain guidance before commencing the journey. (Signature) ............................................................... (Appointment) ......................................................... (Must be a responsible person as defined in para 06004.j above). (Establishment) .......................................................................................... (Date) ........................ (Telephone number-Civil) .............................................. (Telephone number ­ military) ................................... JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-B-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-B-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives ANNEX C TO SECTION II TO CHAPTER 6 RESTRICTED ­ When completed (may be protectively marked higher if appropriate) FORM OF AUTHORITY TO BE CARRIED BY SECURITY ESCORT/DRIVER FOR MOVEMENT OF ARMS Valid until ________________________ This is to certify that (Name) ________________________(Driving licence no.)____________ (Pass/ID Card No.)______________ (Travel document no.)____________ whose signature is appended below, and who is accompanied by* (Name) ________________________*(Driving licence no.)____________ (Pass/ID Card No.) ____________________ (Travel document no.) ___________ is responsible for the safe transport *(in vehicle no) ______________________ of a consignment of material which is the property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government. This consignment is being moved from ____________________________ via _____________________________ to ________________________________________ leaving at _________________ on ____________________ We have instructed (Name) ________________________________ that the consignment must never be left unattended, that he/she must decline to answer questions concerning the consignment and that no unauthorized persons, except members of the Emergency Services, are to be allowed to examine the contents. RESTRICTED ­ When completed) (may be protectively marked higher if appropriate) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security RESTRICTED (may be protectively marked higher if appropriate) It is requested that (Name) ___________________________________ may be afforded all possible facilities in the discharge of his duties. In the event of (Name) ____________________________________ suffering serious injury will the finder of this certificate please communicate at once with Despatching unit: Unit address: Unit telephone number: and/or notify: Specimen of signature of (Name) Signature of authorizing official *Insert as appropriate List of arms by type: Stamp of authority RESTRICTED ­ When completed (may be protectively marked higher if appropriate) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives SECTION III TO CHAPTER 6 MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE STORAGE OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES Introduction 06301. General principle. All arms, ammunition and explosives are to be stored and protected in buildings and areas that meet the MOD security and safety standards. The Defence Estates (DE) minimum standards for armoury buildings are detailed at Annex A, and those for storage of ammunition and explosives are at Annex B. Details of security locks are at Annex C to this Section. 06302. Increased protection for buildings not constructed to full security standards. Storage buildings which, because of their age, function and size, do not and cannot meet the accepted standards are to be inspected to determine an acceptable level of protection. These measures could include use of a combination of high security weldmesh fencing, additional detection devices, CCTV and approved security lighting, increased patrolling or the introduction of guard dogs (see Annex A). 06303. Security considerations. In order to minimise the financial and manpower costs establishments are to: a. Consider the use of approved alarm systems and approved CCTV systems. (The use of a SEAP approved Class 4 IDS is mandatory for the storage of arms, ammunition and explosives that are considered to be ACTO as listed in Chapter 6 para 06104b). b. Concentrate holding of materials in the least number of buildings commensurate with safety regulations. c. Store ACTO materials in the most secure accommodation. d. Consider the short-term use of an approved arms chest where the quantity of arms, ammunition and explosives is small. e. Ensure materials from laboratory production/test/trial areas are placed in secure storage facilities outside working hours. 06304. Storage facility drawings. DE produces the standard drawings for storage facilities for MOD. The drawings take full account of these instructions. DE is to be consulted at the earliest stage when a new build or upgrade is JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security recommended. HOE are to ensure that any drawings or plans relating to their establishments storage facilities are retained and are available for inspection throughout the life of the building. Storage of Weapons 06305. Man-portable weapons. When not in use all man-portable weapons, including mortars, are to be stored as follows: a. Complete weapons. Complete weapons (include bolts/working parts) must be stored in secure armouries. b. Automatic weapons. Automatic weapons, whether complete or not, must be stored in secure armouries. c. Personal weapons. Personal weapons may be kept, when authorised by the HOE, in barrack rooms or place of work (e.g. offices), during working hours only but must be returned to armouries at the end of duty unless required for duty after normal working hours. HOE are to ensure that adequate security arrangements are made for personal weapons when they are not in establishment armouries. d. Pistols. Pistols must be secured in secure armouries in one of the following ways: (1) (2) (3) Behind an XPM 2089 screen or cage. In approved lockable steel cabinets. In bolt boxes bolted to the floor or wall of the armoury. e. Bolts. Where non-automatic weapons have to be stored in a structurally approved (as opposed to secure) armoury, bolts must be removed from weapons to a separate building and stored separately. A bolt box, secured to the structure of the building as approved by the Principal Security Adviser (PSyA), would meet the requirement. f. Other small arms weapon parts. The same degree of security as detailed in Sub-paragraph e above, must be provided for the following weapon parts and components: (1) (2) (3) Barrels. Breech blocks. Firing pins. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (4) (5) (6) Springs. Magazines. Magazine housings. g. Large weapons. Where the size of weapons precludes storage in armouries, Security Authorities are to issue specific instructions for their protection. Large weapons must, where possible, be stored in buildings, which, although not necessarily up to armoury standards, will afford a Delay Time which must be greater than the Guard Force's Response Time. When possible, firing needle assemblies and ranging devices must be removed and stored in secure armouries. h. 66mm HEAT and LAW 80 rocket launchers. All HEAT and LAW 80 rocket launcher tubes (including inert tubes) are to be treated as ACTO ammunition. j. Non-firing firearms. Minimum security standards for nonfiring firearms are as follows: (1) Innocuous. To be protected to the same standard as live firing weapons. (2) Drill Purpose (DP) and Sectionalised Firearms (SI). Where possible, DP and SI weapons should be stored in an armoury. Where this is not possible, they are to be stored in a mini armoury, approved arms chest or approved secure storeroom. (3) De-activated. De-activated weapons are not required to be stored in an armoury. They are, as a minimum, to be stored in a robust, locked container if not displayed in a locked cabinet or securely mounted on a wall. (4) Imitation/Dummy. Such firearms, which include replica weapons, are not to be stored in an armoury containing live firing weapons. They are, as a minimum, to be stored in a lockable container within a locked room. k. MILAN. MILAN firing posts are to be protected to the same level as small arms and whenever possible stored in establishment armouries. Planning for new armouries should take account of this requirement. Where the use of existing armouries is impracticable they may be stored in a support weapons store or a building of comparable JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security security subject to local security advice. As for other natures, MILAN ammunition is to be stored separately from the firing posts. l. Sectionalised weapons. Sectionalised weapons that expose the working parts can be reconverted to fire live rounds. Such weapons are to be held under secure conditions. These secure arrangements (which will vary according to location, number and type of stores, threat, etc) must meet security requirements laid down by PSyAs. 06306. Small Arms Trainers (SAT) weapons. SAT are to be held under secure conditions. These secure arrangements (which will vary according to location, number and type of stores, threat, etc) must meet security requirements laid down by PSyAs. Storage of Protectively Marked Arms, Ammunition and Explosives 06307. Where protectively marked materials are to be stored, additional safeguards are to be considered. Policy given in this chapter and Chapter 5 should be employed to guard against both the terrorist and espionage threat. 06308. For the storage of SECRET or caveated material approved Type A security doors are to be used. Explosive Materiel on Display 06309. Where explosive materiel is used for display purposes, all materiel must be: a. Certified Free From Explosives (FFE) and clearly and indelibly marked as such (unless properly constructed and marked as Drill Purpose (DP) stores. In addition each item is to be marked with a unique local serial number that is recorded in a register. b. When not in direct custody when being put to training use, all items are to be suitably secured in a locked display cabinet, room, building or compound appropriate to the highest Protective Marking applied to any of the items concerned. c. If Protectively Marked CONFIDENTIAL or above, protected by an IDS and any other additional security measures required by the PSyA. Note: Live materiel must never be used as training aids or for display purposes. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Weapons on Display 06310. Where weapons, including trophy weapons and bayonets etc, are used for display purposes, the following applies: a. Permanent display. Only de-activated firearms may be permanently displayed, unless a dispensation for other weapons is authorised by Sector security staff. Weapons for display are to be: (1) Certified as de-activated in accordance with Paragraph 06143 or as authorised by the PSyA. (2) Firmly secured in a locked display cabinet and/or securely affixed to the fabric of the building. (3) Provided with an alarm system where necessary. b. Temporary display. Any non-firing firearm may be temporarily displayed when the weapon is: (1) Made inert or inoperable by the removal of salient working parts. (2) Locked or chained to the display stand and supervised at all times. (3) Removed to secure storage when not supervised. c. Training aids. Training aids must be supervised at all times when not secured as detailed in Paragraph 06206j. 06311. Before any room, building or area is brought into use to display items, for example in museums, at open days or on permanent display in instructional or crew rooms, permission and advice are first to be sought from the PSyA. Comprehensive orders are to be produced by the owner/custodian of the items and approved by the PSyA. Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives in Laboratories, Test Chambers and Process Buildings 06312. Weapons are not to be left unattended in laboratories, test chambers or process buildings. ESyOs are to ensure that the storage of weapons meets the standards required in this chapter. 06313. Ammunition and explosives held in laboratories, test chambers and process buildings are to be protected within secure storage facilities that meet with explosive licensing requirements. Where this is not possible it may be JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security necessary for the ESyO or the Safety/Explosives Officer to ensure that suitable physical measures exist or arrange the removal of these items to suitably secure and licensed accommodation. Arms Issued to Individuals 06314. Individuals are not permitted to keep Service arms or ammunition at home or in any private residence or accommodation accessible to the general public (e.g. hotels or clubs). Security of Demountable Weaponry 06315. General. The security protection given to demountable weapons (as used on ships, vehicles or aircraft) is to be considered when the weapon is fitted and when the weapon is not. Due to the variety of different weapons and weapons systems that fall within this category, it is the responsibility of PSyAs to determine the specific security instructions for a demountable weapon. The standards applied to demountable weapons are not to be lower than the security standards for personal weapons. Handling and Firing of MOD Weapons by Civilians 06316. The possession of MOD weapons by civilians is to be in accordance with current Firearms legislation, Armed Forces Act 1996 and MOD instructions including the requirement for security clearances. The term 'possession' covers the handling and/or firing of weapons and, for the purpose of this instruction, includes ammunition for those weapons. 06317. A civilian may be in possession of MOD weapons under the following conditions: a. Unsupervised (1) If the civilian is employed in the service of Her Majesty and in accordance with their duties as authorised by the HOE. or (2) If the civilian is under contract to the MOD and holds an appropriate and current Firearms Certificate or is covered by an appropriate and current Section 5 Authority issued by the Home Office under the provision of the Firearms Act 1968 where, in either case, such Authority is specific to the purpose of possession of MOD weapons on, in transit, or between, JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Service property and in accordance with Service orders and regulations. b. Supervised. On Service premises only, at events authorised by the HOE, such as open days, providing that each civilian is under supervision by a suitably qualified, competent and authorised member of the Armed Forces. Storage of Privately Owned Firearms and Ammunition on MOD Property 06318. General principles. All privately owned firearms and ammunition must be the subject of a valid firearms certificate and must be stored in an approved Service armoury under regulations laid down for armouries or licensed explosive storehouses as appropriate. 06319. Storage on MOD property. If there is no Service armoury available, such arms and ammunition may be stored on MOD property provided that the following procedures are strictly adhered to: a. Authority must be obtained from the HOE where the arms and ammunition are to be stored. b. The civil police for the area in which the arms and ammunition are to be stored must be consulted under the terms of the Firearms Act 1968; their approval for the storage, and any security conditions that they may impose, must be obtained in writing; and such conditions must be complied with. c. The approval of the PSyA is to be obtained. They may impose any further limitations above and beyond those required by a and b above. d. On cadet force premises, only those private weapons needed to meet or supplement cadet forces training requirements are to be stored; no stored private weapon is to be of greater than .22 calibre, and handguns of all types are prohibited. e. No type of firearm is to be owned by any individual unless he has a valid firearm or shotgun certificate. f. Units owning full bore or small bore rifles or pistols for competition shooting purposes must comply with the Firearms Act 1968, Section 11. This necessitates the formation of a target-shooting club which must be approved by the Home Office. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security g. Privately owned firearms and ammunition may be stored in establishment armouries and ammunition stores at the owner's risk, but only with permission of the HOE. They are to be accounted for and afforded the same security, including periodic checks, as Service arms or ammunition. h. Privately owned firearms and ammunition are only to be used by the holder of the firearm certificate to which the firearms and ammunition relate. 06320. Long term safe custody. Personnel living in privately owned accommodation and posted overseas may request long term safe custody of privately owned weapons (but not ammunition) at a suitable establishment subject to the terms of this chapter. Storage of MDP Owned Firearms and Ammunition 06321. Responsibility. The security of MDP weapons, ammunition and explosives is the subject of MDP regulations. 06322. Requests for storage. An MDP detachment, based at a MOD establishment, may request the establishment to provide safe custody of MDP weapons and ammunition if local circumstances are such as to prevent compliance with MDP regulations. 06323. Recording and checking. For purposes of recording and checking, MDP weapons are to be treated as Service weapons being held in safe custody. 06324. Issue. MDP weapons and ammunition are only to be issued on the authority of the Chief Constable, MDP or the HOE. Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives during Range Practices and Exercises 06325. When arms, ammunition and explosives are taken out of armouries/storage for range courses and exercises, the security risk is greatly increased. In addition to a comprehensive security brief on the care, control and custody of arms, ammunition and explosives, the following precautions are also to be taken: a. Off-base range practices. Standing orders are to be issued covering the procedure to be followed before leaving base and during the outward and return journey, and setting out the safeguards to be taken and checks to be made on arrival at the ranges, during firing practices, and before departure from the ranges. A complete check of all JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives arms and ammunition is to be made on arrival and on departure from the range and on return to the unit. b. Field exercises. Responsibilities are to be clearly defined in standing orders for the safeguarding and carriage of arms, ammunition and explosives throughout the exercise. The following points should be included: (1) Arms, ammunition and explosives are to be protected at all times. In camps and bivouacs where there is no secure armoury and ammunition store, arms, ammunition and explosives are to be centralized subject to safety rules under a 24 hour two person guard, or held in the care of the individual to whom they have been issued. (2) When movement eventually takes place after a prolonged static period, a thorough 'sweep' of the areas vacated is to be carried out. (3) A daily check is to be made of all personal weapons, ammunition and explosives held by individuals. Note: Policy on movement of arms, ammunition and explosives is at Section II. 06326. Inert items of ammunition. Inert items of ammunition are to be afforded reasonable protection due to their potential for adaptation. A particular example of this danger is the tube of the 66mm HEAT or LAW 80 rocket launcher, which it is possible to convert after firing to launch illegally manufactured missiles. To guard against this risk, inert tubes are always to be handled and stored under secure arrangements. Tubes are to be accounted for and when no longer required they are to be returned to the appropriate ammunition depot. 06327. Accounting for ammunition and explosives on ranges and exercise areas. When live ammunition is fired it is to be accounted for directly on completion of the training period. All personnel are to be warned that the declaration that they are not in possession of live or blank rounds or empty cases, applies equally to explosives, pyrotechnics and accessories when used. 06328. Return of ammunition and explosives after exercises. Units returning from training are to ensure that ammunition and explosives are returned immediately to approved secure storage. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives ANNEX A TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 6 PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR ARMOURY BUILDINGS General Physical Security Consideration and Siting 1. New armoury buildings are to be constructed in accordance with DE approved standard drawings. If there is a requirement for existing armouries to be rebuilt, approved standard drawings are to be used. Compliance with the regulations laid down in this Manual is not a justification by itself for the rebuild of existing armouries. where concerns about the standards of existing storage arrangements are raised, the advice of the PSyA is to be sought. Doors 2. If possible, only one access door is to be used, which is to be kept locked when not in use. Detailed specifications for doors and door fastenings are: a. All new building doors are to conform to approved standard drawings. b. When fitted, the steel plate should be wrapped around the edges of the door and frame and secured on the edges and inside face by woodscrews, countersunk and spaced not more than 100mm apart. The metal faces are to be carried bolted at the centre and the corners, with the bolt heads fitted on the outside faces. c. The frames on which the doors are hung should be of the same standard as the doors and should be securely fixed to the buildings by ragbolts at 600mm between centres, set to a depth of at least 50mm. If the building fabric is not suitable for ragbolts, the advice of Command security staff should be sought to determine a satisfactory method of securing the frame. Any gap between frame and masonry should be filled with material which cannot easily be removed. d. Doors should open outwards and be hung on a minimum of three robust steel hinges which are to be capped and recessed. e. A door security chain should be fitted and hinge bolts fixed to the frame and hanging edge of the door. f. Doors are to be protected by an approved IDS. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 6-3-A-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 3. If it is essential to fit double or sliding doors, padbolts must be fitted at the top and bottom of each section. Sliding doors should be fitted so as to slide internally. Sliding channels should be protected by fitting a raised concrete sill at floor level and a heavy metal retaining rail at the top, firmly fixed to the fabric of the building. 4. Ideally, where double and sliding doors are fitted, provision should be made for a small access door for personnel. The physical construction of this access door should be as specified in para 2: it is to be fitted with the locks and devices described below. Locks 5. Two approved locks are to be fitted to armoury building doors (see Annex C). The types of locks to be used are: a. b. c. d. Two rimlocks. Two mortise locks One rimlock and one mortise lock. Dead locking 3 way multiple bolting system. In general, new builds are to have locks included with the doorset, e.g. Benweld door with ASSA hookbolt deadlocks. Windows and Ventilators 6. All non-essential apertures are to be bricked up. Remaining windows are to be of the non-opening type and are to be located as high above ground level as possible. They are to be constructed or protected as follows: a. Windows should be made either of wire reinforced translucent glass, or of glass bricks to SSG Outline Specification No 8 set in concrete or a steel frame. The frame should be an integral part of the building so that it cannot be easily removed. b. Window bars should be constructed as per SSG Drawings PS 301 or PS 302. The bars are, however, at 150mm centres with 45 x 6mm rails at 200mm centres in 50 x 50 x 6mm angle frame, bolted/screwed to the wall. (SSG specification No 8 blocks do not require bars). c. Windows are to be included in the IDS. d. If the local security situation warrants additional security, e.g. to prevent explosive or toxic devices from being introduced into the buildings, the window should be covered by sheets of heavy gauge mesh welded to a metal frame and bolted to the masonry. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives 7. Where the fabric of the building will not permit steel bars to be secured into position, they should be welded to a frame of similar metal which should be welded or burred to prevent their removal. The framework is to be securely bolted through the building fabric. 8. If ventilators are necessary, they should be of the staggered airbrick variety and must be as strong as the rest of the building. If not, they are to be reinforced with heavy gauge mesh. If the interior of the building can be viewed through the ventilator, with or without the interior lights being switched on, the ventilator is to be covered with metal sheeting, standing proud from the ventilator to permit air circulation. The metal sheeting should be of sufficient strength to prevent easy bending or distortion and should be so fixed to the fabric as to prevent unauthorized removal from the outside. Consideration should be given to fitting offset ventilators. 9. If a fan or trunk ventilation system is necessary, care must be taken to ensure that all inlets and outlets are fully protected. Any suitable method described in the preceding paragraphs may be considered. Additionally, a heavy narrow gauge XPM sheet, welded or brazed on to a frame and securely bolted into position in the trunking, may be used. Hatchways 10. Where a hatch is necessary, e.g. to facilitate the issue of arms it should be protected by whichever of the methods described above is most suitable. The hatchway is to be included in the IDS and should incorporate identification slots and sentry door viewers. Intruder Detection Systems 11. A Class 4 IDS (see the Catalogue of Security Equipment for details) is to be installed in all armouries containing weapons classified as ACTO as listed in Chapter 6 para 06104b and those weapons considered by Service Security Authorities to require such protection. The purpose of the IDS is to ensure that the response force can respond in accordance with para 06130 or 06131. 12. The IDS is to provide an audible alarm as a deterrent to an unauthorised entry and an alarm signal to an alarm panel located in a 24 hour manned secure control centre. 13. A manual emergency alarm system, consisting of a duress alarm, is to be installed within the armoury so that the occupants can raise the alarm in the event of an attack. This alarm is to be located near doors and issue hatches and should sound an audible warning as a deterrent, and provide an alarm signal to a warning panel in a 24 hour manned secure control centre. 14. The advice of the PSyA is to be sought on the type of IDS and alarm system to be installed. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 6-3-A-3 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 15. System activating keys are to be treated as security keys and safeguarded in accordance with the instructions in Chapter 5. Inspection Grilles 16. A sentry door viewer should be fitted to external doors and issue hatchways to permit the positive identification of persons seeking entry. An inspection grille, suitably protected and large enough for identification documents to be passed through for scrutiny, should also be let into the doors of buildings where control of entry is in force, and into issue hatchways. Internal Doors 17. Internal doors of armoury buildings, which directly lead to weapons, should be constructed to the same standard as external doors, as per para 2. Security of Weapons 18. Weapons are to be stored so that they cannot be removed quickly or easily by a person who has gained unauthorized access to the armoury building. This can be achieved in a number of ways depending on the type of weapon to be protected. 'In use' weapons can be stored on a rack or in a steel cupboard and secured with a high tensile steel rod or bar or a suitable steel wire rope, spliced and bound with copper wire and then soldered or mechanically joined by the Talurit method, passed through the rack or cupboard and the trigger guards of the weapons. The rod, bar or wire is then fixed by 2 hasps and secured by a security padlock. The fixing bolts of the hasps should be properly secured, preferably by being secured into the building structure. Racks and storage cupboards should be securely bolted to the floor and fabric of the room. SA80 Weapon Racks 19. SA80s are to be stowed in specific purpose built racks. Chessington drawings 16 40 007 and 16 40 098 refer. Security Lighting 20. The provision of external lighting for armoury buildings must take account of the need to create a high degree of illumination and eliminate shadows. A lighting factor of 3.0 lumens per 900 square centimetres should be achieved to illuminate the building and its immediate surroundings. Lighting fixed to armoury buildings should be in sealed glass bulkheads, located above the entrance doors and at all corners at a height of between 2.44m and 3.05m. The operating switches for this lighting should be located either within the building or in a secure position. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 6-3-A-4 RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Security Keys 21. External keys to armoury buildings and keys to internal weapons stores are to be protected in accordance with Chapter 5, i.e. as security keys. Keys to internal weapons stores are not to be secured within the armoury building and are to be kept separate from the external door keys. The security of keys is to be so arranged so that one person cannot gain access to both arms and ammunition. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 6-3-A-5 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 6-3-A-6 RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives ANNEX B TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 6 MINIMUM PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR BUILDINGS CONTAINING ACTO EXPLOSIVE STORES 1. Buildings containing ammunition and explosives are to be constructed according to the standards set by the Explosives Storage and Transport Committee (ESTC), which are incorporated into the mandatory Service explosive regulations. A representative of the CIE will assist in the selection of the building type to be considered and provide guidance to the designer on the service regulations to be applied. These standards and regulations shall be read in conjunction with DE (Specialist Construction Group) (DE(SCG)) Works Services Functional Standards. DE(SCG), as the Works Technical Authority for physical security and explosive buildings, should be consulted for design approval prior to construction. 2. For security reasons the following principles and design requirements are to be applied to all new buildings, and as far as is practicable, when improving existing facilities to a commensurate standard, to store ACTO explosive stores. General Physical Security Consideration and Siting 3. Explosives buildings should not be sited in remote areas unless a satisfactory combination of security patrols, response forces, intruder detection system (IDS) and local orders ensure the physical security of the explosives. 4. The ESTC design standards cover a variety of construction options including reinforced concrete, earth covered igloo structures, free standing, traversed, brick structures and light frangible buildings each with the minimum of openings that require security safeguarding. Where new or conversion work is being considered, DE(SCG), the PSyA and the CIE advisor will highlight any short-comings in the design that could be a potential security risk; these shortcomings are to be addressed during the design phase and eliminated as far as is practicable. The following specific design requirements for components of the building are to be considered during the design phase and incorporated as necessary. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Frangible Blow-out Panels 5. Some approved designs of explosive buildings incorporate blow-out panels, which are provided to fail in the event of an internal explosive event. These blow-out panels are not as strong as the remainder of the structure and depending on their design may require additional security devices to prevent access, without inhibiting design failure, from the outside of the building. When all explosives are removed from the building at cease work the additional security requirements may be permanently waived. 6. A blow-out panel of brick, concrete or similar construction (unsuitable for HD1.1 containment structures) will not appear different from the remainder of the building and no further security devices will normally be necessary, although it must not be obstructed in any way. When security considerations are to prevent the introduction of explosive or toxic devices into the building through the blow-out panel, then a solid blow-out panel of this type is generally used. 7. A frangible blow-out panel made from glass, glass reinforced plastic or similar (suitable for HD1.1 containment structures) will need to be safeguarded by the fitting of bars. These bars may be incorporated into the blow-out panel itself but must be positioned internally so as to permit unrestrained venting. When bars are used they are to conform, as a minimum, to the diameter and spacing, and/or fixing specified at para 12b or 13. Doors 8. Doors used on explosive buildings are specified by the ESTC and may override the security requirements because explosive safety considerations specify a particular type and construction. The construction of the doors to meet the minimum security requirements is detailed below and is to be applied if the ESTC guidelines are not specific: a. b. If possible only one access door is to be used. All doors are to be kept locked when the building is not in use. c. For all new buildings doors are to conform to the Government standard "Chessington" Drawing No DW 55713/3 Sheets 1 - 16. d. For existing buildings being modified as explosive buildings the doors are to be of minimum 44mm thick solid hardwood core construction, covered by 1.6mm mild steel on both sides and edges, and fitted with hinge bolts. The steel plate is to be secured on all edges and the inside face by woodscrews, countersunk and spaced not more than JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives 100mm apart. The metal faces are to be carriage bolted at the centre and corners, with the bolt heads fitted from the outside face. e. The frames upon which the doors are hung should be of the same standard as the doors. The frame should be secured to the building by a suitable secure bolt system at 600mm centres, with a minimum embedded length of 100mm. Any gap between the frame and masonry should be filled with a fireproof and tenacious mastic. f. Doors should normally open outwards, except when the building design requires inwardly opening doors for the containment of an explosive event, and be hung on a minimum of 3 robust steel hinges, which are to be capped and recessed. g. Doors are to be protected by an IDS approved by the appropriate PSyA and the CIE. 9. When double or sliding doors are specified, padbolts must be fitted internally at the top and bottom of each section. If sliding doors are specified they should be fitted to slide internally if possible. Sliding channels should, if operating conditions permit, be protected by fitting a raised concrete sill at floor level and a heavy metal retaining rail at the top which is securely fixed to the building fabric. 10. Ideally a personnel access door should be fitted when sliding or double door sets are specified. The physical characteristics of this type of door are to be the same as specified in this Annex. Locks 11. Locks from the approved types listed at Annex C are to be fitted to explosives building doors. The number and types of locks to be fitted to buildings storing explosives are to be selected from the following: a. b. c. d. Two rimlocks. Two mortise locks. One rimlock and one mortise lock. Two dead locking 3 way multiple bolt system. Windows and Ventilators 12. All non-essential apertures are to be bricked up. Apertures required for ventilation of the building contents or venting (blow-out panels) shall not be JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-B-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security obstructed. Essential windows are to be of the non-opening type and located as high above ground level as possible. They are to be constructed or protected as follows: a. Windows are to be made from laminated glass or glass bricks set either in concrete or a steel frame that is integral with the building and not easily removable. b. High tensile steel bars are to be fitted. They are to be not less than 20mm in diameter, spaced apart not more than 125mm between centres, and set into the fabric of the building. The bars should be held in place by 40 x 10mm flat steel spacers or plate spaced at not more than 460mm. The spacers should have 'T' ends that are secured to the fabric with cement grout to a depth of 150mm on either side of the window. c. If windows are fitted they are to be protected by detectors connected to the IDS. d. If additional security warrants, e.g. to prevent the introduction of explosive or toxic devices into the building through the windows, then sheets of heavy gauge welded mesh shall be welded to the window frame. 13. Where the fabric will not permit steel bars to be secured into position, they should be fixed internally by welding to the frame. 14. If ventilators are specified they should generally be air-bricks and of equivalent strength as the rest of the walling. If this cannot be achieved they are to be reinforced with heavy gauge expanded metal sheet fixed to the interior of the building in such a way as to prevent unauthorised removal. 15. If a fan assisted ducted ventilation system is specified care must be taken to ensure all inlets and outlets are protected. Bars or narrow gauge XPM sheet shall be provided within the ductwork at the security boundary. This must be welded or brazed to a frame and securely bolted into the ducting. Hatchways 16. Where a hatch is necessary, i.e. to facilitate the issue of stores, it should be protected by whichever of the methods described in this Annex is most appropriate. The hatchway is to be included in the IDS. Intruder Detection Systems 17. A Class 4 IDS is to be installed in all buildings used for the long term storage of ACTO ammunition and explosives listed or associated with, the JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-B-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives weapons in Chapter 6, para 06104b and those ammunition and explosives considered by the Security Authority to require such protection. The purpose of the IDS is to ensure that the response force can respond in accordance with para 06131 or 06132. 18. An exception to para 17 may be granted by the PSyA for short term storage, following consultation with the CIE and where an appropriate guard, patrol or alternative security device or measure is provided so as to respond to any unauthorised entry in time to prevent the loss of or damage to the ammunition and/or explosives being protected. 19. An IDS is to provide an audible warning as a deterrent to an unauthorised entry and an alarm signal to an alarm panel located in a 24 hour manned secure control centre. 20. A manual emergency alarm system, consisting of a duress alarm, may also be provided within the building so that the occupants can raise the alarm in the event of an attack. Such an alarm is to be located near doors and issue hatches and should sound an audible warning as a deterrent, and provide an alarm signal to a warning panel in a 24 hour manned secure control centre. 21. The advice of CIE, DE(Works) and the PSyA is to be sought on the type of IDS and alarm to be installed. Any IDS or alarm must electrically meet the requirements of the electrical category of the explosives building. 22. System activation keys are to be treated as security keys and safeguarded in accordance with the instructions in Chapter 5. Inspection Viewers and Grilles 23. A sentry door viewer is to be fitted to external doors on guardrooms where explosives are stored to permit identification of persons seeking entry. A viewer is not required on those explosives buildings that are used solely as storehouses and process buildings. An inspection grille should be fitted into the door of buildings where control of entry is in force. The grille should be large enough to permit identity documents to pass through it. Internal Doors 24. Internal doors protecting the explosives being stored are to be of the same or equivalent standard as the external door type specified in para 8d. Alternative equivalent doors may be found in JSP 411. For example the secure gas-tight door at Figure 22 would be suitable. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-B-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Internal Storage 25. Where explosive safety regulations permit explosives to be stored in manned areas the explosives are to be stored in authorised storage devices. Keys to internal explosive stores are not to be secured within the building containing the internal store, but are to be kept separate from the external keys in a secure place and safeguarded in accordance with the instructions in Chapter 5. Security Lighting 26. The provision of external lighting for explosives buildings must take account of the need to create a high degree of illumination and eliminate shadows. This requirement must be balanced against the overriding safety requirement when the building is on an airfield. 27. A level of illumination of 4 LUX should be used to illuminate the buildings and surrounding area. When the luminaire are mounted upon columns they are to be positioned such that there is a distance of one and onehalf times the height of the stanchion from the building to the luminaire. Luminaires fixed to buildings are to comply with the ESTC standards and service regulations for electrical equipment used in explosives areas, and mounted at the corners of the building at a height of between 2.5 and 3.0m. Lamps in sealed glass bulkheads may be mounted above the doors of the building to illuminate the area in front of the doors. Operating switches for security lighting should be located in a secure cabinet attached to the external wall of the building or operated automatically. Fences 28. Consideration should be given to providing a security fence if the local situation dictates the need. The PSyA is to be consulted on the need for, and (if required) standard of the fence. When a security fence is required the fence should be positioned at least 20m from any explosives storage building. The keys for the access gates are to be treated as security keys and handled in accordance with the instructions in Chapter 5. Other Security Criteria 29. The instructions for security patrols, response forces and security orders detailed in this chapter apply. In addition the protection of security keys is to be in accordance with the instructions in Chapter 5. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-3-B-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives ANNEX C TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 6 APPROVED LOCKS AND DEVICES FOR ARMOURY BUILDINGS Rimlocks 1. The Avon Locking Unit is the only rim lock suitable for armoury use. The following locks remain suitable for armoury use but are not to be used for new constructions and replacements of unserviceable locks unless an Avon Locking Unit cannot be physically fitted: a. b. c. d. The Avon Rim Fixed Deadlock. Ingersoll SC71. Ingersoll SC73. Ingersoll D20. Mortise Locks 2. use: The locks listed below are the only mortise locks suitable for armoury a. b. c. d. e. f. Chubb 3R35 locking latch. Chubb hookbolt 3M50. Chubb 3K70(upright). Chubb 3J60 (horizontal). Chubb 3G110. ASSA Twin 6000 with 9788 high security deadlock. Note: Hookbolts must always be used for double and sliding doors. Hinge Bolts 3. Security hinge bolts - e.g. Chubb pattern WS7. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 6-3-C-1 RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Door Security Chains 4. Doormaster security door chain - Chubb pattern WS6. Sentry Door Viewer 5. Door viewer - Chubb pattern WS8. This provides a 175° angle of vision and only permits viewing one way. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 6-3-C-2 RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives SECTION IV SECURITY OF CADET FORCES ARMS AND AMMUNITION Introduction 06401. The general principles given in this section are to be applied to the storage of cadet forces' arms and ammunition. The movement of cadet forces arms and ammunition (e.g. from cadet forces to ranges and shooting camps) is to be in accordance with Section II of this chapter. Whenever possible, arms and ammunition are to be stored in Service establishments; the regulations for storage on regular establishments are contained in Section III. However, alternative storage facilities may need to be authorized and the Matrix for the storage of arms and ammunition within cadet force premises described at para 06190, has been so designed to identify the criteria required for storage in these circumstances. Security of arms and ammunition - General principles 06402. Under normal circumstances all Service-owned arms and ammunition are to be stored in an approved armoury/storeroom. An approved armoury/storeroom is: a. b. A Regular Service armoury. A Reserve forces armoury. c. A Home Office armoury, if previously approved by the appropriate single-Service Security Unit. d. e. A mini armoury or approved arms chest. A secure storeroom, in accordance with Section III. Dispensations for cadet forces 06403. Permanent storage. Where there is no approved armoury within a reasonable distance of the cadet force unit, permanent storage will be considered if the premises meet the criteria detailed in the matrix at Annex A. 06404. Temporary storage. Service-owned arms and ammunition may be temporarily stored (up to 48 hours) in cadet force premises that do not meet the JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4- 1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security standards of sub paras d or e above, where the facilities meet the index for short term storage detailed in Annex A. 06405. Transport of cadet weapons. In general, up to 2 Service-owned weapons and where necessary up to 1000 rounds of rimfire ammunition may be transported in a private vehicle by an adult member of the cadet forces' uniform cadre. Quantities may be varied in accordance with single-Service instructions. All other provisions of Section II, regarding the precautions to be taken during transit, apply. (Particular attention is drawn to sub-para 06062.c above). Matrix for the storage of arms & ammunition within cadet forces premises. 06406. Methodology. The matrix at Annex A is to be used for the storage of arms and ammunition within cadet force premises. It is similar in methodology to the Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix used in Chapter 5 for physical security. A set of baseline scores has to be met in order for arms and ammunition to be stored on cadet force premises. The standards required are divided into 4 categories as follows: a. b. c. d. Permanent Storage. Temporary Storage. Emergency Storage. Storage of DP Weapons. 06407. Security standards matrix. The security standards matrix is at Annex A. It details the scores required for the 4 categories for both high and low risk areas. 06408. Storage indices. The indices used to calculate the score for use with the Matrix is at Annex B. Withdrawal of weapons & ammunition 06409. Heads of establishments or their nominated deputies, are to give written authority on every occasion that centre-fire/full bore weapons and ammunition are drawn. The weapons and ammunition are to be returned to authorized premises immediately following use. Certificate of security for armouries 06410. Initial certification. All cadet force armouries holding arms and ammunition are to be subjected to an initial survey by the appropriate single-Service security unit JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4- 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives before being certified to hold arms and ammunition. Certification, is only to be given following the implementation of essential recommendations. 06411. Issue of certificate. Arms and ammunition are not to be stored on premises until the security unit has given approval and the appropriate cadet force HQ has issued a certificate of authority to hold arms and ammunition. 06412. Location of certificates. The certificate is to be retained with the arms register and a duplicate retained by the appropriate HQ. 06413. Security unit reports. Security unit reports, following inspections, or security investigations, are to be forwarded to the appropriate Cadet Force HQ and PSyA, with recommendations for the improvement of security facilities. The HQ is to define those recommendations essential for the security of unit arms and direct the unit to implement the modifications. The HQ is to decide, with the advice provided by the security unit whether to withdraw temporarily the authority to hold arms pending the implementation of the recommendations. When unit authority is withdrawn, the arms and ammunition are to be removed immediately and stored in an authorized armoury. Inspections of armouries by security units 06414. In addition to the initial survey of a cadet force's armoury, inspections by security units are to be undertaken in the following circumstances: a. When any doubt exists whether the cadet force unit's security standards are adequate to safeguard its arms and ammunition eg following a break-in. b. Periodically, as prescribed by the appropriate PSyA to ensure appropriate security standards are being maintained. Inspections by cadet force HQs 06415. Cadet force unit security procedures and arms are to be checked periodically by HQ staff at intervals of not more than 12 months. Periodically, a check is to be made without prior notice. When visiting units, regional staffs are to check that security standards are being maintained. Registers 06416. Cadet forces are to maintain 3 registers: a. Small Arms Register. This register is to bear the serial number of the weapons on charge and the dates of voucher and receipt numbers. b. Check of arms register. follows: This register is to be maintained as JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4- 3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (1) All weapons held within the cadet force premises are to be listed individually by type. (2) Arms and ammunition are to be checked by an adult member of the cadet force on every occasion that the unit is open. Each check is to be recorded in the register, which is to be signed and dated by the checker. (3) The register is to contain the certificate of authority to retain arms and ammunition on the premises. (4) The register is to be signed by any officers making periodic security inspections. c. Safe Custody Register. This register is to contain details of weapons held in safe custody (e.g. for other cadet force units). Keys 06417. Protection of keys. Keys are to be protected as follows: a. Armoury keys. When the armoury is not being used to receive or issue arms and ammunition, the armoury door is to be locked. The keys are to be held on a dedicated separate key ring held by the unit commander or his deputy. b. Approved arms chest keys. When not being used to receive or issue arms, arms chests are to be locked. The keys held on a dedicated separate key ring by the unit commander or his deputy. c. Ammunition boxes. When not being used to receive or issue ammunition, ammunition boxes (see para 06214) are to be locked. The keys are to be held on a dedicated separate key ring held by the unit commander or his deputy. (Where possible the ammunition box keys are to be held by a separate person). d. Other security keys. Other unit security keys are to be kept in the possession of the unit commander or an adult member of staff on a separate key ring to those listed in sub-paras a to c above. e. Duplicate keys. The duplicate keys to those listed in sub-paras a to d above are to be deposited in accordance with single-Service Instructions. 06418. Orders. Orders regarding the custody and issue of keys are to be promulgated by the unit commander. They are to be regularly reviewed. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4- 4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Liaison between cadet force units and the civil police 06419. Personal liaison between officers commanding cadet force units and the local police authorities is essential. The police may agree to routine patrols of cadet force buildings where rifles are held, or accept rifles, bolts and magazines and ammunition for short-term custody following unauthorized entry to the premises. Alarm system 06420. Units are encouraged to install a suitable alarm system. Appropriate HQs are to consider fitting an alarm system at those units where the civil police advise that it is essential. Alternatively HQs are to order the removal of the arms and ammunition to a secure authorized armoury. Private weapons 06421. The cadet forces do not accept financial responsibility for any private weapons placed in safe custody with Service issued weapons. The term 'private weapons' includes weapons owned by private individuals and those purchased by the unit concerned. The regulations concerning the handling, storage, safe custody and disposal of these weapons are contained in the Firearms Act 1968. This Act also requires that, when private weapons are held on unit premises, a firearms certificate is required. 06422. In order to qualify for a free issue of a firearms certificate, units require the approval of the Secretary of State. Applications for such approval should be made to the Home Office through local police stations or the National Rifle Association or National Small-bore Rifle Association. Applications should give the correct title of the unit, the type and calibre of weapons concerned, the range or ranges used, and the home address of a responsible adult to whom the firearms certificate can be issued. 06423. Only those private weapons needed to meet or supplement cadet force training requirements are to be stored in a unit's armoury/arms chest. No stored weapon is to be greater than .22 calibre. Handguns of all types are prohibited. 06429. Spare. Losses and recoveries of firearms 06430. All losses and recoveries of firearms and ammunition are to be reported in accordance with the format in Section I. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4- 5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Physical security of cadet force secure storerooms 06431. Purpose-built storerooms for cadet forces are to comply with the following structural standards: a. External walls of the building are to be of 275 mm cavity brick, concrete block or stone, and internal walls of the armoury are to be of 225 mm solid brick, concrete block or stone. b. Floors and roofs of armoury rooms are to be of 150 mm concrete. c. Windows trapdoors, fanlights, etc. are not to be incorporated in the armoury rooms. d. There is to be only one access door to the armoury room, which is to be to the standard laid down in Annex A to Section III: (1) All new buildings doors are to conform to SSG Chessington Drawing No DW 55713/3 sheets 1 - 16. For existing buildings, doors should be of solid core construction at least 40 mm thick covered by 1.6 mm mild steel on both sides and fitted with hinge bolts. (2) When fitted, the steel plate is to be wrapped around the edges of the door and frame and secured on the edges and inside face by woodscrews, countersunk and spaced not more than 100 mm apart. The metal faces are to be carriage bolted at the centre and the corners, with the bolt heads fitted on the outside faces. (3) The frames on which the doors are hung are to be of the same standard as the doors and should be securely fixed to the building by ragbolts at 600 mm between centres, set to a depth of at least 50 mm. If the building fabric is not suitable for ragbolts, the advice of PSyAs should be sought to determine a satisfactory method of securing the frame. Any gap between frame and masonry should be filled with material which cannot easily be removed. (4) Doors are to open outwards and must be hung on a minimum of 3 robust steel hinges which are to be capped and recessed. e. Approved locks of the type listed in Section III, Annex C, are to be fitted to armoury buildings doors. The types of locks to be used are: (1) (2) (3) Two rimlocks. One rimlock and one mortise lock. Two mortise locks. 6-4- 6 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (4) Two padlocks with heavy duty padlock bars. 06432. Modernisation or upgrading of existing buildings. When existing buildings are modernized or upgraded, they are as far as practicable to incorporate the specifications above. Examples of improvements are given below: a. Walls, ceilings and floors. Weldmesh or heavy gauge expanded metal sheeting may be fixed to the walls, ceilings and floors to improve the protection of soft skinned (e.g. Spooner or modular type buildings) and inferior internal walls and ceilings. b. Windows. Any of the following may be considered for reinforcing windows, ventilators, trapdoors and fanlights: (1) Glass bricks. Glass bricks in pre-cast panels, i.e. bricks pre-set into a concrete honeycomb rather than built in singly as in a brick wall. (2) Steel roller shutters. Where steel roller shutters are used, it is important to ensure that the guide frames are firmly secured to the side walls and the locking mechanism is as strong as the shutter. (3) Steel shutters (casement type) on the outside of windows. It is important steel shutters (casement type) are capable of being secured from the inside. (4) Gates. Gates are to be secured by an approved lock. The gates are to be fixed in a position with expanding bolts or bolts cemented into the masonry or brickwork; woodscrews and plugs are not to be used. (5) High tensile steel bars. Steel bars not less than 19 mm in diameter and at not more than 127 mm centres, held in place by flat steel spacers at not more than 457 mm intervals. The spacers are not to be less than 38mm x 10mm and be secured into the masonry or brickwork. (6) Expanded metal or weldmesh. Heavy gauge expanded metal or weldmesh welded to a metal frame and bolted to the masonry. c. Doors. Ideally approved, purpose built, security doors and furniture are to be used. However, wooden doors of solid laminated hardwood core or solid multi-ply construction not less than 54 mm thick may be used and can be improved as follows: (1) (2) By facing or backing with mild steel sheet. Fitting dogbolts and approved locks and bolts. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4- 7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (3) Mortise locks backed with mild steel sheet. (4) Fitting mild steel angles to wooden doorposts, and improving the fixings between wall and frame. Additional heavy duty hinges may be required to support the increased weight. 06433. The advice of the appropriate PSyA and the appropriate security unit is to be sought before implementing enhanced security measures. Security of weapons 06434. Only .22 (rimfire) calibre weapons, DP and sectioned weapons not falling into the category laid down in para 06004b, are to be stored in cadet force premises. The security requirements are: a. Storage is to be in an approved mini armoury or in Benweld/Thompson/Kennedy arms chests located in the unit storeroom. The weapons are to be secured through the trigger guards by steel chains or steel cables and padlocks with the chains/cables welded to the side walls. The outline specification for the mini armoury is contained at para 06217. b. The approved arms chests are to be secured by ragbolts through the base into the solid building foundations with the opening edge next to a wall to prevent leverage. A concrete infill or plinth is required for buildings on stilts which permit access to the underside of the building. c. Additionally, Thompson arms chests are to have: (1) Two approved mortise locks. (2) Two approved model security hinge bolts fitted on the hinged edge of the door/lid. (3) The door outer edge modified at source with integral lip; or angle iron fitted top to bottom, tack welded - weld spots at intervals down full length of outer edge; or angle iron fitted from top to bottom with a continuous or running full length weld; or angle iron fitted from top to bottom, tack welded - with the 2 areas covering the lock tongues continuous welded over a length of 60 to 75 mm. (4) Steel chains or cables with padlocks fitted. The cables are to be located in, and welded to, the side walls of the arms chest. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4- 8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Security of ammunition 06435. Under no circumstances is ammunition greater than .22 calibre to be held on cadet force premises. Storage of .22 ammunition is to be in one of the following: a. An approved mini armoury. b. Security lockable approved ammunition boxes located in the armoury and ragbolted into the floor or other substantial feature of the building structure in such a manner that level access is prevent (eg opening edge to a wall) by: (1) (2) Ragbolting onto the arms chest plinth. Bolting to the top of the arms chest plinth. (3) Ragbolting into the floor or other substantial feature of the building structure. c. Ex-MOD cash safes. d. A lockable steel container secured to the inside of a further steel container (pending the issue of approved ammunition boxes). 06436. Ammunition stocks. Stocks of .22 ammunition are to be kept to the minimum compatible with training requirements. A maximum of 2000 rounds may be held at the unit in approved ammunition boxes or ex-MOD safes and up to 5000 rounds in an approved mini armoury. Where a unit wishes to hold more than 10000 rounds for geographic distribution purposes, their security facility is to be inspected for suitability by the appropriate security unit. A storage limit compatible with the secure facility will be approved. All issues and receipts are to be entered in an ammunition issue/receipt log. Security of rifle bolts and other weapon parts 06437. Unless the cadet force armoury is a secure or structurally approved armoury, rifle bolts for weapons of greater than .22 calibre are not to be stored in cadet force premises. When not in secure or structurally approved armouries, bolts for .22 rimfire and DP weapons are to be removed when not in use and stored in robust steel arms chests, ex-MOD cash safes, or lockable steel bolt boxes of robust construction firmly secured to the structure of the secure room. Other weapon parts such as barrels, breech blocks, firing pins and magazines may be stored with the bolts. The storage containers holding bolts and weapon parts are not to contain ammunition, which is to be stored separately in a secure container or purpose built arms chest. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4- 9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Mini-armouries 06438. Mini-armouries have the following significant features: a. The floor and roof are to be 150 mm reinforced concrete. b. Walls are to be 215 mm solid brick (engineering brick), concrete or stone.(1) c. Straight ventilators protected on the outside by a steel plate rag bolted at the corners and the bolt heads spot welded are to be installed. d. There are to be 2 separate compartments, one for arms and one for ammunition, divided by a 6 mm steel plate built into brickwork at front and sides and welded to front angle iron. e. Each compartment is to have a steel security door hung on 3 robust steel hinges not less than 60 mm which are to be capped and recessed. f. Note: (1). Facilities built before Jul 92 having walls constructed of 275 mm cavity brickwork with stepped ventilators are acceptable. Each door is to be fitted with 2 Chubb 3M50 locks. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4- 10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED The Defence Manual of Security ANNEX A TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 6 SECURITY STANDARDS AT CADET FORCES PREMISES The following matrix should be used to calculate the minimum security index required to permit the storage of Service- owned weapons and ammunition on cadet forces premises. Once the required index is known, use the tables at Annex B to calculate the index value of security features present. Using Annex B the index for a given Unit can be calculated and compared with the minimum requirement. If there is a shortfall then Annex B can be used to determine the security enhancements that could be made to bring the premises up to standard. Serial No Purpose Risk level(1) High Risk (a) 1 2 3 4 Permanent storage Temporary storage Emergency storage (<24 hours)(2) Storage of DP weapons (b) (c) 33 25 20 20 Low risk (d) 25 20 15 15 Notes: (1) The risk is determined by the appropriate single-Service security unit and is based upon a civil police assessment of the burglaries in the area, the amount of any other arms, ammunition and explosive items within the unit and any other factors relevant to individual locations. Where a security unit has not carried out on assessment, the risk level is to be based on the insurance risk assessment used by national firms. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4-A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (2) Emergency storage in substandard premises may only be undertaken in exceptional circumstances, when weapons normally lodged elsewhere cannot be returned to their parent armoury that day. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED The Defence Manual of Security ANNEX B TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 6 INDICES FOR THE STORAGE OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION WITHIN CADET FORCES PREMISES 1. To determine the security index of a cadet force unit: a. For each of the 3 sections below examine the measures or facilities that are in place and note the score for each. b. Add the scores together for the section total. c. Add the section scores together for the total index. (The total index must include a score from each section). Section One Containers (use para 2 or 3 for weapons and ammunition respectively) 1. Armouries. a. b. c. Either: 2. Arms Chests. a. b. c. d. Or Benweld.(4) Benweld.(5) TAC.(4) Kennedy.(4) 25 15 10 10 Regular Service or TA.(1) Home Office.(2) Mini armoury.(3) NA 35 30 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4-B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 3. Ammunition Containers a. b. H-60 Box (ammunition or bolts only).(4) 10 Other ammo boxes detailed at para 06214.(4) 10 Section one score: Notes: (1) If weapons are stored in a Regular Service or Reserve Forces, armoury no further action is required. (2) Subject to prior approval by the appropriate single-Service security unit. (3) Mini armouries are not considered stand-alone items. Therefore other sections in this matrix apply also to establishments which hold mini armouries. (4) (5) Installed in accordance with JSP 440, Chapter 6, para 06213(b). Not installed in accordance with JSP 440, Chapter 6, para 06213(b). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-2-B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED The Defence Manual of Security Section Two Storeroom (housing the Arms Chest/Ammunition Container) 1. 2. Secure storeroom(6). Walls. Each wall scored individually. a. b. c. d. e. f. Double brick/stone/concrete block. Reinforced concrete. Single brick/stone/concrete block. Wood or other robust material (include Portacabin/Spooner Hut wall). Plasterboard or similar (internal wall only). XPM or Weldmesh lined. 4 each 4 each 3 each 2 each 0 each add 2 each wall for each layer of (separated) XPM(7) 25 (go to Section 3) Sub total: 3. Floor & Ceiling. A single score for the weakest part of the floor or ceiling of the room housing the Arms Chest/Ammunition Container. a. b. c. d. e. Concrete. Wood/Ply. Plasterboard. Ceiling tiles. XPM or Weldmesh lined. 2 1 0 -1 add 2 for each layer of (separated) XPM(7) Sub total: 4. Securing point of Arms Chest a. b. Concrete plinth or concrete floor. Other. Sub total: 2 0 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4-B-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 5. Windows. A score based upon the weakest window in an external wall of the room housing the Arms Chest/Ammunition Container. a. Protection. (1) (2) (3) b. Frame (1) (2) (3) Metal or PVCu frames. Wooden frames in good order.(10) Wooden frames in poor order.(11) 1 0 -1 Add same index as the wall from 2 above (8) Bars/metal shutters/glass bricks/XPM. 2 Sealed or lockable.(9) 1 No window. Sub total (a+b): (Max index of 4) 6. Door. A single score for the weakest of any internal door affording access to the storeroom housing the Arms Chest/Ammunition Box. a. (1) (2) (3) (4) Steel door.(12) Steel faced door.(12) Modified wooden door.(13) Wooden fire door (half-hour resistance). 3 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 0 -1 b. c. Door opening outwards. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 2x Rim locks.(14) 1x Rim & 1x mortice locks.(14) 2x mortice locks.(14) 2 x Padlocks.(14) Single lock.(14) Other lock(s). Sub total (a+b+c): Section two score: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4-B-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED The Defence Manual of Security Notes: (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) In accordance with JSP 440, Chapter 6, para 06210. The XPM should not be on external walls. In accordance with JSP 440, Chapter 6 para 06211(b). Lockable by means of a removable key. Frames with no rotten wood, brittle putty or other defect. Any defect effecting the overall integrity of the window. (12) Such doors only score if the frame is in accordance with JSP 440, Chapter 6, para 06210(d)(3). (13) In accordance with JSP 440, Chapter 6, para 06211(c). (14) Of approved security pattern fitted at one-third and two-thirds down the locking edge of the door. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4-B-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4-B-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED The Defence Manual of Security Section Three SITE 1. Situation of the building. An index based upon additional security measures or weaknesses that affect the security of the building as a whole. a. b. c. d. e. Within an MOD site.(15) Within a government site.(2)(15) Within a secure civil site.(2)(16) Unguarded in a residential/industrial/commercial area where a crime watch policy exists.(17) Any other location. 25 20 15 5 0 Sub total: 2. Compound Fences. An index based upon a fenced perimeter with appropriate gates, all in good order. a. b. c. Within an anti-intruder fence/gates. Within a Defence Barrier standard fence (DWS SD50/1-5). Within a substantial barrier (non-security fence) 3 2 1 Sub total: 3. Alarms. A single score for an alarm, if fitted, to a building. To score the alarm must cover the storeroom/armoury where the weapons and ammunition are stored. a. b. Monitored alarm system Alarm with external sounder only. 5 2 Sub total: Section three score: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4-B-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Notes: (15) Applies to any site with a full time security force. (16) Applies to commercial/industrial sites with patrolled by a guard force and including such security measures as CCTV. (17) To be checked and verified by the Security Unit during the survey. 2. Total Index. To calculate the total index add together the Section Scores. The final index is to include a positive score from Sections 1 and 2. Total Index = JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 6-4-B-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures CHAPTER 7 COUNTER TERRORIST MEASURES Para Section ICounter Terrorist Measures Introduction Terrorist Methodology Threat Assessment and Dissemination The Focal Point System Reporting and Collation of Suspicious Activity Considered Terrorist Related in GB Annex A Annex B Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Section II Terrorist Modus Operandi The Focal Point System (FPS) & Suspected Terrorist Activity Reporting Procedure Focal Point System-Diagrammatic Layout Participation in the Focal Point System 07101 07104 07106 07111 07113 7-1A-1 7-1B-1 7-1-B1-1 7-1-B2-1 Page Principles of Counter Terrorist Protection and the MOD Counter Terrorist Strategy Principles of Protection Action to Counter Terrorist Attack MOD Counter Terrorist Organization Responsibilities of the Security Service and the Civil Police for Counter Terrorist Matters in GB 07201 07203 07205 07218 Section III Terrorist Alert States General GB Alert States Definitions and Alert Measures Overseas Alert States 07301 07303 07304 07309 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-0-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Overseas Terrorist Threat Assessment List The Carriage of Weapons and Employment of Armed Personnel on Security and Police Duties in Peacetime Rules of Engagement Batons Annex A Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Appendix 3 Appendix 4 Appendix 5 Annex B Appendix 1 Annex C Annex D Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Section IV 07310 07313 07322 07324 MOD BIKINI Alert States ­ Definitions MOD BIKINI WHITE Alert State - Counter Measures MOD BIKINI BLACK Alert State - Counter Measures MOD BIKINI BLACK SPECIAL Alert State ­ Counter Measures MOD BIKINI AMBER Alert State - Counter Measures MOD BIKINI RED Alert State - Counter Measures MOD TESSERAL Alert States - Definitions MOD TESSERAL Alert States - Counter Measures Guidance on Mortar Attack Counter Measures Orders and Instructions The Issue and Use of Batons by Service Personnel Baton Training ROE for the Use of Batons 7-3A-1 7-3-A1-1 7-3-A2-1 7-3-A3-1 7-3-A4-1 7-3-A5-1 7-3B-1 7-3-B1-1 7-3C-1 7-3D-1 7-3-D1-1 7-3-D2-1 Counter Terrorist Protection within Establishments and Elsewhere General Plans Orders 07401 07402 07403 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-0-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Briefing Protection outside MOD Establishments (Less Service Families or Private Accommodation) Personal Security at Home Security at Armed Forces Careers Offices Contingency Planning and Post Incident Procedures Security Vigilance Areas Security at Public Military Events Responsibilities for a PME Overseas Security when Training Outside Service Establishments Counter Terrorist Search Requests for Assistance Annex A Annex B Annex C Appendix 1 Annex D Appendix 1 Annex E Annex F Annex G 07405 07409 07410 07415 07424 07435 07448 07464 07470 07479 07490 7-4A-1 7-4B-1 7-4C-1 7-4-C1-1 7-4D-1 7-4-D1-1 7-4E-1 7-4E-1 7-4G-1 Contingency Planning for Unexpected Events Special Precautions for Protection outside MOD Establishments Advice on Handling Anonymous Telephone Calls with Warnings or Threats Checklist for Telephoned Bomb Warnings Action upon Discovery of a Suspect Postal Bomb Postal Bomb Recognition Sample Guide to Identification of IEDs Minimum Security Standards at Armed Forces Careers Offices Civil Police Control and Co-ordination of the Emergency Services' Response in the Event of a Major Terrorist Incident ACPO Emergency Procedures Terminology Appendix 1 7-4-G1-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-0-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Annex H Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Appendix 3 Appendix 4 Appendix 5 Annex I Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Appendix 3 Appendix 4 Appendix 5 Annex J Section V General Principles of Incident Management Action on Discovery of a Suspect IED Action should an IED Explode Action in the Event of a Mortar Attack Action in the Event of a Terrorist Shooting Attack Action in the Event of a Proxy Bomb Attack Aide memoire for Event Security Officers (ESO) Notification of a PME in GB PME Acknowledgement Slip Notification of a PME Overseas Open Day Security Plans Off Site Events Guidance on Counter Terrorist Search Awareness Security Measures 7-4H-1 7-4-H1-1 7-4-H2-1 7-4-H3-1 7-4-H4-1 7-4-H5-1 7-4I-1 7-4-I1-1 7-4-I2-1 7-4-I3-1 7-4-15-1 7-4-I6-1 7-4J-1 Personal Counter Terrorist Security Measures General Terrorist Targeting Anonymity Protection of High Threat Personnel (HTP) Home Security Survival in Hostage Situations Annex A Annex B Appendix 1 Annex C 07501 07504 07508 07509 07516 07517 7-5A-1 7-5B-1 7-5-B1-1 7-5C-1 Guidance on Personal Security at Home Guidance on Personal Security when Travelling Additional Security Precautions for Staff Car Drivers Security at Places of Entertainment JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-0-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Annex D Annex E Section VI Dealing with the Media Survival in Hostage Situations 7-5D-1 7-5E-1 Leave and Temporary Duty Visits to Northern Ireland (NI) and the Republic of Ireland (ROI) General Leave in NI Leave Travel to NI ­ General Authority for Leave Visits Compassionate Leave Travel Security Briefings Travel to and from NI Marriage within NI Temporary Duty Visits to NI ­ General Carriage of Protectively Marked Documents Leave Travel to the ROI Temporary Duty Visits to the ROI Establishment Standing and Routine Orders Annex A Annex B Annex C Annex D Annex E Annex F Annex G Annex H 07601 07602 07603 07604 07612 07613 07620 07622 07624 07631 07636 07648 07651 7-6A-1 7-6B-1 7-6C-1 7-6D-1 7-6E-1 7-6F-1 7-6G-1 7-6H-1 Brief prior to visiting NI on Leave or Temporary Duty NI Leave ­ Signal Format Map of NI Brigade Areas Details Required for Impending Marriage in NI NI Duty Visit by Service Personnel ­ Signal Format ROI Leave ­ Signal Format Brief prior to visiting the ROI on Leave ROI Temporary Duty Visit by Service Personnel ­ Signal Format JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-0-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Annex I Brief prior to visiting the ROI on Temporary Duty 7-6I-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-0-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures CHAPTER 7 SECTION I COUNTER TERRORIST MEASURES Introduction 07101. Threats to the security of MOD interests include espionage, terrorism, sabotage, subversion and organized crime. These threats change profile over time, reflecting the domestic and international scenes. The protective security system must therefore be capable of countering all elements of the threat. 07102. The term terrorism is applied to the activities of those organizations resorting to the use of violence and intimidation in the furtherance of political aims. Terrorist organizations have available the wide range of attack options detailed in Annex A. The threat to Service personnel and MOD civilian staff is under constant review. There may be a specific and higher threat to certain personnel because of past service or particular appointments. 07103. The MOD has a duty of care to ensure that proper arrangements exist for the protection of its personnel, weapons, equipment and property, wherever located. The purpose of this Chapter is to give general guidance for protection against terrorism. PSyAs and Command security staffs are responsible for providing detailed guidance on security procedures commensurate with the prevailing threat and the mandatory minimum standards of protection detailed in this chapter. Terrorist Methodology Terrorist Objectives 07104. Although their political aims may vary, terrorists have three common principal objectives: a. b. To publicize their existence and cause. To terrorize the community, thus coercing governments. c. To discredit the authorities, possibly by provoking repressive counter measures. Common forms of terrorist modus operandi are described at Annex A. Non-Violent Extremists 07105. Non-violent extremist action directed at Defence interests often requires the commitment of resources to counter it. The measures outlined in this Chapter provide a sound basis for protection against such action. Anti-establishment demonstrations at non-nuclear MOD sites are generally of a minor nature and can be dealt with by local JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security resources. Non-violent extremist action at nuclear sites is sometimes on a larger scale but the guidance given throughout this Chapter remains applicable. Threat Assessment and Dissemination Threat Assessment 07106. Within GB, the threat to Service and MOD establishments from terrorism is assessed by the MOD Counter Extremist Advisory Group (CEAG). This assessment is based on intelligence provided by: a. Security Service. The Security Service provides an assessment of the threat from Irish related terrorism and international terrorism. b. Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB). MPSB provide a resume, when appropriate, of Irish related terrorist activity in GB. c. Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). The DIS provide an assessment of Irish related terrorist activity in NI. d. Ministry of Defence Police (MDP). The MDP, drawing on information from the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU), provide an assessment of the threat from anti-nuclear and anti-arms groups and animal rights organizations. 07107. Using the intelligence received, the MOD CEAG provides a monthly terrorist threat assessment. This assessment is also used as the basis for setting the various BIKINI Alert States in GB. The assessment is based on a six-tier system of threat levels applicable to establishments, individuals and events. The definitions and terms for use in threat assessments have been agreed by ACPO for use by the civil police and national agencies. They aim to standardize terms used by all those concerned in assessing the terrorist threat and implementing counter-measures. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Level 1 2 Term IMMINENT HIGH Definition Specific intelligence shows that a target is at a very high level of threat and that an attack is imminent. Specific intelligence, recent events or a target's particular circumstances indicate that it is likely to be a high priority and the target is at a high level of threat. Recent general intelligence on terrorist activity, the overall security and political climate of the target's general circumstances indicate that it is likely to be a priority target and is at a significant level of threat. A target's circumstances indicate that there is potential for it to be singled out for attack and it is at a moderate level of threat. There is nothing to indicate that a target would be singled out for an attack and there is a low level of threat. A target is unlikely to be attacked. There is a negligible level of threat. 3 SIGNIFICANT 4 MODERATE 5 6 LOW NEGLIGIBLE Northern Ireland 07108. Due to the volatile nature of the terrorist threat in NI, all assessment in this area of the UK is undertaken by personnel within the Province. Overseas Theatres 07109. In overseas areas threat assessments are undertaken by in-theatre security committees and groups. These committees and groups are similar to the MOD CEAG and provide regional assessments of the current terrorist threat. MOD Procedures for the Dissemination of Terrorist Threat Warnings and Information 07110. Within GB, there is a specific need to facilitate rapid response to intelligence and changes in Alert States. It is also essential that any information of activity that may be terrorist related be passed quickly and accurately to the appropriate agencies so that investigations are carried out. Rapid dissemination of warnings is achieved through the Focal Point System (FPS); other information is passed using the Suspected Terrorist Activity Reporting Procedure. Details of these systems and procedures are at Annex B. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security The Focal Point System (FPS) 07111. The terrorist threat in GB demands a quick response to intelligence warnings or terrorist incidents. A key element of this response is the early dissemination of warnings and the exchange of information at all levels between the Services, MOD establishments and civil police forces, together with Foreign Service installations in GB. 07112. The FPS has been established in GB to meet the requirement for rapid dissemination of: a. b. Urgent warnings of likely terrorist activity. Information regarding real or possible terrorist incidents. c. Urgent changes in the BIKINI or TESSERAL Alert States as ordered by the MOD, commanders or HOE on a local basis. The responsibility for coordination of the FPS is delegated by MOD to HQ LAND. It is fully described at Annex B. Reporting and Collation of Suspicious Activity Considered Terrorist Related in GB 07113. The procedures to be used for reporting incidents that are considered to be suspicious and possibly related to terrorist activity but that by themselves do not meet the criteria for activating the FPS are also described at Annex B. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX A TO SECTION I TO CHAPTER 7 TERRORIST MODUS OPERANDI 1. When extremists use violence to further their political aims they are classified as terrorists. The tactics used by terrorist organizations vary with their objectives. The threat of violence to MOD personnel and property includes: a. Rocket and bomb attacks, including petrol, nail, and acid bombs, intended to inflict casualties, cause major economic damage, disruption, discredit to security authorities or to gain publicity. b. Booby traps, such as concealed improvised explosive devices (IED) (possibly incorporating delay timers ranging from a few hours to more than 30 days), or an under vehicle improvised explosive device (UVIED). Booby traps are used to harass and cause a diversion from other terrorist activity. They are also used in an attempt to murder, maim, intimidate, and lower morale generally. c. Ambushes, ranging from small arms fire to co-ordinated multiple weapon attacks. d. e. f. g. h. Sniping attacks at bases or at individuals outside establishments. Mining of roads as an ambush or to cause disruption. Use of direct and indirect fire mortars. Raids to obtain weapons, ammunition, explosives or other stores. Assassination, abduction and the holding of hostages. i. Intimidation by all means ranging from threatening telephone calls to booby traps. j. Hijacking of vehicles, aircraft or ships to seize hostages and to bring pressure on the government. k. Attacks on aircraft on the ground and in the air to cause casualties and damage and to publicize terrorist offensive power. l. Other incidents that cause embarrassment to HMG. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Terrorist Intelligence Activities 2. Terrorist organizations devote considerable effort to collecting intelligence. They use agents and informers and carry out covert observation and surveillance of establishments and individuals. They use technical equipment and are sometimes equipped with electronic devices for intercepting communications, particularly radio and telephone. Terrorists try to infiltrate government offices, customs posts, and even seek employment within establishments, where further opportunities for intelligence gathering may exist. They attempt to identify regular patterns of activity by establishments and individuals that disclose areas where the MOD is vulnerable, and where 'soft' targets exist. Detailed planning and preparation are likely to precede any attack. Terrorist Weapons 3. Occasionally terrorists use large weapons such as improvised heavy mortars mounted and concealed inside vehicles, but they generally use weapons small enough to be concealed easily until the moment of use, or weapons that are capable of rapid assembly and breakdown. The armoury of well-organized terrorists normally includes collapsible weapons, light mortars, small rocket launchers, man portable air defence weapons and all types of small arms. They can be a mixture of professional manufacture or home made. Care is usually taken to husband weapons, particularly those that are regarded as prestigious, such as man portable air defence weapons and heavy calibre machine guns. Use of Explosives 3. Terrorists use all types of manufactured and home-made explosives, sometimes in great quantities. They become skilled in concealing the movement of explosives by using specially adapted vehicles, suitcases, prams, carrier bags, and personal electronic equipment. They utilize a variety of equipment and techniques in the construction of improvised devices, examples of which are as shown below: a. Switches: (1) Simple release switches such as clothes pegs, activated by pulling a trip wire, operating the throttle lever of a vehicle, opening a door, or picking something up. (1) Pressure switches triggered by stepping or sitting on something, or depressing an accelerator pedal. (3) Cable switches set off by mechanical movement such as operating a manual choke of a vehicle. (4) Time-delay mechanisms such as watches, clocks and clockwork and electronic timers, often used in IEDs and UVIEDs. (5) Electronic switches, triggered remotely by a radio signal (remotely controlled improvised explosive devices (RCIEDs)). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures (6) Tilt (mercury) and trembler switches set off by movement or inertia, and often used against vehicles, usually in conjunction with a time delay mechanism. (7) Heat switches activated by, for example, a vehicle exhaust system. (8) Light sensitive switches activated by, for example, exposure to light by removing a dustbin lid or discharging a photographic flash unit. (9) b. Barometric pressure switches that operate on a change of altitude. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). (1) Anti-personnel grenades thrown at security forces or placed as part of an ambush, sometimes containing nails or other improvised shrapnel. (2) (3) Devices concealed within or attached below a vehicle. Postal bombs ranging from a slim letter to a parcel. (4) Incendiary bombs constructed, for example, inside a cassette box with a time-delay mechanism and typically placed in commercial premises and public transport. (5) Cylindrical "pipe" bombs, using a wide range of different sized containers, for example, butane-gas cylinders, fire extinguishers and milk churns, packed with explosives. (6) Stolen military ammunition modified for use as booby traps. (7) Time delay IEDs using commercial or home made explosives packed into a car or truck. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1A-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1A-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX B TO SECTION 1 TO CHAPTER 7 THE FOCAL POINT SYSTEM AND SUSPECTED TERRORIST ACTIVITY REPORTING PROCEDURE The Focal Point System (FPS) 1. The aim of the FPS is to ensure the rapid dissemination of information upwards, downwards and laterally, thereby facilitating quick reaction and mutual support between the Services, MOD establishments and the Armed Forces of other Nations in response to terrorist incidents or threats in GB. Organization and Focal Point Plan 2. The FPS is based on groupings of Service and MOD establishments that lie within the geographical area of Army Divisional (including LONDIST)1 and Regional Brigade boundaries. Responsibility for the overall co-ordination of the FPS, which is shown diagrammatically at Appendix 1, is delegated to HQ LAND. The arrangements for participation in the FPS by the Services and MOD establishments in peacetime are set out at Appendix 2. 3. The Army Divisional HQ is the Focal Point for that area and is responsible for coordinating and issuing a Focal Point Plan to cover all Service and MOD establishments located within the division's geographical boundary. Within a division's area, Service and MOD establishments are organized geographically into groups, and each group is coordinated by a specified Nodal Point. In areas where there are large concentrations of establishments it may be necessary to establish a third tier of co-ordination by using Sub-Nodal Points. Normally, Service HQ or major RN shore establishments, RM and Army units or RAF stations are nominated as Nodal and Sub-Nodal Points. 4. Divisional Focal Point Plans ensure that a simple unclassified message can be relayed within one hour (in most cases by telephone) from any location within a division's area to a point of contact for every other establishment throughout a division's geographical area. LONDIST is the only District within LAND. For the remainder of this Annex when Divisions are mentioned LONDIST is included. 1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Reporting Incidents 5. In the event of a terrorist incident or suspected incident, which necessitates urgent notification to local establishments, e.g. within the node, or when a local assessment is made which causes an establishment to raise the BIKINI or TESSERAL Alert State or to increase the counter measures in force, reports are to be made as follows: a. To the civil police. The civil police have prime responsibility within GB for dealing with terrorist incidents, including hoaxes, on MOD property and it is essential that the local civil police are informed immediately. b. MOD Reporting Chain (1) TLBs. Reports are to be made to the appropriate PSyA and Command security staffs. PSyAs are to ensure that all reports of terrorist related incidents and changes to Alert States are passed immediately (usually by telephone) to D Def Sy. Confirmatory signals are to be sent to the appropriate HQ and MODUK (D Def Sy) using SIC 'YPL'. c. Through the FPS. In the event of a terrorist incident, actual or suspected, or when an Alert State has been changed based on local assessment: (1) The establishment, unit or station concerned is to notify its associated Sub-Nodal or Nodal Point and all other establishments to whom it has a responsibility to pass information under the FPS. (2) The Sub-Nodal Point, where there is one, is to inform its associated Nodal Point and all other establishments to whom it has a responsibility to pass information under the FPS. (3) The Nodal Point is to inform its associated Focal Point and all other Sub-Nodal Points and establishments to which it is required to pass information under the FPS. (4) The Focal Point is to inform HQ LAND and if it is considered necessary other Nodal Points to which it has a responsibility under the FPS as considered appropriate. (5) HQ LAND is to inform MOD and the following: CINCFLEET, 2SL/CINCNAVHOME, HQ STC, PJHQ, HQ DLO and, if it is considered necessary, other Focal Points in GB as appropriate. Awareness of the System 6. The effectiveness of the FPS will depend largely on duty personnel manning telephones, on a 24 hour basis, being aware of the system and being able to implement it. To this end: a. All HQ, establishments, units and stations are to nominate day and night contact telephone numbers that are permanently manned. Where this is considered JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures to be impossible, dispensations are to be sought from the appropriate PSyA and Command security staff. b. All personnel liable to man duty telephones in establishments within the FPS are to be briefed on the system as it affects them and on their responsibilities for making it function. In most cases, this will involve clearly displayed simple instructions on the action to be taken in the event of a terrorist incident and a list of telephone numbers to which the initial reports are to be passed. c. All personnel are to be aware of the need to pass information accurately, clearly and concisely. Coordination 7. Chain of command. The FPS complements established single-Service and MOD chains of command, which should normally be used for the passage of single-Service reports to and from MOD. 8. Mutual support. In the event of a terrorist incident, the co-ordination of emergency assistance is the responsibility of the civil police. In cases of urgent need, mutual support may be requested and provided on a local inter-Service basis using the Focal Point communications channels. 9. Alert state changes. It remains the prerogative of single-Service commanders to decide whether to raise Alert States or to increase counter measures in particular areas within GB in response to a locally perceived threat. Such changes are to be reported to D Def Sy. 10. Practices. HQ LAND will co-ordinate the practices of the FPS to involve all units and establishments not less than twice annually in consultation with the appropriate PSyAs where MOD HQ, DPA and DSTL establishments are involved and CINCFLEET, 2SL/CINCNAVHOME HQ STC, PJHQ and DLO for their respective establishments, units and stations. They will also inform D Def Sy. These exercises are known as Exercise Rapid Call. 11. Amendments. Any changes to the FPS that appear to be necessary as a result of its use are to be reported through PSyA channels to HQ LAND who will inform D Def Sy. 12. Application in TTW and War. In TTW and war, the FPS will be expanded to include the exchange of intelligence on all matters relevant to the defence and continued function of all establishments involved in the system. It will be activated by MOD. Army Division and Regional Brigade HQ will continue to act as Focal Points, but TAOR HQ, when activated, will take over the responsibilities of Nodal Points for all establishments within the TAOR. Details of the Wartime Focal Point System are in Part 1 of the United Kingdom Commanders-in-Chief Committee MHD Plan. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1B-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Reporting of Suspicious Incidents 13. Aim. The aim is to establish Joint Service, MOD (including MOD HQ, DPA, DLO, DSTL and MDP procedures for the passage and collation of reports of suspected terrorist related activities. Definitions 14. To ensure common understanding of some definitions and application of these instructions, a number of terms need to be defined. These are: a. Suspected terrorist related activities. Suspected terrorist related activities are activities that fall short of the criteria for initiating the FPS; examples are: (1) A vehicle, or persons, acting suspiciously in or near Service Families Accommodation. (2) A conversation overheard, or an action seen in a public place, that clearly pointed to possible wrong doing or was of a highly suspicious nature. (3) Receipt of a bomb threat warning. (4) Service dependant's visitor who has been acting strangely or asking suspicious questions. (5) Suspicion regarding the occupants of a house or flat close to an MOD installation. b. Unit level, intermediate level, command level. Due to the differing Service Command chains, the following terms are used: (1) Unit Level. This will include MOD, Service, DPA, DLO and DSTL establishments. (2) Intermediate Level. This applies to Naval Base or Naval Air Station Commanders, HQRM (if RM units are involved), Army Divisional HQs (through Regional Brigade or area HQs as appropriate), RAF P&SS Regions and MDP Divisional HQ. (3) TLB Level. CINCFLEET, 2SL/CNH, CINCLAND, CINCSTC, PTC, PJHQ, CDL, CDP, and MOD Centre. AG, c. Focus. This is the focus of the collation activity that supports a particular Service or TLB. They are as follows: (1) (2) RN and RM. DNSyICP. Army. 2 MI Bn. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1B-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures (3) (4) (5) RAF. HQ P&SS. MOD Centre. CB (Sy)1. MDP. MDP Force Information Room. (6) CCRIO RMP. Whilst not a Service security focus, CCRIO RMP is heavily involved in the investigation of suspect or stolen vehicles. d. Resolved. This term implies that investigations show that the reported activities are not terrorist-related or have been pursued to a reported conclusion. Reporting Procedures 15. Individuals. All personnel, both Service and civilian, and their dependants are to be instructed to report any activity that arouses their suspicions, however trivial it may seem, without delay. Reports are to be made as follows: a. To the designated reporting point (e.g. main guardroom, MDP security control room, or ESyO) if the activity occurs within a MOD establishment or very close to it. b. All other suspect activities are to be reported immediately to the civil police using 999, followed by a report to a Service reporting point, e.g. an individual's unit, nearest Service unit or the MDP. 16. Unit Level. On receipt of a report, the unit is to: a. Ensure that the civil police are immediately made aware of the reported suspect activity, particularly that to which an operational response by them appears necessary. b. Telephone an immediate report of the suspicious activity to the appropriate intermediate level. Telephoned reports must be corroborated by signal or fax, with information copies to the relevant HQ, as well as CCRIO RMP if suspect or stolen vehicle are involved. Follow up of Reports of Suspected Terrorist-Related Activity 17. Intermediate Level. The appropriate security units in conjunction with the civil police and the unit are immediately to investigate the circumstances leading to the report. This is to confirm the original facts reported with a view to: a. Determining whether any additional protective measures are needed, such as an increased Alert State or activation of the FPS. b. Helping to assess similar reported activities or trends. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1B-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c. Closing the case as resolved or deciding that no further progress can be made at Intermediate Level. Progress in the investigation is to be reported to the relevant TLB, as well as to CCRIO RMP if suspect or stolen vehicles are involved. Unless there are good reasons to the contrary, the security focus that initiated a report is to lead on any follow up activity. Any incident that gives cause for concern, or appears to correlate with information from another TLB is immediately to be passed to the other relevant security focus, MDP Force Information Room and CCRIO if suspect or stolen vehicles are involved. Close liaison is to be maintained with the civil police, and the other security focus that may be approached for help direct. The relevant PSyA and Command security staffs are to be advised of the progress of the investigation. Investigations are to continue until the case is resolved or it is decided that further investigation is fruitless. 18. TLB Level. If a wider dissemination is deemed necessary, the reports (or gist of them) with comment from security staff, if appropriate, are to be passed to all the other TLBs and security focus. CCRIO RMP should be included if suspect or stolen vehicles feature in the report. Reports of significant incidents are also to be passed to MOD D Def Sy. 19. MOD Action. D Def Sy will monitor ongoing cases and where appropriate prepare briefs for Central and Ministerial staffs. D Def Sy will disseminate relevant details to national agencies. A monthly summary of reporting activity will be produced for discussion at the MOD CEAG. 20. CCRIO RMP Action. In addition to its current task, CCRIO RMP will review the reports it receives of suspect or stolen vehicles with a view to discovering similarities in reports stemming from independent sources. This is opposed to follow-up reports on vehicles about which it had already disseminated information. Any such similarities are to be drawn to the attention of the security focuses from which the independent reports originated. This will allow further investigation if considered necessary. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1B-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO SECTION I TO CHAPTER 7 FOCAL POINT SYSTEM 1. The Focal Point System (FPS) is designed to facilitate the rapid dissemination of information up, down and laterally along the chain of command. A schematic example is given below: MOD UK PJHQ HQ LAND FOCAL POINT Army Divisional HQ SUBFOCAL POINT (if used) FOCAL POINT Army Divisional HQ FOCAL POINT Army Divisional HQ NODAL POINTS NODAL POINTS NODAL POINT Naval/Estb Regional Bde/Gar RAF Stn HQ NODAL POINT Naval/Estb Regional Bde/Gar RAF Stn HQ SUB-NODAL POINT SUB-NODAL POINT MOD HQ BUILDING US INSTALLATION DLO/DPA Establishment Army Unit UNITS/ESTBS UNITS/ESTBS NAAFI SHOP JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1-B1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1-B1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B TO SECTION I TO CHAPTER 7 PARTICIPATION IN THE FOCAL POINT SYSTEM 1. The Royal Navy. DNSyICP is the point of contact concerning Focal Point arrangements. Subordinate RN/RM HQ, shore establishments and units may be used as Nodal Points. 2. The Army. The responsibility for co-ordinating arrangements for the Focal Point System is delegated to HQ LAND. Army Divisional HQ are used as Focal Points and are to co-ordinate the Focal Point arrangements within their geographical boundaries. 3. The Royal Air Force. RAF stations and units may be approached direct through SSyOs on matters concerning Focal Point arrangements, keeping the relevant RAF Command HQ informed. RAF stations may be used as Nodal Points. 4. US Forces based on RAF stations. Liaison with US Forces based on RAF stations is through the RAF commander. 5. Other Allied Forces. Liaison with allied forces (other than US Forces based on RAF stations) is through the controlling formation HQ of the Service with whom the allied forces are stationed. In the event of an allied base being the responsibility of a department other than one of the Services then advice is to be sought from MOD as to the correct method of liaison. 6. MOD HQ Buildings. Liaison is direct to the appropriate Building Controller. 7. DLO. Where a DLO unit is a lodger unit, liaison is to take place through the host establishment, otherwise liaison is to take place directly with the Director/Head or Security Officer of the DLO establishment concerned. 8. DPA. Where a DPA unit is a lodger unit on a Service establishment, liaison is to take place through the host establishment, otherwise liaison is to take place directly with the Director/Head or Security Officer of the DPA establishment concerned. 9. MDP. MDP detachments conform to the arrangements agreed by their parent establishments. 9. NAAFI. Army Divisional and Regional Brigade HQ are to liaise direct with NAAFI regional managers for the inclusion in the Focal Point System of NAAFI premises outside Service establishments. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1-B2-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-1-B2-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures SECTION II TO CHAPTER 7 PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER TERRORIST PROTECTION AND THE MOD COUNTER TERRORIST STRATEGY Principles of Protection 07201. The principles of protection against terrorist attack are: a. Timely dissemination of the assessed threat and maintenance of an appropriate Alert State by units and personnel. b. Initiation of appropriate response mechanisms to deal with rapid changes in the Alert State. c. Deterrent measures, such as: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Defence in depth. Armed posture. Constant review and improvement of physical security. Effective personal security. Security education programme for all MOD personnel. The MOD Counter Terrorist Strategy 07202. To ensure that the above principles are applied throughout the MOD and that clear, long term, goals are set and promulgated in order that appropriate LTC funding can be allocated for physical security measures, security training and awareness programmes. Action to Counter Terrorist Attack Individual Vigilance 07203. The key factor in countering the threat of terrorist violence is a high state of vigilance by all personnel. Every individual needs to be aware that the threat of terrorist attack is real and that protection is best achieved by being alert, suspicious and vigilant, at all times, both on and off duty. Such alertness is comparatively easy to maintain following a well publicized act of terrorist violence, but is difficult to sustain during quieter periods. Every opportunity must therefore be taken to remind everyone of the need to be vigilant, and to be seen to be vigilant. Efforts should be made to raise the level of awareness of the general public living adjacent to MOD establishments and involve them in the need for vigilance. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-2-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 07204. Action to counter terrorist attack is based on: a. b. Assessing the threat (see paragraph 07106). Maintaining the Alert State (see paragraphs 07301 to 07309). c. Establishing sound systems of protection in Service establishments (see Section IV). d. Protecting High Threat Personnel (HTP) (see Section V paragraphs 07509 to 07515). MOD Counter Terrorist Organization Introduction 07205. Service establishments and personnel have traditionally been viewed as attractive and legitimate targets by Irish republican and other terrorist organizations. In order to counter these and other threats that may arise, the MOD has developed a responsive counter terrorist organization. The organization extends from Whitehall to establishments, through PSyAs and Command security staff, and is assisted by security units and the civil police. Co-operation throughout the MOD has resulted in a joint approach to counter terrorism, which is outlined below. MOD Directorate of Security Policy (D Def Sy) 07206. D Def Sy and is responsible for setting and monitoring security policy for the MOD. D Def Sy promulgates the Alert States for the MOD in Great Britain and is responsible for the dissemination of threat information world-wide. MOD Counter Extremist Advisory Group 07207. Within MOD, the CEAG is the focus for all counter terrorist and extremist matters in UK, excluding NI. 07208. The main purpose of CEAG is to receive and consider assessed intelligence on current or future terrorist and extremist activity from both indigenous and international threats which are of concern to defence interests world-wide. CEAG usually meets on the first Wednesday of each month and issues an extremist threat assessment signal. Should any new intelligence become available or terrorist incidents occur between the regular meetings, the CEAG would meet in special session. All members of the CEAG are on call at all times. The CEAG also provides, when necessary, members for 'ad hoc' working groups to consider and approve joint counter terrorist policy. Passage of Warnings 07209. In Great Britain, at Ministry of Defence level, warning of possible terrorist activity may be received from the Security Service, the Metropolitan Police Special Branch or other sources at any time. These reports are handled as follows: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-2-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures a. During Working hours. Warnings are passed to the CEAG Secretary. The CEAG considers the assessment received and, through D Def Sy, passes the assessment and any change in the Alert State to the MOD. b. During non-working hours. Warnings are passed to the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC). DCMC informs the CEAG Secretary who arranges for a reassessment to be made by members of the CEAG if required. The DCMC disseminates any change in the Alert State to the MOD on authority of the chairman of the CEAG. In the event of immediate danger to life, the DCMC Duty Officer may issue instructions on his own authority, informing DCDS(C) and the CEAG Secretary as soon as possible. 07210. Commands and HQNI are responsible for laying down their own procedures for passing warnings to formations. Liaison with the Security Service and the Metropolitan Police Special Branch. 07211. a. D Def Sy is responsible for liaison with the Security Service and the Metropolitan Police Special Branch on behalf of the MOD. b. Liaison overseas is dealt with at sub-paragraph 07109. TLB Holders Responsibilities. 07212. a. Division of staff responsibility. The responsibility for ordering protective measures against terrorist attack is vested in the operations staff. PSyAs and Command security staff are responsible for providing assessments of the threat from terrorism, and for the planning and co-ordination of protective security measures to counter the threat. b. Assessment of the threat. For Great Britain and overseas threat assessments are disseminated by the CEAG Secretary. In NI assessments are made and disseminated by HQNI. c. Guidance on security measures. TLBs are responsible for issuing guidance and instructions to subordinate establishments on the counter terrorist measures to be taken. Establishments 07213. a. The local threat. HOE are responsible for assessing the vulnerability of their own establishment and for keeping the threat to their personnel, weapons, JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-2-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security equipment and property under review. They are given the authority to declare a higher Alert State and additional measures in response to a local emergency ­ PSyAs and Command security staff are to be informed of such action. b. Implementation of security measures. HOE must take all necessary measures to ensure the safety and security of their personnel and installations, based on the instructions issued by superior HQ, taking into account their own assessment of local circumstances. c. Briefing and training. HOE must ensure that all Service personnel and MOD civilian staff are briefed regularly on the threat, the security measures that they need to know and, most importantly, the need for vigilance at all times. Security routines, particularly those concerned with the safety of personnel, must be practised. d. Liaison with the civil police. In Great Britain establishments are to maintain liaison with their local police except where this is done under collective arrangements, e.g. by a neighbouring garrison or HQ. HOE overseas are responsible for issuing appropriate instructions. e. Reporting of incidents. HOE must report immediately all incidents concerning the terrorist threat, however minor, to their superior HQ and as appropriate, through the Focal Point Scheme. Plans and Training 07214. HOE are responsible for the production and maintenance of an up-to-date, comprehensive security plan, which is to include a joint contingency plan with the police and emergency services for handling terrorist incidents. They are also responsible for ensuring the regular briefing of all Service personnel, civilian employees and dependants on the terrorist threat. In addition, they are to ensure that all Service personnel and civilian employees receive sufficient protective security training to allow them to carry out their establishment security duties effectively and protect themselves from terrorist attack while on and off duty. HOE should seek specific advice from their establishment security staffs, security units, MDP and MGS (if appropriate), and from their PSyA or Command security staff. Inter Service Security Committee (ISSC) 07215. The ISSC is a Command level forum for the discussion of all security matters that may affect the Services in GB. It acts as focus for the exchange of ideas and as a coordinating body for the implementation of security policy, security education and the staffing of proposals to MOD, such as matters raised at the higher level CEAG. Search Working Group (SWG) 07216. Counter terrorist search (CTS) involves the use of systematic procedures to find terrorists and their resources and to confirm the presence or absence of bombs within specified boundaries. Objectives of CTS include obtaining evidence, depriving terrorists JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-2-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures of their resources, providing information or assuring a facility is safe to use. The MOD SWG assists the Joint Service Search Policy and Resources Committee (JSSPRC) to develop search techniques and procedures and identify requirements for manpower and equipment. The SWG is currently in abeyance and will be resurrected if required. In the meantime, the work of CTS is carried forward by the JSSPRC. Funding 07217. Funding for all physical security measures is provided by the appropriate TLB holder. The guidance in this document must therefore be applied by PSyAs and Command security staffs, balanced against their other commitments. If in the event of a significant change in the terrorist threat additional security enhancement funds become available on a centrally funded basis they will be allocated on a priority basis. Responsibilities of the Security Service and the Civil Police for Counter Terrorist matters in GB Civil Authorities 07218. The primary responsibility for the maintenance of the Queen's Peace, the prevention and detection of crime, the protection of life and property and the prosecution of offenders (in support of the prosecuting authorities) rests with the civil police; any such incident or suspicious activity must, therefore, be reported to the civil police immediately. In practice, because of the heavy burden on civil police resources, the Services are required to accept responsibility for the protection of their own personnel and dependants within establishment perimeters. Establishments must maintain liaison with the local police on such matters as: a. The local threat. b. Security plans involving action both on and off Ministry of Defence property. c. Establishment security measures that may affect the public. d. The security of military personnel in local places of entertainment and when using public transport. e. Post incident control. The Security Service 07219. The Security Service is the lead Government Service for the collation and assessment of information relating to all terrorist threats in GB. The Security Service works closely with the Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB) and with the Special Branches of other forces as required. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-2-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security The Home Office for England and Wales and the Home and Health Department for Scotland 07220. The Home Office for England and Wales and the Home and Health Department for Scotland are responsible for the promulgation of policy on terrorist matters relating to the civil police. Civil Police 07221. In the civil police each constabulary or force is commanded by a Chief Constable who has autonomous responsibility for all civil police counter terrorist operations conducted within his jurisdiction. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and its Scottish Counterpart ACPO(Scotland) provide a national forum for the discussion of Home Office policy and represent the 51 police forces in GB. The ACPO committee on terrorism and allied matters specifically discusses anti-terrorist matters. Within individual forces, the Assistant Chief Constable Operations (ACC Ops) is usually responsible for operational control of counter terrorist operations. Investigation of Terrorism 07222. The investigation of terrorism is carried out by the appropriate civil police CID. In the case of Irish republican terrorism, the Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist Branch (SO13) has a co-ordinating role. Joint Service Police Committee (JSPC) 07223. JSPCs are established at Force, Divisional and Sub-Divisional level. Their function is the co-ordination of common security matters and procedures, the exchange of relevant security information and the review of joint police and Service security plans. Representation is as follows: a. Force. (1) (2) (3) (4) a. Police - Chief Officer. RN/RM - As considered appropriate. Army ­ GOC or Brigade Commander. RAF - A senior provost officer appointed by OC HQ RAF P&SS. Divisional. (1) (2) (3) Police - Divisional Commander. RN/RM - Establishment commander. Army ­ Garrison or establishment commander. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-2-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures (4) RAF - Station Commander(s) or officer from the appropriate RAF P&SS Region. b. Sub-Divisional. (1) (2) (3) (4) Police - Sub-Divisional Commander. RN/RM - Establishment commander. Army - Garrison or establishment commander. RAF - Station Security Officer. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-2-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-2-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures SECTION III TO CHAPTER 7 TERRORIST ALERT STATES General 07301. The MOD terrorist Alert States are the foundation of counter terrorist security precautions for all MOD personnel, the Alert States also provide maximum commonality with other Government Departments. Overseas commands have similar Alert States although they may be known by different codewords. They all provide controlled, measured and standardized responses to the various terrorist threats applicable to the MOD. The systems are concerned with: a. Warning of possible terrorist activity. b. Measures to be taken upon receipt of a warning. 07302. Establishments are to be prepared to change from one Alert State to another at short notice. Alert States 07303. The following codewords are used to convey warnings of possible terrorist activity: a. BIKINI. Used to warn of non-specific forms of terrorist activity. b. TESSERAL. Used to warn of a threat of terrorist use of surface to air missiles (SAM) or anti-aircraft machine guns (AAMG) against Service aircraft. c. KEENWIND. Used to warn of non specific forms of terrorist activity in BFG (see paragraph 07309). Definitions and Alert Measures 07304. The definitions and countermeasures associated with the individual Alert States are detailed as follows: a. MOD BIKINI Alert State system - Annex A. b. MOD TESSERAL Alert State system - Annex B. 07305. BIKINI Alert State System a. The Alert State is decided by the Cabinet Office and is normally applicable across all Government Departments. In the MOD, the CEAG considers the BIKINI Alert States and related countermeasures and, through D Def Sy, represents the MOD view to the Cabinet Office. Exceptionally, MOD may apply a higher Alert State if the threat is directed at Defence interests. The assessed threat of terrorist attack will continue to be promulgated routinely by CEAG to both GB and overseas commands and theatres. In the UK the Alert State will be issued by the CEAG, following discussion with other Government Departments. In overseas commands, JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security the in-theatre Joint Security Group (JSG) takes into account the threat level issued by CEAG, as well as regional and in theatre assessments of the current terrorist threat, and decides the Alert State. b. There are five Alert States: WHITE, BLACK, BLACK SPECIAL, AMBER and RED in ascending order of threat level. BIKINI WHITE is the first and lowest of the five BIKINI Alert States and provides the foundation of countermeasures for all higher Alert States, including those of the declared Alert State as invoked in the relevant command or theatre; e.g. BIKINI BLACK SPECIAL would also incorporate the countermeasures of BIKINI BLACK. Where countermeasures refer to similar actions, those imposing the highest standard take precedence. The definitions of the BIKINI Alert States are at Annex A. The BFG KEENWIND Alert State System used in Germany, Belgium, France and the Netherlands mirrors the BIKINI Alert State colours and definitions. c. The countermeasures for each BIKINI Alert State are given at Appendices 1-5 to Annex A. CEAG and JSGs may also determine that additional countermeasures from within the BIKINI system are appropriate to the threat and add these to the mandated BIKINI countermeasures at each level of the Alert State, promulgating them on a monthly basis. Additional countermeasures over and above those within the BIKINI system can also be developed by overseas commands, depending on local circumstances, and promulgated on a local basis, bearing in mind the need to achieve a security posture broadly compatible with the relevant BIKINI Alert State. Note that the BFG KEENWIND countermeasures, which are not necessarily tied to Alert States, differ substantially from the BIKINI system. d. Unless the threat assessment indicates otherwise, all establishments should adopt the same Alert State and countermeasures. Additional countermeasures in individual TLBs and Commands may also be applied where appropriate and registered with CEAG. The Alert State and associated countermeasures ordered by CEAG or JSGs are to be regarded as minimum mandatory standards. Where, for practical reasons, an establishment is unable to implement a particular counter measure the Head of Establishment is to consult the appropriate PSyA through the chain of command and alternative compensating countermeasures are to be applied where practicable. Promulgation of the Threat and Alert State 07306. Terrorist threat assessments, BIKINI Alert States and applicable countermeasures will normally be promulgated by CEAG through D Def Sy, Service chains of command and, where appropriate, through the Focal Point System. Exceptionally, in the face of imminent increased terrorist threat, an establishment or formation has reason to believe that at any time it is subject to a higher threat than elsewhere, then it may raise the Alert State locally or enhance the countermeasures locally. Such action should be reported as soon as possible to the MOD through the normal chain of command keeping all other interested establishment and formations informed as appropriate. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Counter Terrorist Physical Security Measures for MOD Buildings 07307. Counter terrorist physical security measures are to be applied to all MOD owned or occupied buildings, the purpose of which is to limit damage to the building fabric and injury to the occupants. It is the responsibility of PSyAs and Command security staffs to ensure that the measures applied are appropriate and take into account the location and function of the building. The minimum physical security measures are given in Chapter 5 Section II Annex G. Protective Marking of Alert States and Measures 07308. The protective marking of the definitions of the BIKINI Alert States is RESTRICTED but the codewords BIKINI WHITE, BIKINI BLACK, BIKINI BLACK SPECIAL, BIKINI AMBER and BIKINI RED are not protectively marked. These codewords may be passed by telephone provided that they are not qualified in any way. Notices displaying the current Alert States are to be sited so as to minimize the likelihood of the general public seeing them. These codewords and their meanings are understood by the civil police. The codewords and their definitions are not to be communicated to the media or any other unauthorized person. Overseas Alert States 07309. With effect from 1 Jan 01 the codeword BIKINI, with the associated colour coded Alert State definitions and suites of countermeasures, is used throughout MOD and in all overseas commands and theatres with the exception of British Forces Germany (BFG). In Germany, Belgium, France and the Netherlands the BFG KEENWIND codeword and its associated mandatory, random and discretionary countermeasures will be retained but using the BIKINI Alert State definitions and colour codes. From 1 Jan 01 the codewords RIPPLE (Cyprus), ROCK (Gibraltar), TONGA (Turkey), NOMAD (Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) and GLACIER (Falkland Islands) are no longer to be used and are replaced by BIKINI. In overseas commands, the appropriate in-theatre security committee or Joint Security Group (JSG) takes into account the threat level issued by CEAG, as well as regional and in theatre assessments of the current terrorist threat, and decides the Alert State. Before deployment, units are to be informed by the appropriate PSyA through the chain of command of the current BIKINI or BFG KEENWIND Alert State and the associated countermeasures required in theatre. Overseas Terrorist Threat Assessment List 07310. D Def Sy in conjunction with DI(TILS) and the Security Service provide a threat assessment for those overseas areas to which the Services deploy on a regular basis. This assessment is known as the Overseas Terrorist Threat Assessment List (OTTAL) and includes US threat levels world-wide. 07311. The OTTAL is updated on receipt of new intelligence that affects changes in threat levels. Amendments are issued by signal to Defence Attaches and TLBs. Personnel deploying overseas are to ensure that they are aware of the threat in the country to which they are travelling. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Division of Responsibilities for Protection Overseas 07312. The nature and extent of MOD responsibility vis-à-vis that of the civil police in overseas commands and establishments varies considerably. In some cases working arrangements with the civil police may be similar to those in the United Kingdom. Where there is inadequate civil police support, the MOD may be entirely responsible for the security of UK personnel. However, in commands such as UKSC(G) the civil police may have complete jurisdiction outside the actual confines of establishments. The local operations staff is responsible for ensuring that the division of responsibilities is clear. The Carriage of Weapons and Employment of Armed Personnel on Security and Police Duties in Peacetime Authority and Responsibilities for Arming 07313. Routine arming of guards is authorized by the MOD, with Ministerial approval, although there are prescribed circumstances which automatically require arming (see below). CINCs are responsible for operational armed guard deployments at establishments under their command, and will personally issue written arming authorities and authorize ROE as appropriate in accordance with MOD direction, promulgated in Joint Service Publication (JSP) 398 2000 Edition - UK Compendium of National Rules of Engagement. Circumstances for Arming 07314. CINCs may authorize the carriage of arms and ammunition by suitably trained and qualified Service personnel for general security duties when the BIKINI Alert State is BLACK, BLACK SPECIAL, AMBER or RED. 07315. The HOE at any installation may authorize the arming of Service personnel if there is a substantive or immediate threat to the establishment. Ministerial approval is to be sought retrospectively through the chain of command without delay. The arming of personnel on nuclear weapons security duties is to be in accordance with JSP 440 Volume 4. Civil Police Jurisdiction 07316. The primary responsibility for maintaining law and order and the internal security of the UK rests at all times with the civil authority, normally represented by the civil police. The Armed Forces, which are subject at all times to the direction and control of HM Government must, when operating in the UK, comply with the law and act in support of the civil authority. Civil police primacy is therefore to be respected and the Armed Forces will only take responsibility when the civil police assess that they do not have the capability or resources to deal with particular situations. Even then, responsibility will be transferred to the military for the minimum period of time necessary to enable effective action to be taken to preserve life. The Chief Constable must therefore give his formal agreement to any proposal to deploy Service personnel or MDP outside Service establishments. Weapon States 07317. Weapons are not to be issued without ammunition. There are 3 possible arming states for general use: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures a. State 1 - Unarmed. At State 1, firearms and live ammunition are to be held in the guardroom or other specified location in such a way as to be available in the event of an emergency. b. State 2 - Armed (Prepared). At State 2, firearms are to be carried with loaded magazines held in the ammunition pouch. c. State 3 - Armed (Alert). At State 3, firearms are to be carried with a loaded magazine on the weapon, and the weapon made safe. Reporting of Incidents 07318. Commanders are to report any serious incident involving armed personnel, through the normal chain of command without delay. Any rounds discharged inadvertently in the preparation for, conduct of or dismissal from, armed security duties are to be treated as negligent discharges and are to be reported accordingly. Warning Notices 07319. Notices warning of the presence of armed guards are not to be posted. Questions on the Arming Posture - Public Relations (Media Liaison) 07320. Questions from the public or media about the arming posture at particular establishments are normally to be referred to command Media Ops staff. Unless there are special factors that require the MOD to be consulted, questions should normally receive the reply: "It is not MOD practice to comment on security arrangements. These arrangements are kept under review". Employment of Armed Personnel on Security Duties 07321. HOE are responsible for the security of their establishment and personnel. In practice, the ESyO will be responsible through the normal chain of command for the implementation of all routine security measures and practices to combat terrorism. Rules of Engagement 07322. The ROE for the use of firearms in peacetime within GB are to conform to the Joint Service Publication (JSP) 398 2000 Edition - UK Compendium of National Rules of Engagement. HOE are to promulgate ROE in standing orders. All personnel are to receive adequate training. Combat Body Armour and Combat Helmets 07323. At BIKINI BLACK SPECIAL (or BLACK 'ARMED') it is not mandatory for armed counter terrorist security personnel to wear specialized equipment such as combat body armour or combat helmets. However, at BIKINI AMBER or RED all personnel employed on armed counter terrorist security duties outside protected buildings should wear combat body armour together with a combat helmet where these are available. Batons 07324. Detailed policy on the issue and use of batons by Service Personnel is at Annex D to this Section. Authority for the issue of batons is as follows: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. Operations. Requests to issue and use batons on operations are to be made through the ROE process. b. Security. Standing authority is granted to CINCs for the issue and use of batons to personnel deployed on security duties. CEAG is to be informed when batons are issued for security purposes. Training 07325. Batons should only be issued to appropriately trained personnel. The single Services are responsible for determining the scale of the training requirement and for the implementation of suitable training. Minimum training standards are mandated at Appendix 1 to Annex D. Auditable records of training are to be kept. Guidance on the Use of Batons 07326. Short of armed conflict, batons are to be used in accordance with English law. ROE for the use of batons is at Appendix 2 to Annex D JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX A TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 7 MOD BIKINI ALERT STATES - DEFINITIONS 1. General. There are five BIKINI Alert States1 which, in ascending order of severity, are listed and defined below. 2. BIKINI WHITE. No specific threat. This Alert State provides for a minimum level of security appropriate to the ever-present global risk of terrorism and violent extremism. 3. BIKINI BLACK. It is assessed that there is a possibility of terrorist activity with no defined target or time of attack. The minimum Alert State to be applied while Irish republican and other terrorist organizations are assessed as a potential threat in Great Britain or overseas and have the capacity to revert to operations during the period of a cease-fire. 4. BIKINI BLACK SPECIAL. Information has been received and it is assessed that there is an increased likelihood of terrorist activity with no defined target or time of attack. This Alert State would normally be applied when the assessment indicates an increased threat that does not justify adopting BIKINI AMBER. It may also be applied as a precautionary measure for short periods to cover events liable to stimulate terrorist action. 5. BIKINI AMBER. Specific information has been received and it is assessed that there is a substantial threat to government targets within a specified period of time. This Alert State could be adopted as a general or local warning and would normally be applied for a limited period only. The date for review will be set at the time of rise to BIKINI AMBER. 6. BIKINI RED. A specific threat or other definite information indicates that an imminent terrorist attack against a particular government target or in a particular area can be expected; or an object, suspected to be a bomb, has been found. This Alert State would normally only be applied as a local warning and for a very limited period. The same Alert State definitions and associated colour codes apply to the BFG KEENWIND system used in Germany, Belgium, France and the Netherlands. 1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 7 MOD BIKINI WHITE ALERT STATE - COUNTER MEASURES W1. Incremental Action. WHITE Alert State is the first and lowest of the five Counter-Terrorist Alert States. Together with the Counter-Terrorist Baseline measures, it provides the foundation of countermeasures on which the other Alert States are based. All of the following countermeasures, which constitute good security practice, are to be implemented. W2. Review of Security Procedures and Preparation of Contingency Plans. a. Regularly review and where necessary update all relevant contingency plans and security instructions. These should include the Counter-Terrorist Alert State System, threat assessment and dissemination, warning and Alert State systems and reporting of terrorist-related incidents, physical defences, orders for guards and patrols, security of vulnerable areas and events, contingency planning and post-incident reporting, action in the event of a terrorist attack, local vigilance schemes, personal security and travel security. In buildings where there are more than one occupier, all parties should be encouraged to participate in the process. b. Identify buildings, and areas and other locations within the establishment, where personnel congregate and which might be vulnerable to improvised explosive device (IED), vehicle borne IED (VBIED) or mortar attack. c. Make plans for protective security measures around particularly vulnerable and/or attractive targets. d. Basic building protection measures should be reviewed and works service action initiated for protective security measures around particularly vulnerable and/or attractive targets, especially with respect to the use of antishatter film/curtains in buildings normally housing a large number of personnel. Review the scope for any immediate self-help protective works to lessen vulnerability to IED, VBIED or mortar attack. e. In consultation with the Police, review the area around establishments to identify areas vulnerable to terrorist attack. This should include locations where large VBIEDs (LVBIEDs) could be parked and also mortar firing points. Agree contingency plans to overcome any vulnerabilities. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-A1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security W3. Personal Security. a. Brief all personnel, at least annually, to be alert, suspicious and vigilant, especially concerning strangers, unknown vehicles, unattended packages and articles, and suspect postal packages. The brief should also advise personnel on the correct action to take. b. Where appropriate, advise personnel to adopt those measures which protect information or practices the compromise of which could not be reversed or countered in the event of an increase in the threat. c. Brief personnel on the principles of anonymity and advise them to adopt those countermeasures which protect personal information or routines. W4. Security Measures at Establishments. a. Positively identify all persons entering establishments, including staff, visitors and contractors. b. Carry out periodic security patrols. c. Ensure that perimeter walls/fences are in good repair. Where appropriate, all unnecessary undergrowth on departmental land concealing both approaches to the perimeter and potential mortar firing points should be removed. d. Maintain a clear and tidy area in and around all buildings so that unusual packages or articles can be spotted easily. If possible, consider moving objects (e.g. dustbins and crates) which could be used to hide an explosive device to at least 25 metres away from occupied buildings, or keeping them in a secured or supervised building. e. Ensure that fire fighting equipment is well maintained and that drills are practised. f. At least annually, hold practice bomb alerts and rehearse action on the discovery of a suspected IED, VBIED or mortar attack, and for dealing with suspect delivered/postal devices. g. W5. Escort visitors as necessary. Travel Security. Departmental vehicles should be locked when left unattended. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-A1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 7 MOD BIKINI BLACK ALERT STATE - COUNTER MEASURES B1. Incremental Action. Implement all security arrangements applicable to BIKINI WHITE and in addition, the measures detailed below. BIKINI BLACK is the lowest Alert State at which the MOD will consider the arming of MOD guards and sentries. B2. Review of Security Procedures and Preparation of Contingency Plans. a. Arrange for the Duty Officer to be on call, preferably by telephone, and to be prepared to initiate additional security plans at short notice. b. Review plans for controlling vehicle access to establishments. c. Inform the appropriate Security Authorities and civil police in advance of any Service events planned to be held in public places and also of any major events on MOD property to which the public has access in accordance with the requirements for Public Military Events. d. Ensure that security works service action initiated under BIKINI WHITE have been completed. If not, consider the implementation of low cost physical protective measures. B3. Personal Security. a. Brief all personnel on the change to the Alert State. b. Brief all personnel to increase their vigilance. The whole establishment must be seen to be alert to the threat. Particular attention is to be paid to the briefing of security patrols, guards, sentries and watchmen or caretakers. c. Brief all personnel on the need to pay particular attention to checking vehicles, including private vehicles, after they have been left unattended. B4. Security Measures at Establishments. a. Carry out periodic security patrols and sweeps. b. Limit the number of access points for vehicles and pedestrians. Consider using other exits on a random basis. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-A2-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c. d. Make spot checks of parked vehicles. Where appropriate, keep external lighting on at night. e. Wherever possible prevent vehicles from parking within 25 metres of occupied buildings. f. Institute random patrolling by establishment security personnel or civil police as appropriate in areas where potential mortar firing points and possible IED and VBIED locations cannot be adequately observed from existing guard positions or using CCTV at main guardrooms or security control rooms. These patrols should be made at irregular intervals and without warning so that this measure cannot be predicted by a terrorist, thereby denying the terrorist the opportunity to avoid the counter measure. g. At least once every six months, hold practice bomb alerts and rehearse action on the discovery of a suspected IED, VBIED or mortar attack, and for dealing with suspect delivered or postal devices. h. B5. Escort visitors as necessary. Travel Security. a. Regularly check travel arrangements to ensure that coaches and passenger carrying vehicles are searched before use, are not left unattended and that all passengers and baggage are carefully checked. Collection and disembarkation points should be on protected property, wherever possible. b. Drivers are to be briefed about the threat and the measures they should adopt to counter terrorist attacks. c. Review measures for safeguarding Service transport, particularly when parked in public places. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-A2-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX A TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 7 MOD BIKINI BLACK SPECIAL ALERT STATE COUNTER MEASURES BS1. Incremental Action. Implement all security arrangements applicable to BIKINI BLACK and, in addition, the measures detailed below. BS2. Review of Security Procedures and Preparation of Contingency Plans. a. Confirm that the civil police are aware of the increased Alert State and coordinate security measures where appropriate. b. BS3. Ensure that additional guards can be made available at short notice. Personal Security. a. Brief all personnel on the change to the Alert State. b. Brief all personnel on the increased threat to security and advise them of appropriate personal security measures. Ensure that all personnel are, or have been, briefed on the plans and instructions for action to be taken in the event of a terrorist attack; particularly in respect of IED, VBIED or mortar attack. NOTE: A thorough knowledge of the action to be taken is essential if casualties are to be minimized. c. Regularly examine routine patterns of activity and where possible modify them to avoid presenting a predictable target. d. Implement, in consultation with the civil police as necessary, precautionary measures at public places of entertainment frequented by Service personnel. e. Implement SHARKWATCH for groups of MOD personnel on or off duty, particularly at places of entertainment. One member of the group to be nominated as look-out on behalf of the remainder. BS4. Security Measures at Establishments a. If possible, move objects (e.g. dustbins and crates) that could be used to hide an explosive device to at least 25 metres away from occupied buildings, or keep them in secured or supervised buildings. b. Inspect the exterior and interior of all buildings prior to occupation at least daily. Where applicable, particular attention should be paid to domestic JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-A3-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security accommodation and general purpose areas (e.g. recreation and dining areas) that may require more frequent searching. Buildings, rooms and cupboards not in regular use should be searched and secured, and then inspected periodically. c. Further reduce the number of access points as far as possible by erecting physical barriers. Establish check points at all entrances remaining in use. Conduct random searches of vehicles and hand baggage of any person about whom there is any suspicion and delay entry until their bonafide is confirmed. d. Increase the frequency of security patrols and sweeps within perimeters. e. Carry out regular checks of perimeters and areas adjacent to them. Whenever possible this should be done in conjunction with the civil police. f. Pay particular attention to the checking of goods being delivered to stores, restaurants, living accommodation etc. g. Using establishment resources, if available and as appropriate, and in consultation with the civil police, monitor potential mortar firing points and possible IED or VBIED positions. h. Institute security checks at entrances to museums and other similar places open to the general public. i. Escort visitors as necessary. j. Check all sites not normally occupied by MOD personnel prior to use or occupation. (The term sites includes ranges, assault courses, training camps, sports grounds, drill halls etc). BS5. Travel Security. a. Wherever possible vary routine timings, particularly for passenger journeys. b. When not in a protected area safeguard all departmental transport. c. Ensure that collection and disembarkation points associated with coach travel arrangements are varied or are on protected departmental property and that routes are varied wherever possible. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-A3-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX A TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 7 MOD BIKINI AMBER ALERT STATE ­ COUNTER MEASURES A1. Incremental Action. Implement all security arrangements applicable to BIKINI BLACK and BIKINI BLACK SPECIAL and, in addition, the measures detailed below. A2. Review of Security Procedures. a. Confirm that the civil police are aware of the increased Alert State and consult them about precautionary measures to be taken outside perimeters. b. Confirm that all personnel with regular access to establishments considered to be at risk have been briefed on the action to be taken in the event of a terrorist attack; particular mention should be made of the action to be taken for IED, VBIED or mortar attack. c. Where appropriate, cancel activities that might place MOD personnel at risk other than those that are essential. A3. Personal Security. a. Brief all personnel on the change to the Alert State. b. Brief all personnel of the increased threat and draw attention to the importance of applying their personal security measures. A4. Security Measures at Establishments. a. b. Increase strength of guard if necessary. Where applicable, erect ramps or chicanes to control the speed of vehicles. c. Search as many vehicles, briefcases and packages being brought into establishments as possible. d. Enforce very strict control of access. Reduce to the minimum and, where practical, deny access to the establishment to non-departmental personnel. e. Implement establishment and civil police contingency plans for frequent patrols of vulnerable areas to enhance security and to deter the use of potential mortar firing points, IED and VBIED locations. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-A4-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security f. Where necessary take additional protective security measures at particularly attractive targets. g. h. Prevent vehicles from parking within 25 metres of all occupied buildings. Increase the frequency of searches of parked vehicles and of buildings. i. Reduce to the minimum the use of top floors of frangible buildings that give minimum protection. A5. Travel Security. a. When not in a protected area guard departmental transport wherever possible. If vehicles are left unattended, they are to be searched thoroughly before use. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-A4-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX A TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 7 MOD BIKINI RED ALERT STATE ­ COUNTER MEASURES R1. Incremental Action. Implement all security measures applicable to Alert States BIKINI AMBER and, in addition, the measures detailed below. R2. Review of Security Procedures. a. Confirm that the civil police are aware of the increased Alert State and consult them with a view to their closing public roads that might otherwise make establishments particularly vulnerable to terrorist attack. b. Consider closing MOD controlled roads to the public. c. Cancel all activities that might place Service personnel at risk other than those that are operationally or administratively essential. R3. Personal Security. a. b. c. R4. Brief all personnel on the change to the Alert State. Brief all personnel about the very high threat. Do not permit personnel to congregate in large groups. Security Measures at Establishments. a. Ensure that the strength of the guard force is such that the establishment presents a very secure posture. b. Search all vehicles, briefcases and packages being brought into establishments. c. Search all parked vehicles immediately the RED Alert State is imposed and at more frequent intervals thereafter. d. Deploy resources, if available, in conjunction with the civil police and MDP as appropriate to deny the use of potential mortar firing points, IED and VBIED to terrorists. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-A5-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security e. According to the nature of the threat, review and adjust where necessary, the concentrations and locations of personnel, inside and outside establishments, in order to reduce the risks to them. f. Avoid, wherever feasible, the use of single storey buildings and the top floors of accommodation blocks. g. Equip guards at appropriate locations with alarms so that they can give warning of any mortar, IED or VBIED attack. h. Institute patrols around Service families accommodation areas consulting, where appropriate with the civil police. i. Review security arrangements of personnel living in Substitute Service Single Accommodation and Substitute Service Families Accommodation. R1. Travel Security. a. Search and guard department vehicles that need to be used outside establishments. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-A5-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX B TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 7 MOD TESSERAL ALERT STATES ­ DEFINITIONS 1. TESSERAL BLACK. TESSERAL BLACK is a general warning of possible terrorist attack against aircraft by extremists armed with man-portable SAM or AAMG without any particular target being defined. This Alert State is the minimum to be applied while Irish republican and other terrorist organizations are assessed as posing an active threat to aircraft by SAM or AAMG attack in Great Britain (GB). 2. TESSERAL BLACK SPECIAL. TESSERAL BLACK SPECIAL is issued as a general warning that there is an increased likelihood of extremists armed with man-portable SAM or AAMG attacking an aircraft at an unspecified location in GB. 3. TESSERAL AMBER. TESSERAL AMBER is issued as a warning that extremists armed with man-portable SAM or AAMG intend to attack an aircraft in GB in the near future. It could be issued as a general or local warning and would normally be applied for a limited period only. 4. TESSERAL RED. TESSERAL RED is issued as a warning that an attack against an aircraft in GB by extremists armed with man-portable SAM or AAMG is imminent. It will normally only be issued as a local warning and for a very limited period. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 7 MOD TESSERAL ALERT STATES ­ COUNTER MEASURES Preparatory Measures 1. The preparatory measures listed below are to be reviewed periodically by units and establishments and details reported through the chain of command. a. Appreciation and planning - Commands and HQ. Commands and HQ are to review the vulnerability of and risk to establishments and, as appropriate, order the implementation of preparatory measures. b. Appreciation and planning - establishments. (1) If ordered, a reconnaissance is to be carried out and an appreciation made to identify likely firing points taking into account the maximum assessed altitude and the maximum range of the SA7B and AAMGs in relation to the take off and landing patterns practised at the airfield or helicopter landing site (HLS). (see Note 3). (2) Contingency plans are to be made and orders and instructions drafted for action to be taken at TESSERAL Alert States or in the event of a terrorist SAM or AAMG attack. Detailed orders and instructions will vary between establishments to take account of the type of aircraft operated and local factors. c. Briefing and liaison. Establishments are to liaise with their local civil police and MDP as appropriate, in order to agree with them on local TESSERAL plans and counter measures and to seek their advice and assistance. TESSERAL BLACK 2. Review and update, where necessary, all the contingency plans, orders and instructions relating to TESSERAL and implement the following additional counter measures: a. Briefing. Brief all personnel (Service and civilian) on the threat and the orders and instructions for higher TESSERAL Alert States. b. Liaison. Establishments are to liaise with their local civil police, and MDP as appropriate, in order to brief them on local TESSERAL plans and counter measures and to seek their advice and assistance. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-B1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security TESSERAL BLACK SPECIAL 3. Review all the actions carried out at TESSERAL BLACK and implement the following additional counter measures where appropriate: a. Briefing and liaison. (1) Brief all personnel of the increased threat, especially pilots, ground support crews and aircraft controllers. (2) Inform civil police of the threat and co-ordinate plans for safeguarding aircraft flight paths into and out of establishments. (3) Prepare to activate contingency plans, and issue detailed Air Traffic Control (ATC) procedures. (4) Be prepared to receive and direct aircraft from other establishments. b. Precautions inside establishments. (1) Institute patrols to search areas within MOD establishments' perimeters from which attacks on aircraft could be made and take action to ensure that no extremists armed with a SAM or AAMG can operate against aircraft from within the perimeter. (2) c. Hold practice alerts within establishment perimeters. Precautions outside establishments. (1) In conjunction with local civil police carry out regular checks of perimeters, especially under and adjacent to flight paths. (2) Remind the civil police of any areas outside the perimeter from where attacks could be mounted and that cannot be avoided by aircraft on take off or landing. (3) Warn all aircrew to report any unusual activity seen near approach and overshoot areas. TESSERAL AMBER 4. Implement all security arrangements applicable to TESSERAL BLACK SPECIAL and implement the following additional measures where appropriate: a. Briefings and liaison. (1) Brief all personnel of the increased threat. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-B1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures (2) Inform local civil police of the increased threat and consult them on precautionary measures to be taken outside establishments' perimeters. (3) Implement appropriate flying counter measures laid down in SOPs, as directed by ATC. b. Precautions inside establishments. (1) Increase patrols within perimeters and maintain continuous observation of approach and overshoot areas. (2) Reduce flying to essential operational flights only and cease circuit flying. (3) (4) Close relief landing grounds. Check airfield diversion state. c. Precautions outside establishments. Establishments are to be prepared to react to requests from Command HQ to provide Service personnel to assist the civil police to search the approaches outside the perimeter of Service airfields for terrorists under normal Military Aid to Civil Power (MACP). [See Notes 1 and 2] TESSERAL RED 5. Review all security arrangements applicable to TESSERAL AMBER and implement the following additional measures where appropriate: a. Briefing and liaison. (1) (2) b. Brief all personnel of the very high level of threat. Inform local civil police of the increased threat. Precautions inside establishments. (1) Cease all flying except for specifically authorized operational sorties and implement appropriate flying counter measures. (2) Be prepared to accept aircraft diverted from other establishments. (3) Be prepared to deploy light aircraft and helicopters for surveillance tasks (against SAM only - not in the event of an AAMG threat). c. Precautions outside establishments. allowing access to the airhead. Notes: Consider closing military roads JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-B1-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 1. Normally action outside MOD establishments will be entirely a matter for the Chief Police Officer who, on receipt of a TESSERAL alert will take whatever action considered appropriate. Exceptionally, and after consultation with the Home Office, the Chief Police Officer may request aid in: a. Providing deterrent patrols in the area around airfields. b. Helping to deal with terrorists who have been located but, because of their actions or the way they are armed, are beyond the power of the civil police to handle. 2. Any assistance given by the Services outside the perimeters of MOD establishments will come under MACP and will always be at the request of the civil police. Any request for or provision of such assistance should be reported as soon as possible through the chain of command. 3. Detailed characteristics of man-portable SAMs and AAMGs which are likely to be in the possession of terrorist have been issued by the MOD to PSyAs and Command security staff. ESyOs responsible for the implementation of TESSERAL counter measures should ensure that they have access to this information. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-B1-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX C TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 7 GUIDANCE ON MORTAR ATTACK COUNTER MEASURES - ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS Introduction 1. The guidance set out below will probably need to be addressed in any orders or instructions produced by individual establishments concerning the planning, briefing and action to be taken before, during and after any terrorist mortar attack. The guidance given is not exhaustive and should be applied with due regard to the local circumstances applicable to a particular establishment. Thought should be given to consulting local civil police and other Service agencies that may be able to give professional advice on the application of mortar counter measures and their implementation. Preparation 2. A standard mortar attack alarm and all clear signal equipment must be immediately available to guards and easily identifiable as such by personnel within an establishment. Immediate Action in the Event of an Attack 3. The mortar attack alarm must be sounded immediately an attack is suspected. 4. On hearing the attack alarm, the sound of a mortar firing, or the detonation of a mortar round, all personnel are to take cover immediately by: a. Inside buildings. Lying on the floor or ground. Where possible, this should be done away from windows and preferably under some form of shelter such as tables, beds, desks or in internal corridors. (Some buildings may have predesignated bomb shelter areas). b. Outside buildings. Seeking cover immediately wherever they can, and then moving as quickly as possible to the shelter of a building as soon as the alarm or explosions stop. c. Vehicles. Vehicles should not be abandoned obstructing roads. 5. Guards should take cover in guard posts where available and close viewing ports if fitted. Guards should count the number of reports from the baseplate, the general direction from which the mortar(s) firing is coming and the reports of the bombs exploding. These details are then to be relayed to the main guardroom or security control room. 6. Personnel should remain under cover unless: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. b. c. d. They are ordered to move. They are aware of an unexploded bomb nearby. They are aware of a casualty requiring assistance. The all clear sounds. 7. Personnel who are aware of the existence of an unexploded missile or casualties are to inform the security control room or ICP immediately. 8. The security control room is to inform the civil police, the superior HQ and the focal point system of the attack. The assistance of an EOD officer is to be requested by the establishment or civil police and an RVP arranged away from the establishment. Action by the HOE 9. As each attack will probably be different, there is no standard time for personnel to remain under cover. Much will depend on the number of mortars believed to have been used, as the likelihood of unexploded or non-fired bombs increases with the greater number of mortars used in the attack and therefore the longer personnel should remain protected. Those in charge will have to make their own judgement at the time. 10. Once the establishment has been secured and any casualties dealt with, the clearance of the base plate position and any unexploded bombs should follow the normal procedures for dealing with IEDs. This procedure should include clearance of the area, the establishment of a cordon and an ICP by the civil police. The HOE is to act in support of and as requested by the civil police, keeping his own authorities informed. 11. Once the base plate has been located, the area around the baseplate, the area under the flight path and the impact area must all be cleared of personnel and cordoned off. The evacuation of the area under the flight path is essential in order to minimize the danger from an unfired or delayed action bomb still remaining in a mortar. These requirements may entail the complete evacuation of the establishment. 12. Orders and instructions should include measures to cope with the disruption caused by the attack to mains power and communication facilities and the potential risks involved with hazardous or inflammable materials within the establishment. 13. The all clear should not be given until the ATO and the civil police commander agree that it is safe to re-enter the cleared area. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX D TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 7 THE ISSUE AND USE OF BATONS BY SERVICE PERSONNEL Introduction 1. A baton is a weapon that has the capability to seriously injure or kill. It is therefore essential that those using a baton are authorized to carry it, are correctly trained in its use and understand the circumstances that will allow its use. For the purpose of this paper the term `baton' includes any truncheon (generally regarded as obsolete), expandable baton or rigid baton specifically designed for an operational, security or policing purpose. It should not be confused with `baton rounds', used in public order situations, for which separate instructions apply. The use of pickhelves, staves or any other implement as a substitute for a purpose-designed baton is not authorized. Aim 2. The aim of this paper is to outline the situations in which the use of batons by Service personnel may be authorized, and the procedures and constraints that apply to their issue and use. The Requirement for Batons 3. A number of situations are envisaged when batons may be required. These may be operational, security or police related. The provision of a baton will allow a graduated response, from an unarmed reaction through to the use of a firearm, if issued, depending on the situation and the ROE in force. 4. Batons may be a suitable weapon for use in both Peacetime Operations and during Armed Conflict. The requirement for batons will therefore vary depending on the nature of the conflict at the time. 5. The list of circumstances that follows illustrates the range of situations for which the issue of batons may be appropriate. Operations 6. Members of the Armed Forces may require to use batons in order to achieve a mission on any type of Military Operation within the Spectrum of Conflict. Within such an operation, batons may provide an effective option to, or be used with, other weapons. 7. Examples of such Military Operations include: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3D-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. b. c. d. Public Order operations within military aid to the Civil Power. Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement Operations. Military Home Defence. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations. Security 8. In order to provide security for the Department, personnel may be posted as sentries to guard property or personnel. The MOD has a responsibility to equip its personnel for the task on which they are employed and therefore a sentry should be equipped on a basis commensurate with the assessed threat. A sentry could therefore be equipped with a firearm (and perhaps also a baton), with a baton, or unarmed. Policing Duties 9. The MDP and Service Police require batons to execute Police Duties. Where their use has been approved by Minister (AF), CCMDP and Service Police Provost Marshals will issue separate police instructions which accord with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidelines. Consequently, this Policy Paper does not apply to the MDP and/or the Service Police. 10. Batons could be required by Service personnel who may not be Service Police but who could be employed in support of Service Police e.g. patrols, sentries or in response to a specific incident. Summary 11. Batons offer an effective weapon to provide: a. Deterrence through display of capability. b. Individual protection of the Servicemen or of others from aggressors in a variety of scenarios, and for the protection of property. c. An offensive capability short of the use of a firearm. Authority for the Issue of Batons 12. Given that a baton has the capability to kill or seriously injure, with consequences for the individual using a baton and the Department, and in line with arming policy for firearms, approval for their issue must be given at the appropriate level. The issuing of batons for operational use would reflect the policy promulgated in the relevant ROE profile. Ministers have agreed to standing authority being given to CINCs for the issue of batons for security guarding purposes; this authority may be delegated down the respective chains of command. When batons have been issued for security purposes CEAG is to be informed. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3D-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures 13. Trained Personnel. Batons should only be issued to appropriately trained personnel. Planning is to allow for sufficient trained personnel to be available to meet foreseeable scenarios. 14. Self Defence. In extremis, when faced by a particular substantive and immediate threat and where the issue of batons may resolve the immediate situation, Commanding Officers/Heads of Establishments (CO/HOE) and operational commanders may order the issue of batons, notifying the chain of command as soon as possible. Guidance on the Use of Batons 15. Minimum Force. For all operations at home, and those abroad where host nation consent for operations has been obtained, UK Forces will be under the jurisdiction of English Domestic Law as enshrined by Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967. Thus, minimum force for all operations, other than where the laws of armed conflict apply is defined as: "A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or persons unlawfully at large". 16. Further guidance, designed for use in the field, is provided at JSP 398. Training Requirements 17. Those issued with a baton have the option to respond by means of overt deterrence at the lower end of the scale, up to use of potentially lethal force at the other. It is necessary therefore to ensure that all personnel equipped with a baton have confidence in their ability to use it correctly in a number of situations within the law. 18. Training to meet Single Service requirements is necessary and it is for Single Services to decide how these requirements are to be met incorporating the guidelines and training objectives at Annex A. The training is to ensure that the trainee understands how to use the baton correctly in a number of scenarios and this will help fulfil the MOD's responsibilities as an employer. Records of Training 19. A clear and auditable record of initial and continuation baton training carried out by Service personnel is to be maintained and available for scrutiny when required. Resource Implications 20. Provision of Batons. The provision of batons, if required, will be a Single Service responsibility. Only batons, as defined in paragraph 1, are to be issued and any other implements currently issued for use are to be withdrawn. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3D-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 21. Training Costs. Training costs are to be met by the Single Services. Conclusions 22. The following conclusions have been reached: a. Batons may be required for the protection of MOD personnel and property in a number of situations (para 3). b. Authority to issue batons for operational use will reflect guidance articulated in the relevant ROE profile (para 12). c. Standing authority is granted to CINCs to issue batons for security guarding purposes (paragraph 12). d. 13). Batons should only be issued to appropriately trained personnel (para e. Guidance for the operational use of batons at home and abroad, short of Armed Conflict, is to be in accordance with English domestic law (paragraph 15). f. Single Services are responsible for determining the scale of the training requirement and for the implementation of suitable training (para 18). g. Auditable records of training are to be kept (para 19). h. Training and procurement costs will lie where they fall (paragraphs 20 and 21). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3D-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 7 BATON TRAINING General Guidelines 1. The following points relate to all personnel undergoing baton training. a. A safety brief must be given as part of the introduction. b. All personnel must qualify on the basic course before being armed with the baton. Training Objectives (Applicable to all Types of Batons) 2. At the conclusion of the course the student must be able: a. b. To explain the nomenclature of a baton. To demonstrate a clear understanding of the use of minimum force. c. To perform all practical baton techniques and associated movements effectively. d. To demonstrate a clear understanding of the baton ROE and their use in all relevant scenarios. (To achieve this, Home Office Police Forces and the RN use the `Conflict Resolution Model' as a basis for their training). (Experience gained by Police forces and the RN has shown that the above elements of training takes a minimum of 4 hours to complete). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-D1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-D1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D TO SECTION III TO CHAPTER 7 ROE FOR THE USE OF BATONS Guidance for the Use of Batons by Service Personnel General Rules 1. These ROE do not affect your general right to self-defence. However in all situations you are to use the minimum force necessary to achieve your aim. Your baton may only be used as a last resort. 2. Where personnel are authorized to use Public Order Control Equipment, JSP 398 Card D should be issued. Challenging and Warning 3. A challenge should be given before using your baton. (A challenge need not be given if to do so would increase the risk of death or injury to you or others, for example because aggressive confrontation is imminent). 4. You are to challenge by shouting: "ATTENTION - STOP/MOVE/DISPERSE* OR I MAY USE A BATON AGAINST YOU" (* As appropriate) Striking 5. If you have to strike you should USE THE MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE YOUR AIM. Use of Lethal Force 6. Striking in a manner that may cause a fatality constitutes the use of potentially lethal force. You may only strike a person in such a way: If he/she is committing or about to commit an act LIKELY TO ENDANGER LIFE, AND THERE IS NO LESSER WAY TO PREVENT THE DANGER. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-D2-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security After Striking 7. After striking you should: a. AND b. Decide upon any follow-up action required. (e.g. strike again, summon assistance or give first aid). Re-assess the situation; Protection of Specified Property, Equipment or an Installation 8. This extra paragraph operates ONLY when your superior has told you that it applies to a specified property, installation or equipment that you are guarding. If this paragraph is authorized, then you may use a baton against a person if: a. He/she attempts to take possession of that specified property, installation or equipment, or to cause it serious damage, which could prevent its effective use, or to destroy it; AND b. BUT c. All other Card E rules apply. There is no other way of preventing this; JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-3-D2-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 COUNTER TERRORIST PROTECTION WITHIN ESTABLISHMENTS AND ELSEWHERE General 07401. Thorough planning and supervision of protective measures is needed to defeat terrorist attack. It is important to try to foresee what forms of attack terrorists might adopt. In particular, establishments and individuals should assess where they are most vulnerable and concentrate on these areas, instead of attempting to protect everything, to the same extent, all the time. Protective measures stand the best chance of succeeding if: a. Sound plans exist which are sufficiently simple and flexible to respond quickly to changes in the threat and in the manning state of the establishment. b. There are clear orders, standing operating procedures (SOPs) and guidance. c. Everyone is properly educated about the threat, briefed, trained, practised and alert. Plans 07402. Counter terrorist plans should cover the general precautions required at all times, the action to be taken at each Alert State, and how to react to emergencies. They should be based on command instructions and draw on the guidance given in this Chapter and Chapter 5. They should include such matters as: a. External protection and control of access. This should cover guarding arrangements, the searching of vehicles and people on entry, passes, restrictions on movement where civilians have access to military roads, the security of the establishment perimeter, and observation generally (external and internal). b. Internal protection. This should cover the general state of preparedness of the establishment, including such matters as guard and reaction forces, lighting, parking, searching, building security, medical arrangements, fire fighting, arrangements for the delivery of mail and goods, and escorts for visitors and other similar points relevant to the establishment. Emphasis must be given to the protection of personnel in such places as accommodation blocks, NAAFIs, messes, etc. Plans should be made for the protection of sensitive targets such as armouries, guardrooms, ammunition stores, vehicles, other major equipment, communications centres and telephone exchanges, etc. c. The protection of personnel and families when outside the establishment both on and off duty including movement. Protective arrangements must be included for those soft targets that are not normally protected JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security but that may be vulnerable in periods of high threat such as Service families accommodation areas (in conjunction with the civil police where appropriate), or other living accommodation, ranges and local training areas, public houses and cafes, transport facilities such as buses and railway stations, etc, regularly used by Service personnel. d. Counter measures. This should cover the measures to be taken in the event of a terrorist attack or other contingencies, including orders for the issue of arms and ammunition. e. Liaison. The arrangements for liaison with the local police and adjacent military establishments should be specified, and their participation reflected in establishment security plans. f. Post incident procedures. These should cover the procedures and actions to be carried out in the event of a terrorist attack. Orders 07403. Establishment orders, apart from covering the matters at paragraph 07402 above, must give specific guidance on the action required in the event of the following: a. b. Changes to the Alert State. A specific threat to the establishment. c. The discovery of a suspicious item in the mail or other suspicious objects elsewhere, including guidance on the identification of such objects. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. Any form of evacuation that is necessary. The discovery or suspicion of intruders. Other suspicious activity that may relate to terrorism. An explosion or attack. A mortar attack. Requests for Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP). Other contingencies. 07404. Additional guidance on matters that should be included in Contingency Planning for Unexpected Events is at Annex A. Briefing 07405. Establishments must ensure that all personnel are briefed, trained and practised in terrorist precautions. The extent to which this is necessary is for HOE to decide, based on JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures the current threat, the role and state of training of the establishment and directions issued by superior HQ. A large part of an establishment's protection and that of individuals should be based on the physical security measures described elsewhere in this manual coupled with normal military skills, alertness and initiative. However, there are protective measures that are necessary normally only during periods of high threat; at other times they tend to be forgotten. Advice on such measures is covered in succeeding paragraphs. Operation ROUNDUP 07406. Operation ROUNDUP is the establishment level operation to alert its personnel to the possible presence of intruders and/or IEDs within the establishment. Its implementation requires: a. b. c. d. The securing of the establishment. The imposition of rigid control of entry to all areas. The cessation of non-essential movement. The instigation of a thorough search. 07407. All MOD establishments are to have plans to instigate Operation ROUNDUP should the presence of intruders or IEDs be suspected or as a proactive security measure. Focal Point reporting should only be used in the event of an actual terrorist related incident. Operation WIDEAWAKE 07408. Operation WIDEAWAKE can be used to initiate a search for IEDs at start-work. It can be instigated at establishment level and higher formations can also order its implementation at one or more establishments. Establishments may be passed this codeword, through the Focal Point System, and should consider whether to initiate a similar procedure at their own establishment. Protection outside MOD Establishments (Less Service Families or Private Accommodation) 07409. Guidance covering aspects of life outside MOD establishments, such as protective measures for drivers, unit movement generally, training, sport, social activities, and travelling arrangements for individuals or groups moving by public or private transport are included at Annex B. Personal Security at Home 07410. The need for precautions in Service families and in private accommodation will vary widely. Depending on the level of threat, occupants of Service families and private accommodation should either be issued with security advice or briefed on common-sense security precautions. It is not possible to specify precautions to suit all circumstances, but guidance suitable for use by High Threat Personnel (HTP) is given at Annex A to Section V and should be used as the basis for advice for other personnel when the need arises. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Anonymous Telephone Calls or Threats 07411. All personnel in an establishment who are likely to receive anonymous telephone calls or telephone threats directed at the establishment should be briefed on how to react. Officers, NCOs, clerical staff, mess waiters and telephone exchange operators, are among those likely to be affected. Guidance is at Annex C. Suspicious Letters or Parcels 07412. All MOD personnel should be briefed on how to deal with suspicious envelopes and packages arriving by post. Guidance is at Annex D. Explosive Devices and Booby Traps. 07413. All MOD personnel should be briefed on how to recognize possible unexploded devices and booby traps and what to do when such devices are suspected or discovered. Guidance is at Annex E. Searching of Vehicles 07414. Vehicles, both military and civilian, are an easy target for terrorists and all MOD personnel must understand how to search them. Security at Armed Forces Careers Offices 07415. Experience has shown that Armed Forces Careers Offices and staff are particularly vulnerable to terrorist attack. Located in urban areas, very often in a shopping area with free public access and normally isolated from other Service establishments. 07416. The need to protect careers offices must be balanced with the requirements of Service recruiting policy and the need for an "open door" approach. Security arrangements will also be complicated by local planning restrictions, multiple occupancy of buildings and tenancy or lease agreements. However, the application of the security measures detailed below should provide a realistic degree of security. The Threat 07417. The types of attack most likely against Armed Forces Careers Offices are as follows: a. A time delay IED attack close to or inside careers office premises, probably involving the placement of a device in silent hours. b. A booby trap, postal bomb or similar device delivered to careers office premises. c. A close quarter shooting against careers personnel arriving, departing or at a careers office. Personnel unlocking and locking premises at predictable times are particularly vulnerable. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures d. An under vehicle improvised explosive device (UVIED) attack against a careers office vehicle, particularly if it is clearly identifiable or insecurely parked or parked in a secluded but accessible area. Security Planning 07418. Each Armed Forces Careers Office must possess a comprehensive security plan that should include the following: a. b. c. d. e. f. to: Measures for BIKINI Alert States. Briefing and training. Personal security measures. Vehicle security measures. Office security measures. Reporting, to include instructions for reporting terrorist related information (1) (2) (3) g. Civil police. Focal Point System contact points. Normal chain of command. Incident contingency plans, to include: (1) (2) (3) (4) Immediate response drills. Evacuation plans. Search plans. Joint careers office and civil police post incident plan. 07419. Minimum security standards at Armed Forces Careers Offices are at Annex F. Briefing and Training. 07420. Provision should be made, as part of induction training for careers offices personnel to receive: a. Formal security briefings on first arrival and thereafter at regular intervals. These should include coverage of the threat (in particular current terrorist methods of operation), local situation and security orders. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. Formal security training by specialist staff to cover operational counter measures such as personal security drills and vehicle search. Immediate Response Drills 07421. Security procedures and immediate response drills, such as office evacuation drills, must be monitored and practised. Contact Lists 07422. Viable contact lists (24 hour cover) are to be maintained and passed to the relevant Focal Point System node or sub-node and local civil police. This will ensure that careers staff may be contacted at any time. Security Advice 07423. Careers staff should be encouraged to seek advice from their PSyAs and Command security staff or local security unit. Guidance should also be obtained from current DCIs covering security at public military events and personal security measures. Contingency Planning and Post Incident Procedures 07424. Operational control and co-ordination of the response to a terrorist incident is the responsibility of the civil police. Each civil police force in GB has drawn up contingency plans to respond to terrorist incidents occurring within their jurisdiction. In most cases, these plans are based upon common terminology and procedures and produced by the ACPO Standing Committee on Emergency Procedures. ACPO emergency procedure terminology is included in the glossary of terms shown at Appendix 1 to Annex G. 07425. HOE are responsible for the immediate action to be taken after a terrorist incident has occurred. Post incident operational control within perimeters is to be handed over to a civil police officer on request. Once a formal hand-over is completed, the HOE is to continue to provide help and support to the civil police as required. 07426. Although the following procedures have been developed for use in GB, the content should be used in overseas commands as a guide to develop local contingency plans. Contingency Plans 07427. To ensure that correct action is taken by personnel after a terrorist incident has occurred, HOE are to produce written local contingency plans. These plans are to be drawn up in conjunction with the local civil police and should, where possible, be joint plans. To be effective, contingency plans must be regularly rehearsed, ideally with the civil police and other emergency services. Copies of plans should be held by the civil police, other emergency services and appropriate HQ. 07428. The general principles of incident management to be applied at the scene of an incident are detailed at Annex H. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures 07429. Details of the action to be taken in the event of the terrorist incidents are detailed in the following Annexes and Appendices: a. Advice on Handling Anonymous Telephone Calls with Warnings or Threats - Annex C. b. c. d. e. f. g. Action upon discovery of a suspect postal bomb - Annex D. Action upon discovery of a suspected IED ­ Appendix 1 to Annex H. Action should an IED explode ­ Appendix 2 to Annex H. Action in the event of a mortar attack ­ Appendix 3 to Annex H. Action in the event of a terrorist shooting attack ­ Appendix 4 to Annex H. Action in the event of a proxy bomb attack ­ Appendix 5 to Annex H. Civil Police 07430. Details of the civil police civil police control and co-ordination of the emergency services' response in the event of a major terrorist incident are at Annex G. Deployment of Supporting Service Agencies 07431. A number of supporting Service agencies are available to the civil police and establishment to provide post incident assistance if required. a. EOD. Service EOD teams provide assistance to the civil police throughout GB on request. Such assistance is requested by the civil police direct to the JSEODOC at Didcot. b. Royal Engineer Specialist Search (1) 33 Engr Regt provide specialist search assistance to civil police throughout GB on request. (2) Any civil police request for specialist search assistance should be passed to Joint Service EOD Operations Centre (JSEODOC). c. Helicopters. Requests for helicopter support should be passed to Command HQ and must be accompanied by full details of the task as follows: (1) Contact name and telephone number of the person who can give additional details of the task. (2) (3) Outline details of the task, i.e. Recce, CASEVAC, etc. Number of PAX to be carried. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (4) (5) (6) Pick-up point and destination. Communication details. Timings. d. Photo recce. Photo recce requests are to passed to MOD through the chain of command. e. Service police. Service police will attend the scene of a terrorist incident, and are trained and equipped to provide the following assistance to the civil police: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Cordon and control personnel. Communications. Collection, collation and provision of evidence. Investigation within the local community. Provision of swift and accurate details of the incident. (6) Provision of an officer to act as civil police liaison officer if required. Service Attendance at the Scene of an Incident 07432. a. Service attendance at the scene of an incident should be restricted to those individuals with a legitimate and defined role to play in post incident action. b. There is a tendency for uninvited Service representatives to arrive at the scene of an incident to gain information, conduct liaison or speculate. The following is a guide to those persons who should be in attendance: (1) (2) (3) (4) HOE. Establishment personnel directly supporting the civil police. Emergency services. Specialist personnel such as EOD and local security unit. Post Incident Information Gathering and Reporting. 07433. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures a. There is a requirement following a terrorist incident for swift, accurate information gathering and reporting through the chain of command. Information is required to: (1) Take action to save life or prevent further loss of life. (2) Make decisions based upon facts, including the possible changing of security Alert States and the introduction of enhanced security measures. (3) Identify lessons for the future. b. The following have information gathering and reporting responsibilities after a terrorist incident: (1) Establishment. Gather immediate post incident information and send Incident Reports to the civil police, and superior formation HQ. (2) Security Unit. (a) Ensure that D Def Sy, PSyAs and Command security staffs are aware of the incident. (b) Gather post incident information and within 12 hours of an incident submit a written initial incident report to PSyAs and Command security staffs and to D Def Sy (and RAF only, to HQ RAF P&SS). (c) Liaise closely with all other appropriate agencies in the compilation of the initial incident report. (d) (e) Contribute to the compilation of any subsequent reports. Conduct investigations in support of the civil police. Media Liaison and Public Information 07434. a. The civil police are directly responsible for media liaison after a terrorist incident. b. Establishment responsibilities are as follows: (1) Provide an update briefing for the Command Media Ops staff who may deploy to the scene of a terrorist incident. (2) Keep the media away from the scene until media liaison facilities are agreed by the civil police. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (3) The HOE is to be available to broadcast interviews as advised by the Command Media Ops staff or civil police press liaison officer. (4) The HOE is to avoid comment on security arrangements and is to take steps to ensure that personnel under his command observe similar discretion, even when talking to relatives or acquaintances. (5) The HOE should bear in mind that public relations is a command function, and that although operational tasks take priority the need to reassure the public or to gain recognition for positive actions taken are significant considerations and in certain circumstances may be of overriding importance. Security Vigilance Areas (SVA) 07435. An SVA is primarily defined as the ground outside the perimeter from which a MOD establishment or Service families accommodation estate could be observed or attacked by a terrorist group. The size of an SVA will vary, depending upon the local geography. It may also be appropriate to include other locations where personnel are required to congregate and where the setting of routines is unavoidable, e.g. railway stations at particular times. 07436. The setting of an SVA is a local arrangement between the HOE and the local civil police commander; they will determine its boundaries according to local circumstances, availability of resources and counter terrorist security requirements. 07437. It is currently assessed that a terrorist group will normally spend considerable time reconnoitring and making its preparations prior to mounting an attack. One or more members of the group may well be within an SVA watching a target prior to attack. The terrorist group will subsequently enter the SVA to attack an establishment and may select mortar base plates or firing points within the SVA. 07438. It is within the SVA, particularly during the reconnaissance and preparatory stages of an attack, that the terrorist is vulnerable to identification. However skilfully he or she merges into the local pattern of life, the terrorist is usually a stranger in an unfamiliar environment. It is this vulnerability which SVA plans should seek to exploit. Aim of an SVA 07439. The aim of an SVA is to establish an area, primarily around the outside of establishments, in which counter terrorist security awareness is raised. Joint civil police and MOD measures utilising increased public awareness of the terrorist threat and modus operandi are implemented, if appropriate, to identify suspicious activity and subsequently to deter, disrupt or respond to an attack. 07440. The aim is not one of general deterrence, but one of fully utilising the eyes and ears of those in the vicinity of Service establishments with a view to identifying suspicious activity and reporting it to the appropriate authorities. Publicity of the scheme is to be strictly limited to those living within the SVA. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures SVA Plans 07441. SVA plans should include the following: a. A civil police led observation and reporting plan designed to raise the level of public awareness and identify suspect terrorist activity within the SVA. b. A civil police led plan designed to respond to reports of suspect terrorist activity within or beyond the SVA. c. A joint civil police and establishment contingency plan to respond to a terrorist attack. Implementation of SVA 07442. Phase One - Preparatory Measures a. Joint police and Service liaison. Establishments, in consultation with their PSyAs and Command security staff and civil police HQ, should identify where SVAs are needed and decide whether their satellite establishments need separate SVAs. At locations where other Service establishments are collocated or in close proximity, HOEs should consider establishing joint SVAs. SVA coordinating groups may be necessary and could include: (1) (2) (3) (4) Civil police commanders. HOE. ESyO. Command representative. Once liaison is established the b. Joint police and Service planning. following planning should take place: (1) A joint appreciation conducted by the local civil police and MOD, to include the following: (a) Ground analysis to identify potential terrorist approach and escape routes, drop off and getaway rendezvous points, vantage points for terrorist observation and potential firing and mortar base plates points. HOE should take account of any previous action resulting in security or counter terrorist surveys that could provide much of the information needed. (b) An assessment of establishment vulnerability and identification of potential targets, e.g. accommodation blocks, messes and main guardroom. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (c) A pattern-of-life study to establish what is normal within an SVA, e.g. local routines, local vehicles, etc (identifying normality is a precursor to spotting the abnormal). (d) An assessment of civil police and MOD resources available to implement an SVA plan. (2) Production of SVA plan. The SVA plan should include: (a) (b) Map showing SVA boundaries. Observation and reporting arrangements. (c) Operational response to reports of suspected terrorist activity. (3) Education and training. The key to the possible identification of suspect terrorist activity within an SVA is likely to be appropriate education within the civil police, the establishment and the local civilian community. (a) Within the civil police and Services, education and training might include terrorist methods of operation, familiarity with the ground, the SVA pattern of life, observation and reporting techniques, vehicle recognition and joint police and Service incident handling drills. (b) Within the local civilian community, increasing the level of awareness of the terrorist threat and modus operandi may require publicity material, follow up visits by the civil police and possibly the involvement of neighbourhood watch committees. 07443. Phase Two - Implementation of the Observation Framework a. Civilian Involvement. Distribution, normally under civil police arrangements, to all dwellings and shops throughout the SVA of the publicity material produced by MOD. b. Civil Police. Chief Constables to decide upon the appropriate deployment of foot and vehicle patrols in uniform and civilian clothes within an SVA in light of the local needs and circumstances. c. Service Personnel (1) On duty. Observation from establishment perimeter vantage points into the SVA conducted by Service guards, MGS, Service Police or MDP. (2) Off duty. Observation and awareness by all Service personnel, dependants and civilian employees as they pass through the SVA. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-12 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures (3) At home. Encouragement to become involved in neighbourhood watch schemes, both as participants and co-ordinators. 07444. Phase Three - Implementation of Local Information Reporting System a. Reporting system. (1) Civilians. Directly to the local civil police using the 999 system or a locally arranged Freephone system. (2) Civil police. By radio or report directly to the civil police control room. (3) Service personnel. Either directly to the civil police or where this has been agreed locally, to the main guardroom or Service police. (4) Establishments. Where information is passed other than to the civil police, in the first instance, establishments are to ensure that it is relayed immediately to them. All reports are also to be passed to the local MDP or Service police unit and to the OP MARSHALL Cell within 2 MI Bn as appropriate. b. Collection system. The civil police are responsible for the handling of all terrorist related information produced within the SVA. However, various Service police and security agencies have collation systems for all security reports passed to them including those related to SVAs. Such reports are then passed on to the civil police and other agencies as appropriate. Maintenance of SVAs 07445. Security is, in part, an attitude of mind and is a continuous process. The local civil police commander and HOE will need to consider appropriate means of maintaining security awareness through repetition and reinforcement of the need to maintain vigilance. This could include: a. A civil police led additional leafleting programme. b. Inclusion in new arrival briefings, periodic security education and repeat routine orders. Plan to Respond to Reports of Suspicious Activity 07446. As a corollary to the establishment of SVAs, HOEs will need to prepare and maintain contingency plans, in conjunction with the civil police, for activation in the event of reports of likely terrorist activity: a. Within the SVA, the response to a report of suspicious activity is likely to be an exclusive civil police operation. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. The operational response of the civil police within an SVA is likely to be mirrored by an appropriate response within the perimeter of an establishment. Joint Contingency Plan in Response to a Terrorist Attack 07447. The HOE in conjunction with the civil police, is to produce contingency plans covering the eventuality of a terrorist attack and the likely response to it. Security at Public Military Events Definition 07448. A Public Military Event (PME) is an event that the Services organize or participate in, about which the general public has prior knowledge and to which they have access. The term includes civil events with military participation examples of which are as follows: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. Recruiting activities. Publicity tours. Band concerts. Parades. Service social functions. Sporting and charity events. Service social functions such as reunions and dinners. Air Days, Open Days and Ships open to visitors. Lectures by Service personnel. 07449. The event may take place on or off MOD property. All such events are at risk from terrorist attack or interference by extremists. Application of the Definition 07450. The definition of PME remains deliberately wide to allow HQs and establishments to make a sensible judgement. The vital words are 'the general public'. There are many minor activities involving elements of the public with the Services that receive no general advance publicity and that can be secured by establishment procedures when they are on MOD property and personal security procedures, such as SHARKWATCH, when off MOD property. Examples are sports fixtures against Service teams within MOD establishments, participation by small numbers of individual Service personnel in local sporting or cultural events or the performance of a small number of musicians (less than 4) at a private function. Such activities are described as Off Site Events (OSE) and are not considered PME. The procedures within this Section need not be applied, advice on OSE security is at Appendix JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-14 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures 6. However, if in doubt about the status of an event, advice should be sought from the appropriate PSyA or Command security staffs in sufficient time to allow for 6 weeks notice of the event to be given to the civil police. Responsibility for Approval in GB 07451. The notification proforma in the format at Appendix 1 to Annex I and the acknowledgement slip at Appendix 2 to Annex I are to arrive at the civil police force HQ in whose area the event is to take place at least 6 weeks before the event. The civil police will acknowledge receipt using the proforma at Appendix 2 to Annex I, giving the sponsor the local civil police point of contact for liaison. If the civil police force HQ advises that the military participation in the event should not take place, then the event cannot proceed. In exceptional circumstances where participation in an event is identified with less than 6 weeks notice, it may proceed, only with the unqualified agreement of the civil police force HQ. Examples might include little publicized, short notice sports fixtures or band concerts. Division of Responsibility 07452. The civil police have overall responsibility for security at PMEs both on and off MOD property. In general, the Service takes the lead in arranging security on MOD property and the civil police take the lead outside MOD property including liaison, when necessary, with the British Transport Police. Organizers and Event Security Officers 07453. PME sponsors, organizers and participants are to ensure the following measures are taken: a. Restrict, within the requirements of the event, distribution of information such as forecasts of events e.g. of band concerts, guest lists (particularly important when VIPs will be present), invitations and any other information that might help a terrorist. b. Ensure that transport (including private cars and minibuses): (1) Is searched before boarding and loading. (2) Where possible varies routes to and from entry and exit choke points. (3) Is ideally parked within a protected MOD establishment or civil police station or is guarded throughout the event by Service personnel positioned outside the vehicles or, in the worst case, located where it can be visited frequently. c. Provide assistance to the civil police search operations if requested. This may include securing and controlling access to any buildings, rooms, areas and vehicles that Service personnel are likely to use before, during or prior to dispersal JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-15 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security after the event. Personnel may be in uniform or civilian clothes, as agreed by the civil police. d. Ensure the security of military personnel, equipment and arms at the event and during travel to and from it, using secure overnight storage and accommodation as appropriate. e. Comply with the Aide Memoire at Annex I. f. Seek advice on security from their PSyA and Command security staff if required. Commands 07454. PSyAs and Command security staffs are responsible for monitoring all PMEs to ensure that they are being dealt with correctly. HQ RAF P&SS is responsible for monitoring and co-ordinating security for all PMEs for the RAF. Civil Police Requests for Large Scale Support 07455. Assistance provided will normally involve those personnel who can be made available without undue penalty. Civil police requests for large scale support must be referred to the relevant HQ who will seek MOD authority if necessary. Coordination 07456. Outside a Service establishment where more than one Service or unit is participating, the relevant Army HQ in whose area the event is to take place will ensure (in conjunction with the other Services) that responsibility for Service aspects of security are clearly laid down, and co-ordinated, including the appointment of an overall Event Security Officer (ESO) (see Annex I). Whenever possible this will be an officer or WO. Financial Liability 07457. Where the civil police have a statutory responsibility to provide security, they also have the associated financial liability, regardless of the period of notice involved. For officially sponsored events, civil police would not seek to raise charges. For private engagements run by a commercial sponsor, whether or not for financial gain, the organizer will be responsible for meeting any police charges raised, in addition to the normal charges raised by MOD. If Service attendance at an event is cancelled on civil police advice for security reasons, MOD will assume no financial liability. Commercial sponsors should be advised of the full extent of their liability when booking engagements. It would be improper for any such costs to be met from the Defence budget. Action to be taken for PMEs outside London District in GB 07458. Completed proforma in the format at Appendices 1 and 2 Annex I are to be sent to the following addressees not less than 6 weeks before the event: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-16 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures a. b. c. Command security officer. (PME involving RAF). Civil police and own Service local security unit. Relevant Army Division and Brigade HQ. 07459. For the details of points of contact in Army Brigade and Division HQ, supporting Military Intelligence Sections and the civil police force HQ to be informed see the current DCI GEN. 07460. Organizers are to await the civil police force HQ contact officer's notification of the local civil police point of contact and are then to inform the ESO who will: a. Liaise with the local civil police prior to the event to discuss the proposed security arrangements, in particular any requirement for Service assistance if the event is to take place outside MOD property. If appropriate, a joint reconnaissance of the venue should be conducted by the local civil police commander and the ESO. b. If the event is not on MOD property, ensure that the military assistance agreed with the civil police is provided. c. Brief the Service personnel participating in the event on the detailed security arrangements and the duties of personnel provided purely for security prior to the event. The Aide Memoire for ESOs is at Annex I. d. If an event has to be cancelled for whatever reason then the initial addressees on the notification proforma are to informed as soon as possible. Action to be taken for PMEs within London District in GB 07461. HQ London District is responsible for informing the civil police about PMEs within the district. Establishments and staffs sponsoring, organising or participating in PMEs within London District are to: a. Complete the proforma in the format at Appendices 1 and 2 to Annex I and send them to HQ London District and 90 Military Intelligence Section no less than 6 weeks before the event is due to take place. b. Appoint an ESO. The Metropolitan Police Division in whose area the event is to be held will contact the ESO prior to the event to discuss security arrangements. 07462. Should the relevant Service Authority wish an event to go ahead, even if the civil police cannot be given 6 weeks notice, negotiations with the civil police about this event are to be conducted through HQ London District. If an event has to be cancelled for any reason, then all addressees are to be informed as soon as possible. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-17 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Royal Parks 07463. Service Bands with engagements in the Royal Parks are to travel to London in civilian clothes and change at the locations shown below. Bands should, wherever possible, move in one vehicle. Bands are to change back into civilian clothes before leaving London District. Contact should be made with the relevant location at least 4 weeks before the event as follows: a. St James' Park and Hyde Park. Wellington Barracks, Birdcage Walk. Camp Commandant: London District Mil ext 3283 or 020 7414 3283. b. Regents Park. Regents Park Barracks, Albany Street. Quartermaster: London District Mil ext 8742 or 020 7414 8742. c. Greenwich Park. Woolwich Barracks, Woolwich (Quartermaster): Woolwich Garrison ext 3296 or 020 8781 3296. Responsibilities for a PME Overseas Approval 07464. PMEs overseas, including NI and the ROI, also require similar prior notification so that the civil police or appropriate security organization in the country where the event takes place can be consulted. Action to be Taken 07465. Establishments and staffs sponsoring, organising or participating in PMEs are to ensure that notification takes place at least 6 weeks before the event by informing one of the following: a. The security staff in countries where a UK Command Headquarters is located. (For PME in NI the relevant Bde HQ with an information copy to HQNI). b. The UK Military Support Unit at a NATO HQ. c. The British Embassy or High Commission where no UK Command Headquarters exists. (The BRITMILREP Dublin for PME in the ROI). 07466. The PME notification proforma at Appendix 3 to Annex I is to be used. The relevant overseas Command HQ security staff, Military Support Unit, British Embassy or High Commission should then be requested to assume responsibility for: a. b. c. Liaison with the local civil police and relevant security organizations. Granting clearance and approval for the event. Providing a security brief for the sponsor, organizers and participating unit. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-18 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures 07467. The ESO is to take account of relevant paragraphs of the Aide Memoire for ESOs in GB at Annex I when planning participation in a PME overseas. Security at Open Days 07468. The security of open days poses particular security problems as the very nature of the event gives an extremist the opportunity to enter an establishment under the cover of being a genuine spectator. There is, therefore, a need to plan carefully for such events and involve all the security agencies at an early stage. 07469. The ESO should ensure that the ESyO, Service police, civil police, and local security unit or RAF P&SS are aware of the event. The ESO should also ensure that a security plan is prepared based on the current threat assessment. NB: The list of police and army units to be notified prior to an event is published in current DCIs and will be updated as required. Security when Training outside Service Establishments 07470. Training areas are particularly vulnerable to terrorist attack and Alert State measures must be applied rigorously. Training within GB 07471. Public notification of use of ranges and training areas. Over a long period of time the custom has grown up of publishing, for the benefit (including safety) of members of the public, details of forthcoming training activities on our ranges and training areas. It would clearly be extremely difficult to cease all such notification, particularly in respect of training areas that fall within a national park or where specified routes are open to the public when a range is not in use. However, information published should be kept to the minimum compatible with the above purpose. Established Training Camps 07472. a. Due to their fixed and permanent nature, established training camps can be targeted relatively easily by terrorists. In addition, their small or non-existent regular guard or caretaker element can make it comparatively easy for devices to be placed. Where practicable, there should be continuity of occupation, e.g. an advance party of an incoming unit should take over from a rear party of an outgoing unit. It is appreciated that this may be difficult for Reserve or cadet units. b. In addition to checking the camp thoroughly for IEDs (OP WIDEAWAKE) on arrival or, preferably, by the advance party, the measures relevant to the Alert State in force are to be applied, as appropriate to the size of the party occupying the camp and subject to any specific conditions that may be ordered by the PSyAs and Command security staff of the area in which the camp is located. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-19 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c. These measures are to be co-ordinated with the Training Camp Commandant and his Standing Orders as appropriate. When units share a camp, the Commandant may well co-ordinate a joint security plan. These procedures are to be followed if permanent training camps of other Services are used. d. When the unit or sub-unit leaves the camp for the training area, all doors and window shutters (if applicable) of accommodation vacated should be locked. On return to the camp a check for IEDs should be made (OP WIDEAWAKE), the extent of which would depend on whether or not a rear party had remained in the camp. 07473. Approaches to permanent training camps may be targeted with a view to the placing of booby trap IEDs, RCIEDs or the carrying out of a mortar attack. Particular vigilance should be exercised in relation to the close approaches, in particular route choke points, culverts etc. Ranges and Training Areas 07474. Due to their permanent nature, range and training areas can be identified relatively easily by terrorists. However, the actual area of the training area to be used would be difficult to identify, albeit that certain fixed facilities provide possibilities for booby traps. When using such areas the following guidance is to be followed: a. Access points and facilities, e.g. gates, firing points, range consoles, target galleries, huts, kitchens, ablutions and tents etc are to be thoroughly checked on arrival, secured throughout the period in use and checked again on departure if appropriate. b. Transport is to be guarded or parked in a secure area. c. On departure the doors and window shutters (if applicable) are to be locked and the keys returned to the relevant authority. Private Land 07475. Training on private land is generally unpredictable and would be difficult for a terrorist organization to target, but the relevant Alert State measures should be enforced throughout the training period. Adventurous Training 07476. Unless there are good reasons for not doing, personnel on adventurous training should adopt the principle of anonymity. The expedition should, therefore, be civilianized in every respect (including clothing and vehicles). Rules for adventurous training and expeditions are contained in DCIs reissued annually. The expedition leader will need to read the relevant DCI in the early planning stages of an expedition; copies of the DCI should be held by establishment training staff. Whenever possible unattended vehicles should be left in a secure area. However, in all cases vehicles are to be thoroughly searched if they have been left unattended. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-20 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Major Sports Events 07477. Sponsors of major sports events where the public have or could gain access, are to treat the event as a public military event (PME) and take action accordingly. Training outside GB 07478. a. Training in Germany (excluding adventurous training). Before deployment, units are to be informed of the KEENWIND state (the BFG Alert State system similar to BIKINI) by PSyAs and Command security staff. b. Overseas training exercises other than in Germany (excluding adventurous training). Overseas training exercises outside Germany fall into two categories: those taking place in countries where a UK command or training structure exists, e.g. Cyprus or Kenya; and those where no such structure exists, e.g. France and Norway. c. Countries with a UK Command or training structure. Exercise recce teams will be briefed on the threats to security and the appropriate protective counter measures by the receiving Command or training unit. Relevant security aspects are to be considered in exercise planning and included in instructions and briefing. Any planning problems should be referred to the Command security staff. If appropriate, the receiving Command or training unit is to supplement this with a more detailed briefing on the unit's arrival in country. d. Countries without a UK Command or training structure. As in subparagraph 07478c above but the action is to lie with the sending Command and the training unit. e. Overseas adventurous training expeditions. The relevant adventurous training staffs will pass details of such projects to the relevant security staff, who will obtain threat assessments, as necessary, and pass them on together with security advice for inclusion in their briefing of the expedition leader. f. Overseas sports events. Organizers or sponsors of military teams participating in sports events overseas are to seek security advice from the relevant security staff. This advice should be sought as early as possible in the planning stage. Counter Terrorist Search Introduction 07479. Counter terrorist search (CTS) has been a significant component of security force operations in NI since 1970. After the bombing of the Grand Hotel in Brighton in 1984 and terrorist attacks on military installations in Great Britain and elsewhere, CTS measures have become an important part of military counter terrorist operations wherever a threat of JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-21 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security terrorist attack exists. Military CTS capabilities have been developed primarily to defeat the Irish republican terrorist threat, but are equally capable of countering threats from other terrorist groups. Terminology CTS 07480. Military CTS involves the use of systematic procedures to find terrorists and their resources and to confirm the presence or absence of bombs within specified boundaries. The objectives of CTS include obtaining evidence, depriving terrorists of their resources, providing information or assuring a facility is safe to use. It is conducted by trained personnel who may be supported by other agencies including intelligence, Arms and Explosive Search Dog Teams, EOD Teams, Electronic Counter Measures and Aerial Photographic Reconnaissance. The following terms are commonly used: a. High Risk Search (HRS). HRS operations are searches carried out when it is assessed that there is a high probability of a bomb, booby trap or improvised explosive device (IED) being present. b. Low Risk Search (LRS). LRS operations are searches carried out when it is assessed that there is a low probability of a bomb, booby trap or IED being present. c. CTS Awareness (CTSA). CTSA is an individual's knowledge and use of basic search measures to deter, detect and defeat a terrorist attack. d. Defensive CTS. Operations carried out to protect potential targets, including personnel and property, are defensive CTS. Such operations include both random search measures to deter the terrorist, and any search instigated to ensure that a specific area, route or venue is clear of terrorist devices. e. Offensive CTS. Offensive CTS operations are investigative operations mounted to achieve any of the following: (1) (2) (3) Deprive terrorists of their resources. Gain evidence that may be used in a prosecution. Obtain information for intelligence purposes. f. Search co-ordinators. The role of the search co-ordinator is to integrate search operations into the commander's overall plan and to provide liaison between agencies at the appropriate level. The degree of knowledge will depend on the position held. Training is provided for appropriate appointees on Command HQ and formation staffs, operations officers of specified units deploying on operational tours such as in NI, and Royal Engineer and Service police officers in appointments within units involved in operational search. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-22 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures g. Search Advisors. Search Advisors are trained to provide detailed CTS advice on the operational deployment and employment of search teams for which they are responsible. Search Advisors must be involved in the planning of search operations, they will direct and issue orders to search teams involved, and should provide the link between search teams and the all arms commander on the ground throughout the operation. Policy Civil Police 07481. In the UK, Chief Constables are responsible for CTS operations within their own areas. The Home Office provides guidance to police forces on CTS matters and on the procedures to be used by police forces requiring military CTS assistance. MOD 07482. Within MOD the Army Department takes the lead on CTS issues. Specific responsibilities are as follows: a. Joint Service Policy and Resources Committee (JSSPRC). JSSPRC considers and endorses Joint Service CTS policy and resource requirements. Implementation of Joint Service policy, and provision of suitable resources to implement endorsed policy once agreed, is a Single Service responsibility. JSSPRC reports through the Joint Service Explosive Ordnance Disposal Policy Committee (JSEODPC) to DCDS(C). The Chairman of JSSPRC is nominated by the Engineer in Chief (Army) (EinC(A)). b. Director Military Operations (DMO). DMO (MO2) sets the tri-service CTS policy and is the MOD focus for co-ordination of CTS operations. DMO provides the link between MOD and other government departments and controls Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) support under arrangements designated in the MACP Handbook. DMO is responsible to Assistant Chief of the General Staff (ACGS) for ensuring the implementation of Joint Service policy within the Army Department. c. Director of Naval Security and Integrated Contingency Planning (DNSyICP). DNSyICP is responsible to the 2SL/CINCNAVHOME for implementation of Joint Service CTS policy within the RN. d. Engineer in Chief (EinC(A)). EinC(A), through DMO, will normally provide military CTS advice to all government departments and provides the Chairman and Secretariat for JSSPRC. EinC(A) sponsors all CTS training, which is carried out under the direction of the Commandant Royal School of Military Engineering (RSME) at the National Search Centre (NSC) Chattenden. NSC is the national focus for provision of CTS advice. e. DCDS (EC). DEC(SP) sponsors all CTS equipment programmes. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-23 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security f. Defence Procurement Agency (DPA). DPA is responsible for the procurement of all CTS equipment. g. Air Officer Security and Provost Marshall (RAF) (AOSy&PM(RAF)). AOSy&PM(RAF) is responsible to Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS) for implementation of Joint Service CTS policy within the RAF. Theatres and Commands 07483. Theatres and Commands are responsible for CTS policy and operations within their commands. Commanders are to ensure that: a. An officer within his HQ, where necessary also within subordinate formation HQ, is nominated and trained as a Formation Search Co-ordinator (FSC). This officer should be the focus for co-ordination of advice on search policy and of CTS operations. b. Adequate CTS resources are established in theatre to counter the assessed threat. This includes provision of manpower and equipment. c. d. Procedures exist for the conduct of CTS operations. CTS and CTSA direction and advice is provided to units. Units 07484. Unit commanders are to ensure that all personnel are trained to be CTS aware, and are responsible for security arrangements and procedures within the unit. A Unit Search Co-ordinator (USC), normally the Unit Security Officer, is to be appointed to be responsible for CTS arrangements and for CTSA training within the unit. Units should seek CTS and CTSA advice and assistance where necessary from their FSC. CTS Resources 07485. There is a wide variety of resources that can contribute to CTS operations. These resources are not available in all theatres, but are tailored to meet theatre requirements. The types of resource and their capabilities are outlined in this section. Police 07486. a. Civil Police. Civil police in GB and NI have the capability to carry out LRS using Police Search Teams (PSTs) under the control of a Police Search Advisor (POLSA). Their capabilities are similar to those of Service Police Search Teams (SPSTs). The capabilities of civil police in other theatres will vary. b. Service Police. Service Police have the capability to form SPSTs. Such teams are trained and equipped to carry out LRS. Their employment is primarily JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-24 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures for defensive search operations for specific events. SPSTs should operate under direct command of a trained Service Police Search Advisor (SPSA) or Royal Engineer Search Advisor (RESA). SPSTs are deployed by the Army and the RAF. c. MOD Police (MDP). MDP have POLSAs and low risk PSTs deployed at certain locations in UK. Additional teams can be tasked centrally by Territorial Operations Branch for MDP HQ. All Arms 07487. All units have some search capability. This capability should include at least CTSA trained personnel. The all arms capabilities are: a. CTSA. Personnel trained to be CTSA can carry out basic CTS procedures using simple equipment (e.g. torches and mirrors) provided under local arrangements. These should only be employed in random low risk searches in areas with which they are familiar. These personnel cannot be formed into search teams and are not a substitute for a qualified, fully equipped, search team. b. Patrol Search. Patrol Search is an all arms LRS capability currently only employed in NI but which could be employed in other theatres if the threat warranted it. It involves search by all arms units as part of normal patrol activity, using limited types of search equipment. The patrol search capability is limited to route checks, rummage search of areas, and vehicle and personnel searches, under direction of their unit commanders. Training for patrol search is carried out within units under direction of RSME. Patrol Search operations should be co-ordinated by the Unit Search Co-ordinator (USC). c. All Arms Search Teams (AASTs). An AAST normally consist of eight personnel trained and equipped to carry out designated LRS operations. The training and capabilities of AASTs is tailored to meet the requirements of the Teams' different will vary by operational areas. AASTs operate under the direct control of a qualified Unit Search Adviser (USA) or a RESA, and are currently deployed in NI and Cyprus. Royal Engineers (RE) 07488. RE provide a comprehensive capability for CTS operations. RE are primarily responsible for HRS and searches of a specialist nature but also provide support and advice to all arms search operations where necessary. The RE capability consists of: a. RE Search Teams (RESTs). A REST consists of six personnel trained and equipped to carry out HRS and LRS operations within their designated theatre. RESTs operate under the direct control of an RE Search Advisor (RESA). Their deployment should be controlled by an RE Search Co-ordinator (RESC). RESTs are currently, available in GB, NI and Cyprus, but GB based assets can be deployed elsewhere if necessary. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-25 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. RE Specialist Search Equipment Teams (RESSETs). RESSETs are RE personnel equipped with specialist equipment. They can be deployed, normally in pairs, to assist in HRS or LRS operations. RESSET operators are trained members of a REST and their deployment should be controlled by a RESA. Formed RESSETs are currently only available in NI, however in GB 33 Engr Regt (EOD) have access to a similar range of equipment. Supporting Agencies 07489. A wide variety of agencies may be involved in search operations. Search advisors will suggest which supporting assets might be necessary. The following, which is not a comprehensive list, provides some examples: a. Dogs. CTS operations may be supported by dogs trained in the detection of weapons, ammunition and explosives. The Army, RAF Police, MDP and UK civil police all have dogs for this task. b. EOD Team. Where EOD action may be required the involvement of the appropriate JSEOD team or Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO) should be considered. c. Specialist Electronic Counter Measures (ECM). Where necessary, and where a threat exists, specialist ECM assets supported by an IEDD team, should be deployed to support a CTS operation. d. Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (RIC). In certain circumstances RIC assistance may be appropriate prior to a CTS operation. Requests for Assistance Assistance to Military Establishments and Units 07490. Requests for CTS assistance should follow the chain of command. Advice should be sought from FSCs who should normally assist in carrying out a risk assessment in conjunction with the civilian police Special Branch, PSyA and Command security staffs and the establishment or unit concerned. The level of risk is determined by considering: a. Threat Level. The threat level is generally assessed by considering terrorist intentions and capabilities. Special Branch or PSyA and Command security staffs will consider the level of threat generally, and the attractiveness of the target (a person or an event) to terrorist groups. b. Vulnerability. The following factors contribute to vulnerability: (1) Predictability. Both periodically occurring events and those that are widely publicized are vulnerable, particularly if the people attending are attractive targets. Events occurring at less than five days notice, or with little public knowledge or prior indication are less vulnerable. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-26 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures (2) Security. A lack of security or freedom of access will provide opportunities for terrorists to exploit potential targets. 07491. If the risk warrants it, a fully trained search advisor should be employed to determine the type of search required. Assistance to Police 07492. In the UK, military CTS assistance to police or other civil organizations is carried out under MACP arrangements as follows: a. NI. GOC NI can employ the Army to carry out CTS under MACP as a standing arrangement. b. GB. The method of providing CTS assistance depends upon the degree of urgency: (1) Planned Operations. Requests from the civil police are directed to DMO (MO2), who will then task as appropriate. (2) Immediate Operations. When terrorist activity is identified, a request for immediate RE assistance may be made through DMO or direct to the Joint Service EOD Operations Centre (JSEODOC) at Didcot (civil telephone 01235 819191 extension 3360/1/2 or Didcot Military 3360/1/2) which is manned on a 24 hour basis. JSEODOC has the authority from DMO to task CTS assets from 33 Engineer Regiment (EOD) for an immediate task. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-27 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-28 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX A TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR UNEXPECTED EVENTS Scope of Planning 1. Establishment contingency plans must lay down procedures for: a. Evaluating the threat on receipt of a bomb or attack warning. Every warning must be investigated unless or until it is proved to be a hoax or otherwise. b. c. d. e. Deciding how to respond to threats. Implementing the response. Informing all concerned if evacuation is necessary. Directing personnel away from the threatened areas to safe zones. f. Ensuring the speedy arrival of emergency services, e.g. civil police, Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO), fire or ambulance as required. g. Appointing an Incident Control Officer (ICO), (in working hours the unit security officer (USO)), to be responsible for directing the response to the threats. More than one control officer may be necessary in large depots or establishments. h. Establishing a control centre with adequate internal and external communications. Evacuation 2. Arrangements for evacuation should be pre-planned and practised. There are two options: a. Partial evacuation. This response may be appropriate when the location of the bomb or the likely target to be attacked, is known or suspected. Safe assembly areas should be identified in advance. b. Total evacuation. Contingency plans should allow for the direction of personnel away from the danger zone. 3. Safe assembly areas of evacuation should be searched and cleared before moving personnel to them and where possible the approach routes should also be cleared. Care JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security should be taken to avoid vulnerable areas such as car parks, refuse bins, etc (that could have explosives planted in them) when moving personnel during evacuation procedures. Liaison and Notification Drills 4. Planning should take account of the need for liaison with local police, fire and ambulance services. If the decision is taken to evacuate, the control centre should notify the police and ATO, and alert the fire services. Service Precautions During Partial or Total Evacuation 5. Unit arrangements must ensure that if evacuation of a security area or building is necessary, all protectively marked material is secured in the appropriate containers before evacuation. If an explosion or fire makes this impossible, doors and windows must be securely fastened. Stand-down 6. 'Stand-down' and 'lock up' drills should be organized in advance, either to order the return to duty, or to disperse, with further instructions as to when to return. Detailed Guidance 7. Guidance on the detailed action to be taken on the discovery of an explosive device is given at Appendix 1 to Annex H. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX B TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS FOR PROTECTION OUTSIDE MOD ESTABLISHMENTS General 1. The greatest protection will stem from maintaining individual vigilance and avoiding predictable patterns of activity. Common-sense and alertness are of paramount importance. Where regular patterns of activity are unavoidable Service personnel should adopt positive protective measures, e.g. by forming organized groups with nominated 'look-outs' at times of high risk. In such circumstances it may be necessary for units to consult the civil police. 2. Guidance on protection outside MOD establishments is given below. The detailed application of this guidance will depend on local circumstances. Unit Movement 3. Units should: a. b. Avoid regular patterns of timings and routes. Avoid regular predictable parking arrangements. c. Ensure they do not present an easy target by adopting other predictable patterns of activity, for example, by failing to guard empty vehicles or post sentries when groups of personnel are vulnerable. d. Ensure that personnel stay alert. e. Adopt a system for reporting any suspicious activity and for taking action on such information. f. When using hired transport. (1) (2) (3) Search vehicles before use. Check the identity of drivers with employers. Check the arrangements for the carriage of baggage and equipment. g. Consider the need to take special precautions to avoid being surprised when using public transport. These might include, for example, making arrangements for JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security the searching of railway stations and carriages before use, avoiding advance publicity, etc. h. Obtain advice from the civil police, Service police or local security unit as necessary. Drivers 4. The following guidance for drivers may be applied by units to personnel whether on duty in Service vehicles or in private cars. Drivers should: a. Avoid leaving a vehicle unattended outside a protected area. When this is impossible, carry out a search before using the vehicle. b. c. Never leave a lockable vehicle unlocked. Look out for areas along routes that could be used for an ambush. d. Observe other vehicles and people and look out for suspicious activities. Avoid and then report any suspicious activity. e. Carry a mobile phone or know the location of public call boxes along routes and carry relevant telephone reporting numbers and suitable coins/cards. f. Avoid displaying military connections when using private vehicles. For example, do not display Service badges or stickers or leave items of uniform or equipment where they can be easily seen. 5. Additional points for staff car drivers are at Appendix 1. Training 6. Training often involves the regular use of ranges and training areas. The nature of range work tends to compel units to follow predictable patterns of activity because regular use of butts, firing points, etc, is unavoidable. When planning training, units should consider the following: a. b. Searches and checks of ranges and training areas before use. The requirement to guard areas after searches and checks. c. The requirement for sentries where groups of Service personnel may be vulnerable, e.g. in bivouac areas. d. Additional vehicle guards. e. Liaison with emergency services when training is planned in more remote areas. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Sporting Activities 7. Sporting activities, like training, may produce predictable patterns of activity. Units should consider: a. Staggering sports periods to avoid, for example, regular Wednesday afternoon activities. b. Searching sports areas and arenas, etc, before use and, in particular, changing accommodation that may need protection while in use. c. Paying particular attention to routes frequently used for running, orienteering, etc. d. Assessing the risk involved in the regular participation of individual personnel in civilian teams and events. Social Activities (Organized and Private) 8. All social activity involves risk and units should consider the security implications, in particular the following: a. The requirement to brief all concerned on the risks involved when using public houses, clubs, etc. At times it may be necessary to lay down that Service personnel go out in groups and that each group has an agreed lookout responsible for the security of the group, sometimes known as SHARKWATCH. b. The need to organize social functions with care, particularly official ones and to draw up a proper security plan in conjunction with others, as necessary, again it may be necessary to adopt SHARKWATCH. c. The need for liaison with the civil police and, where appropriate, with the managers of frequently used local places of entertainment, who may agree to participate in SHARKWATCH. Travel on Duty, Leave and Recreation 9. Travel outside the unit frequently involves individuals or loose groupings of individuals forming at railway and bus stations, etc, on weekends and at stand-down periods. While there can be no substitute for individual vigilance, units should give briefings to personnel on points to remember, including: a. The need to avoid displaying military connections. Examples include: (1) Wearing uniform or items of uniform unnecessarily in public. (2) Using Service issued suitcases, rucsacs or kit-bags when this is avoidable. (3) Careless talk. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4B-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. The need to exercise particular care when using public transport. Control of baggage should be emphasized. c. The need for individuals to take the same security precautions with their private cars as with Service vehicles (see paragraphs 3 and 4). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4B-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX C TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 ADVICE ON HANDLING ANONYMOUS TELEPHONE CALLS WITH WARNINGS OR THREATS 1. General. Suspicion that an IED may have been planted within an establishment often results from an anonymous telephone call or bomb warning. Any such call must be taken seriously even though subsequent investigation may reveal a false alarm or hoax. Terrorists have used hoax calls in the past to test reactions, observe evacuation procedures and encourage complacency. The following definitions are in general use: a. Bomb warning. This term refers to the manner in which the incident starts. The majority of bomb warnings are received by telephone but the term also covers the alarm that is raised on the discovery of a suspect item. b. Bomb scare. After a bomb warning has been investigated and discredited, any precautionary measures may be relaxed and normal activity resumed. This incident would be termed a "bomb scare." c. False alarm. A suspect item is discovered and an EOD operator tasked. If, after investigation, the item turns out to be completely innocent, i.e. left without evil intent, it is declared as a "false alarm". d. Hoax. A hoax is an item constructed to resemble an IED but containing no explosive or dangerous substance. 2. Action on receipt of a call. On receiving an anonymous call you should: a. Try to keep a verbatim record of the conversation. b. Attempt to obtain the name of the caller and their address and telephone number or a contact point. You should point out to the caller that by giving these details they are indicating that it is a genuine warning. c. Attempt to keep the caller talking on the line and elicit further information if possible. d. Keep the line open after the caller ends the call; this will make it easier to trace the call. e. Summon assistance to trace the call (through a telephone exchange) and to corroborate the facts and your opinions. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security f. Comply with any request by the caller to be connected with another extension but if possible monitor the call and alert the Service Police, MDP, civil police or ESyO. g. Warning containing a codeword. If the warning contains a codeword, the codeword used by the caller should be verified immediately with the civil police. 2. Facts to be obtained. During the course of the call the recipient should attempt to establish the following: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. 3. Establishment involved. The exact location of the device. The time it is due to detonate. What sort of device it is. The specific reason for the attack. Identity of the caller. Why the caller is giving a warning. Other useful facts. Security staffs will require details of the following: a. Voice characteristics. (1) (2) Was the tone normal or not? Did it sound disguised or muffled? (3) Was it high pitched or stuttering or otherwise indicative of nervous tension? (4) Was it slurred or indicative that the person was under the influence of drink or drugs? (5) (6) out? (7) (8) (9) b. Was there evidence of excitement in the informant's voice? Did the caller give the impression that the message was being read Did the voice have a pronounced or recognisable accent? Was the caller male or female? Was the caller young or old? Background noises. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures (1) Was there any sound that would indicate someone else was with the caller, e.g. prompting or giggling in the background? (2) Was there any background noise of road traffic, aircraft, radio or juke box etc? c. Caller's knowledge of circumstances. Did the caller display a detailed knowledge: (1) Of the establishment, particularly its role and layout or personalities. (2) The device. d. Recording information. After providing the security staff or police with details of the call the operator or recipient should immediately make a full written record of the conversation and the impression gained of the various characteristics outlined above. 4. Threat call checklist. A suggested threat call checklist is at Appendix 1. A supply of these forms should be readily available, especially at locations where threat calls are likely to occur, e.g. telephone exchanges and guardrooms. 5. Immediate response drills After receipt of an anonymous call or bomb warning the following action should be taken: a. Inform the civil police immediately using the 999 system. (The civil police will inform the JSEODOC who will place an EOD team on standby). b. Inform the appropriate HQ, local security unit and Focal Point depending on local SOPs. c. Evacuate all or part of the establishment under threat by implementing an evacuation plan. d. Carry out establishment level search to confirm that an IED has been placed. Guidance on counter terrorist search awareness is included in Annex J. 6. Use of BT '1471' facility. When a call is received on a direct dial BT line the recipient should dial 1471 immediately after the call, in order to trace the call (assuming the caller has not barred this facility). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4C-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4C-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 CHECKLIST FOR TELEPHONED BOMB WARNINGS OBTAIN AS MANY OF THE FACTS LISTED BELOW AS POSSIBLE (Switch on Tape Recorder if Connected) 1. EXACT WORDING OF THE THREAT: ............................................................... ............................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................... (KEEP THE TELEPHONE LINE OPEN - even if the caller disengages). 2. QUESTIONS TO ASK: a. Where is the bomb right now? ..................................................................... b. When will it explode?................................................................................... c. What does it look like?................................................................................. d. What kind of bomb is it? .............................................................................. e. What will cause it to explode? ..................................................................... f. Did you place the bomb?.............................................................................. g. Why?............................................................................................................. h. What is your name?...................................................................................... i. What is your address?................................................................................... j. What is your telephone number?.................................................................. 3. Where automatic number reveal equipment is available, record the number shown: ................................................................................................................................... 4. INFORM YOUR SECURITY CONTROL (IAW Establishment Orders) Record the Name and Telephone Extension of Person Informed Name: 5. Ext. INFORM CIVPOL BY 999 CALL (if required by Establishment Orders): Time Informed: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-C1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This part of the form should be completed once the caller has hung up and the Establishment Security Control/CIVPOL have been informed. 6. DATE AND TIME OF CALL: Length of call: Extension on which call received: ABOUT THE CALLER Date and Time: Length: Ext: Sex of caller? Male Female Nationality? ............................................. Age? ................................................................... THREAT LANGUAGE Well Spoken Irrational Taped Foul CALLERS VOICE Calm Incoherent Message Read by Threat Maker Crying Clearing Throat Angry Nasal Slurred Disguised Stutter Excited Slow Laughter Lisp Rapid Deep Familiar (see below) Hoarse Accent What Accent? ...................................................................................... If the voice sounded familiar, who did it sound like? BACKGROUND SOUNDS Street Noises House Noises Animal Noises Clear Motor Voices Static PA System JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-C1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Factory Machinery Office Machinery Booth Music Other (Specify) .................................................................................................................. REMARKS ............................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................... Signature:................................................. Date:................................................................... Name in Block Capitals JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-C1-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-C1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX D TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 ACTION UPON DISCOVERY OF A SUSPECT POSTAL BOMB General 1. In basic terms, a postal bomb is an IED that has been delivered to an individual or organization though the mail system. It is likely to have been handled by several people during transmission and will be constructed to withstand such man-handling. 2. Being an anti-personnel device designed to detonate on opening, the person discovering a postal bomb is likely to be quite safe provided that no attempt is made to open or tamper with the object. Once declared as suspect, the general procedures for dealing with an IED should be observed. Immediate Response Drills 3. Having decided that an item of mail is suspect, the following actions should be taken: a. Place the object on the nearest level surface, such as a table or the floor. b. Without further handling the object, make a detailed note of any markings and characteristics, including size, post mark etc. c. d. 4. Do not: a. b. c. Attempt to open the package. Attempt to carry the object out of the building. Attempt to place the object in a bucket of water. Evacuate the area, leaving all doors and windows open. Carry out the IED immediate response drills. d. Attempt to cover the object with sand, or sandbag around the object, or surround the object by steel cabinets or other furniture, as this is likely to enhance any explosive shrapnel effect. 5. If suspicions are aroused once the package has been partially opened, or the contents partially removed, carry out the same immediate reaction drills. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4D-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 6. Advice on postal bomb recognition is at Appendix 1. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4D-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 POSTAL BOMB RECOGNITION Types of Postal Bomb 1. A postal bomb is essentially an anti-personnel weapon that is usually designed to explode at the moment of opening. The device will invariably contain an explosive charge, a detonator or igniter to initiate the charge and some form of triggering mechanism. The triggering mechanism will probably employ an electrical igniter system, a percussion device involving the release of a spring-loaded striker, or a simple frictional method of ignition. Superficial Appearance and Other Indications 2. The sender of a postal bomb will take great care to make its appearance as innocuous as possible. The envelope may be professionally embossed suggesting that it comes from a bonafide source, and the recipient's address may also be printed or typed. As the first identification of a postal bomb is likely to depend totally on the recipient becoming suspicious when the mail is first examined, personnel should be alert to the following aspects that could indicate receipt of a letter bomb: a. b. c. d. If the point of origin gives cause for doubt. If the manuscript of the sender is unusual. If the balance of the package is uneven. If the package seems very heavy for its size. e. If there is any springiness in the top, bottom or sides of the package or letter (but do not bend excessively). f. g. If wires protrude from it. If there is a hole (like a pinhole) in the package wrapping or envelope. h. If there are grease marks on the envelope or parcel wrapping (from the "sweating" of the explosive). i. If it smells of almonds or marzipan. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-D1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security j. If the package is thought to contain a book that is not expected. k. If the flap of an envelope is stuck down completely (usually there is an ungummed gap at each end of the gummed flap). 3. Additionally look for the following when examining letters. a. The feel will indicate whether there is only folded paper inside the envelope (that will show that it is all right). A bomb will probably have stiffening, e.g. by cards or the feel of metal. b. Letters usually weigh up to 28 grams. Postal bombs will usually weigh more than 56 grams and therefore need more than the usual postage stamps. They will tend to be unusually thick (e.g. 3.2mm or more) and are likely also to feel lopsided. c. If an envelope contains an inner envelope addressed to an individual, this should be examined again for the signs listed. An inner envelope that is tightly taped or tied with string is also typical of a bomb. 4. It may not be possible to feel any solid objects in the package since these are not essential ingredients and, if present, may be shielded by padding. It is also important to realize that the envelope and its contents may be quite flexible. Operation of the Device 5. A postal bomb is usually designed so that the action of opening it causes an immediate explosion. The actions relied upon to operate the device may be summarized as follows: a. Tearing apart the envelope. This action can either operate a simple electrical switch or release the spring-loaded retainer of a striking mechanism. b. Pulling out a tucked in envelope flap. The interior part of the flap may be connected by a thread to an electrical switch, to a friction device or to the retainer of a percussion striker. It should be noted that, in some devices, the necessary pull on an operating thread is very small indeed. c. Using a paper knife. The use of a paper knife could pull a thread, as in sub-paragraph 4b above. d. Removing the contents of an already opened envelope. This action could achieve the same results as those referred to in sub-paragraphs 4a and 4b above. In this context, any unusual resistance to the removal of the contents could be significant. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-D1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Potential of a Postal Bomb to Kill 6. Postal bombs may be designed either to kill or to wound and frighten. Lethal letter bombs invariably contain powerful explosive; those not designed to kill may contain either a small charge of high explosive or even a detonator alone, or a quantity of incendiary or flash material. The characteristics of both types of bomb are as follows: a. Lethal postal bomb. The designer of a postal bomb normally strives to avoid suspicion by keeping the package as thin as possible and using standard envelope sizes. But technical considerations and the need to include an adequate explosive charge mean that a lethal bomb less than about 3.2 mm thick is unlikely to be used. Lethal bombs are likely to weigh 43-84 grams (they can, of course, be heavier) and would cause the recipient injury, severe shock and possible death. One that was 84 grams or more would almost certainly kill. While these weights, which are based on past experience of these devices, are still most likely to be encountered, modern developments in explosives and electrical circuits does mean that smaller devices could also be lethal. b. Postal bombs designed to wound, shock or frighten. Bombs not designed to kill are made in the same way as lethal ones but may be of the same flexibility and thickness (about 1.6mm) as an ordinary letter. Those that contain a high explosive could be expected to cause injury to hands and possibly to the eyes. Others containing incendiary or flash material could produce a brilliant flash followed by fire but not a dangerous blast, injury being limited to burns on the hands and possible harm to the eyes. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-D1-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-D1-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX E TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 SAMPLE GUIDE TO IDENTIFICATION OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IED) DO NOT MOVE OR TOUCH ANY SUSPECT OBJECT THAT HAS NOT COME THROUGH THE POST. IT MAY BE BOOBY-TRAPPED. Suspected IED Received in the Mail 1. A postal package or letter should be treated as a suspect in the following circumstances: a. Point of origin; e.g. the post mark or name of sender, being particularly careful with items postmarked from Northern Ireland that are 2 cm or more in thickness. If from an unusual point of origin or sender, treat as suspect, but do not return to the sender for validation. b. Handwriting of sender; if this indicates a foreign style of writing and as such is not usually received. c. d. e. Balance; if the package or letter is lop-sided. Weight; if there seems to be excessive weight for size. Protruding wires (even well prepared devices can get damaged in transit). f. If there is a small hole (like a pinhole) in the package wrapping or enveloping. g. If there are grease marks on the envelope or parcel wrapping (from the "sweating" of explosives). h. i. If there is a smell of almonds or marzipan. If the package is suspected of containing a book. j. If the flap of the envelope is stuck down completely (usually there is an ungummed gap of about 3mm). k. To cater for modern explosives, a packet may be less than 2cm thick, otherwise the above characteristics may be similar. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4E-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security l. In addition, in the case of letter, the feel of the letter will indicate whether there is only folded paper inside the envelope (that will show that it is alright) or if there is some stiffening material or metal. m. Letters usually weigh up to about 30gms. Effective postal bombs will weigh about 60gms or more. n. If on opening an envelope, there is an additional envelope addressed personally to someone, this should be felt again for signs of the pointers indicated above. An inner envelope that is tightly taped or tied with string should be treated as suspect. 2. If suspicions remain, place the package on the nearest horizontal firm surface. Leave the room, having opened the windows if possible. Leave the door open but prevent other people entering. Call the Security Officer or a member of the Guard Force. a. b. c. Do not take the package to the security officer or to the guardroom. Do not put the package in a bucket of water or sand. Do not bend or flex the package. d. Do not operate electrical emission equipment such as radios or mobile phones within 25 metres of the suspect device. 3. If you have started to open the package when suspicions are aroused, put it down gently on a firm surface, protecting the face and body if possible by reaching around a desk or steel cupboard or by leaving the room and reaching around the door post into the room. Leave the room, leaving the door open. Prevent others entering. Call the Security Officer or a member of the Guard Force. If it is prudent to lock the room, give the key to the Guard Force or Security Officer. IED other than Postal Devices 4. An IED may be of any size and may exhibit any or none of the following characteristics: a. Visible characteristics. IEDs are often assembled with adhesive tape. The following may also be present: (1) (2) (3) (4) Wiring, switches, torch bulbs, electronic circuits. One or more dry cell batteries. Container of liquid. Clock or clockwork timer. (5) Plastic-covered cord, similar to washing line or domestic electric cable. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4E-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures (6) (7) Cylindrical tubes, cardboard or paper-wrapped. Small plywood box (approximately 15 x 10 x 4cms). b. Sound. Noises may be produced by the device prior to it exploding or igniting. c. Smell. Some explosives have a characteristic smell similar to almonds or marzipan. The smell of petrol may be present. Any pungent smell is suspect. However, some modern explosives have no smell. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4E-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4E-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX F TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 MINIMUM SECURITY STANDARDS AT ARMED FORCES CAREERS OFFICES 1. Front door. a. The front door is to have: A minimum of a 5-lever deadlock fitted. b. Laminated glass fitted or glass covered with anti shatter film (ASF) and/or bomb blast net curtains (BBNC). c. Remote control locks fitted where entrance is away from main entrance or cannot be seen from main reception. d. A CCTV camera with appropriate lighting fitted to cover the entrance with a monitor located in the reception area, whenever the entrance is away from the main door or cannot be seen from main reception. 2. Entrance halls and passage ways. All internal entrance halls and passages should have good lighting to assist staff when checking for IEDs. Similarly, immediately adjacent external passage ways or entrance halls, where devices could be concealed, should be illuminated and capable of being viewed from within by use of mirrors or windows and, if considered necessary by a specialist survey team, monitored by a CCTV system. 3. Glass frontages and windows. There is no standard security template for the protection of window displays. Careers offices vary in size and location and each display window must be assessed separately. Specialist survey personnel will assess individual requirements. Those windows and fanlights not used for display purposes are to be protected by ASF, bomb blast curtains and bars, as necessary. 4. Rear doors. Rear doors are to be fire resistant and of solid construction. Heavy duty bolts and 5-lever deadlock are to be fitted unless the door is designated as a Fire Exit, when a Fire Safety or Fraser Bar is to be fitted. Any window or aperture in the door is to be covered by a metal grille. Finally, if the door is in regular use a heavy duty digital lock is to be fitted. 5. Letter boxes. All letterboxes are to be sealed and arrangements made for the mail to be collected from the local Post Office or delivered by hand during office working hours. 6. External office ventilation. All external office ventilation intakes/exhausts are to be protected by metal grilles. 7. Reception desk panic button. The reception desk is to have a concealed panic button fitted that sounds a muted alarm to summon assistance from other members of staff. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4F-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 8. Garages and parking. Ideally, all careers office vehicles should be garaged in a secure parking area e.g. at a police station, or in unmarked lockable garages. The garages should, if practicable, be monitored by a CCTV camera system and/or an audible alarm. Where neither secure parking or lockable facilities are available then vehicles should be parked in discrete parking areas up to 15 minutes away from the careers office. Whenever possible the "buddy" system should be used in respect of such parking. Either two personnel travel in the same vehicle or two vehicles park relatively close together at synchronized times and the occupants move to and from the careers office together. Garages or parking spaces are not to be marked to indicate military usage, and wherever possible those "reserved" (but unmarked) spaces should be regularly exchanged with other "reserved" spaces. 9. Building alarm system. An alarm system is to be fitted to the careers office in such a way that it will allow staff to determine whether the building has been illegally entered before they themselves enter the building. Ideally the alarm indicator should be in a concealed location known only to the staff. 10. Rolling grilles to cover windows and entrances. Rolling grilles to cover windows and entrances should be considered for offices assessed to be at high risk from vandalism. 11. Emergency exits. Where practicable, a careers office is to have an emergency exit on a different side of the building from the main entrance. 12. Outside sheds and storage areas. Outside sheds and storage areas (to store refuse bins etc) are to be well-built and have substantial hard wood or metal doors and are to be secured by a 5-lever deadlock. All careers office equipment and aids should be stored in an internal store. Personal Security Measures 13. Irish republican terrorists are likely to have targeted careers office personnel and vehicles by surveillance over a period of time, noting patterns of movement including timings and vehicles used. Careers personnel could unwittingly lead terrorists to vehicles parked nearby. To counter this surveillance, consideration is to be given to adopting the following counter measures where possible: a. Personnel are to be especially vigilant and aware of the surveillance threat when arriving at and leaving the careers office. If suspicions are aroused, personnel should move immediately to a secure location and alert the civil police. b. When arriving at or leaving the careers office, staff should consider the use of a "buddy" system to provide mutual support and visual cover for each other. c. Routes to and from careers offices, whether on foot or by vehicle, should be varied. d. Timings of arrival at and departure from careers offices should be varied. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4F-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures e. Personnel should wear civilian clothes when travelling to and from careers office premises and make a conscious effort to blend in with the local civilian population. Vehicle Security Measures 14. General. In the past, terrorists have exploited the vulnerability of careers office vehicle parking arrangements. To reduce this vulnerability the use of vehicles and their parking arrangements are to be kept under review and the guidance shown below should be implemented where feasible. 15. Service vehicles. If it is essential that they are used Service vehicles are to be parked within Service establishments whenever possible. They are only to be parked unattended in public places where it is unavoidable and, in such cases, they must be searched thoroughly prior to re-use. 16. UVIED detection. If the Service vehicle is fitted with a UVIED detection alarm system (such as TALOS), the alarm display unit is to be checked before attempting to enter or touch the vehicle. All drivers of vehicles fitted with UVIED detection systems are to be fully briefed on their operation before using the vehicle. Appropriate guidance has been issued to users. 17. Civilianized military vehicles. a. The use of civilianized military vehicles in the vicinity of careers offices should be reduced to a minimum. Recruiting staffs should ensure that only those vehicles essential for the work of the careers office are held for use. The use of hire vehicles should be encouraged. b. Every effort is to be made to avoid linking specific vehicles with careers offices. Consideration is to be given to the use of public transport by personnel travelling to and from work. Private vehicles should not normally be used. Long term lease or hire vehicles and/or civilianized white fleet vehicles should be regularly rotated. c. Alternatively, consideration should be given to a system whereby careers office personnel are taken to and from work collectively by vehicles that do not remain at the careers office but operate from a secure location. 18. Vehicle parking. Where it is necessary to use vehicles in the vicinity of careers offices and to park them locally, consideration is to be given to the following measures: a. Parking in a secure military establishment or, by permission, in a local police station (vehicle searches should still be carried out). b. Public parking places are, where practicable, to be changed daily and an indirect route taken to and from the careers office. c. Isolated and insecure sites, such as alleys, should be avoided. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4F-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security d. Parking some distance (up to 15 minutes walking radius) from the careers office. Close parking will more easily enable terrorists to link vehicles to the office. e. Every effort should be made, through the chain of command, to obtain lockable garages for careers office vehicles. 19. Vehicle searching. It is stressed that there is no substitute for comprehensive vehicle searching, whenever a vehicle, whether Service, civilianized or private has been left unattended, even in a locked garage. A search on a civilianized or private vehicle in a public place should be carried out as surreptitiously as possible to avoid indicating the Service connection. Under-vehicle search mirrors and torches are to be available at all careers offices. Office Security Measures 20. Liaison with police. Good local contact should be maintained with the civil police, Service police or MDP. Inclusion on patrol routes of the police forces, where possible, should be requested, particularly at office opening and closing times. Inclusion in SVA, neighbourhood or other local watch schemes should be considered. 21. Searches. Guidance on counter terrorist search awareness is contained in Annex J. The outside and inside of careers office premises are to be comprehensively searched before occupation at the beginning of each working day and also at other irregular intervals. Where applicable, and possible, the start work check should include easily accessible flat roofs. These procedures are particularly important after weekends and public holidays. Office cleaners must not have access to the careers office before security sweeps have been completed. 22. Office security procedures. a. Office furniture in public areas should not have shelves or drawers where IEDs could be left. b. Irregular but frequent security sweeps are to be conducted. c. Public access into the careers office should be restricted to one door only which is to be monitored by a member of staff. d. Visitors to the careers office are to be identified and supervised whilst in the careers office. e. Unattended doors must be locked whenever security measures dictate. 23. Parking by the general public. Where possible, parking by the general public should be restricted within 25 metres of the careers office through negotiations with local authorities by use of: a. Double yellow lines. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4F-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures b. c. Concrete or metal bollards. Cones (that could cover a device) should only be used as a last resort. 24. If it is not possible to restrict public parking outside careers offices, the staff should be alert to any unusual activity in relation to vehicles and their occupants. 25. Careers offices environs. Exits and entrances are to be kept clear of debris and other items that could conceal an IED, including refuse bins and bicycles. Security during Recruiting Activities away from the Careers Office 26. Careers staff undertake a wide range of duties away from the office, including: a. b. c. d. Town or county shows. Careers conventions. School visits. ATC/ACF/CCF/OTC/UAS, etc visits. 27. Much of this activity is, by its very nature, open to the public and pre-notified, if not publicized, before the event. Careers office staff should therefore be aware that these activities could provide terrorists with a means whereby they could be targeted. The provisions of paragraphs 07448 to 07469 (Security at Public Military Events) should, when applicable, be applied for all such events. In addition, the appropriate aspects of the following Annexes should be considered and acted upon: a. Annex J to Section IV - Guidance on Counter Terrorist Search Awareness Security Measures. b. Annex B to Section V ­ Guidance on Personal Security when Travelling. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4F-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4F-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX G TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 CIVIL POLICE CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF THE EMERGENCY SERVICES' RESPONSE IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR TERRORIST INCIDENT Command and Control 1. Dependent on the size and location of the incident, 3 levels of civil police command and control may be established: a. FCP. The FCP will normally be the first control to be established by those nearest to the scene of the crime and responsible for immediate deployment and security. Under the command of the Incident Officer, the functions may vary depending on the siting of the Incident Control Room. b. ICP. The ICP will control and co-ordinate the management of the incident, providing a central point of contact for all emergency and specialist services. The ICP will be the responsibility of an ICP co-ordinator and also under the command of the Incident Officer. c. Major Incident Control Room. The need for such a control is dependent on the size of the incident. In some cases, even though there is a number of casualties all aspects of the operation will be co-ordinated through the ICP. However, with protracted incidents where there are ongoing manpower and logistical requirements, a major incident control room may be established to coordinate the overall response and provide facilities for senior command functions. The major Incident Control Room will be under the command of the Overall Incident Commander (OIC). 2. Whilst the rank of officers nominated may vary dependent on the individual force establishments, the following command functions will be necessary: a. b. c. d. e. Overall Incident Commander (OIC) - Chief Officer. Incident Officer - Divisional Commander. Senior Investigating Officer - Detective Superintendent. Major Incident Room Co-ordinator - Superintendent/Chief Inspector. ICP Co-ordinator - Sub Divisional Commander. 3. Where forces adopt the GOLD, SILVER, BRONZE concept the following applies: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4G-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. b. c. GOLD - Overall Commander. SILVER - Incident Commander. BRONZE - Sector Commander engaged on site. 4. As these command and control functions are established, the tasks associated with each will be progressively implemented. Invariably, however, initial responsibility after an incident will fall to the first officer to arrive at the scene who will act as Incident Officer, until replaced by a senior officer, and to the Divisional and Force Operations Rooms which will undertake the rapid mobilization of resources. Initial Action by the First Officer at the Scene 5. The first officer at the scene will normally be a police constable. His immediate responsibility is to ensure that other emergency services are informed if they are not already in attendance. His priorities are to ASSESS and INFORM on the following: a. b. c. d. e. f. Exact location of the incident. Type of incident. Hazards present and potential. Access routes for emergency vehicles, turning routes etc. Casualties. Emergency services present and required. Action by the Divisional/Sub Divisional Control 6. Action by the Divisional/Sub Divisional Control, if applicable, is as follows: a. b. Inform the Force Ops Room. Direct the nearest officer to the scene to assess the situation. c. Inform the senior officer on duty who will attend and assume the role of Incident Officer. d. e. f. g. Inform the Divisional Commander or his Deputy. Deploy personnel as directed by the Incident Officer. Commence a log and co-ordinate the Divisional Response. Maintain liaison with the Force Operations Room. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4G-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Action by the Force Operations/Control Room 7. Upon receipt of information that an incident has occurred, the Duty Officer in the Force Operations Room/Centre/Control is responsible for instigating the mobilization of the emergency services, specialist agencies such as EOD, police manpower and for establishing communications with the first officer at the scene. 8. Aide memoire procedure sheets are normally prepared in accordance with individual force mobilization plans and are immediately taken into use should an incident occur. These procedure sheets include information for the mobilization or implementation of the following if required: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. Other emergency services. FCP. Traffic control. Divisional Command. Divisional personnel. Local authority. Major incident control vehicle and equipment. Hospital documentation team. Scene photographers. Major Incident Control Room staff. Press liaison. Scene Management 9. The immediate and overriding responsibility of the emergency services at the scene of an incident is to save life. To this end, the Fire and Ambulance Services must be afforded the opportunity to utilize their training and experience. The prime responsibility of the Incident Officer is to facilitate the deployment of the emergency/specialist services. 10. During the rescue phase, the civil police co-ordinating role is vital and the Incident Officer, who is the link to every other police control, will undertake a preliminary reconnaissance and determine what action has been taken to establish: a. b. An ICP. Security at the scene. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4G-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c. d. e. f. g. h. Traffic control. Casualty clearance. Property team. Hospital documentation team. Mortuary facilities. Liaison with other emergency/specialist services. 11. When it becomes apparent that no further life can be saved other considerations take precedence: a. b. c. d. Preservation of the scene of crime. Recovery of the deceased. Investigation. Identification of the deceased. Incident Control Post 12. Operational command will be at the ICP. Initially, the first police vehicle at the scene will become the FCP/ICP. Thereafter, other options for the ICP may be considered. The ICP should have facilities for radio and telephone and should be sited such that it is: a. b. c. d. Safe. Accessible. Conspicuous. Secure. Security and Preservation of the Scene 13. Cordons. The civil police will establish 2 cordons: a. Outer Cordon. To seal off an extensive area and prevent unauthorized access. b. Inner Cordon. To provide immediate security of the "scene of crime". c. Cordon Personnel. Normally police officers deployed in cordons will be divided into units, each under the command of a Sergeant and responsible for a fixed section of the boundary. A senior police officer will normally be JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4G-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures appointed to oversee the maintenance and resourcing of the cordons through the ICP. 14. Media Liaison. a. Terrorist incidents generate intense media interest. Representatives of the press and television may be at the scene of an incident as quickly as the emergency services. b. The civil police will make provision for media liaison as follows: (1) Press Liaison Officer. May be an officer nominated by the incident officer, a member of the Force Press Liaison Section or a designated officer, who will be directed to the scene and be responsible for the release of information. (2) Press Liaison Point. An area will be designated for exclusive use by the media. Accredited members of the press will be directed to this area. 15. Traffic Control. a. Immediate action will be taken by the civil police to ensure free passage for emergency traffic to and from the scene. b. Whenever possible, a one way system will be implemented to ensure the rapid attendance of emergency vehicles at the scene and facilitate the evacuation of casualties to hospital. c. Marshalling area. An area suitable for accommodating a large numbers of vehicles will normally be designated a marshalling area for those resources not immediately required at the scene. Vehicles at the scene will not be allowed to remain at the scene. d. Diversions. Diversions will be established if necessary to divert all non essential traffic from roads leading to the incident. 16. RVP. As soon as practical, all civil police resources attending the scene will be directed to nominated or pre-designated RVPs. An officer will be appointed to run the RVP. The function of the RVP is as follows: a. b. c. d. e. Maintain a log of incoming civil police resources. Inform the ICP of their availability. Brief officers attending the scene. Issue equipment. Log details of resources leaving the RVP to be deployed. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4G-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security f. Direct resources to a marshalling area. Casualty Clearance 17. The civil police will liaise closely with the Ambulance Service and the MO in charge at the scene. To co-ordinate the removal of the injured, the Ambulance Service after consultation with the Emergency Services as to location, routing and signing will set up: a. b. c. d. Casualty Receiving Station. Ambulance Loading Points. Ambulance Parking Point (Marshalling Area). Ambulance Control Point. Evacuees 18. An officer with local knowledge will normally be the designated Evacuation Officer. He will be responsible to the Incident Officer for all evacuations. 19. Suitable buildings/covered areas will be identified as Evacuation Assembly Points and signed as such. All evacuees will be directed there for transport to "Rest Centres" run by the local authority. Investigation 20. After an incident, the overall Incident Commander will appoint a Senior Investigating Officer to collate evidence for: a. b. c. The Coroner. Any Inquiry. Criminal Proceedings. 21. Teams of officers under the command of the Senior Investigating Officer will be responsible for evidence gathering from the scene and for interviewing witnesses as follows: a. b. c. d. e. Survivors. Eyewitnesses. Emergency Services personnel. Technical witnesses. Background witnesses. 7-4G-6 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures f. Identification witnesses. 22. Once the rescue and victim recovery phases of the operation are complete, an extensive search will be undertaken to recover items for evidential purposes. Police personnel trained in search techniques will be used for the task. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4G-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4G-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX G TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 ACPO EMERGENCY PROCEDURES TERMINOLOGY Approach Path. Route taken from the inner cordon entry point to the scene of the crime or seat of explosion. Casualty. Any person who is directly involved or is affected by an incident, i.e. survivors, deceased, evacuees. Casualty Bureau. Central contact and information point established by the civil police for all records and data relating to casualties. Controlled Area. The area contained by the outer cordon. Cordons Inner cordon. Surrounds the immediate scene of crime and provides security for it. Outer cordon. Seals off an extensive area to which unauthorized personnel are not allowed access. Cordon Entry Point. Point at which authorized personnel gain entry to the inner cordon. The entry point is normally controlled by the cordon officer/commander or nominated cordon personnel. Cordon Officer/Commander. Responsible to the incident commander for the siting, deployment and management of the inner and outer cordons. Designated Receiving Hospital. Those hospitals identified by the Regional Health Authority as suitable for receiving multiple casualties. Evacuation Assembly Point. Area or building to which evacuees are directed before subsequent transportation to a rest area. First Officer to the Scene. First civil police officer directed to the scene of an incident to assess and inform. FCP. The control point nearest to the scene of the incident responsible for immediate deployment and security. ICP. The point from which the management of an incident is controlled and co-ordinated. The central point of contact for all specialist and emergency agencies on site. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-G1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security IC SILVER. The civil police forward operational commander, controlling and coordinating the police operation within the controlled area and responsible to the overall civil police incident commander. The Service equivalent is the establishment incident commander, normally the Duty Officer. Major Incident Control Room. Established by the civil police in protracted incidents to co-ordinate overall response, dealing with ongoing manpower and logistics requirements and providing facilities for senior command functions. OIC GOLD. The designated civil police chief officer who assumes command of the operation as a whole. The Service equivalent is the senior officer, i.e. the HOE. Police Call Back. Procedure whereby the civil police call back to confirm an initial call is bonafide and subsequently maintain an open line to the establishment main guardroom or ICP. PST. Civil police search team. Press Liaison Officer. Civil police representative responsible for the initial release of information from the scene of an incident. PLP. Area adjacent to the incident scene designated for the exclusive use by accredited media representatives and through which official press releases occur. Red Line Telephone. The dedicated telephone line for incoming calls only, which is used by the civil police to call back and remains open thereafter. RVP. Point to which all resources arriving at the outer cordon are marshalled, directed for logging, briefing, equipment issue and deployment further forward if required. RVP Officer. Civil police officer responsible for the routine of the RVP. Rest Centre. Building designated by the local authority for the temporary accommodation of evacuees. Senior Investigating Officer. The senior detective officer appointed by the OIC to assume responsibility for all aspects of the civil police investigation. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-G1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX H TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INCIDENT MANAGEMENT General 1. Although each incident will be different in nature, it is possible to lay down certain principles that will be common to all. Evacuation 2. Evacuation of a building or area may become necessary as a result of the discovery of a suspicious item, a warning, or in consequence of an explosion. Once ordered, the evacuation must be effected quickly, but in a controlled and co-ordinated fashion. 3. Evacuation plans. Evacuation plans should be prepared in advance, publicized and rehearsed on a regular basis. The evacuation itself should be controlled by a nominated person acting on behalf of the overall incident commander. 4. Area to be cleared. The area to be cleared will depend upon the nature of the incident: a. Suspect IEDs (1) (2) b. c. For a device placed by hand, at least 100m radius. For a suspect vehicle or larger item, at least 400m radius. Explosion. At least 100m from the extremity of the scene of the explosion. Mortar blinds. At least 200m from any unexploded mortar round. 5. The size of the area will also be influenced by topography and secondary hazards, such as fuel or a large expanse of glass. Due consideration should also be taken of likely blast effects. 6. Method of evacuation. a. Direction. Starting at the scene of the incident, work outwards. In the case of suspect devices, avoid evacuating past the object or being in line of sight. b. Cascade. To save time, when evacuating buildings adopt a cascade system where members of the guard alert a small number of nominated occupants, who are then responsible for arousing and evacuating other personnel present, releasing the guard to move on to other buildings or tasks. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4H-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c. Inform. Personnel responsible for evacuation should tell evacuees: (1) (2) Why the evacuation is taking place. If a suspect device is involved, its location. (3) Where to go, including exit points and the route to, and location of, the Evacuation Assembly Point. Routes should be chosen to avoid confusion or bunching and that avoid potential hazards such as plate glass or windows. d. Action by Evacuees. Before exiting the area, evacuees should: (1) Secure all protectively marked material. (2) Carry out a quick visual search of their immediate work and living areas. (3) (4) Open windows, leave lights on and doors open. Leave the area and proceed to the evacuation assembly point. (5) Take personal belongings such as coats, handbags, briefcases, etc with them. (6) Evacuees leaving living accommodation at night should take a prepackage evacuation bag containing overnight kit. e. Clearance check. A system should be established for ensuring that all buildings and areas within the potential danger area have been evacuated and cleared. f. Evacuation assembly point. (1) Evacuation assembly points should be carefully sited. They should be sufficiently far from the scene of the incident and in open areas that may be easily checked for IEDs. Car parking areas containing vehicles should be avoided. (2) Before evacuees assemble, the immediate area should be checked for possible secondary IEDs by a nominated member of the guard. (3) There should be clearly established assembly point procedures and a person, preferably of at least SNCO rank or AO grade, should be nominated to control and marshal evacuees and check on nominal rolls. (4) Establishment should avoid the regular and routine use of the same assembly point as part of exercises or in response to threatening telephone calls. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4H-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Cordon 6. The cordon area may be divided into the inner and outer cordons. a. Inner cordon. Once clearance and evacuation has commenced, a cordon must be placed around the scene of the incident to isolate the danger. A suitable Cordon Entry Point should be selected, through which all authorized personnel enter the danger area. (1) Size. The size of the area to be cordoned will depend upon the nature of the incident, but it should encompass the entire danger area and in particular the area that has been cleared and evacuated. It is easier to contract a cordon at a later stage than to expand it. (2) Cordon positions (a) Should be carefully chosen and sited by a nominated cordon commander. (b) Should be situated at the edge of the cleared area. (c) Should avoid obvious positions where secondary devices could have been placed. (d) Should be checked by cordon personnel prior to occupation for secondary devices. (3) Cordon commander. A cordon commander should be appointed to oversee the management and deployment of the cordon. Ideally, the cordon commander should be located at the Cordon Entry Point. (4) Cordon personnel. Sufficient numbers of cordon personnel should be deployed to ensure complete security of the inner cordon area. All obvious access routes into the cordon area should be manned. (5) Barriers. To save manpower, physical barriers may be erected to block access points. Tape may be used to delineate the cordon area. b. Outer cordon. An outer cordon may be deployed to prevent unauthorized access to the Incident Area and to create a controlled environment in which the emergency services may operate. Outside Establishment perimeters, the outer cordon is a civil police responsibility. Inside a large establishment, if sufficient personnel are available, an outer cordon may be deployed to assist control at the scene. Control 7. The following command and control elements should be established in response to any incident: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4H-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. Incident commander. The incident commander is responsible for the initial command and control of the incident, until handing over to the civil police incident commander. The incident commander should: (1) Conduct an appreciation of what has occurred and what action needs to be taken. (2) Initiate and supervise follow up actions, giving clear directions to those involved. (3) Ensure that full briefings are given to the civil police, EOD, Command staffs, and Focal Point depending upon local SOPs. (4) Establish an Incident Control Post (ICP). Once control of the incident has been passed to the civil police incident officer, the incident commander should remain with him to act as a liaison officer. b. ICP. An ICP should be established at an early stage and should become the focal point for the control and co-ordination of follow-up action. The ICP should be: (1) The point of contact for specialist agencies and the emergency services. (2) Located in a building equipped with telephones and radios and may often be a custom built command post such as a control room or guard room. Alternative ICP locations should be identified for activation, should the primary ICP be located in a potential danger area. c. Incident box. An incident box should be prepared and pre-stocked with the following items: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Establishment maps, plans and aerial photographs. Road signs. Directional signs. Log books, message pads and stationery. First aid kit and minor rescue equipment. High visibility vests for key personnel. Torches. Loud hailer. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4H-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures (9) Cordon tape. d. Forward Control Point (FCP). An FCP should be established at the edge of the cordon and should become the focus of activities at the scene itself. Security of the incident and deployment of personnel should be exercised from the FCP. e. Rendezvous Point (RVP). The RVP is the point to which the civil police, EOD and other emergency services will report before being directed forward to the ICP or FCP. The RVP should: (1) Be clearly signed and marshalled by nominated personnel. (2) Have adequate access and parking space for a large number of vehicles. f. Briefing (1) Once control of the incident scene has been established an area should be nominated for briefings to take place. Ideally, the briefing area should be located close to the ICP. (2) A detailed briefing should be prepared for civil police and EOD, detailing the circumstances of the incident and all actions that have been taken. Terminology 8. Standard ACPO Emergency Procedures Terminology is detailed at Appendix 1 to Annex G. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4H-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4H-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX H TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 ACTION UPON DISCOVERY OF A SUSPECTED IED General 1. If a suspicious object is discovered that could be an IED and its presence cannot be readily explained it is to be treated as a genuine device and must not be touched or moved. Either an object is suspicious or it is not. There is no such thing as a possible suspect IED. 2. Attempts to establish ownership of the object or the identity of the person who placed it should continue, but should not take precedence over immediate response drills. Immediate Response Drills 3. Phase One - Confirm. Confirm the presence of a suspicious object. a. If a reliable witness reports a suspect IED inside the establishment perimeter accept the information. Do not wait until someone has been to check. Gather all available information, including the exact nature of the device and its precise location. b. If a patrol or search team discovers a suspect IED they should immediately withdraw to cover and send an incident report to the security control room. 4. Phase Two - Clear. Having confirmed the presence of a suspect IED, all personnel should be evacuated from the surrounding area. The size of the area to be cleared will depend upon the nature and size of the object, together with any secondary hazards that may be present; as a guide the following distances should be observed: a. b. c. Device placed by hand - at least 100m. Suspect cars - at least 400m. Suspect vans or lorries - at least 400m 5. Phase Three - Cordon. A cordon should be established around that area that has been cleared, to prevent personnel entering into the danger area. 6. Phase Four - Control. A nominated incident commander should exercise control over the incident until relieved by a civil police incident officer. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-H1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 7. Concurrent Actions. In addition to controlling activities at the scene, the incident commander should: a. Continue attempts to identify the owner or person who placed the object. Consideration should be given to making suitable public address system broadcasts. b. Hold all available witnesses at some suitable location for interview by the civil police and EOD. It is particularly important that the person who discovered the device, or any other person who has closely observed it, should be present. c. Issue suitable briefings to the civil police, PSyAs and Command security staff, local security unit and Focal Point as may be appropriate. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-H1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX H TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 ACTION SHOULD AN IED EXPLODE Explosion after Evacuation - No Casualties 1. The Cordon should be maintained. Access to the area of the explosion is to be restricted to specialist personnel, e.g. EOD and the civil police. 2. The Fire Service may be required to fight any fires that may threaten undamaged buildings provided this can be achieved without putting personnel at risk from other IEDs. 3. A full telephone Incident Report should be sent to the following: a. The civil police if they are not yet in attendance. b. PSyAs and Command security staff, local security unit and Focal Point (depending on SOPs). Explosion with Casualties 4. The priority is to save life and search for and evacuate casualties. 5. Despite the understandable willingness of many personnel to approach the area of an explosion and provide help, control must be exercised over rescue efforts. a. The minimum number of personnel should be employed in the search for casualties in order to minimize the risk from further IEDs, falling masonry and fire. b. Those rescue personnel approaching the seat of the explosion should move in on a designated approach path and exit by the same route. This will reduce the risk from other IEDs and minimize the possibility of contaminating or destroying evidence in the debris. c. Bodies should be left in situ and should not be touched or covered. d. Establishment contingency plans must include casualty evacuation arrangements and provision made for rescue equipment such as stretchers, ropes, hydraulic jacks, props and heavy lift gear to be available if required. e. A casualty list should be prepared and passed up the chain of command in accordance with local SOPs. "KINFORM" actions should be taken without delay. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-H2-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-H2-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX H TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 ACTION IN THE EVENT OF A MORTAR ATTACK Immediate Response Drills by Gate Guards or Patrols 1. It is likely that gate guards or patrols will be the first to be aware of a mortar attack. Their immediate response should be to activate the attack alarm or relay a message to the security control by radio. 2. The gate guard or patrol is then to take cover and attempt to count the reports from the base plate and the reports of bombs exploding. This information is to be reported without delay to the Security Control with details of the area attacked and the direction from which the mortars were launched, if this can be assessed. Immediate Response Drills by the Guard Commander 3. 4. If necessary, activate the attack alarm. Take cover. a. Inform the following by sending a radio or telephone incident report. (1) The civil police using 999. Request the civil police to: (a) Ask for EOD assistance. (b) To nominate a Rendezvous Point (RVP); this should be outside the establishment perimeter. (2) PSyAs and Command security staff, local security unit and Focal Point (depending on local SOPs). b. Keep personnel under cover. There is no laid down time for remaining in cover. However, the commander on the spot should anticipate a 2 phased attack that could last 15 minutes. c. Once a safety period has elapsed deploy a search team to: (1) (2) Locate blinds. Locate casualties. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-H3-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (3) (4) Locate the base plate. Identify a safe evacuation route for other personnel. d. Once the base plate has been located, the area around the base plate to a radius of 300m and the area under the flight path and the impact area to a radius of 100m must be cleared of personnel and cordoned off. Ensure that no attempts are made to touch the base plate or any blinds. e. Once casualties have been dealt with and the area secured, the control drills that are to be followed are the same as those for an IED. Immediate Response Drills by other Personnel 5. On hearing the attack alarm, the sound of a mortar firing or the detonation of a mortar round, all personnel are to take cover immediately by: a. Inside Buildings. Lying on the floor or ground. Where possible this should be done away from windows and preferably under some form of hard shelter such as tables, desks, beds or internal corridors. b. Outside Buildings. Seeking cover immediately wherever they can and then moving as quickly as possible to the shelter of a building as soon as the alarm or explosions stop. c. 6. Vehicles. Vehicles should not be abandoned obstructing roads. Personnel should remain under cover unless: a. b. c. d. They are ordered to move. They are aware of an unexploded bomb or blind nearby. They are aware of a casualty requiring assistance. The all clear sounds. 7. Personnel who are aware of the existence of unexploded bombs or blinds are to inform the Incident Control Point immediately. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-H3-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX H TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 ACTION IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST SHOOTING ATTACK General 1. Armed personnel coming under fire from a terrorist gunman within establishment perimeters should respond positively, operating within the authorized and relevant ROE JSP and according to establishment plans and orders. Immediate Response Drills 2. Return fire. If the conditions specified in the relevant ROE JSP are met and fire is returned, only single aimed shots should be used. 3. Initial contact to the main guardroom/security control room. An initial contact report should be made to the Security control room including: a. b. c. Contact location. Information on position of intruders. Casualties. 4. Clear the area. Take whatever follow-up action may be necessary to clear and secure the area and ensure there is no further threat. 5. First aid. Apply first aid to any casualties and call an ambulance. 6. Hot pursuit. Action to pursue and apprehend the gunman can only be taken within the provisions of JSP 385. NB, This does not apply to Scotland. If hot pursuit has to take place beyond establishment boundaries, consideration must be given to the danger posed to the general public and the ability of the local police to respond. If such action is successful, the gunman should be arrested and held until handed over to the civil police. 7. Inform civil police. Inform the local civil police (and the MDP or Service police if stationed at the location), notify the local security unit, PSyA or Command security staff. All relevant police forces should be informed of the precise nature and location of the incident, although the primacy of the civil police in the investigation must be respected. In addition, it should be made clear whether there are other suspects or vehicles and, if so, full descriptions given where possible. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-H4-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Subsequent Action 8. Clearance. Check the establishment for any devices. Do not touch discarded weapons or equipment. Be aware of possible booby traps. 9. Cordon. Isolate the scene and place a cordon around the firing point area and the contact point until the civil police arrive. Thereafter, act on their instructions. 10. Control a. Maintain a log of the sequence of events for a subsequent full report and for use at any subsequent enquiry. b. Establish a Rendezvous Point (RVP) and an Incident Control Point/Forward Control Point (ICP/FCP). c. Hand over control to the civil police. 11. Witness information. Ensure that any witnesses, military or civilian, do not leave the scene before the police arrive. If a Service person or MDP officer has carried out the shooting, ensure that the individual remains under escort until the civil police arrive. (The individual who fired is likely to be in a state of shock and should, if possible, be escorted to a nearby building rather than required to remain exposed at the scene). 12. Evidence. Take action to preserve all evidence in the immediate area as well as at the scene (including spent ammunition cases). The scene of the incident should not be interfered with except for safety reasons until the civil police are present. Weapon(s) should not be touched until a police authorized firearms specialist is in attendance. 13. Reporting. Inform PSyAs and Command security staff, local security unit and Focal Point as required by local SOPS. 14. Brief personnel. Brief all Service personnel and their families living in the immediate area on: a. b. c. What has happened. Any further threat. What action, if any, to take. 15. Press statement. HOE should, if necessary, issue a short press statement confirming an incident has taken place. A standard statement for this purpose is provide below. HOE should liaise with the police and their Command Media Ops staff over the further release of public information. No personal details of those involved should be given. No other personnel should make any statement to the media. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-H4-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Standard Press Release Confirming an Incident has Occurred AT (time) TODAY AN INCIDENT OCCURRED AT (location) WHICH RESULTED IN (number) PEOPLE, INCLUDING (number) OF SERVICE PERSONNEL BEING SHOT. THE INCIDENT IS NOW THE SUBJECT OF A CIVIL POLICE ENQUIRY. ANY FURTHER QUERIES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO (name) CONSTABULARY. Possible Police Action following a Terrorist Shooting Incident 16. Personnel who become involved in a terrorist shooting incident should be advised of the possible civil police action following such an incident. Despite what may appear to the layman to be a laudable, brave act committed by a person in accordance with the Rules of Engagement, the civil police have a duty fully to investigate the incident and establish the circumstances. To fulfil this duty, it is possible that the civil police may caution and detain an individual in the pursuit of their enquiries. This of itself does not mean that the individual is guilty of an offence. Any individual in this situation has the right to independent legal advice and obviously has a right to reserve a defence. 17. In normal circumstances an individual should provide information that may have an immediate bearing on the apprehension of terrorists, the saving of life or the prevention of damage to property. Support to Personnel following a Terrorist Shooting Incident 18. Obtain the services of a solicitor to act for the individual who has carried out the shooting. 19. Appoint an officer, to assist the individual concerned. 20. Obtain the advice and assistance of the SMO or retained Civilian Medical Practitioner to ensure that the person responsible for the shooting is assessed for the effects of stress or any other medical condition resulting from the incident. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-H4-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-H4-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX H TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 ACTION IN THE EVENT OF A PROXY BOMB ATTACK General 1. Proxy bombs can explode any time after being delivered, immediate response drills therefore must be implemented quickly. 2. The driver of a proxy bomb may well be acting under duress. The individual must be handled firmly but politely and is a potentially valuable witness. Immediate Response Drills 3. Action by the gate guard. a. Raise the alarm. b. Attempt to persuade the driver to drive the vehicle to a place where the explosion may cause less damage. Areas to which vehicles can be driven should be a previously designated part of the establishment identified in the contingency plan. (1) (2) (3) (4) c. 4. Do not try for more than 15 seconds. Do not use physical force. Do not drive the vehicle yourself. Do not get into the vehicle yourself. Detain the driver and move to safety. Action by the guard commander. a. b. Sound the alarm. If necessary, move to a safe area or alternative ICP. c. Clear and evacuate by deploying members of the guard to evacuate personnel quickly from the danger area (minimum 400 metre radius) to an Evacuation Assembly Point that may be outside the establishment perimeter. d. Ensure the Evacuation Assembly Point is checked for secondary IEDs. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-H5-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security e. Inform the civil police using 999 and send a telephone Incident Report. f. Inform the PSyA or Command security staff, local security unit and Focal Point depending on local SOPs. g. Place an inner cordon round the danger area to a minimum radius of 400m. h. i. Establish an RVP and ICP/FCP. Hand over to the civil police. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-H5-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX I TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 AIDE MEMOIRE FOR EVENT SECURITY OFFICERS (ESOS) 1. This Aide Memoire is designed primarily for the use of non-specialist ESOs nominated to cover PMEs off MOD property. ESO responsibilities for PME on MOD property should be overseen by the ESyO. Prior to the Event 2. At Least 2 months in advance. Start preparing the proforma at Appendix 1 to ensure its arrival with the civil police HQ contact officer and the other addressees at least 6 weeks before the event. 3. Five weeks before the event. Contact the civil police to discuss detailed security arrangements. Points should include: a. Searching and securing of the venue (including any Service changing accommodation) prior to the event. b. Searching and securing of the arrival, debussing and embussing point(s) of Service participants and the immediate approaches to those points. c. Protection of transport. d. Control of access to the venue from the moment any search beings or, if no search is required, when it is opened to the public until all participants are dispersed. (Unauthorized personnel should not be admitted once the clearance search has been started). e. Monitoring and control of approaches to the venue immediately prior to, during and after the event until all participants have dispersed. f. The roles of Service personnel provided for security duties such as the protection of transport. 4. Subsequently. Co-ordinate organization of Service aspects of the security plan. Points should include: a. Transport. (1) Anonymous or is the Service identity essential to the purpose of the PME, e.g. a recruiting display? JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4I-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (2) Full details passed to civilian transport firm as late as possible. (3) Multiple as opposed to single vehicles e.g.: personnel coming from different locations. b. Dress. (1) (2) Anonymous for travel if relevant but see 4a(1) above. Arrange changing accommodation at the venue. c. Security personnel. Ensure that unit personnel are organized to meet the number agreed with the civil police. If other support was requested ensure it is being provided. d. 5. that: Communications. Confirm what system is to be used. Shortly before the event. Brief all personnel on the general security plan ensuring a. b. Participants understand the need for alertness and vigilance. Security personnel fully understand their duties. On the Day of the Event 6. 7. Briefings. Re-brief personnel as necessary. Oversee the deployment to the event. This should include: a. b. Checking of personnel and kit onto transport. Paying particular attention to arrival, debussing and entering the venue. 8. On arrival. Contact the senior civil police officer on arrival and introduce your security personnel. If possible, together with the senior civil police officer, detail them to their duties. 9. During the event. Visit your security personnel to ensure all is well. 10. After the event. Ensure that, in accordance with the overall civil police plan, your security personnel remain on duty until all Service personnel are withdrawn. 11. In the event of an incident. In the event of an incident assist the senior civil police officer, where you can, in handling the matter. 12. Post event action. If any aspect of the security plan was not satisfactory, inform the chain of command. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4I-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX I TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 NOTIFICATION OF A PUBLIC MILITARY EVENT (PME) IN GB 1. To: Military Reference.....................................Date.............................. Civil Police Force HQ........................................................................ Local Sy Unit/RAF P&SS/MI Sect .................................... (2 Copies) Command SyO.................................................................................... Army Division/District HQ ................................................................ Army Bde HQ................................................................................... From: 2. Unit (Full Address)............................................................................. ......................................................................................................... ........................................................................................................... ........................................................................................................... 3. Telephone Number......................Offr IC tel no................................. Fax Number..............................Mobile tel no................................... 4. Date of Event.............................Event Timings Start....................................... Finish....................................... Unit time of Arrival....................Unit Time of Departure..................... Date of Leaving.......................................................................... 5. Any rehearsal details (include dates/timings, numbers, recces etc)........ ................................................................................................................... JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security ................................................................................................................... (If less than 6 weeks notice is given the event may not be policed) 6. Full Name and Address of Venue:.............................................................. ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... 7. Summary of Previous Use (incl dates)......................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... 8. Description of Event (e.g. Concert/Parade).................................................. ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... 9. If a March or Parade: a. Form Up (Start Point and time)........................................................ ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... b. Route (include map showing assembly area).................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... c. Location of Dais.............................................................................. ................................................................................................................... JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures d. Parade/March ends at (Location/Time):............................................ ................................................................................................................... 10. 11. 12. Numbers participating:......... Expected numbers of public........................... Number of Service Personnel for Sy duties.................................................. Overall Event Organizer............................................................................. a. b. Contact tel no................................................................................... Sponsor.......................................................................................... Contact tel no.............................................................................................. d. Officer in Charge of Event............................................................... Mobile tel no.............................................................................................. 13. Event Security Officer (ESO): a. b. 14. Before the Event.............................................................................. At the Event.................................................................................... Transport Arrangements: a. To be used....................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... b. Parking Arrangements..................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... c. Vehicle Guarding Arrangements...................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I1-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... 15. Accommodation plans (Changing or overnight (hotel etc))......................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... 16. Publicity: a. When was the Event publicized and how?...................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... b. Follow up publicity......................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... c. Terrorist incidents involving this Unit............................................. ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... 17. Details of VIPs attending: Rank/Name ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I1-4 Appointment ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ....................................... 18. ....................................... Any other details (Weapons involved etc).................................................. ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... 19. Dress for event............................................................................................ ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................... Signed.................................. Name/Rank/Appt....................................... Enclose PME Acknowledgment Slip (APPENDIX 2) and s.a.e addressed to unit requiring receipt *(when completed consider upgrading protective marking) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I1-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I1-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX I TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 PME Acknowledgement Slip (to be completed by appropriate Civil Police Force HQ) 1. 2. 3. To: ................................................................................................ From: ............................................................................................. Acknowledgement of notification of Public Military Event on Date............ Reference............................. Venue............................................ 4. Receipt of your Proforma is acknowledged: (Delete as applicable) a. b. There are no security objections to the event taking place. It is advised the event should not take place. 5. The Police response will be as indicated below: (Delete as applicable) a. A search will be conducted and full Police cover will be given throughout the Event. b. A search will be conducted. However, on completion of the search, the military are requested to undertake responsibility for security at the event. c. d. e. The event has been noted and local Police Officers have been informed. No cover will be provided by the Police. A decision as to Police response is yet to be made. 6. Your Civil Police contact for the security arrangements for the event is: a. b. c. Name and Rank ................................................................. Civil Police Station ............................................................. Telephone number .............................................................. Date ..................................... Signature........................... Police Contact telephone number in case of emergency .................................... JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I2-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I2-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX I TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 NOTIFICATION OF A PUBLIC MILITARY EVENT OVERSEAS To: HQ Comd ) ) as appropriate ­ see paragraph 07465 ) Reference: UNIT (Address and telephone number including BT dialling code): UK Support Unit (NATO HQ) British Embassy/High Commission From: 1. 2. DATE OF EVENT AND ON-SITE REHEARSALS (If less than 6 weeks state reason for late notification): 3. LOCATION OF EVENT a. Full details of venue: b. Brief summary of previous use of venue (Including dates): 4. OUTLINE OF EVENT AND NATURE OF SERVICE INVOLVEMENT a. Type of activity (1): b. Numbers participating: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I3-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c. Expected number of spectators/audience/attendance: d. Number of Service personnel dedicated to security duties in attendance: e. Details of involvement/participation of other Services: 5. PERSONALITIES (Names and contact numbers of the following): a. Overall event organizer (If Service personnel are participating in a joint activity with civilians): b. Local sponsor, if appropriate (e.g. Theatre manager): c. Unit person in charge at the event: d. Event Security Officer (ESO) (Responsible for civil police liaison and security organization - to include telephone numbers) (1) Before the event (2): (2) At the event (2): e. Overall ESO (If other Service units are involved in the event) (3): 6. TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENTS a. Transport to be used: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I3-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures b. Parking location(s) throughout the total activity associated with the event (e.g. rehearsals, overnight and during the event itself): c. Proposed guarding arrangements (If not parked in a secure Service establishment or civil police station): 7. TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS a. Outward journey. (1) Method of travel with flight/sailing number: (2) Arrival location with date and time: b. Return journey. (1) Method of travel with flight/sailing number: (2) Departure location with date and time: 8. ACCOMMODATION ARRANGEMENTS a. Changing accommodation: b. Overnight accommodation address (If civilian, the date of booking and confirmation that the reservation was made without reference to the Services): 9. PUBLICITY a. When the event was first publicized and how: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I3-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. Follow-up publicity with dates (e.g. regional newspaper coverage and local posters): c. Brief details of any previous terrorist incidents involving the unit: 10. DETAILS OF VIPs ATTENDING THE EVENT NOTES: (1) (2) (3) Duty (Include details of type of activity, i.e. marching band, concert band, display team etc). Service, community, charity or fee-paying engagement. Ideally these are the same person. This may be decided subsequently in conjunction with the other Services if appropriate. (When completed, consider upgrading protective marking) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I3-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX I TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 OPEN DAY SECURITY PLANS 1. The style, format and structure of the open day security plan will be dictated by local circumstances; however, it should contain the following essential elements: a. The composition of the security organization and command and control arrangements, including the location and function of the Joint Security Control Room. b. Detailed plans depicting: (1) The geographical and physical layout of the establishment, including the division between public and non-public areas. (2) The location and arrangement of key elements of the open day, to include the crowd line, car parks, static equipment displays, VIP and Service enclosures, trade and exhibition stands etc. (3) The location of access gates and physical barriers, including the erection of temporary obstructions and fences. c. Access arrangements to both the public and non-public areas, including arrangements for the checking and searching of vehicles where necessary. d. Vehicle parking arrangements, including arrangements for staff, exhibitors and traders, VIP guests and establishment personnel. e. f. g. Pass systems and ticketing arrangements. Security tasks and assignment of forces. Arming arrangements. h. Security arrangements within the public area, including arrangements for the security of VIP and Service enclosures, buildings, sensitive or similar installations, patrolling, both prior to, during and after the event. i. Security arrangements within the non-public area, to include arrangements for the security of buildings and installations, patrols etc. j. Arrangements to ensure the security of materiel and equipment. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I4-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security k. Contingency plans for dealing with incidents and emergency situations, to include immediate reaction drills, command and control arrangements, allocation of resources, media arrangements and pre-determined public address broadcasts. l. Measures to heighten security awareness. Security within the Public Area of the Establishment 2. Minimum security precautions. The following minimum security measures are to be implemented within the public area of the establishment: a. Public entrances. Wherever possible, public access to the event is to be through dedicated entrances that afford direct access to the public areas of the establishment; the location and number of entrances being dictated by local circumstances and topography. If, due to geographical constraints, it is necessary to allow members of the public to access the Open Day through gates that would normally serve the non-public areas of the establishment, such as the establishment Main Gate, suitable physical barriers are to be erected along the access route to prevent members of the public gaining access to that part of the establishment that is not open to them. Under such circumstances, a new, temporary, access point serving the non-public area should be constructed at some convenient location. Consideration is to be given to the provision of facilities for the random searching of vehicles as a deterrence measure. b. Public car parks. The siting of public car parks will be dictated by the layout of the establishment; however, public car parks are not to abut static equipment displays or public buildings so as to avoid collateral damage in the event of an explosion. Additionally, consideration is to be given to: (1) The provision of 'fire lanes' within the car park to allow easy access for emergency vehicles. (2) The provision of a dedicated and secure parking area for VIP guests. c. Exhibitors and Traders. Other than military participants or other official bodies of similar standing, traders and exhibitors are not to be allowed access to the non-public areas of the establishment. They should access the show site through either the public entrance gates or through a separate, dedicated, entrance provided for that purpose. Additionally: (1) Trade stands and displays are to be sited far enough away from static equipment to avoid collateral damage in the event of an explosion. (2) All trade and exhibition stands are to display a locally produced certificate of authority to trade or display. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I4-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures (3) A member of the security staff is to brief all traders and exhibitors upon arrival about basic security precautions to be observed on the establishment. In particular, the briefing should include: (a) Actions to take during an incident or emergency. (b) The need regularly to check the stall or exhibit, including the immediate surrounds, for any unidentified items that may have been left or secreted. (c) The need to report any suspicious incidents or activities. (4) Other than military personnel who have made appropriate arrangements for accommodation, exhibitors and traders are not to be permitted to remain on the establishment overnight prior to, or immediately following, the event. (5) A written security brief that covers the above points is to be prepared and issued to the person in charge of each stand or exhibit. d. Security patrols. Routine, high visibility, security patrols are to be mounted continuously within the public area. The number of personnel employed upon patrol duties will be dictated by the physical layout of the area and the anticipated size of the crowd. e. VIP and dedicated Service enclosures. Facilities provided for VIPs and enclosures set aside solely for use by Service personnel and their families, such as mess enclosures, are to be the subject of specific security precautions, to include: (1) Control of access to the area and the identification of personnel present. Consideration should be given to the introduction of an identification 'badge' system. (2) Regular checks of the enclosures for suspicious items. (3) The briefing of staff employed therein on the need for increased vigilance within the area. f. Building security. Additional security measures are to be taken to safeguard buildings and their occupants, including: (1) Buildings that are open to the public. (a) Each building that is open to the general public is to have a dedicated security guard force, members of which are to continuously patrol the building, both internally and externally, to ensure that items have not been left or secreted that could contain an explosive device. The size of the guard force will be dictated by the size of the building and the anticipated numbers of personnel present. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I4-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (b) The building is to be thoroughly searched and checked, both internally and externally, once the public have departed to ensure that: i No objects have been left that could contain an explosive device. ii iii (2) No fire hazard exists. It is properly secured. Buildings that are in use but not open to the public. (a) Each building is to have an appointed building monitor, who is to remain in the building throughout the time that the public are present on the establishment, and who is to conduct regular security checks of the building, both internally and externally, to ensure that only authorized personnel are present and no items have been left or secreted that could contain an explosive device. (b) Access points are to be reduced to a minimum, and strict control of entry is to be enforced. (c) The building is to be thoroughly searched and checked, both internally and externally, once the public have departed from the establishment to ensure that: i No objects have been left that could contain an explosive device. ii iii No fire hazard exists. It is properly secured. (3) Buildings that are not in use. (a) Each building is to be checked and properly secured before the public are granted access to the establishment. (b) Security patrols are to confirm the security of the building at regular intervals throughout the time that the public are present in the establishment. (c) The building is to be thoroughly searched and checked, both internally and externally, once the public have departed from the establishment to ensure that: i No objects have been left that could contain an explosive device. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I4-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ii iii No fire hazard exists. It is properly secured. Security within the Non-Public Area of the Establishment 3. Security Alert State. The notified BIKINI or KEENWIND Alert State prevailing at the time of the open day is to be maintained throughout the non-public area of the establishment. However, plans are to be formulated to rapidly implement increased security measures in response to an increase in the local Alert State, should this prove to be necessary. 4. Minimum security precautions. The following minimum security measures are to be implemented within the non-public area of the establishment: a. Alert State measures. Routine Alert State security measures are to be strictly enforced. In particular: (1) Objects that could be used to conceal an explosive device are to be moved at least 25 metres from all buildings. (2) The 25 metre parking rule is to be adhered to strictly. b. Control of entry. Strict vehicular and pedestrian control of entry is to be exercised to the non-public area. Random searches of vehicles are to continue. Where there is no other recourse but to allow members of the public to access the Open Day through gates that would normally serve those areas of the establishment that are not open to the public, such as the establishment Main Gate, it may be necessary to establish a secondary, temporary, control of entry point at the boundary between the public and non-public areas. b. Barriers. Where suitable permanent structures do not already exist, temporary, robust, physical barriers are to be erected along all boundaries between the public and non public areas of the establishment. The hire of 'Readyfence' or some other similar temporary fencing system should be considered. Because of the risk of accidental injury, the use of barbed fencing should be avoided in those areas that abut public access routes or areas. c. Security patrols. Sufficient security patrols are to be mounted within the non-public area to detect and apprehend any unauthorized person, or member of the general public who may have gained deliberate or inadvertent access to the area. Patrols are to pay particular attention to: (1) Domestic facilities including clubs, accommodation blocks and messes. (2) Establishment boundaries, particularly where physical defences are inadequate to prevent members of the public gaining access. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I4-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security d. Identification. All establishment personnel, including dependants contractors, honorary Mess members etc, who have a bonafide reason for being within the non-public area, are to carry some form of authorized identification. Consideration should be given to adopting some form of temporary 'badge' system for ease of identification. e. Access to the non-public area. Access points linking the public and nonpublic areas are to be manned by Service personnel who are to exercise strict control of entry, including rigorous identity checks of any person seeking entry to the non-public areas of the establishment. f. Sensitive installations. Consideration is to be given to providing sensitive installations, including fuel and explosive storage areas, with a dedicated guard force who are to be located within or around those installations whilst the public are present on the establishment. g. Building security. Additional security measures to be taken to safeguard buildings and their occupants are: (1) (2) Securing buildings that are not in continuous use. Exercising strict control of entry on all buildings that are in use. (3) Thoroughly searching and checking each building, both internally and externally, once the public have departed from the establishment to ensure that no object has been left or secreted that could contain an explosive device. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I4-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX I TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 OFF SITE EVENTS Off Site Events (Excluding PMEs) - Physical Security General 1. The terrorist threat increases the risk to any MOD activity held off MOD property, particularly where members of the Armed Forces are involved, and when any members of the public have prior knowledge of the event. If the terrorist threat to an identifiable MOD organized or sponsored Off Site Event (OSE) is assessed at SIGNIFICANT (Level 3) or higher, whenever possible the event should be held on MOD premises. Events Covered by this Instruction 2. Examples of OSEs covered by this instruction include conferences, seminars, lectures, dinners or other social gatherings arranged by MOD for MOD Service personnel or civilian employees, where either the public is excluded or only very limited numbers are invited individually. Public Military Events (PMEs) are not covered by this instruction nor are the existing rules for PMEs altered in any way. (PMEs are events to which the public has both access and prior knowledge. Security instructions for PMEs are contained in paragraphs 07448 - 07469). Action to be taken 3. At the initial planning stages of an OSE, prior to the booking of a venue, an Event Security Officer (ESO) is to be appointed. The ESO is to inform the Establishment Security Officer (ESyO) of the proposed OSE. If the ESyO requires additional advice, especially where the event may fall under the definition of a PME, this is to be sought through the chain of command or from the appropriate PSyA or Command security staff. ESyOs are to maintain lists of all current OSEs within their locality, keeping the local police informed as appropriate. In addition, ESyOs for all OSEs sponsored by the Royal Navy are to contact their local RN Area Security Team. 4. Maintaining the anonymity of the MOD connection is the most important factor in OSE planning; from the time of the initial booking or enquiry, to the conclusion of the event. When making the booking the venue should be told not to record or publicise the MOD connection (for example on notice boards or directional signs). Where possible the booking should be with an address that does not reveal any MOD or military connection. All those attending the function are to be forewarned to use the event's pseudonym when contacting the chosen venue. Additionally, event organizers are to note the following: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I5-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. Repeated and regular use of the same venues should be avoided. b. Loose talk in public areas of the venue that may identify the participants with the MOD should be avoided. c. Sponsors, organizers and participants are to be reminded of the current threat assessment and of their individual personal security responsibilities. d. Normally, the participants, including guest lecturers or presenters, should not wear Service uniform. e. The ESO, assisted by suitable personnel, should search the venue, inconspicuously if possible, before the event. Subsequent admission should be controlled until the event is completed. f. Participants are to be reminded to be alert and vigilant for suspicious persons, packages and vehicles. g. list. Invitations and identities of attendees are to be checked against a master h. At social gatherings, such as in hotel bars or restaurants, individual(s), who should not drink alcohol, are to be detailed to remain on watch both inside and, if appropriate, outside the area concerned. (SHARKWATCH). i. Service transport is not to be used to travel to and from the venue unless it has been `civilianized' and service drivers should not wear uniform. Security of vehicles will normally remain the responsibility of the owner or driver. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4-I5-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX J TO SECTION IV TO CHAPTER 7 GUIDANCE ON COUNTER TERRORIST SEARCH AWARENESS SECURITY MEASURES (CTSASM) Individual CTSASM 1. General. Individuals can play a vital part in ensuring their own safety, and that of others in their immediate vicinity, by being alert and punctilious in their application of CTSASM. 2. Measures. Individual CTSASM include: a. Knowledge of surroundings. A sound knowledge of their local surroundings is essential if individuals are to notice that which is out of place. It is the responsibility of every individual to familiarize themselves with their work area, living accommodation and their private transport so they can complete quick and effective searches. b. Tidiness. Individuals should be encouraged to keep their work and living accommodation areas tidy. This will minimize the scope for hiding devices and aid both the occupant and deployed search teams to check more quickly a building and its surrounds. c. Routine checks. Checks and searches of an individual's environment are essential and must be carried out as a matter of routine. Key times for such searches include: (1) (2) (3) Before getting into a vehicle that has been left unattended. Returning to accommodation that has been unoccupied. Entering an unguarded place of work that has been left unoccupied. d. Observation. Individuals need to be alert to observe unusual and suspicious occurrences. 3. Unit action. Individuals should be briefed regularly on CTSASM and checks carried out within units to ensure that preventative measures, including tidiness and routine checks, are being applied. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4J-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Establishment CTSASM 4. CTSASM for establishments are both preventative and protective. The following measures applied at unit level by search aware personnel should greatly increase the unit's level of security: a. Verification. Effective measures to verify the authority for people and vehicles to be within an establishment perimeter will reduce the search burden. b. Surveillance. surveillance by: Consideration should be given to countering terrorist (1) Identifying potential observation points and lines of sight into and within the location. (2) Use of screening. c. Checks. Repetitive routines must be monitored, set patterns varied and checks conducted in a random and unpredictable manner. Checks should include: (1) Routine checks. The reason for and thoroughness of routine checks must be emphasized. For the most part, they are dull and boring and are only really effective if those involved know what they are looking for and why. (2) Random checks. Random checks are effective but disruptive. However, very few are needed to create uncertainty in the mind of a would be attacker. Random checks should be carried out as follows: (a) Vehicles. Random vehicle checks in public view have an enhanced deterrent effect. (b) Visitors. A thorough search of a small sample of visitors' baggage provides a good degree of security with the minimum disruption. d. Specialist areas. Complex buildings, vehicles and equipment require special arrangements to ensure that those familiar with them are available to carry out searches as necessary. e. Tidiness. Searching is made more difficult by the presence of rubbish and other waste items that could hide a bomb. Measures to ensure that rubbish areas are kept tidy, secure and regularly emptied should be put in place. f. Accommodation block fittings. The number of fittings such as bins, traffic cones and fire extinguishers, that could hide bombs, must be kept to a minimum. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4J-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures g. Sealing. Where possible, those areas and spaces that might be used to hide bombs should be searched and sealed so that unauthorized entry can be more readily detected. h. Horizontal surfaces. Horizontal surfaces, such as flat roofs, are suitable platforms for bombs and can provide cover from view. Such areas must be searched more regularly than most. Guidance on the Formulation of a Search Plan 5. Stage One. Conduct a vulnerability assessment as follows: a. Identify those buildings that are most vulnerable and which terrorist might wish to attack, i.e. living accommodation, messes, guardroom, NAAFI. b. Buildings should be graded as follows: (1) (2) High Risk (RED) i.e. living accommodation. Medium Risk (AMBER) i.e. working areas and offices. (3) Low Risk (GREEN) i.e. buildings that are rarely occupied such as garages and stores. 6. Stage Two. Use this colour system to plot the vulnerability assessment onto a plan of the establishment. Colour coding will provide priorities for search, i.e. RED area first. 7. Stage Three. Sub-divide the establishment into sectors providing the following: a. Set areas of search responsibility with well defined boundaries. b. These areas should be plotted onto search sector cards which are issued to each search team by the search organizer. Each card should include any relevant information for that given area of responsibility e.g. simplex lock combinations. (Keep cards under lock and key when not in use). Conduct of Search 8. Stage One. The search organizer assembles search team leaders and allocates search tasks and sector cards. A record should be kept of potential team leaders who should ideally have had previous search experience. It is recommended that search team leaders with a detailed knowledge of particular areas should be given those to search. 9. Stage Two. Teams are assembled and briefed by their team leaders. Each team should consist of up to 10 search aware personnel drawn from whoever is available within the unit. 10. Stage Three. The actual search should be conducted as follows: a. Buildings. 7-4J-3 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (1) Carry out an external search of walls, foliage, the roof and refuse areas. Do not forget to search for disturbed ground where an IED may have been buried in close proximity to an external wall. (2) Search those internal areas that are easily accessible such as ablutions, rest rooms, stairwells and corridors. (3) Search those internal areas that are not easily accessible such as accommodation rooms, false ceilings and attics. (4) Search starting on the ground floor and clearing each floor before moving up. (5) A room should be searched as follows: (a) A pair of searchers start at the entrance. clockwise and the other anti-clockwise. One works (b) They each carry out sweeps at floor, mid and ceiling level. Be sure to search the middle of the room including any furniture. (c) Each searcher starts and finishes at the door. b. Co-ordination. As buildings and or sector searches are completed the team leader should report back to the search organizer. The team leader should be sited at a suitable control centre. Search and Seal Option 11. To save time and effort, consideration should be given to the use of "Tamper Evident Seals". Buildings, rooms, containers or any other equipment that lends itself to sealing that are rarely used or vacated at weekends or at night should be sealed on exit, removing the need to search them. Seals are then easily checked for sign of forced entry. If used, seals should be applied to all entry points, checked regularly and recorded in a register. Seals should be regarded as an aid to searching and not a replacement. Search Equipment 12. Search equipment should be easily accessible and possibly held in the guardroom and should include: a. b. c. d. e. Torches. Telescopic mirrors. Ladders. Screwdrivers. Sector cards. 7-4J-4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures f. g. h. i. j. Tamper evident seals. Radios. Safety harness. Periscopes, endoscopes. Rolling boards for under vehicle search. Search Advice 13. Search advice is available on request from the following sources. If in doubt as to who to consult an approach should be made initially to the FSC at the appropriate HQ. a. b. c. d. The FSC on the 2SL/CINCNAVHOME staff. P&SS FSA (through P&SS Regions). The STIRC at NSC Carver Barracks. Police Search Advisers within the Home Department police and MDP. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4J-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-4J-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures SECTION V TO CHAPTER 7 PERSONAL COUNTER TERRORIST SECURITY MEASURES General 07501. Certain terrorist organizations have shown that they may consider personnel with MOD connections to be "legitimate targets". During a terrorist campaign, therefore, all personnel are at risk from attack. An attack could materialise at any time or place and personnel need to remain vigilant even when at home or travelling. 07502. Within GB, the standard graded threat levels are also used to indicate the level of threat to an individual. The definitions of the threat levels have been previously described in Section I paragraph 07107. 07503. If it is considered than an individual, of whatever rank, is at a higher risk of terrorist attack then a special threat assessment should be sought from D Def Sy through the appropriate PSyAs and Command security staff. If that assessment places the individual at threat level 3 or above, then special protective measures will be implemented - see also paragraphs 07509 - 07515. Terrorist Targeting 07504. Terrorist organizations use open source material to obtain information for use in targeting personnel. A wide variety of information sources are used for this purpose including the media and publications such as telephone directories, electoral rolls, "Who's Who", the Service Lists and Service journals. 07505. In addition, terrorists can be expected to conduct general observations and target reconnaissance of personnel or target areas such as Service families accommodation, places of entertainment used by personnel and routes used to travel to and from work. 07506. The greatest contribution to personal safety can be made by: a. b. c. d. Alertness and vigilance. Avoidance of routine patterns of activity. Adoption of sensible and practical personal security drills. Remaining, as far as possible, anonymous. 07507. Guidance to counter targeting of individuals by terrorists are detailed in the following Annexes. Not all the advice needs to be followed by everyone all of the time. The HOE has a duty of care to ensure that personnel should adopt those measures that they JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security see as appropriate to their circumstances bearing in mind the level of threat that pertains at the time. a. b. c. d. Security at home - Annex A. Security when travelling - Annex B. Security at places of entertainment - Annex C. Dealing with the media - Annex D. Anonymity 07508. When a serious terrorist threat has been identified, personnel should be alert to the dangers of unnecessarily identifying themselves as being members of the MOD or Armed Forces. The following list, whilst not exhaustive, is intended as a reference guide to those areas where identification with the Services could be avoided: a. General. (1) Avoid wearing uniform or using military equipment in public. (2) When out of uniform avoid wearing MOD or Service related T-shirts or sweatshirts in public. (3) Avoid disclosing MOD or Service connections to strangers. (4) Do not wear establishment passes outside your place of work. Colleagues wearing passes in public should be warned of the risks that they are incurring. b. House. Do not include Service details in documents and correspondence relating to: (1) (2) (3) (4) Council Tax. Electricity, gas, oil and water. TV licence. Telephone bill. (5) BT directories. (Consider an ex-directory telephone number or requesting BT to omit a directory entry but to make details available through directory enquiries. In any event, an entry giving rank should be avoided). (6) (7) Insurance - buildings and contents. Appliance warranties and guarantees. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures c. Vehicle. Do not include Service details in: (1) (2) (3) (4) Registration book. Insurance certificate (where avoidable). Driving licence. Vehicle servicing log book. d. Bank and Building Society. Do not include Service details in: (1) (2) (3) Cheque books. Cheque guarantee and credit cards. Building Society account books. e. Personal. Do not include Service details in: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Warranty and guarantee certificates. Bus and rail passes (unless HM Forces Railcard). Market research questionnaires. Concession and discount application forms. Membership cards for clubs, motoring organizations etc. f. Electoral Registration. The Representation of the People Act 2000 came into effect on 16 Feb 01 and introduced a number of changes to electoral registration procedures. Electoral Registration Officers are now required to make copies of their electoral registers available for sale. Two versions of the electoral register will be produced. The full version will be used for electoral and law enforcement purposes, and will be available for banks and other credit institutions to check identity in credit applications. It will be an offence to use the full version of the register for any other purpose. An expurgated version will be available for general sale. Individual electors, including Service personnel, will be given the option of deciding whether all of the details they provide for registration purposes should be included in the commercially available register. They are also able to opt out of having their names, or any other details, included on the register that will be made available for commercial use g. Absent Voting. The rules for those individuals that elect to vote by means of a Service declaration remain unchanged. Those overseas can only vote by proxy, while those physically in the UK but who are unable to vote in person, may vote by either post or proxy. Those individuals that choose to register on a local electoral register, and who are not registered as Service voters through a Service declaration, will be able to vote either by post or proxy if they are overseas or away JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security from home during an election or are disabled. All personnel will need to contact their local Electoral Registration Office directly if they wish to register under these arrangements. h. Council Tax. A legal right exists in the Council Tax legislation for individuals who believe themselves to be at risk of violence to request anonymous registration with local authorities. MOD has been informed that local Council Tax registration authorities are likely to treat applications from Service personnel for anonymous registration favourably. The following advice is therefore given to establishments, units and individuals in GB: (1) Lists of those living in accommodation blocks should be submitted by establishments to the local authority requesting anonymous registration. (2) Those living in Service families and private accommodation should apply for anonymous registration individually. i. Schools. Parents of children at boarding school should warn the staff of the school of the need, especially in periods of high threat, to exercise careful control over information that may identify Service parents. j. Release of information to commercial companies. Before voluntarily divulging personal information to commercial companies, individuals should ensure that the potential recipient has a genuine need to know the information. Wherever possible, avoid the use of MOD or Service details. When completing forms requiring to know an individual's occupation the term "Government Service" should be used whenever possible. However, where an accurate description of employment, e.g. for insurance and mortgage purposes, is required this may not be possible. In such circumstances it may be necessary to reveal a Service connection to ensure that the policy's validity cannot be questioned. k. If Service details have to be divulged the following should be applied: (1) Only supply the minimum of information and ask permission before providing personal details of employers or superior officers for reference purposes. (2) Ask the commercial organization to provide a written undertaking to the effect that Service details will be omitted from any correspondence, the information will be handled in the strictest confidence, not recorded on an IT database or disclosed to third parties. l. Mailing lists. If personnel find their names on mailing lists, these can be removed by applying to the Mailing Preference Service, 1 Leeward House, Plantation Wharf, London, SW11 3TY or FREEPOST 22 London, W1E 7EZ. This firm will normally assist where the individual is on a list maintained by one of the firm's subscribers. There is, however, no guarantee that any name can be removed from all lists world-wide. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Protection of High Threat Personnel (HTP) 07509. In addition to the requirement to protect all Service personnel from the general threat of terrorism, it is sometimes necessary to provide enhanced protection for particular individuals, known as High Threat Personnel (HTP), who are assessed to be at higher threat of attack because of: a. or b. or c. other factors serving terrorist propaganda objectives. the status and high profile of their appointment; The nature of their service in relation to counter terrorist operations; Action in GB 07510. The Security Service informs D Def Sy and provides a threat assessment if intelligence is received that a particular individual is targeted by terrorists. In addition, advised by the CEAG, D Def Sy nominates a small number of personnel who match interdepartmental criteria developed from the factors at sub-paragraphs 07509 a to c above, for assessment by the Security Service. Vulnerability and risk are taken into account. Those assessed to be at or above Significant threat (level 3) (see paragraph 07107 for definition) are categorized High Threat Personnel (HTP) and certain essential protective security measures (PSM) are authorized for them. These are in line with interdepartmental standards and are additional to or subsume any measures provided under the terms of Chapter 5. If armed protection is justified it is provided by the appropriate Home Department Police Force (HDPF). A list of HTP is published periodically by D Def Sy. Action in NI and Overseas 07511. In NI and overseas the decision on whether and to what extent enhanced PSM should be provided for an individual at higher threat is to be made by the commander concerned, based on a threat assessment and recommendations provided by the security staff. Any host nation provision should be taken into account; whether this includes armed protection depends on relevant inter-governmental agreements. If appropriate, security staffs should seek a Security Service assessment of the threat to individuals overseas through MOD D Def Sy. Such requests should attach a report assessing the vulnerability of the subject. Where personnel assessed below threat level 2 are, nevertheless, considered by PSyAs and Command security staff to be at exceptionally high risk, they may decide to protect them as though they were HTP at that threat level. Names of personnel in this category should be notified to D Def Sy as they arise. Protective Security Measures 07512. These should take into account the modus operandi of the terrorist group(s) concerned and might include: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. The appointment of a single point of contact (POC) responsible for all contingent security advice and assistance to the HTP, his family and staff. b. Personal security drills at home, at work, during visits, while travelling, during recreation and at official and private social events. c. d. HTP. e. f. g. The security vetting of household staff. Physical protective security measures at the home and place of work of the Close protection (CP) (see paragraph 07523 below). Provision of an armoured staff car (CSAP). Provision of a reaction force. h. Protection of information to avoid publication, whether official, private or in the media of the individual's location, movements and general activities. Close Protection 07513. Close Protection (CP) is the armed protection by Service police or other specially trained personnel of an individual (the "principal") against unconventional, direct, harmful attack at close quarters. Its sole aim is to protect the principal. In conventional military operations or where enemy Special Forces (SF) may be deployed, CP is a matter for the operations staff advised by the intelligence staff. The intelligence staff provide assessments of the threat upon which decisions are made. Armed protection of HTP in mainland GB is the exclusive responsibility of HDPF. Where there is a terrorist threat or the risk of attack by other violent extremists in NI or overseas the security staff should advise whether CP is appropriate. CP will usually be appropriate for HTP assessed to be at threat levels 1 or 2. Armoured Staff Cars 07514. The provision of an armoured staff car, Car Saloon Armoured Protected (CSAP), to protect against terrorist attack is justified where an HTP at higher threat (levels 1 or 2) is required to travel by road in high risk conditions. In GB the HDPF personal protection officers (PPOs) of HTP at threat levels 1 or 2 will decide whether an MOD provisioned CSAP is appropriate for a particular journey. In NI and overseas, where CP is provided by Service police or the host nation, a CSAP will be required for those high risk journeys where an operational road vehicle or helicopter is unavailable or its use is impracticable or inappropriate. Alternative methods of risk reduction, such as the use of a hired indigenous vehicle to achieve anonymity, should also be considered. The Protection Plan 07515. The protection plan must make it clear that the greatest contribution to an individual's personal safety is achieved by strict observance of four key factors: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures a. Alertness. HTP and their families and staff should be inquisitive and alert at all times for the many sources of danger. The security staff, security unit POC, the HTP and his personal staff should examine the individual's security arrangements from the terrorist viewpoint to see whether they can detect any weaknesses. b. Avoidance of routine patterns of activity. Regular patterns of activity should be avoided; where this is unavoidable those concerned should be fully aware of the risks and take appropriate precautions. c. Adoption of practical security drills. The adoption of simple, common sense security drills make an individual a harder target. d. Anonymity. No matter how inconvenient, outside Service establishments, particularly where an HTP lives, shops or takes recreation, the HTP should make it as difficult as possible to be identified with the Services. Home Security 07516. Guidance on personal security at home is given at Annex A to this Section. Survival in Hostage Situations 07517. Guidance on survival in hostage situations is given at Annex E to this Section. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX A TO SECTION V TO CHAPTER 7 GUIDANCE ON PERSONAL SECURITY AT HOME General 1. This guidance is designed for personnel at higher threat (HTP) but all should draw on it as necessary to suit their own particular circumstances. This Annex is designed to be read by the individuals concerned. The Key to Successful Protection 2. The most important thing to remember is always to be on the alert for terrorist sources of danger, particularly when you are most vulnerable, such as when leaving or entering your home or place of work. You should avoid creating a regular pattern of behaviour. The adoption of the simple personal security drills set out in this annex will make you a less likely target for terrorist attack. Anonymity 3. You should avoid giving information about where you are going and what you are doing. You should aim to achieve anonymity outside Service establishments, particularly where you live, shop, or take recreation. In particular, you should: a. Ensure that military stores such as MFO boxes and items of uniform are not left outside your house or in your private vehicle where they can be seen by strangers. b. As far as possible, avoid wearing visible items of uniform when travelling to and from work. c. Whenever possible, avoid being collected at home by non-civilianized Service vehicles or drivers in uniform. d. Whenever possible, avoid disclosing your Service connection to professional and commercial organizations or utilities who may record it in their data bases and issue documents, such as credit cards and cheque books to you, or correspond with you. Do not authorize the publication of your rank or Service in telephone directories, the electoral roll and other easily accessible records. It is advisable to have your telephone number ex-directory. e. Use a forwarding rather than a private or official address in such publications as 'Who's Who', or in open registers published by clubs and societies. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security f. Arrange for your private and personal mail to be addressed to your office and not to your private address. Ask anyone who may correspond with you to omit your rank from any mail sent to your private address. Locks and Keys 4. Secure locks and good key control are essential security aids. Cheap locks are easily picked and secure locks are only effective if the keys to them are properly protected as follows: a. b. Keep a strict check on your house keys. Do not allow duplicate keys to be made without your permission. c. If a key is lost in suspicious circumstances, report the fact and have a new lock fitted. d. Working keys should never carry any form of written identification. If you need to identify keys, a system of colour coding could be used. e. f. Never leave keys under the mat or in other obvious hiding places. Spare keys should be held in a central location not accessible to visitors. Doors and Windows 5. You are particularly vulnerable when answering the door. Do not answer the door automatically in response to a knock or bell. Check who is there by observing through an adjacent window, by using an entryphone, if installed, or by using a door viewer if fitted. You should note the following points: a. If suspicious of any caller do not open the door. b. When answering the door, do not put on the hall light. An external light in the vicinity of the door should be kept burning during the hours of darkness, see paragraph 7. c. If you have glass panes in the door, prevent observation by, for example, fitting a thick curtain. d. Keep access windows locked. e. After dark, keep curtains or blinds closed. Remember to draw curtains before switching on lights and switch off lights before drawing back curtains in order to avoid being silhouetted at windows. f. Make a safety check each night before retiring to ensure that all doors and windows are properly closed and locked. g. Have a security chain fitted to the door. 7-5A-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Garden, Garage and Outbuildings 6. Doors and windows of garages and outbuildings should be kept locked, except for specific access. The following additional action should be taken: a. Consider locking drive gates with a security lock to prevent vehicle entry. b. Doors and windows of garages and outbuildings should always be checked for signs of unauthorized access before entering. c. Bushes, trees and undergrowth providing cover, especially close to the house, footpaths or driveways, should be removed or trimmed to make it more difficult for an intruder to operate or to conceal an explosive device. d. e. If possible refuse bins should be kept in an enclosed area. Do not handle anything suspicious - call the police. Lighting 7. At least one strong light should be kept burning in the area of the front door during hours of darkness, so that you do not signal your approach to the door by turning on a light. Remember: a. If you go out at night prepare for your return before leaving. Turn on any outside approach lights and lights in the garage, leave a light burning in the house in a regularly used room - not just the hall light. Consider using a light plugged into a time switch that will simulate activity within the house; do not overlook the need to vary timing and position. b. Always have some reserve lighting to hand such as torches, candles or lamps. Telephone 7. Site your telephone in such a position that you cannot be observed through windows or doors when using it. Consider having an extension in the bedroom. Also: a. If your telephone is out of order, report it immediately and be especially vigilant until it has been repaired. b. Keep a list of emergency numbers near the telephone. c. Other members of the household, especially staff, should exercise discretion when answering the telephone. No information should be given concerning your whereabouts, movements or future appointments, or those of your friends and colleagues. The caller's name, address and telephone number should be taken so that you can return the call. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5A-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security d. Telephones fitted with BT caller display and call return services can identify the number you call from. Consider having your telephone blocked from this service. Alternatively, by dialling 141 before the number called your number will be protected. This service may be useful for the tracing of anonymous or threatening calls - by dialling 1471 immediately after the call is received. Visitors, House Staff and Tradesmen 9. All visitors should be positively identified before being allowed to enter, in particular: a. Arrange fixed times for workmen to call. Check their identity and never leave them alone in the house. If they are unexpected, call their works office. b. Friends and relatives should be asked to inform you of intended visits whenever possible, particularly if they plan to arrive at an unusual time. c. Very late callers should be treated with particular suspicion. d. Check newly engaged staff. If additional staff are engaged for a function they should be vouched for and identified by a responsible person. e. Deliveries by tradesmen (1) (2) door. Do not accept parcels that have not been ordered. Discourage the leaving of parcels or bags on window sills or at the (3) Deliveries should be checked carefully before accepting them and the person making the delivery detained until this has been done. (4) Be suspicious of any change of postman, milkman or other regular delivery men. (5) Stop deliveries of milk, papers, etc, when going away. (6) Particular care is needed when removing routine deliveries such as milk or newspapers; first, you may expose yourself in a routine manner and secondly, deliveries can easily have explosive devices attached that may be difficult to see, particularly on dark mornings. Mail 10. Familiarize yourself with action to be taken on receipt of a letter or package that might contain an explosive device. 11. Guidance on the advice you should give private correspondents addressing mail to you is given in paragraph 3. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5A-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Alarms 12. Consider fitting a 'panic alarm' bell to the outside of the house with switches upstairs and down. Consider an alarm to a neighbour's house. Private Social Activities 13. Invite only guests who are known to be reliable and do not present a security risk. Care must be taken in the issue of invitations to large functions. 14. Vary your times as much as possible for sporting activities, e.g. visits to a golf club, tennis courts, etc. Do not regularly go walking alone in the country, or go on lone fishing trips, etc. Personal Security of Children 15. Ensure that children's rooms are not readily accessible from outside the house. 16. Instruct children never to admit strangers to the house. As soon as they are able to learn, teach them when and how to alert police or neighbours. 17. Instruct children attending school always to: a. b. c. d. Travel in groups or at least pairs. Use well frequented thoroughfares. Avoid play-areas outside the school. Refuse gifts or approaches from strangers. e. Report attempts of an approach immediately to the nearest responsible adult, and tell you as soon as possible. f. Tell you at all times where and with whom they will be, when away from the house. g. Never discuss what you do and to tell you if they are ever questioned about you by anyone. 18. 19. Also: Encourage your children to report suspicious incidents to you. Young children should be accompanied to and from bus stops, where necessary. a. Do not allow pre-school children to wander from the house or to play in areas where they cannot be supervised. b. Discourage children from answering the door, especially during hours of darkness. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5A-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c. Do not allow younger members of the family to collect or open your mail. d. Young children should be discouraged from answering the telephone, as they may unintentionally give out information detrimental to your safety. e. Employ only mature, responsible baby-sitters in whom you have complete trust. Ensure that they are well acquainted with procedures for opening the door and answering the telephone and make sure that they know where you can be reached, and where to find emergency telephone numbers. f. If a child is attending school, arrange with the school authorities to contact you before releasing the child to the custody of anyone you have not previously nominated. If the school is a day school, arrange for the child to be accompanied on each journey by a responsible adult or by other children. Absence 20. If you leave your residence for a period of days, ensure it is locked and secured. Arrange for visits to be made by the police and neighbours. On return be suspicious. Do not push excessively against a door that normally opens easily. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5A-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX B TO SECTION V TO CHAPTER 7 GUIDANCE ON PERSONAL SECURITY WHEN TRAVELLING 1. The following guidance is intended to offer general advice to personnel when travelling. Personnel should adopt measures as appropriate to their circumstances, the assessed level of terrorist threat and Alert State. 2. Never make a journey or keep an appointment without informing family or colleagues of the following: a. b. c. d. e. Destination. Person to be visited. Method of travel. Expected time of arrival. Expected time of return. 3. Avoid travelling in uniform including to and from work. If the wearing of uniform cannot be avoided, it is recommended that a civilian jacket or coat is worn to cover the uniform when in the vehicle (mixed dress in public is not encouraged). NEVER hitch hike in uniform. 4. Never allow yourself to be driven by anyone who is not known to you other than on accredited public transport. 5. Be alert for anything unusual or out of place at the beginning and the end of the journey. 6. Check the driveway and road before leaving home. 7. Be alert to suspicious or unaccountable conduct by persons in the vicinity of the home or place of work. Be particularly aware of manned vehicles, people tinkering with vehicles and innocent seeming workmen from service industries. 8. Restaurant, hotel and travel reservations should be made without reference to rank, title or, where avoidable the Services. 9. Avoid travelling, working or staying overnight in conditions that involve isolation from persons able to give or summon assistance. Always have to hand or in mind a ready means of communication or of otherwise attracting attention. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 10. By private vehicle. a. Counter measures to the UVIED threat. (1) Know your vehicle thoroughly, when searching for an IED you must know what should be attached, inside or underneath. (2) Keep your vehicle in good condition and regularly serviced. (3) Never leave your vehicle unlocked. Remember to secure all the doors, sunroof, bonnet and boot. Use the alarm or immobiliser if fitted. (4) On returning to your vehicle, do not take it for granted that it is as safe as when you left it. (5) Secure bonnet locks and lockable petrol caps should be fitted and used whenever possible. (6) Never leave your baggage unattended outside the vehicle. (7) Never carry other people's baggage or packages unless you have personally checked the contents. (8) Do not display Service badges or stickers or leave military clothing or equipment visible in your vehicle. Vehicle passes should be concealed from view when outside MOD establishments. (9) Carry a torch with you to check your vehicle after dark. Do not leave the torch in the vehicle. (10) Switch off the courtesy light inside the vehicle to avoid illumination when getting in and out. (11) Always try to park the vehicle in a lockable garage at home and at work. If no garage is available, leave it in a supervised car park or where the general public can see it. b. Searching. Searching should be conducted routinely if your vehicle is used and parked in an area that is associated with the presence of Service personnel. You should exercise your judgement as to whether you should carry out a search of your vehicle if it has been left in other areas. Keep in mind the possibility of a terrorist being able to predict where the vehicle would be parked or being able to identify it as belonging to Service personnel. Remember that the very act of searching could draw attention to you and your vehicle. Care should be taken to ensure that the vehicle is not moved while conducting a vehicle search. Searching should be conducted by: (1) (2) First looking carefully around the outside of the vehicle. Looking at the doors, boot and bonnet for signs of tampering. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures (3) (4) Looking through the windows for any unidentified item. Checking around and behind each wheel and inside the wheel arches. (5) Looking underneath the vehicle, using an angled mirror on a rod designed for the purpose if available, paying particular attention to the area of the drivers seat, the exhaust system, floor pan and behind and around the fuel tank. (6) Unlocking the vehicle and checking the driver's area. Checking inside, including under seats, the glove compartment, under the bonnet and inside the boot area. (7) If any signs of tampering are noted or anything suspicious is found such as unusual objects inside the vehicle or attached and out of place. STOP No attempt should be made to touch, start or move the vehicle. Keep all persons away from the vehicle. The police should be called immediately. c. On the move. (1) Ensure that windows are fully closed when the vehicle is parked and opened only enough for ventilation when you are driving. (2) Look forward along the row of vehicles parked in the street for anything of a suspicious nature and through the driving mirror for following vehicles. (3) (4) front. Avoid narrow and lonely streets, keep to main routes. Conform to traffic flow but keep your distance from the vehicle in (5) Try to avoid becoming hemmed in when held in traffic. At traffic lights leave enough room for manoeuvre. If possible, adjust speed when approaching traffic lights to avoid having to stop. (6) If something suspicious appears to be taking place on the road ahead, stop and turn off before it is too late. (7) If you suspect that you are being followed, try not to allow yourself to be overtaken or forced off the road. Take a known detour, and if still suspicious, stop at the nearest police station or Service establishment. (8) Ensure that you have sufficient fuel to avoid stopping at unknown or isolated filling stations. (9) Do not give lifts or open doors or windows to unknown persons. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5B-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (10) Beware of accident scenes in isolated areas; these may have been staged. 11. Rail, sea, air and other means of travel. a. b. On a train, enter a compartment that is already occupied. Baggage should be kept locked and within view wherever possible. c. If you have had to surrender your baggage, make sure it is correctly identified on its return and that it has not been tampered with before opening it. d. e. f. 12. Hotels. a. visit. If you have to visit an area frequently, avoid using the same hotel on each When travelling by ferry, be alert when walking on the deck at night. At sea, try to obtain your own cabin and ensure that the door is kept locked. Be cautious of sharing a taxi with unknown persons. b. Do not meet visitors in your room who are unknown or not vouched for. Meet them in a public room where others will be present. 13. Use of Service issued baggage. The use of Service issued baggage when travelling could identify the carrier as a Service person. Personnel are therefore advised: a. Not to use items of Service issued baggage for leave and off-duty travel (except the 'civilianized' holdall). b. To be aware of the security risk when travelling on posting or detachment on public transport with items of Service issued baggage. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5B-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO SECTION V TO CHAPTER 7 ADDITIONAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS FOR STAFF CAR DRIVERS 1. The security precautions listed at Annex B are generally applicable to all drivers. The role of staff car drivers and their responsibility for passengers raise additional security considerations. 2. Units should examine the need to brief staff car drivers and potential passengers on the additional points outlined below: a. Picking up and setting down passengers. This is a period of risk where habits may become dangerously routine. Both driver and passenger should agree, where applicable, to: (1) (2) (3) Vary times. Vary points of arrival and departure. Vary general procedures in as many ways as possible. b. Waiting. Staff car drivers may spend significant periods of time waiting. They should be aware that a more effective way of guarding a vehicle is to observe it from a sensible position outside the vehicle rather than by sitting in it. c. Actions on the move. Drivers should be particularly vigilant and adopt the following procedures: (1) Doors should always be locked and windows closed wherever possible. (2) There must always be room to manoeuvre the vehicle. This means not getting boxed in by other vehicles or caught in traffic jams. (3) If it is suspected that the vehicle is being followed, the following vehicle must not be allowed to overtake or to force the staff car off the road. Drivers should attempt to take a known detour. If there is still cause for suspicion, they should drive to and stop at the nearest police station or MOD establishment. d. Action if a staff car is directly threatened. The following action should be taken if there is direct threat: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5-B1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (1) (2) Use horns, lights or any other means to attract attention. Use rapid acceleration or sudden braking to outwit the attacker(s). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5-B1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX C TO SECTION V TO CHAPTER 7 SECURITY AT PLACES OF ENTERTAINMENT 1. In GB, places of entertainment (e.g. public houses, wine bars, restaurants and even theatres) have in the past been attractive targets for terrorist attack. The measures advised below should be adopted in places of entertainment as appropriate. 2. Be alert and vigilant for suspicious persons, packages and vehicles. 3. Avoid talking about matters that identify you as a member of the MOD or Armed Forces. 4. Do not wear uniform, unit ties, blazers with official crests, T-shirts or sweatshirts with MOD logos or any item of clothing that would identify you as a member of the MOD or Armed Forces. 5. At large group gatherings, an individual, who should not drink alcohol, should be appointed to remain on watch both inside and outside the place of entertainment; this is known as SHARKWATCH. 6. 7. Do not make "bookings" using MOD or Service details. Repeated and regular use of the same place of entertainment should be avoided. 8. Do not use Service or MOD transport to travel to and from the venue unless it has been civilianized. 9. Do not place anything in or on your vehicle that would identify you as a member of the MOD. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX D TO SECTION V TO CHAPTER 7 DEALING WITH THE MEDIA 1. Individuals. Publicity is an important means of informing the public and gaining recognition for the MOD and for efforts of individual personnel. However, all personnel should, in their relations with the media, ensure that they do not divulge information that would assist terrorists to target either themselves or other members of the MOD. The following provides some general guidance: a. Individuals are always free to decline to give any information to the press. b. Private addresses should not be disclosed. Home towns may be specified in such articles as "local boy" stories. Journalists should be advised accordingly when conducting interviews. c. Avoid giving ranks and addresses in public notices in the personal and social columns of newspapers. d. Individuals who feel that they are at particular risk by virtue of the branch of the MOD to which they belong, or because of operational duties they have performed, who have agreed to be involved in a story in a MOD magazine or newspaper, should ensure personally that biographical detail is cleared with them before publication. 2. Service authors. Service authors of articles to be published in Service or general magazines and newspapers should be alert to the dangers that could arise from writing stories that include details of Service personnel. For example, articles that connect named personnel with operational incidents should be avoided. 3. Service publications editors. The editors of Service publications should take care to avoid inadvertently providing information that could be useful to terrorists. Guidance on security matters is available to editors of Service publications and establishment magazines from MOD and Command Media Ops and security staffs. 4. MOD associations. All MOD associations and similar organizations should remind members that some of the information contained in their correspondence and magazines might be of use to terrorist organizations. Recipients of such material should be warned that it should, therefore, be treated and disposed of with care. 5. Honours and awards. Staff responsible for gazetting and publicising honours and awards are to ensure that, where necessary, suitable arrangements are made to protect the anonymity of individuals whose background makes them especially vulnerable to terrorist attack. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5D-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 6. Publication of the names of those holding official appointments. The following guidance should be adhered to when considering the release of information of those holding official appointments for inclusion in such publications as commercial directories: a. The names of those at one-star and below are not normally to be released. b. Regardless of rank, the names and telephone numbers of those holding appointments in the following categories are not to be released: (1) (2) (3) c. Intelligence. Security (where "Security" is included in the post title). Counter Terrorism. The provisions of 6.a. above do not apply to: (1) (2) The Defence Corporate Communications organization. The Defence Export Services Organization. 7. Any other organization that feels that it deserves special status should, consult D Def Sy through the chain of command. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5D-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX E TO SECTION V TO CHAPTER 7 SURVIVAL IN HOSTAGE SITUATIONS 1. Good personal counter terrorist security and anonymity as described elsewhere in the Defence Manual of Security (JSP 440) are the most effective counter measures to avoid targeting and therefore becoming a victim in a hostage or kidnapping situation. 2. Very few military personnel have been kidnapped or held hostage in the past. However there has been a general increase in kidnapping world-wide and there is therefore an increased possibility of military personnel being held as human shields during humanitarian or peace keeping operations. 3. The security advice contained in this Annex is based on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Brief Guidance Notes on Personal Protection Measures Overseas. General 4. Nobody can predict when, where or against whom terrorists will strike. Although senior officers may be singled out as an attractive target, because of their high publicity value, all ranks must be aware of the danger. For this reason it is important to retain anonymity within the local community and to keep a low profile, especially when off duty. Service personnel must make every effort to keep up to date, through their designated overseas security authority (this must be decided prior to deployment), with any changes to the threat. This is reflected in the Overseas Terrorist Threat Assessment List (OTTAL), which is disseminated by MOD D Def Sy. However, despite a thorough awareness and appreciation of the terrorist threat, together with the application of preventative measures, kidnapping can still take place, therefore all ranks should be aware of survival techniques if taken hostage. 5. Once captured the hostage is on his or her own, usually in total isolation. Their immediate reaction and subsequent behaviour during captivity can be vital in leading to their eventual release unharmed. The following notes have been prepared from debriefings of hostage victims. Moment of Capture 6. This is generally one of the most critical and dangerous parts of the abduction phase. Any sudden or unexpected movement, noise or cry for help is likely to provoke a violent response from the terrorist, which could prove fatal to the captive. In a hostage situation tension will remain high until the terrorists are sure that they are in control. They will attempt to gain a psychological advantage by putting the captive on the defensive. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5E-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Resist or Submit? 7. Whether to resist or surrender to kidnappers must remain a personal decision. You should weigh carefully the danger of resistance in the face of what may be overwhelming odds. If you decide not to resist, assure the abductors of your intention to co-operate, particularly during the abduction phase. Remember that resistance is extremely risky because the terrorists are already mentally prepared to meet this contingency and are acting under a great deal of tension during the first few moments of the operation. Blindfolds, Gags and Drugs 8. It is important to realize that terrorists want hostages alive. While they may use blindfolds, gags or drugs at the time of the abduction, you should not be over-alarmed, pressured or provoked into resisting. Resistance is likely to result in the terrorists using more extreme measures. Stay Alert 9. Try to occupy your mind by noting sounds, direction of travel, passage of time, conversations of the terrorists and any other information which later could lead to their capture and conviction. Living Conditions 10. The living conditions of hostages vary greatly from incident to incident. In general hostages are detained in cramped conditions and in isolation. There will usually be a complete lack of privacy and conventional toilet facilities may not exist. Maintaining dignity and self-respect under such conditions will be difficult, but such standards are important for survival. Fear 11. Fear is the most important tool of terrorists. They use it to control, intimidate and wear down the hostage, negotiators and anyone sympathetic to the victim's plight. Fear may be further induced by the captors loading and unloading weapons in the presence of the hostage, displaying excesses of temper, resorting to physical abuse and staging mock executions. Fear of dying is very real and it can become overwhelming, particularly during the early stages of captivity. Although death is a possibility remember that, statistically, the odds favour a hostage being released. Time 12. Experience has shown that the more time that has elapsed the better are the chances of the hostage being released or rescued. For this reason, although the passing of time in captivity is depressing, it is to the hostage's advantage. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5E-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Boredom 13. To ward off the effects of boredom and keep up morale, the hostage must discipline himself to take daily physical exercise and engage in creative mental activity such as reading, writing or any other pursuit that exercises the mind. Because of the likely cramped space, physical exercise may be reduced to running on the spot, push ups and sit ups. Isometric exercises may have to be used to overcome cramped space or physical restraints. Illness 14. A side effect of captivity for some hostages is illness caused by inadequate meals or poor diet. Gastro-intestinal upsets or constipation may also be suffered. Though such symptoms may be unpleasant they do not generally threaten life and the hostage should not hesitate to complain to the terrorists, who normally want to keep their hostage alive and at least reasonably well. Rapport 15. It is important for the hostage to establish an early rapport with the captors. Studies have shown that the more human their victims appear, the more difficulty the captors will have in carrying out threats of violence against them. The display of family photographs or discussions about children and family matters have, occasionally, been instrumental in saving the lives of hostages. Of course, you must avoid giving the terrorists any information, which they could use later to their advantage. This is a matter of fine judgement, particularly for female hostages, and care should be taken not to give the terrorists the wrong impression by becoming too familiar. Rescue or Release 16. Most hostages who die are killed during rescue attempts. So it is crucial for hostages to be particularly alert, cautious and obedient if they suspect that such an attempt is close at hand. The terrorists may be extremely nervous during any negotiations, especially if the process is long and drawn out. As the central figure in any rescue attempt, the hostage must avoid all sudden moves, which would invite reaction from the rescue force as well as from the terrorists. The natural impulse to stand up and run must be resisted as it could easily be thought to be the action of one of the terrorists by the rescue force. The hostage's safest course is to drop immediately to the floor and lie as flat as possible. Carry out any request by the rescue force and remember that the rescuers may not know you initially and they are trained to treat everyone as a suspect until positively identified. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5E-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-5E-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures SECTION VI TO CHAPTER 7 LEAVE AND TEMPORARY DUTY VISITS TO NORTHERN IRELAND (NI) AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND (ROI) General 07601. In order to protect Service personnel and to prevent the Security Forces becoming involved in avoidable additional effort and danger, restrictions exist on the taking of leave in Northern Ireland (NI) and the Republic of Ireland (ROI). Service personnel should be well aware of the inherent risks involved and that while the security situation in NI remains unsettled they would not wish to visit either country without good reason. Restrictions on personnel taking leave and visiting on temporary duty have therefore been introduced and it is essential that the rules and guidance laid down in this Section are observed. By doing so unnecessary administrative effort and disappointment to individuals will be avoided. It is the responsibility of the HOE to ensure that only eligible personnel are granted permission to visit NI or the ROI whether on or off duty. Leave in NI 07602. Regardless of any change in conditions of eligibility, notification or reporting, the following is to be observed by all Service personnel taking leave in NI. a. When on leave civilian clothes are to be worn at all times. Service personnel wishing to wear uniform in NI for a specific occasion, e.g. a wedding, are also to seek permission from the senior officer of the relevant Service in NI, when notifying leave details to the relevant Brigade HQ. Civilian clothes are to be worn when travelling to and from NI. b. Service style or issued clothing and equipment, e.g. Service issue raincoats, overcoats, holdalls, Service ties, blazers or badges, are not to be worn or carried. Baggage labels showing Service particulars and badges and stickers on vehicles showing military connections must be removed. c. Privately owned vehicles with registration plates (e.g. NATO registration) that could identify the occupants as being connected with the Service are not to be taken to NI. d. Regulations for firearms, including air and gas weapons, are published periodically in DCIs/GAIs. HOE are to ensure that these regulations are brought to the attention of personnel intending to travel to NI. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security e. Personnel should not indicate that they work for the Services or talk about their job or place of work. Leave Travel to NI - General 07603. This section provides the framework of rules that apply to all or part of NI according to the assessed security situation at the time. Where the application of the rules vary or change for a specific reason this will be updated by signal from HQNI through MOD D Def Sy and PSyAs and Command security staff will be notified accordingly. Authority for Leave Visits 07604. Authority for Service personnel to take leave in NI rests with the Brigade HQ of the area to be visited. Notification for all such leave visits is mandatory and is to be submitted in accordance with the following paragraphs. The rules apply to all Service personnel, except those stationed in NI, who are subject to special additional regulations. There will occasionally be periods of time when leave will not be allowed; in such instances the Brigade HQ will advise establishments accordingly when the leave is requested. MOD civilian staff are not subject to these notification rules. Eligibility for Leave Visits 07605. There are three states that affect the eligibility of Service personnel wishing to take leave in NI and these will vary in accordance with the current security situation. The states affecting eligibility are: a. Condition Normal. No restrictions on visits. b. Condition Restricted. Service personnel may only take leave in NI if the individual concerned can fulfil at least one of the following criteria: (1) (2) Was domiciled in NI up to the time of joining the Service. Is married and the spouse would normally be domiciled in NI. (3) Has a parent or first relative, i.e. brother, sister or child, domiciled in NI. (4) Has urgent private affairs in NI that cannot be postponed and the requirements cannot be met by a meeting outside NI or by correspondence. Any cases of doubt are to be referred to security staff. (5) Has been sponsored by an individual currently on the posted strength of a NI unit. (The leave notification signal is to include the rank, name and unit of the sponsor and Service accommodation address, only a mess or Service families accommodation address is acceptable). c. Condition Nil. No leave visits. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures 07606. The prevalent state existing throughout NI under the current assessed security situation is Condition Restricted. 07607. As the security situation in NI changes it is sometimes necessary to place areas out of bounds at short notice to all Service personnel, therefore, permission to take leave may be withheld despite correct notification of the intended leave period and the eligibility of the individual concerned. Establishments will be advised accordingly. Application for Leave Visits 07608. All Service personnel wishing to take leave in NI are to make an initial formal application through their HOE. MOD civilian staff should inform their HOE and obtain a copy of the security briefing at Annex A. HOE are to ensure that Service personnel are eligible to take leave and meet the criteria detailed in paragraph 07605. Leave details are then to be forwarded to the relevant Service authorities in NI using the signal format shown at Annex B. A map showing NI Brigade areas is at Annex C. No signal is required for MOD civilian staff. 07609. HOE are responsible for ensuring that the notification by signal provides at least 21 clear days notice before the intended leave visit. Signals should be sent ROUTINE, except in compassionate circumstances, when an IMMEDIATE signal is to be sent in addition to the further actions required as detailed at paragraph 07613. Confirmation of receipt must be obtained for all applications. Included in the confirmation will be whether authority is granted or not and whether any specific instructions will apply. 07610. The purpose of the leave notification system is: a. To give the relevant Brigade HQ the opportunity to assess the risk to the individual and advise the HOE that a visit may warrant postponement or cancellation. b. To ensure that Service personnel arriving on leave receive an up to date briefing about the security situation in the area(s) to be visited. This will reduce the chances of unnecessary exposure to dangers through ignorance. c. To provide units in NI with information on the presence of Service personnel, or families, within their area of responsibility. This will allow them to take any appropriate action should the security situation suddenly change. Leave Addresses 07611. Because of the rapidly changing security situation, Service personnel will only be granted permission to stay at, or visit, private addresses that have been specified for clearance at the time of the signalled application. Any intention to attend wedding services and receptions or christenings etc, must be notified at the time of the original submission and should include additional addresses and intended dates of visits. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Compassionate Leave Travel 07612. When it is necessary to travel to NI on compassionate leave the establishment authorizing the travel is to inform the Brigade HQ in whose TAOR the leave destination is situated. Initial contact is to be made by telephone. However, since telephones lines to NI are insecure, only outline references to the case, i.e. the applicant's name and rough details of the area to be visited are to be given. This is to be followed by an IMMEDIATE signal as outlined in Annex B. 24 Hour Contact Telephone Numbers HQ HQNI HQ 3 Inf Bde Telephone Numbers Lisburn Mil 42274 Civil 02892 609274 Brent 20247 Portadown Mil 47590 Civil 02838 360590 Brent 23814 Londonderry Mil 34509 Civil 02871 340509 Brent 27068 Londonderry Mil 34208 Civil 02871 340208 Brent 27000 Lisburn Mil 41159 Civil 02892 608159 Brent 20072 Lisburn Mil 41012 Civil 02892 608012 Brent 21017 Aldergrove Mil 31340 Civil 02894 421340 Brent 26077 Aldergrove Mil 31382 Civil 02894 421382 Brent 26074 Notes Watchkeeper Watchkeeper G2 Branch Registry (24 hours, try first) Watchkeeper (use if G2 Registry not available) G2 Branch (normal working hours) Watchkeeper (use in silent hours) Security Advice Centre (0700-2359 hours) Hotel VCP (0001-0659 hours) HQ 8 Inf Bde HQ 39 Inf Bde RAF Aldergrove Security Briefings 07613. HOE are to ensure that all personnel proceeding on leave to NI receive a personal security briefing using the information at Annex A. Personnel are to be instructed that if they are in any doubt about participation in any activity, out of bounds areas or visits to places of entertainment they are to enquire at the relevant Brigade HQ in whose area they are staying or at the nearest military unit. 07614. In addition to receiving a briefing prior to their departure on leave, all Service personnel will be required to report in person for an additional security briefing, at either the Security Advice Centre (SAC) RAF Aldergrove for RAF personnel, or the R IRISH Battalion TAOR HQ of the area concerned, immediately upon arrival in the Province. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Personnel will be advised of the exact reporting requirement, by signal, to their parent establishment prior to the move. On conclusion of the leave period Service personnel will be required to book out by telephone with the SAC or TAOR HQ. Failure to attend the security briefing may place the individual at increased risk and disciplinary action may be taken against Service personnel who fail to comply. Failure to Report back from Leave 07615. Should personnel fail to report back from leave, the following are to be informed immediately. a. Naval and Army personnel. The Brigade HQ in whose TAOR the leave has been taken is to be informed by telephone. b. RAF personnel. The SAC RAF ALDERGROVE is to be informed by telephone (RAF Aldergrove Mil 31340, Civil 02894 421340, Brent 26077). c. MOD civilian personnel. The Brigade HQ in whose TAOR the leave has been taken is to be informed by telephone. 07616. All relevant details are then to be sent by IMMEDIATE signal. Frequent Visitor Status 07617. Brigade HQ staff in NI are authorized to grant the privilege of frequent visitor status to individuals. This privilege permits travel to an agreed leave address without clearance. Notification only is required by signal prior to each journey. Frequent visitor status will only be granted to individuals with a sound security profile. The qualifying criteria includes: a. b. The applicant will travel frequently. The destination is an agreed, cleared address in an assessed safe area. c. The applicant has no history of threats, OOB violations or personal security compromises. 07618. Service personnel granted frequent visitor status will be required to attend an initial security brief with subsequent update briefs at regular intervals. The intervals between update briefs will be at the discretion of the relevant Brigade HQ G2 staff. 07619. A deterioration in the security situation or of specific threats may result in the withdrawal of status at short notice. Any abuse of the privilege will also result in the immediate withdrawal of status. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Travel to and from NI 07620. Service personnel travelling to NI may travel by air to either Belfast International Airport (Aldergrove) or Belfast City Airport (Harbour). Travel by sea must be through the following routes: a. Norse Irish Ferries (Liverpool - Belfast). (1) New arrivals. All Service personnel posted to NI are permitted to use this route but must be met at the Port of Entry (POE) by a unit representative. (2) Foot passengers. Service personnel and their families are permitted to use this service and may be collected by either unit or private family transport. Under no circumstances is public transport to be used. (3) Green vehicle moves. Authorization to use this route should be sought from HQNI. b. Stena Sealink (Stranraer - Belfast). (1) New arrivals. All Service personnel posted to NI are permitted to use this route but must be met at the POE by a unit representative. (2) Foot passengers. Service personnel and their families are permitted to use this service and may be collected by either unit or private family transport. Under no circumstances is public transport to be used. (3) Green vehicle moves. Authorization to use this route should be sought from HQNI. c. P & O Ferries (Cairnryan - Larne). (1) New arrivals. Service personnel posted to NI are permitted to use this route. It is strongly recommended that a unit representative is present at the POE. Where this is not possible the new arrivals are to be fully briefed, prior to arrival, of their onward journey by the receiving unit. (2) Foot passengers. Service personnel and their families are permitted to use this service and may be collected by either unit or private family transport. Under no circumstances is public transport to be used. (3) Green vehicle moves. Green vehicle moves are permitted on this service. Other routes are not to be used. 07621. Personnel travelling to NI on duty visits are normally to travel by air to Belfast International Airport (Aldergrove) or Belfast City Airport (Harbour). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Note: All transport arrangements to and from airports are to be co-ordinated through the duty visit sponsor. Under no circumstances are personnel to travel in taxis or on other public transport. Marriage within NI 07622. Service personnel wishing to marry in NI and who fulfil the conditions detailed in paragraph 07605 should make a formal application to their HOE. Details are then to be sent by CONFIDENTIAL letter to HQNI (SO3 G2(CI)), the Brigade HQ (SO3 G2) of the area in which the marriage and reception is due to take place. RN and RAF (SAC RAF ALDERGROVE) single-Service security staffs with security responsibilities for their personnel in NI should also be included on the distribution. The letter is to be dispatched to arrive at least 30 days in advance of the impending marriage containing the detail required at Annex D. 07623. Personnel who wish to wear uniform during the marriage ceremony may only do so with the prior specific authority of HQNI. Temporary Duty Visits to NI - General 07624. It is essential that temporary duty visits to NI including participation in Public Military Events (PME) are carefully controlled to ensure that security safeguards and requirements are met. Personnel who have a valid reason to visit NI on official duty are to signal their intentions in accordance with Annex E. PME notification should be made to the Bde HQ (copy to HQNI) in whose TAOR the event is taking place using the proforma at Appendix 3 to Annex I to Section IV of this Chapter. Duty Visits to Service Establishments and Defence Contractors 07625. As much notification as possible should be given, however, where less than 48 hours remains before the intended visit, signals are to be given a PRIORITY precedence. Operationally urgent, or short notice visits should be notified to HQNI (Attn SO3 GS Visits) by telephone (Lisburn Mil 44206; Civil 02892 625206; Brent Lisburn Mil 21401) followed by a confirmatory signal. 07626. Visits to defence contractors should not be made unless the matter cannot be dealt with by correspondence or by a reference to a departmental head in NI. In all cases the length and frequency of any visit is to be kept to an absolute minimum. 07627. Service visitors requiring to remain in NI overnight will be usually be required to stay in Service accommodation within secure perimeters. Exceptionally, and only with prior approval of HQNI, will Service personnel be allowed to stay in suitable hotel accommodation arranged by the host firm; however, for obvious reasons, this should be avoided if at all possible. 07628. Notification of any duty visit is to arrive in the signal format at Annex E at least 14 days in advance of the intended visit. Prior to embarking on the visit, visitors are advised to contact either HQNI or the relevant Brigade HQ G2 staff for advice on the security situation at the time. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Duty Visits to Civilian Addresses 07629. Notification of duty visits by Service personnel to civilian addresses or accommodation, for example to undertake a resettlement course etc, are to be forwarded to the relevant Brigade HQ arrive at least 14 days before the planned visit. Duty Visits by Sports Teams 07630. Visits to NI by sports teams will be permitted under Condition Restricted subject to the following: a. b. The security situation at the time of the proposed visit. Availability of accommodation at a Service establishment. c. Visiting teams will be restricted to the confines of Security Force bases throughout their stay. d. Teams will not be allowed to bring supporters. e. Financial approval for travel; although every effort is to be made to use Service aircraft. f. Details of the visit are to be signalled at least 14 days in advance of the intended visit using the format at Annex E. Carriage of Protectively Marked Documents 07631. Any protectively marked documents that are essential for meetings or briefings etc, are to be sent in advance by the Defence Courier Service (DCS). Green Vehicle Movements to NI 07632. Standard military vehicles (Green Vehicles) bearing military registration numbers, logos or colour schemes, are subject to special restrictions. Notification of such movements are to follow the format detailed at Annex E, however, signals are to be protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL. Routes should be cleared with HQNI before being included in movement plans. 07633. The accompanying party is to comprise a minimum of two Service personnel who are to wear civilian clothes. Vehicles are to be secured whilst on the car deck of the ferry and are to be thoroughly checked prior to disembarkation. 07634. Escorts will be provided from the ferry port to the ultimate destination in NI. This requirement is to be indicated on the notification signal at Annex E. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Personal Security Briefing 07635. HOE are to ensure that all personnel proceeding to NI on temporary duty receive a personal security briefing using the information at Annex A. Personnel are to be instructed that if they are in any doubt about participation in any activity, require information about out of bounds areas or in bounds entertainment establishments they are to enquire at the relevant Brigade HQ in whose area they are staying or their host military unit. Leave Travel to the ROI 07636. This section provides the framework of rules and guidance that may apply to all, or part, of the ROI according to the security situation and assessed threat. This policy will be kept under review by MOD D Def Sy taking account of advice from the Defence Attaché (British Military Representative Dublin (BRITMILREP Dublin)). These rules apply only to Service personnel including those stationed in NI who are subject to special additional procedures for leave and travel in the ROI issued by HQNI. Application for Leave in the ROI 07637. All Service personnel who wish to take leave in the ROI are to make a formal application to their HOE who is authorized to grant such leave in accordance with the criteria and constraints contained in paragraph 07638 and subject to the following: a. Prior consultation with the BRITMILREP Dublin in cases of doubt. b. Prior notification, giving appropriate notice, to the BRITMILREP Dublin. 07638. There are three 'states' affecting the eligibility for leave that apply to all, or part, of the ROI and will vary according to the security situation in NI and the assessed threat. These 'states' apply to presence in the ROI and should not be confused with conditions laid down under normal single-Service regulations, for the entitlement to travel at public expense. a. Condition Normal. No restrictions on leave. b. Condition Restricted. This implies that there is some risk involved and that details of all visits will be notified to the Garda Siochana (Police) by the BRITMILREP Dublin. HOE permission should only be given to an individual who has a genuine need to visit the ROI, who has a specific approved address to go to, and who fulfils at least one of the following criteria: (1) Was domiciled in the ROI up to the time of joining the Armed Forces. (2) Is married and the spouse would normally be domiciled in the ROI. (3) Has a parent or a first relative, i.e. brother, sister or child domiciled in the ROI. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (4) Has urgent affairs to settle in the ROI that cannot be postponed and which cannot be met by a meeting outside the ROI or by correspondence. As a guide to the application of this condition by HOE, personnel attending as participants at legal proceedings would be eligible as would a groom or bride (but not their guests) if there is a good reason why the marriage cannot take place elsewhere. Where personnel wish to visit fiancées or partners, the HOE is to be satisfied of the substantive nature of the relationship and the necessity for the visit. Holidays, recreational activities or sport do not qualify for leave under this state. Any cases of doubt are to be referred to the BRITMILREP Dublin. (5) Is required to travel to the ROI on authorized compassionate leave. (6) Is serving on a resident tour in NI and is subject to the detailed procedures and controls laid down by HQNI. (7) Is making a day visit to Dublin under specific arrangements approved by BRITMILREP Dublin and D Def Sy. c. Condition Nil. No leave visits will be allowed. At the time of publication Condition Restricted applies for leave to all areas of the ROI. Notification 07639. The BRITMILREP Dublin is to be notified by signal when Service personnel are granted leave to the ROI by the HOE. HOE are responsible for ensuring that the notification arrives 21 days before the intended visit, except in compassionate circumstances or, exceptionally, when leave is granted at short notice. The BRITMILREP Dublin will advise if there are any reasons why the leave should not take place, all applications will be acknowledged. The signal should be addressed to BRITMILREP Dublin using the format at Annex F. Accomodation 07640. Holiday cottages, touring holidays, camping sites and caravan parks will not be approved for leave visits under Condition Restricted. The BRITMILREP Dublin maintains a list of approved hotels for the Dublin area which can be consulted. Hotels North of the River Liffey in central Dublin will not normally be cleared for use. Applicants are warned that they should seek advice from the BRITMILREP Dublin before booking accommodation and making a financial commitment. Notification 07641. All notifications are to be protectively marked RESTRICTED unless there is reason to afford a higher protective marking. Notification for visits to the border counties of Donegal, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan and Cavan should also be copied to HQNI BFPO 825, Signal address: NORIRELAND and for information to single-Service security staff with responsibility for personnel in NI. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Briefings 07642. Before Service personnel go on leave to the ROI, the HOE is to ensure that they are briefed by a member of the establishment security organization using the information contained in Annex G. 07643. Events may occur during a visit that would make consultation with the BRITMILREP Dublin necessary e.g. where an individual has been granted compassionate leave to visit a sick relative who subsequently dies and the need to attend the funeral arises or when an individual is sick at home and liable to remain in the ROI following leave expiry date. Individuals are to be briefed to consult the BRITMILREP Dublin should such a change of circumstances occur. Service personnel are therefore to be in possession of the BRITMILREP Dublin telephone number when proceeding to the ROI. Family Visits 07644. Service personnel are encouraged to adopt the foregoing procedures when members of their families are planning to visit the ROI unaccompanied by them. Recall Procedure 07645. The notification procedures above will ensure that the BRITMILREP Dublin is in a better position to provide assistance in the event MOD decide to order the recall of all Service personnel on leave in the ROI. In the event of recall, those responsible are to ensure that OHMS envelopes or similarly indicative communications or telephone calls are not sent or made to individuals on leave in the ROI. Failure to Report back from Leave 07646. Should personnel fail to report back to their establishment after leave in the ROI the BRITMILREP Dublin is to be informed immediately by signal. Travel to the ROI 07647. Service personnel and their families entitled to travel at public expense are, as a security precaution, to be given the option to pay the full cost of the journey to and from their establishment in the UK and their leave address in the ROI and reclaim the full cost of the fare in lieu of the exchange of warrants covering the UK rail journey, sea crossing and any rail movement within the ROI. Leave travel to the ROI through NI will only be granted in exceptional circumstances and requires the specific authority of HQNI. Temporary Duty Visits to the ROI 07648. Regardless of the leave condition in force, all visits to the ROI by Service personnel on temporary duty require specific prior authorization by the BRITMILREP Dublin. Applications for temporary duty visits should be made giving full details of the proposed activity by letter or by signal using the format at Annex H. Visits by Service aircraft are normally covered using the Diplomatic Clearance (Dipclear) process and the JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security security brief at Annex I applies. Activities that fall under the category of temporary duty visits include: a. Visits by HM Ships. Arranged through CINCFLEET (Fleet Programmer), MOD (Naval Staff Directorate) and BRITMILREP Dublin who promulgates General Instructions for visits by HM Ships. Security advice for HM Ships visiting the ROI is issued by FOSF prior to each visit. b. c. Visits to Irish Defence Force units. Visits to Defence Contractors. d. Resettlement courses. Full notification is needed to ensure that the accommodation (often needed for up to 4 weeks or more) is properly booked and cleared. e. Representational sport. (1) Under Condition Restricted individuals wishing to play as a member of a civilian team should always seek guidance from the BRITMILREP Dublin before declaring their availability to the team manager. (2) Applications for participation by Service teams should always seek preliminary guidance from the BRITMILREP Dublin before declaring availability. f. Adventurous training in the ROI is not usually permitted. Specific proposals should be discussed with the BRITMILREP Dublin before making any financial commitments. g. Public Military Events (PME). Invitations to Service organizations, including bands and display teams will normally be channelled initially through the BRITMILREP Dublin. Agreement to participate should not be given to sponsors until authorization has been obtained. PME notification should be made to the BRITMILREP Dublin using the proforma at Appendix 3 to Annex I to Section IV of this Chapter. Accommodation 07649. BRITMILREP Dublin holds a list of approved hotels for the Dublin area. Bookings should not be made through the Central Hotel Booking Service and care should be taken to avoid compromising MOD or Service connections when making reservations. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6-12 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures Personal Security Briefing 07650. A personal security brief using the information at Annex I is to be provided to all Service personnel prior to travelling to the ROI on temporary duty. MOD civilian staff should obtain a copy of the security briefing at Annex I. Establishment Standing and Routine Orders 07651. Personnel intending to visit NI or the ROI are to be periodically warned, using Standing and Routine Orders, of the requirement of this Section. A suggested entry is as follows: a. All Service personnel and MOD civilian staff, intending to visit NI or the ROI either on leave or temporary duty, are to read and comply with the contents of Section VI to Chapter 7 of JSP 440. b. Application details and specific advice can be obtained through the ESyOs and leave administration staff. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6-13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED 7-6-14 6 RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX A TO SECTION VI TO CHAPTER 7 BRIEF PRIOR TO VISITING NORTHERN IRELAND (NI) ON LEAVE OR DUTY 1. NI. This brief is to be provided to all personnel prior to travelling on leave or duty to 2. When on leave in NI civilian clothes are to be worn at all times. Civilian clothes are also to be worn when travelling to NI, personnel serving on temporary duty are to wear civilian clothes when off duty and outside the boundaries of their establishment. 3. Military style or issued clothing and equipment (e.g. raincoats, overcoats, holdalls, Service ties, blazers and badges are not to be worn or carried. Baggage labels showing Service particulars are to be removed. 4. Privately owned vehicles with registrations (e.g. NATO) that could identify the occupants as being connected with the Services are not to be taken to NI. Badges and stickers showing Service connections are to be removed. 5. Firearms regulations, including air and gas weapons, are different in NI, further advice can be obtained from: Royal Ulster Constabulary, Explosives and Firearms Licensing Department, RUC Lisnasharragh, Montgomery Road, Belfast, BT6 9JD. 6. Personnel are to exercise discretion at all times, maintaining anonymity about any MOD or Service connections. 7. Disturbances and politically motivated events are to be avoided at all times. If personnel are in doubt about participation in any public activity, they must contact the Brigade HQ in whose area they are staying or at the nearest military unit. 8. Personnel are forbidden to take part in any public activity that may aggravate the security situation by provoking violence or increasing tension in the local community. 9. Service personnel are not to use public transport, including taxis from airports or ferry ports. Unless travelling in their own vehicle they should ensure that they are met at either the ferry port or airport. 10. Personnel should ensure that they have contact numbers for the unit or relatives they are visiting, as well as loose change or phone cards to make telephone calls. 11. All orders received from the Security Forces (whether police or military) are to be complied with regarding movement or behaviour while in NI. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 12. Service personnel will be given a security briefing on arrival in NI and should be aware that failure to follow the briefing provided is likely to result in disciplinary action. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX B TO SECTION VI TO CHAPTER 7 NORTHERN IRELAND LEAVE - SIGNAL FORMAT To: 3 INF BDE PORTADOWN 8 INF BDE LONDONDERRY 39 INF BDE LISBURN Protective Marking: SIC: NORIRELAND LEAVE A. B. C. Service number, rank, name, initials. Ethnic appearance (Note 3). Any significant distinguishing features or marks. RESTRICTED (Note 2) WAI } }(Note 1) } D. Establishment or unit including the full civilian and military contact telephone numbers and extensions of relevant leave administration staffs. E. F. G. Leave address in NI and telephone number if available. Name, relationship of the householder in E above to the applicant. Leave dates (inclusive of arrival and departure dates). H. Route with method of travel, to include flight or ferry timings (when known) otherwise approximate timings are to be given. I. J. Dates and location of previous tours in NI (if applicable). Dates and location of previous leave visit to NI (if applicable). K. Any other relevant information that may assist the relevant Brigade HQ in assessing eligibility for leave. NOTES: Note 1: The Brigade HQ in whose Tactical Area of Operations (TAOR) the leave destination is situated. Note 2: The signal is to be protectively marked RESTRICTED, unless the text requires a higher protective marking. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Note 3. Ethnic Appearance Identity Code (IC) 1 White European; 2 Dark European; 3 Afro Caribbean; 4 Asian; 5 Oriental; 6 Arab; 0 Unknown. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security ANNEX C TO SECTION VI TO CHAPTER 7 MAP OF NI BRIGADE AREAS JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX D TO SECTION VI TO CHAPTER 7 DETAILS REQUIRED FOR IMPENDING MARRIAGE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (NI) 1. The details listed below are to be sent by CONFIDENTIAL letter to the Bde HQ in whose TAOR the wedding and reception is taking place at least 30 days in advance of the impending marriage: a. Service number, rank, name, initials, ethnic appearance1 and any significant distinguishing marks or features. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. m. Names of immediate family accompanying on visit. Unit. Leave address in NI, with telephone number. Name and relationship of occupant at leave address. Dates and location of previous leave visits to NI (if applicable). Name of intended spouse. Duration of visit. Date of wedding. Location of wedding. Location of reception. Complete list of names and addresses of guests. Travel arrangements. 1 Ethnic Appearance Identity Code (IC) 1 White European; 2 Dark European; 3 Afro Caribbean; 4 Asian; 5 Oriental; 6 Arab; 0 Unknown. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6D-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security n. Names of local businesses involved, e.g. vehicle hire firm, photographer, caterers, musicians etc. o. Dates and location of previous tours of duty in NI (if applicable). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6D-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX E TO SECTION VI TO CHAPTER 7 NORTHERN IRELAND DUTY VISIT BY SERVICE PERSONNEL - SIGNAL FORMAT To: NORIRELAND RAF ALDERGROVE (See Note 1) 3 INF BDE PORTADOWN 8 INF BDE LONDONDERRY 39 INF BDE LISBURN NORIRELAND (See Note 1) HQ P&SS HENLOW (See Note 3) SNONI (See Note 4) RESTRICTED (See Note 5) WAX/YAA } } (See Note 2) } Info: Protective Marking: SIC: DUTY VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND. HQNI FOR SO3 G3 (VISITS). BDE HQ FOR SO3 G2. A. B. Service number, rank, name and appointment. Parent establishment or unit. C. Service unit or name and address of civilian firm to be visited in NI. A contact telephone number and name must also be provided. D. Dates of visit and stay in NI, including arrival and departure dates and travel details. E. F. Details of arranged accommodation. Purpose of visit and any other relevant information. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6E-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security NOTES: 1. For RAF visitors only, if the visitor is of Wg Cdr rank or below and does not intend visiting any other unit or formation other than RAF Aldergrove; then SRAFONI (Sy Servs) will authorize the visit. In this instance RAF ALDERGROVE is to be an action addressee and NORIRELAND an info addressee; the text of the signal is to include "RAF ALDERGROVE FOR SY SERVS". 2. Brigade HQ addressees will be dependent on unit or area to be visited. See Annex C. 3. 4. For RAF visitors only. Insert in text: HQ P&SS FOR OC CSC. For RN visitors only. 5. The signal is to be protectively marked RESTRICTED, unless the text requires a higher protective marking. For visits by Captains RN/Colonels/Group Captains, 1 or 2 star officers the signal is to be CONFIDENTIAL; for 3 star officers and above the signal is to be SECRET. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6E-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX F TO SECTION VI TO CHAPTER 7 REPUBLIC OF IRELAND LEAVE - SIGNAL FORMAT To: Info: Protective Marking: SIC: BRITMILREP DUBLIN NORIRELAND (See Note 1) RESTRICTED (See Note 2) WAI REPUBLIC OF IRELAND LEAVE A. B. C. Service number, rank, name and initials. Ethnic appearance. (See Note 3) Any significant distinguishing features or marks. D. Establishment or unit to include full civilian and military contact telephone numbers and extensions of relevant leave administration staff. E. Leave address in ROI and contact telephone number within reach of this address. (See Note 4) F. G. Name and relationship of the householder in E above to the applicant. Leave dates (inclusive of arrival and departure dates). H. Route with method of travel to include flight or ferry timings. When travel is by vehicle the registration number and colour make and type detail is to be provided. I. Details (including date, time and place) of any public or semi-public functions (e.g. wedding or funeral including church and reception) to be attended should be given. J. Any other relevant information. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6F-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security NOTES: 1. Only required if visit includes an address in the border counties of Donegal, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan or Cavan. 2. The signal is to be protectively marked RESTRICTED, unless the text requires a higher protective marking. 3. Ethnic Appearance Identity Code (IC) 1 White European; 2 Dark European; 3 Afro Caribbean; 4 Asian; 5 Oriental; 6 Arab; 0 Unknown. 4. See paragraph 07640 of Section VI for restrictions on types of accommodation. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6F-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX G TO SECTION VI TO CHAPTER 7 BRIEF PRIOR TO VISITING THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND ON LEAVE Introduction 1. All visits to the Republic of Ireland (ROI) by Service personnel on leave require specific prior notification to the Defence Attaché (British Military Representative Dublin (BRITMILREP Dublin)). Notification should be made by signal using the format at Annex F. The following brief is to be provided to all personnel prior to travelling on leave to the ROI. The Threat 2. Republican influence affects the manner in which Service personnel are perceived in the ROI and may place them at risk if identified. While the security situation in NI remains unsettled, republican terrorist groups retain the capability to target Service personnel on leave or temporary duty in the ROI. Republican influence in the ROI remains significant and some elements of the general public sympathize with republicans in the North and have provided support. Although it is assessed that an attack within the ROI is unlikely, awareness of the presence of identified Service personnel increases the risk. It is more likely that republican terrorist groups would attempt to gain targeting intelligence in order to mount an attack elsewhere. Close Quarter Assassination (CQA) is assessed to be the most likely form of attack if an appropriate target is presented. Additionally, dissident loyalist terrorist groups have threatened attacks against targets in the ROI, in which visitors might inadvertently become involved. Personal Security Counter Measures 3. Civilian clothes are to be worn when travelling to and from the ROI and Service uniform may not be worn or carried. Military style or issue clothing and items of equipment (e.g. holdalls, Service ties, blazers and badges) are not to be worn, openly displayed or carried when travelling to or in the ROI. Labels and markings that show Service connections are to be removed from baggage. Defence ID cards should not be taken to the ROI but a passport or driving licence may be used for routine identification purposes. 4. Privately owned vehicles with registration plates (e.g. NATO) which identify Service connections are not to be taken to the ROI. Badges and stickers that show Service connections are to be removed. Service personnel are to ensure that they are either met at the airport or ferry port or are fully briefed on their onward route. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6G-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Personnel should ensure that they have contact numbers for the relatives they are visiting, as well as loose change or phone cards to make telephone calls. 5. Service personnel should exercise common sense and discretion at all times with the aim of maintaining a low profile and protecting their personal anonymity while in the ROI. Service personnel should be prepared to provide a residential (non-military) address that, if necessary, also matches their credit card address. Disturbances or politically motivated events are to be avoided. Identity as a member of the Armed Forces, is not to be routinely disclosed except to the Irish Defence Forces or the Defence Attaché (British Military Representative Dublin (BRITMILREP Dublin)) or Garda Siochana (Police) in cases of emergency or difficulty. All orders and instructions received from the Garda, Irish Defence Forces or BRITMILREP Dublin are to be complied with regarding movement or behaviour while in the ROI. 6. If, exceptionally, Service personnel on leave in the ROI have a valid reason to travel to NI, specific permission is to be obtained from the BRITMILREP Dublin and HQNI. 7. Any suspicious incidents or approaches are to be reported to the BRITMILREP Dublin and the ESyO on return. Useful Telephone Numbers: International Dialling Code for the Republic of Ireland - 00 353 Dialling Code for Dublin ­ 01 (00 353 1) British Embassy ­ 00 353 1205 (within the ROI 01205) 3700 ­ Switchboard* 3792 ­ Assistant Defence Attaché 3793 ­ Leave Enquiries (part-time only) 3878 ­ Fax (Insecure) Garda Siochana (Police) Ambulance 999 or 112 999 or 112 Note* Outside working hours the Embassy Switchboard will connect to the duty officer who should only be connected in an emergency. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6G-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX H TO SECTION VI TO CHAPTER 7 REPUBLIC OF IRELAND TEMPORARY DUTY VISIT BY SERVICE PERSONNEL - SIGNAL FORMAT To: Info: BRITMILREP DUBLIN NORIRELAND (See Note 1) HQ P&SS HENLOW (See Note 2) Protective Marking: SIC: RESTRICTED (See Note 3) WAX/YAA DUTY VISIT TO REPUBLIC OF IRELAND A. Service number, rank, name and appointment. B. Parent Establishment or unit. to include full civilian and military contact telephone numbers and extensions of relevant administration staff. C. Purpose of visit. D. Irish Defence Force unit or name and address of civilian firm or organization to be visited. A contact number and name of sponsor must also be provided. E. Dates of visit and stay in ROI, including arrival and departure dates and travel details. (See Note 4). F. G. NOTES: 1. 2. 3. Only required if visit includes an address in the border counties of Donegal, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan or Cavan. For RAF visitors only. Insert in text: HQ P&SS FOR OC CSC. The signal is to be protectively marked RESTRICTED, unless the text requires a higher protective marking. Details of arranged accommodation. (See Note 5). Requirement for wearing uniform and any other relevant information. 4. Military vehicles, including civilianized military vehicles and RN/RAF/AAC support vehicles, may not be brought to the ROI without special high level approval from the ROI government. 5. See paragraph 07649 of Section VI, BRITMILREP Dublin will provide details of approved hotels in the Dublin area. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6H-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6H-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures ANNEX I TO SECTION VI TO CHAPTER 7 BRIEF PRIOR TO VISITING THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND ON TEMPORARY DUTY Introduction 1. All visits to the Republic of Ireland (ROI) by Service personnel on temporary duty require specific prior authorization by the Defence Attaché (British Military Representative Dublin (BRITMILREP Dublin)). Applications should be made by letter giving full details or by signal using the format at Annex H. The following brief is to be provided to all Service personnel prior to travelling to the ROI. The Threat 2. Republican influence affects the manner in which Service personnel are perceived in the ROI and may place them at risk if identified. While the security situation in NI remains unsettled, republican terrorist groups retain the capability to target Service personnel on leave or temporary duty in the ROI. Republican influence in the ROI remains significant and some elements of the general public sympathize with republicans in the North and have provided support. Although it is assessed that an attack within the ROI is unlikely, awareness of the presence of identified Service personnel increases the risk. It is more likely that republican terrorist groups would attempt to gain targeting intelligence in order to mount an attack elsewhere. Close Quarter Assassination (CQA) is assessed to be the most likely form of attack if an appropriate target is presented. Additionally, dissident loyalist terrorist groups have threatened attacks against targets in the ROI, in which visitors might inadvertently become involved. Personal Security Counter Measures 3. Civilian clothes are to be worn when travelling to and from the ROI and Service uniform may only be worn when on duty within Irish Defence Force establishments or when specifically authorized by the BRITMILREP Dublin (e.g. when attending the UNMO course or taking part in a Military Band performance). Service personnel are to wear civilian clothes when off duty and outside the boundaries of an Irish Defence Force establishment. 4. Military style or issue clothing and items of equipment (e.g. holdalls, Service ties, blazers and badges) are not to be worn, openly displayed or carried when travelling to or in the ROI. Labels and markings that show Service connections are to be removed from baggage. Defence ID cards may be taken to the ROI but a passport or driving licence should be used for routine identification purposes. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6I-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 5. Vehicles with registration plates (e.g. NATO) which identify Service connections are not to be taken to the ROI. Badges and stickers that show Service connections are to be removed. If travelling to the ROI for the first time by vehicle, Service personnel are to ensure that they are either met at the ferry port or are fully briefed on the onward route to the place of duty. Personnel are to ensure that they have contact telephone numbers for their host and BRITMILREP Dublin. Alternatively in an emergency telephone the Garda Siochana (Police) by dialling 999. 6. When driving in the ROI, a suitable road map is to be carried at all times. Unless taking part in an official event, which is sponsored and organized by the Irish Defence Forces and specifically authorized by BRITMILREP Dublin, Service personnel are not to enter the border counties of Donegal, Leitrim, Cavan, Monaghan and Louth. Hitchhikers are not to be picked up. A street map of Dublin can be purchased from most bookshops and stationers. Note that in Dublin City centre, when on foot and North of the River Liffey, Service personnel are advised to remain within the central area bounded by Capel Street - Parnell Street - Gardiner Street Lower. Dublin is a large city with all the usual associated risks including vehicle theft, street crime, mugging and drug abuse. 7. Service personnel should exercise common sense and discretion at all times with the aim of maintaining a low profile and protecting their personal anonymity while in the ROI. Outside Irish Defence Force establishments, Service personnel should behave as tourists and be prepared to provide a (non-military) residential address that, if necessary, also matches their credit card address. Disturbances or politically motivated events are to be avoided. Identity as a member of the Armed Forces, is not to be routinely disclosed except to the Irish Defence Forces or the BRITMILREP Dublin or Garda Siochana (Police) in cases of emergency or difficulty. All orders and instructions received from the Garda, Irish Defence Forces or BRITMILREP Dublin are to be complied with regarding movement or behaviour while in the ROI. 8. If, exceptionally, Service personnel on temporary duty in the ROI have a valid reason to travel to NI, specific permission is to be obtained from the BRITMILREP Dublin and HQNI. 9. Any suspicious incidents or approaches are to be reported to the BRITMILREP Dublin and the ESyO on return. Useful Telephone Numbers: International Dialling Code for the Republic of Ireland - 00 353 Dialling Code for Dublin ­ 01 (00 353 1) British Embassy ­ 00 353 1205 (within the ROI 01205) 3700 ­ Switchboard* 3792 ­ Assistant Defence Attaché JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6I-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Counter Terrorist Measures 3793 ­ Leave Enquiries (part-time only) 3878 ­ Fax (Insecure) Garda Siochana (Police) Ambulance 999 or 112 999 or 112 Note* Outside working hours the Embassy Switchboard will connect to the duty officer who should only be connected in an emergency. THIS BRIEF IS NOT TO BE TAKEN TO THE ROI JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6I-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 7-6I-4 RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security CHAPTER 8 (SPARE) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 8-0- 1 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 8-0- 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security CHAPTER 9 (SPARE) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 9-0- 1 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 9-0- 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security CHAPTER 10 (SPARE) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 10-0- 1 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 10-0- 2 UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information CHAPTER 11 DISCLOSURE OF PROTECTED INFORMATION Chapter 11 Section I - Disclosure of protected information outside Government Service (excluding to other countries (see Section II)) Introduction Disclosure of information to contractors Disclosure of information to university Defence lecturers Disclosure of information at university courses, study conferences, seminars etc. Disclosure of information to promotion, appointment boards etc. Disclosure of information to the media Disclosure of information to local authorities Disclosure of information to members of parliament (including members of the House of Lords and UK members of the European Parliament) Disclosure of information to parliamentary committees Disclosure of information on the telephone Disclosure of information to commercial organisations for commercial publication (information on names etc.) Publications Careless talk JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-1 1101 1110 1114 1115 1117 1120 1126 Para Page 1127 1131 1136 1137 1138 1140 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Chain letters Aerial surveys by foreign firms Unsolicited mail 1141 1142 1143 Security of official maps, charts, plans, air photographs (including air photo-mosaics and films) and diagrams 1144 Section II - Release of protected information to other countries Introduction Policy Principles Control of the release of protected information Procedures Release authority Conditions of release Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO) clearance procedures Release overseas of private venture information References Security of information concerning sales Patent security agreements Courses Unsolicited mail 1145 1146 1149 1154 1160 1162 1168 1172 1173 1174 1175 1180 1181 1182 JSP 44O Volume 1 Issue 2 11-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information Section III - Policy for the disclosure by The United Kingdom of information owned by other countries and International Defence Organisations Information relating to projects developed jointly with other countries Information of other ownership Information owned by NATO Information owned by other International Defence Organisations (IDOs) 1183 1184 1185 1186 Section IV - Security arrangements for the release of UK protectively marked information to Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs)/ Coalition missions involving the UK Armed Forces Introduction Release of NATO and WEU information Principles of release Ownership and protective markings Information systems Protectively marking individual paragraphs UK protectively marked information exclusively for UK Armed Forces Release authority Annex A - Conditions of release labels/statements for documents released to foreign governments Annex B - The safeguarding of commercially significant information in technical memoranda and reports 1187 1190 1191 1192 1194 1195 1196 1197 11A-1 11B-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Annex C - Security of official maps, charts, plans, air photographs (including air photo-mosaics and films) and diagrams Annex D - Security Assurance 11C-1 11D-1 JSP 44O Volume 1 Issue 2 11-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information CHAPTER 11 SECTION I DISCLOSURE OF PROTECTED INFORMATION OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT SERVICE (EXCLUDING TO OTHER COUNTRIES (SEE SECTION II)) Introduction 1101. This chapter lays down the principles to be observed when considering the disclosure of protected information to persons or bodies outside the Government service. A MOD civilian (including staff in MOD agencies such as DERA), contractor or member of the Armed Services is to disclose such information to another person or body outside Government service only when satisfied that the recipient meets, as a minimum, all of the following: a. A 'need to know' (eg. because of a contract or other form of agreement; b. The requirements of the originator or sponsor of the information to receive it; c. The appropriate level of clearance; d. The appropriate physical measures to store and control access to the material. Having been satisfied that the criteria at a. to d. above can be met, the person wishing to disclose such information should finally seek authorization from the appropriate security authority. 1102. These baseline (minimum) criteria at respective levels of protective marking are described by the following matrix. (Note: BC (Basic check) and BC + NIB (Basic check + National Identification Bureau) are not security clearances) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-5 RESTRICTED REGULAR TOP SECRET JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Need to Know Originator/ Sponsor consent Developed Vetting Security Check BC + NIB BC 11-6 Physical Measures * * * * OCCASIONAL TOP SECRET * * REGULAR SECRET * * OCCASIONAL SECRET * * CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED * * * * * * * * * * Defence Manual of Security RESTRICTED RESTRICTED * * * * RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information Stage 1 - clearance for access to protected information 1103. When an individual needs access to protected information the sponsor must seek the appropriate level of clearance via Principal Security Adviser staff. The submission should be made on the relevant security questionnaire, see Volume 2. There is no objection to the individual completing the form. 1104. If access to protected information will require individuals to be cleared for Developed Vetting early notification will be required as the vetting process may take a considerable time to complete. The normal notification period is 5 months. 1105. Where custody of protectively marked documents is not required, but where protected information may be passed verbally, the sponsor should brief the recipient on security responsibilities at the earliest opportunity. The recipient must also be asked to sign the Official Secret Act (OSA) declaration (MOD Form 134) at this time. The recipient will retain one copy of the OSA form and return the other copy to the sponsor. Stage 2 - clearance for custody of protected information 1106. Confirmation of an individual's security clearance does not constitute authority for receipt and retention of documents or other material marked CONFIDENTIAL or above outside Government premises. If this is necessary, advance arrangements must be made to safeguard them. Sponsors should approach their Principal Security Adviser's staff confirming that it is necessary to allow the individual to retain protectively marked documents or material outside Government premises, and indicating: a. b. The highest protection of the material involved, and The address at which protected material will be kept. 1107. On receipt of this information, Principal Security Adviser staff will: a. Arrange a visit to brief the individual on security matters including the maintenance of a protected documents register (PDR), supply the appropriate security furniture; the OSA declaration (MOD Form 134) will also be collected if not already acquired by the sponsor; b. Arrange for security clearance of any staff (secretary or assistant) employed by the individual and who may have access to protected information; c. Arrange periodic security inspections, and the muster of the protectively marked documents held; a report of each visit will be submitted to the sponsor, with a copy of PDR entries for cross-checking against a record of issues made by the sponsor; JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security d. Ensure that, on resignation or retirement, all protectively marked papers and security furniture are recovered or destroyed in accordance with appropriate regulations; e. Provide additional briefing should the individual propose to visit a country to which a special security risk applies (CSSRA), or be visited by a person from a CSSRA, sponsors must report any proposed visits, of which they are aware, to InfoSy(IVCO) or Single Service Principal Security Advisers' staff. 1108. Sponsors must not release protected material to any individual or company until advised by InfoSy(Industry) or Single Service Principal Security Advisers' staff that they may do so. 1109. In support of the baseline requirements, further guidance on disclosure to specific individuals/bodies is as follows. Disclosure of information To contractors. It must not be assumed that a firm is cleared solely because it has undertaken protected work in the past or is currently engaged on classified defence work. Particular care must be taken over sub-contractors, both List X companies and generally. 1110. Security principles for the safe-guarding of information and material bearing a protective marking apply with equal force during contract negotiations and in the course of work against a defence contract. Chapter 12 of this manual contains detailed instructions for contracts' branches and other branches/organisations involved with placing protected contracts and releasing protected information to contractors. 1111. Before entering into any discussions that may involve or lead to a disclosure of information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above, heads of establishments are to obtain InfoSy(Industry) or Single Service Principal Security Advisers approval to deal with the firm(s) concerned, or with named individual(s), even if disclosure of information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above is not expected to be necessary until preliminary negotiations have been completed. 1112. Sponsors are to inform contractors of the protection of individual aspects of work to be carried out by issuing a Security Aspects Letter. 1113. Before releasing any protected information to a contractor's employee an OSA declaration form must have been completed by the proposed recipient. JSP 44O Volume 1 Issue 2 11-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information To university Defence lecturers 1114. The advice of Principal Security Adviser staff is to be sought where a request for protected information is received from a university Defence lecturer who is not directed or controlled by the Ministry of Defence, and no advance instructions have been received from the Secretary Academic Studies Steering Group. At university courses, study conferences, seminars etc. 1115. Unclassified information to be presented as a paper at a conference etc must receive publication clearance. Authors wishing to present unclassified information in a paper at a conference etc must submit their material for prior publication clearance by the appropriate authority (see para 1138). 1116. Authorization for protected material to be presented at a classified conference is the responsibility of the author and the appropriate research area leader/project manager/owner of the protected information. It is the conference organiser's responsibility to ensure that the venue is suitable and that those attending are cleared to receive the material being presented. To promotion, appointment boards etc. 1117. Ministry of Defence Civil Service promotion and appointments boards. Provided reasonable discretion is exercised candidates need not feel debarred from disclosing such protected information as is necessary to give a reasonable account of their work. A candidate has the right to know of the composition of the board and should establish the permissible level of discussion. 1118. Boards of Civil Service Commission or by other Government departments. Candidates must beware of disclosing protected information unless they know that the board is authorised to receive it. The Chairman's assurance on this should be sought and, if given, accepted. 1119. Boards of non-Government bodies (eg, for election to a professional association). Candidates who are asked to discuss their work, should normally be able to do so without disclosing protected information. Those attending the board should consult DD DefSy(S&T), Principal Security Advisers'staff or the establishment security officer (ESyO) if they consider that they will be unable to give a satisfactory account without breaching disclosure regulations. To the media 1120. The term 'media' should be taken to cover newspapers and periodicals and other publications (including information placed on the Internet), radio and television films, news-reels, video recording, still photographs, exhibitions and publicity and advertising JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security of all forms. 1121. No member of the Ministry of Defence (including MOD Agencies) is to allow himself/herself to be interviewed by a representative of the media or communicate with the press on official matters. Any approach must be referred to D News (Press Office), as the sole channel of communication with the media on departmental or official subjects. 1122. Representatives of the media who telephone personnel at establishments, seek appointments with them or arrive without appointment, must be referred at once to public relations officers (PRO) or D News. At outstations they must be referred to the head of establishment, or PRO, who will consult D News before making any statement beyond matters within his local jurisdiction. 1123. The disclosure of information by contractors (eg), in advertisements, press releases or at exhibitions, conferences etc) is governed by DEFCONs 531 and 659. Publication clearance for unclassified information is coordinated by DD DefSy(S&T))/Single Service Principal Security Advisers and their procedures must be followed by the contractor. Anyone approached direct by contractors seeking authority to publish unclassified information related to MOD interests must refer the inquirer to his/her local Security Controller. 1124. The procedures outlined above also apply when contractors are seeking approval for the publication of photographs of buildings, apparatus, etc. erected or installed at MOD premises. 1125. Staff are to notify DD DefSy(S&T) or Single Service Principal Security Advisers, through their ESyO, of any apparent disclosure of protected information that comes to their notice in articles, broadcasts, advertisements, or in firms' publicity literature etc. To local authorities 1126. The "need to know" rule applies with particular force to elected representatives of local authorities, or their associations, if for no other reason than that they are subject to frequent change and their physical security measures are less apparent. The safest course is to impart the minimum information necessary to achieve the purpose and then only in response to legitimate enquiries. Wherever possible protected information should be diluted so that release can be undertaken at unclassified or at most RESTRICTED level. To members of Parliament (including members of the House of Lords and UK members of the European Parliament) 1127. As a general rule, members of Parliament acting in connection with their JSP 44O Volume 1 Issue 2 11-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information parliamentary duties are not allowed access to information graded higher than RESTRICTED. Access to CONFIDENTIAL information may be authorised by the responsible minister. Where information bearing a protective marking is communicated, the member of Parliament is to be informed explicitly of its marking. When considering access by a UK MEP to UK protected information the minister responsible for authorising disclosure must be satisfied that such information will not be disclosed to MEPs of other nationalities. 1128. In the case of proposals to visit an establishment (or a firm holding a protectively marked contract), where more than one Service or department is concerned, the sponsor of the visit is responsible for ensuring proper interdepartmental consultation. 1129. It is unlikely that members of Parliament will have facilities for the safe-guarding of protectively marked documents. Such information should not be communicated to them in writing without approval from Principal Security Adviser staff. 1130. When a Member of Parliament has to be given clearance for access to protected information in a private capacity - eg, as director of a firm undertaking protectively marked contracts - the Home Office is to be consulted, through the relevant Principal Security Adviser staff. To Parliamentary committees 1131. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) will, at the department's request meet in closed session but all other parliamentary committees admit public and media to their hearings. 1132. Guidance regarding HCDC can be found in the 'Notice for Witnesses' available from the HCDC Liaison Officer in the Secretary of State's Private Office; advice to officials appearing before the PAC is available from D Fin Pol. 1133. The House of Commons clerks/staff are responsible for ensuring that distribution of protected information disclosed to parliamentary committees will be restricted to those persons whom departments have agreed may have access. 1134. Protectively marked material is made available to members only during committee meetings and, on request, in the committee office. Members are not free to remove protectively marked documents. Protected portions of oral evidence and, in some cases other special categories of information bearing descriptors eg, "Commercial", given to a committee in closed session, sidelined by the witnesses in the shorthand writer's transcript, will be excised before evidence is printed (in proof form) and distributed to committee members. The full record will be retained in the committee office for examination by members authorised to have access to it. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 1135. The release of TOP SECRET information, to committee members and specialist advisers, is subject, in each case, to approval by the responsible Minister. On the telephone 1136. Telephone requests for information from callers where the caller cannot be satisfactorily identified, should not be met immediately. The caller should be asked to give a telephone number at which he/she can be contacted, this number being checked before any information is disclosed. If the caller declines to give a number the matter is to be reported to the ESyO. The telephone is vulnerable to scan and intercept and highly insecure. To commercial organisations for commercial publication (information on names etc) 1137. General. The release of information about appointments, duties, telephone number, etc, must be carefully controlled to avoid accumulation to the point where the total should be protected. Information containing names, appointments and telephone numbers allows monitoring of calls by Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) and identifies individuals likely to be of interest to FIS, ie. talent spotting. The information may similarly be used by terrorists for targeting. Provision of collated data, eg in the MOD Directory, frees FIS resources for other, higher value work. Staff should be on their guard when confronted with apparently innocent requests for information. Approaches should be processed in accordance with sub paragraphs a to f below. a. Publications. The release of official information containing names, appointments, duties and telephone numbers is co-ordinated by the Directorate of Corporate Communications Services (DCCS). Appropriate information will be released to commercial publishers who have established a genuine "need to know" and where publication is seen to benefit the department. The following arrangements apply: (1) Names, etc, of staff at Captain RN/Colonel/Group Captain/Grade 6 level or below will not normally be released. Any organisation or individual currently providing or invited to provide a commercial publisher with such information should inform DCCS. Approaches by letter, questionnaire, telephone, or personal visit, asking individuals to update published material should similarly be referred to DCCS for action; they should not be acknowledged. (2) The constraints detailed in sub para (1) do not apply where they would be counter-productive to the activities and interests of the Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO) or DCCS. (3) Names and telephone numbers of officials holding appointments JSP 44O Volume 1 Issue 2 11-12 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information in intelligence, security (where 'security' is included in the post title) and counter-terrorism are not to be released to commercial publishers. b. Who's Who type publications. It is largely a personal decision whether Service or civilian personnel provide information for inclusion. Staff are advised to consider the following before taking such decisions: (1) The publication may be used by terrorists for targeting purposes. It is therefore unwise to allow inclusion of a private address or telephone number or of outside interests that would enable such organisations to trace the subject. (2) Details provided may be of value to FIS for talent spotting, particularly if employment on Defence-related work is mentioned or implied. (3) Such publications are widely used by commercial organisations for sales promotion, etc. Unsolicited pamphlets, leaflets, and salesmen may follow publication of personal details. c. It is better and safer not to be identified in such publications. If individuals choose to provide information, office telephone and room numbers should not be disclosed; in addition officers below one-star/Grade 5 or equivalent should not disclose their rank, branch or appointment. Any association with intelligence, security or counter-terrorism work should not be disclosed. See also para 1137 a(1). d. Questionnaire. The style and purpose of questionnaires varies considerably. They may be computer-produced or individually typed; ask astute questions or seek apparently innocuous consumer-survey-type information. They are not always in textual form - in some cases surveys are conducted by telephone. All approaches received at the place of work are to be regarded as being made through official channels. Only where participation is seen to be to the MOD's advantage, and where material sought is unclassified and noncontroversial should participation be considered. Cases of doubt should be referred through the local security officer to either DD DefSy(S&T))/Single Service Principal Security Adviser's staff or the ESyO as appropriate. e. Salesmen. Where a salesman attempts to sell defence or other equipment/services through personal contact, staff must themselves decide if it was reasonable for them to have been approached. Line managers and InfoSy(Industry)1 or Principal Security Advisers staff should be informed, in writing, where those contacted believe that the organisation making the approach had no reasonable ground to have information enabling the approach to be made. In such cases, those contacted should establish the salesman's name and telephone number, and the title and address of the parent organisation; JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security these details should be included in the report so that investigations may be made. In deciding whether to report an approach, it must be remembered that some salesmen employ random dialling on MOD exchanges; in some cases, the telephone numbers of senior staff may be available in commercial publications (see a. and b. above) f. BT telephone directories. Service personnel are strongly advised against the inclusion of their rank in BT telephone directories, for reasons similar to those outlined in b. above. g. Use of the office address for receipt of personal mail, etc. Use of the office address as a receiving point for private mail is at the discretion of individuals and subject to guidance/instructions from local security staffs, eg use of BFPO addresses and mail for single Service personnel. Official address/telephone number should not be disclosed for consumer surveys, on hire purchase or credit agreements, or on similar documents. Publications 1138. Official permission is to be obtained before any member of the Ministry of Defence accepts any invitation, or enters into any commitment, to publish any book, monograph, article or letter, or to deliver any lecture or speech, or take part in any radio or television programme, or put forward any thesis for a degree, diploma, etc, that: a. Is on a subject akin to the official duties of the officer concerned or of any public servant; or b. Otherwise relates to the business of the Ministry of Defence or any former or existing Government department; or c. Has been or will be compiled from sources to which the officer concerned has access in his official capacity; or d. Will contain a reference to the author's official position or association with the Ministry of Defence. 1139. MOD Personnel Manual Volume 7 Section 6 and Chapter 3 Annex M and MOD Form 655, describe how permission may be obtained by members of the civilian component of the Ministry of Defence. Service personnel are to refer to the relevant instructions in Queen's Regulations. Permission is not required for a lecture, speech or publication that is intended solely for a purely Government organisation or conference, or for attendance at a meeting of a scientific or technical organisation at which a contribution to discussion may be made. Staff must, however, guard against unauthorised disclosure of official information on these and similar occasions and observe the normal precautions for safeguarding protectively marked information. Particular care JSP 44O Volume 1 Issue 2 11-14 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information is to be exercised when officials are attending formal and informal discussions at conferences, learned societies, professional institutions, exhibitions and receptions where officials of countries presenting a special security risk may be present. Careless talk 1140. Careless talk is always potentially dangerous - the circumstances are immaterial. To deny or express doubt about the statement of another person may be as dangerous as a positive statement of information. Protected matters are not to be discussed in places where conversation may be overheard by unauthorised persons or even by persons known to be reliable but who do not have a need to know. Particular care is to be exercised in office lifts, canteens and washrooms and even in official cars, as well as in public places such as hotels, public houses, trains and buses. There are many people such as cleaners, canteen assistants, drivers, messengers, porters and maintenance staff employed in Government departments whose presence is familiar and easily disregarded but they have a minimum security clearance and have no 'need to know', they should not, therefore, be entrusted with protected information. Chain letters 1141. It is for individuals to decide whether they wish to become involved in such letters, but they are advised for security reasons not to do so. Attention is drawn to the need to avoid any unnecessary linkage between individuals, official appointments and/or addresses. Participation in such letters could increase the terrorist threat to an individual and their family. Official resources are not to be used, eg stationery, typing, duplicating, communications and transit services. Aerial surveys by foreign firms 1142. An application for a foreign registered aircraft to carry out aerial survey or other similar flights over the United Kingdom would normally be submitted to the Department of Trade, who after appropriate enquiry would submit it for clearance to the Secretary, Defence Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee (Sec/DPBAC). Any application, from whatever source, received directly within the Ministry of Defence, should be referred to Sec/DPBAC. Unsolicited mail 1143. Frequently unsolicited mail, from various sources, is directed at individual members of staff requesting such items as: a. b. photographs; autographs; JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-15 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c. d. personal data for inclusion in obscure publications; the use of an individuals's bank account for a "business venture". In all such cases, staff are advised not to respond. Should staff receive requests from such sources, they should refer the matter to their ESyO for advice/action as necessary. Security of official maps, charts, plans, air photographs (including air photo-mosaics and films and diagrams) 1144. To ensure that official maps, charts, plans, air photographs (including air photo mosaics and films) and diagrams which are made available to the public meet the legitimate needs and interests of their users, without prejudicing the safety and security of sensitive MOD establishments and installations, staff should refer to the guidance at Annex C. If there are any problems concerning sensitive sites, relating to this subject, the ESyO/USyO should refer the matter to the relevant Principal Security Adviser for advice. JSP 44O Volume 1 Issue 2 11-16 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information SECTION II RELEASE OF PROTECTED INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES Introduction 1145. These instructions set out the policy, principles, controls and procedures for the release of protected information to Governments, companies and individuals of other countries, by the UK Government and UK companies. These instructions should be brought to the attention of all concerned, and any enquiries about the policy should be referred to Principal Security Adviser staff. It should be noted that the UK adopts a policy of PROTECTIVE MARKINGS and DESCRIPTORS for its material based upon the consequences of its COMPROMISE in general, whereas other countries CLASSIFY their material on the grounds of National Security. In the UK system there is no unique indicator that a National Security aspect is present, eg. a document marked CONFIDENTIAL - MANAGEMENT may be so marked for National Security reasons as well as Management reasons. Policy 1146. The policy for the release of military information is laid down by the Director General International Security Policy (DGISP). The word 'Military' is deemed to encompass all 'Defence' information. 1147. The main object of the policy is to strike a balance between the requirements of security and of the perceived benefits of political, economic or other factors. 1148. A table of recommended release levels (Table 'X') is issued and kept up to date by DESP 2. The contents of Table 'X' are very sensitive and the distribution of it is strictly limited. Any queries on Table 'X' should be addressed to the DESP 2 Sec2. Principles 1149. Information is released on a Government to Government basis or by industry with UK Government approval, to the Government, industry or individuals of another country. Visiting military/personnel or defence contractors' personnel with suitable credentials and security clearances are eligible to receive visual or oral information on a need to know basis on behalf of their Governments. Once approval for release has been granted, material is to be transferred in accordance with instructions in paras 1160 to 1180. 1150. Information should not be disclosed to other countries unless the Release Authority (see paragraph 1162) is satisfied in respect of both the recipients' "need to JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-17 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security know" and their ability and intention to safeguard that information. The criteria to be used to judge whether release should be permitted should include the following: a. b. c. The protective marking or classification of the material concerned. The Table 'X' release level of the recipient country. The recipient country's role as an ally or otherwise. d. The probability of its contributing to the defence of Western democracy in terms of research and development, manpower or production. e. The need for the recipient country to receive this information in order to assist it to contribute to the defence of Western democracy. f. The chances of the information being compromised. g. The military or technical value of the information to a potential enemy if it were to be compromised. h. The advantages to UK in political, military or economic terms over the risk to national security. These criteria, however, may be amended by special agreements between the United Kingdom and other countries or such other special considerations as those referred to below. 1151. A sponsor branch must be aware of the ownership of the information and must ensure before disclosure that the owner agrees to disclosure. This applies to owners both within and outside the United Kingdom. Thus, the Department should not release information that is the property of, originates in, or is of important interest to, another Department without the latter's consent. Similarly no information which is the property of a private individual or contractor should be released without their consent, and the United Kingdom should not release to a third country information that is the property of another country without the latter's concurrence. 1152. Cost data should not be released without the approval of the appropriate finance or administrative branch since it may be prejudicial to subsequent tendering, international collaborative sharing, commercial, sales or project interests. 1153. Protected information, patent rights, and information of a privately-owned nature which might not be protected under patents, is to be safeguarded as far as possible when released to other Governments. All documents, except those certified for UNCLASSIFIED release, supplied to other Governments should bear one or more of the Conditions of Release stamps or labels referred to in para 1168 and Annex A. Copyright queries should be addressed to MOD Library Services Crown Copyright JSP 44O Volume 1 Issue 2 11-18 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information Section. Control of the release of protected information 1154. In the context of these instructions, the term "information" means information about Defence related items including equipment and documentation which: a. Arises from, and is directly or indirectly related to, any Government contract subject to DEFCONs 531 and 659, and/or b. Arises from a defence-related private venture funded activity, aspects of which may warrant protection in the national interest, albeit the activity is not governed by standard conditions of contract or subcontract. 1155. There are political, security and in some cases commercial factors which must be considered prior to any agreement to export defence material. On a day to day basis, approval for the release of protectively marked information and hardware overseas is obtained through the Arms Working Party (AWP) (made up of Equipment Security Branch, DD Def Sy(S&T) and various members of the DIS as appropriate, using the Form 680 procedure. 1156. In addition to the MOD, the other Government departments involved in control are: a. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) which advises on political considerations. b. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) which operates the export licensing system. c. HM Customs and Excise which enforces the controls on the import and export of goods. 1157. The legal authority controlling the release of official information is the Official Secrets Act 1989. 1158. The Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939 and the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 govern the export of goods from the UK. The regulations which currently control the export of goods are contained in the current Export of Goods (Control) legislation for military goods and in the Dual-use and Related Goods (Export Control) legislation for other controlled goods. 1159. Prior to the export of licensable defence material, the provision of an export licence from DTI is required. The types of export licence that may be issued are: a. Individual Export Licence (IEL). 11-19 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. c. Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL). Open General Export Licence (OGEL). Procedures 1160. This section sets out the procedures to be followed by divisions and branches for the release of information to other countries and is based upon the principles and policies detailed in the preceding paragraphs. 1161. The objects of the procedures are: a. To ensure that no information is disclosed without proper authority and that where releases are authorised the proper safeguards against unauthorized transfer to third parties are imposed. b. To ensure that the agreements with other nations about the release of information of overseas origin are not broken. c. To achieve uniformity of practice within the Ministry of Defence on release of information. d. To ensure that adequate records are kept of information released. Release authority 1162. Authorization to release military information overseas will depend upon the content of the information and the country to which it is to go. a. For certain releases, the Release Authority is the Head of Establishment responsible for that information. Certain powers of release have been delegated also to Commanders-in-Chief, Heads of Service Missions and Service Liaison Staffs, Defence Attaches and Advisers and Commandants of Service Schools. The levels to which members of either of these groups may release are set out in Table 'X' (but see para 1166 in respect of the USA). b. Release at other levels is subject to prior consultation with the appropriate Principal Security Adviser staff and the following table shows who should be consulted: JSP 44O Volume 1 Issue 2 11-20 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information Srl Area Information on General Military Matters (c) Area Security Staff Principal Security Adviser Principal Security Adviser CDI Information on Equipment Info. on Technical Security (a) 1 (b) Royal Navy Delegated to Army Delegated to (d) ACDS OR(Sea) D Def Sys ESB DG of Equipment ESB ACDS OR(Air) DG of Equipment ESB DI(AC) DI(AC) CESG/GCHQ Sc (Nuc) 1 (e) ISG DD DefSy(S&T) / Command HQ DD DefSy(S&T) / Command HQ 2 3 Royal Air Force Delegated to Intelligence Technology Transfer Cryptographic Matters Nuclear Matters DD DefSy(S&T) / Command HQ 4 5 6 7 In cases of doubt, DESP 2 or Principal Security Adviser staff must be consulted. 1163. Acting as the agent of the Release Authority, the Defence Research Information Centre (DRIC), is the prescribed routine channel for the transmission overseas on initial distribution and in, response to specific requests, of Ministry of Defence Scientific and Technical Reports. The DRIC obtains technical policy, patents, commercial and security clearances and is responsible for affixing the appropriate conditions of release. DRIC maintains a record of releases made and can furnish such information on request. 1164. The release of ATOMIC, COMSEC, EMSEC, ECLIPSE, INTELLIGENCE and CHOBHAM ARMOUR information is not delegated to divisions and branches and is the subject of special rules; further information may be obtained from Table 'X' or the appropriate Principal Security Adviser. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-21 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 1165. The prefix "UK" must be added to protective markings on all hard copy documents to be passed to other countries. However, in formal signal messages transmitted over the Defence Communications Network, the prefix "UK" is not recognised. Therefore, staff must only apply the appropriate protective marking and use the term "UK CLASSIFIED RELEASED IN CONFIDENCE" as the first words of the text. If in doubt as to the correct release instructions for overseas messages, staff should initially contact their local COMMCEN staff for advice. 1166. The United States does not appear in Table 'X' and sponsor branches may, with the consent of the release authority and the owner of the information, release protectively marked information (excluding that detailed in para 1164 for which specific rules, detailed in Table 'X' apply). 1167. When a release proposal by a sponsor branch outside the Defence Export Services Organisation has a current or potential "Sales" implication, the appropriate Regional Marketing Directorate (RMD) should be consulted. Conditions of release 1168. When information is released overseas the recipient country should be advised of "The Conditions of Release" which may vary according to the reasons for disclosure. The appropriate "Conditions of Release" are to be shown on all protectively marked and UNCLASSIFIED documents released to all overseas recipients either by means of a rubber stamp or a label (see Annex A). In some cases it may be necessary to write specific 'Conditions of Release', if those specified in Annex A do not completely meet the requirement; in such cases the advice of the appropriate Principal Security Adviser staff is always to be sought. 1169. When the release or disclosure is to be made by a contractor, it will be the responsibility of the sponsor branch to issue clear instructions to the contractor to ensure that: i. There can be no doubt about what information may be released. j. The appropriate Conditions of Release labels or stamps are affixed to documents before release. k. Documents are despatched via the sponsor branch who should arrange transmission through approved Government to Government, or other approved channels. l. In the absence of a sponsor branch, the appropriate RMD should be used. 1170. All releases of protected information to overseas nationals or to their JSP 44O Volume 1 Issue 2 11-22 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information representatives should be systematically recorded by sponsor branches, or the appropriate RMD. 1171. Release of protected information to a foreign national (eg a representative of an overseas company) should be regarded as release to that individual's country of origin. Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO) - clearance procedures 1172. The procedures within the DESO for dealing with enquiries from firms and potential customers regarding clearance for the promotion and sale of British defence equipment overseas are set out in "DESO Internal Instruction No. 1" copies of which are available from DESP 3. Such requests are subject to case-by-case consideration through the MOD Form 680 procedure (see para 1155). Companies should be directed to the appropriate RMD for details. Release overseas of private venture information 1173. Prior to the release of private venture funded information overseas, its protection should be determined in consultation with DD DefSy(S&T). As in the case of Government- owned information, its release is then subject to MOD Form 680 procedure. References 1174. When documents are being released, care should be taken to avoid references to reports which would not be supplied because of their protective marking or sensitivity. Security of information concerning sales 1175. Prior to material marked CONFIDENTIAL or above being delivered to an overseas country, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to cover security, intellectual property rights (IPR), claims, etc must be signed between Her Majesty's Government and the recipient Government before delivery starts. However, where a general security MOU exists with the recipient country, for security purposes, reference to this document in the MOU is all that is required. 1176. On occasions there is a need to arrange for the release of information carrying a higher protective marking than equipment to be supplied. When such instances occur, this release must also be the subject of an MOU. 1177. The existence of an MOU is particularly important where UK protected material is being supplied to countries which do not have direct equivalents to our protective markings. The MOU will describe the security protection to be afforded to JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-23 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security material at each level of UK protective marking. 1178. In the absence of a General Security MOU, all other MOUs relating to the sale of protected equipment and the release of associated information must contain security clauses, as required under para 1175 above, and InfoSy(Industry)1 advice is to be sought. Patent security agreements 1179. Patent action in support of present or eventual commercial exploitation need not necessarily be prevented by military security considerations; the United Kingdom has patent security agreements with a number of countries so that patent applications can be made to cover patentable information even though it may be protected. A patent security agreement between the UK Government and a foreign Government should be made to ensure that information released by one to the other will be afforded the same degree of protection by the receiving Government as it was given by the releasing Government. Under the agreement it is then possible to arrange for patent applications to be made in the security section of each country's Patent Office and to be withheld from publication until the security restrictions are lifted. Patent protection in the conventional sense could not begin until then, but the arrangement does not affect the priority date for the eventual patent. 1180. It is generally part of such a patent security agreement that a country wishing to file a security classified patent application in another country's Patent Office shall also transmit a copy of the information (patent specification) to the other country's defence authorities. More detailed information about these arrangements is available from the Intellectual Property Rights Group (IPRG), which files and prosecutes patent applications, and the Inventions Unit ­ DD DefSy(S&T), which monitors the implementation of the patent security arrangements. Courses 1181. Foreign and Commonwealth students may be admitted to UK military courses as arranged by International Defence Training (IDT) staffs or courses arranged by List X firms. If an IDT course is above the limit set for release of information to the particular nation by Table X then the IDT should seek advice from the appropriate single-Service Principal Security Adviser, before a firm offer is extended. Unsolicited mail 1182. The guidance given in paragraph 1143 should be applied to unsolicited mail whether received from overseas or in the country concerned. JSP 44O Volume 1 Issue 2 11-24 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information SECTION III POLICY FOR THE DISCLOSURE BY THE UNITED KINGDOM OF INFORMATION OWNED BY OTHER COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS Information relating to projects developed jointly with other countries 1183. From time to time an arrangement is reached by the United Kingdom with one or more countries for the joint development of a particular project. The information resulting from such an arrangement becomes "combined" and as such cannot be released without the mutual determination of all countries participating in the project. Information of other ownership 1184. Apart from the above, military information received from another country is not to be disclosed to a third country without the agreement of the originating country. Information owned by NATO 1185. The regulations governing the release to non-NATO countries of classified NATO information, including documents carrying a NATO marking, are contained in the Document C-M(55)15(FINAL) 'Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation'; the approval of the NATO Council must be obtained for any such release. Sponsor branches seeking to make releases which need NATO Council consent are to submit applications to the NATO & European Policy Group (NEPG) which will then forward them through the NATO chain of command to the NATO Council seeking release approval. NATO rules permit all member nations to release any NATO unclassified information to non-NATO countries and also any protectively marked information which is entirely of a national (ie UK) origin. In such cases sponsor branches should satisfy themselves that the release would not be against the interests of NATO. As appropriate Principal Security Adviser staff is to be consulted about the machinery of the release. Governments of countries participating in NATO collaborative programmes may release NATO information relating to the programmes to any country only with the consent of their collaborative partners but without NATO Council consent. UK information relating to these programmes which has not been released to NATO remains subject to UK national release regulations. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-25 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Information owned by other international Defence organisations (IDOs) 1186. Similar considerations to those set out in para 1185 apply in these cases. However, any proposal to release information belonging to one of the other IDOs to a country not belonging to that IDO, unless the information is of entirely United Kingdom origin, should be referred as appropriate to Principal Security Adviser staff. 11-26 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information SECTION IV SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RELEASE OF UK PROTECTIVELY MARKED INFORMATION TO COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCES (CJTFS)/COALITION MISSIONS INVOLVING THE UK ARMED FORCES Introduction 1187. The following guidance is only to be used in the absence of any security information being issued by the relevant CJTF/Coalition mission responsible for the joint operation prior to and shortly following deployment of UK Armed Forces to the area concerned. However the UK Chief J2/senior security advisor should ensure that the guidance issued by the relevant CJTF/Coalition mission fully reflects the context of this Section. 1188. Participation in c CJTF/Coalition mission by the UK MOD presumes that, along with other nations (eg NATO and non-NATO nations), there shall be a release/exchange of protectively marked information required for the conduct of the CJTF/Coalition mission. This information shall principally be to safeguard the forces involved, to assist in the implementation of the operation and also maintain the effectiveness of the mission. 1189. This guidance only sets out additional security requirements for the release/exchange of UK protectively marked information to a CJTF/Coalition mission. Robust rules, to prevent accidental compromise of UK protectively marked information, should be issued by the Chief J2/senior security advisor covering joint operations' rooms, briefing, IT networks, postal and courier systems etc. JSP 440 should be consulted for detailed guidance regarding the physical security, carriage, handling and accounting procedures for UK protectively marked information. Release of NATO and WEU information 1190. Guidance on the release of NATO and WEU information to a CJTF/Coalition mission, will be issued as and when appropriate by their respective security authorities. Principles of release 1191. The following principles shall apply: m. UK political/military endorsement - UK political and military endorsement of the CJTF/Coalition mission shall have been obtained and any JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-27 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security legal requirements satisfied before UK protectively marked information can be released/exchanged within a CJTF/Coalition mission; n. Security agreements/assurances - Security agreements/assurances must be completed by all parties before UK protectively marked information can be released to a CJTF/Coalition Mission. An example of a Security Assurance is reproduced at Annex D: o. Restrictions on release - The originator shall be the sole authority for deciding the level of protective marking. Unless the originator specifies any detailed release/restriction instructions on the document, it shall be left to the discretion of the UK Contingent Commander, acting on the advice of his Chief J2/senior security advisor, to balance the requirement to protect UK information with the need to safeguard the forces involved, to assist in the implementation of the operation and also maintain the effectiveness of the CJTF/Coalition mission before deciding whether to release the UK information received. Sensitive intelligence material must not be released without the prior approval of the appropriate national authority. Separate instructions will be issued by such an authority for the protection and/or release of their material. p. All UK protectively marked information released/exchanged shall be disseminated under strict observance of the need-to-know principle and shall only be used for the accomplishment of the CJTF/Coalition mission; q. Delegation of release/exchange authority - During a CJTF/Coalition mission, in order to ensure the safety of forces and the effectiveness of the mission, the UK Contingent Commander may, in consultation with his Chief J2/senior security advisor, and after the issue of appropriate guidelines, delegate authority for the release/exchange of all UK protectively marked information of an urgent operational nature, such as support of combined combat operations, to those UK officers best suited to evaluate the importance of that information and the need for its immediate release. This should be specified in the promulgation of Operations Order. The guiding principle shall be that UK protectively marked information of an urgent operational nature, that has the potential to affect the lives of CJTF/Coalition personnel, should be withheld only in the most exceptional circumstances. Consideration may also have to be given to editing the information in such a manner as to protect UK national sources, when necessary. r. Once established, the security policy and procedures for the handling of protectively marked information, of the lead organisation/nation, shall apply to the UK Armed Forces contingent participating in the CJTF/Coalition mission; JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-28 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information Ownership and protective markings 1192. There may be a requirement to release/disseminate UK protectively marked information for the planning/preparatory stages of the CJTF/Coalition onwards. Originators should, therefore, designate as much UK protectively marked information as possible as releasable to the CJTF/Coalition mission. UK commanders should seek to anticipate requirements for UK protectively marked information at the earliest possible stage and seek approval for its release/dissemination as outlined in paragraph 1194 below. Separate compartments for UK only and for UK protectively marked information released to the CJTF/Coalition mission must be created in order to provide a mechanism to control the circulation of protectively marked information within the CJTF/Coalition mission. 1193. When it is decided that UK information can be released, the ownership, protective marking and lifing of UK information should be clearly identified as follows: s. Ownership/protective marking - All information shall be protectively marked in accordance with the instruction set out in JSP 440 and prefixed "UK"; t. Release designators - Each document will carry a release designator, where appropriate, as in the examples below: (1) (2) UK SECRET Releasable to (Name of CJTF/Coalition mission) UK SECRET Releasable to (eg WEU/NATO members only/CJTF/Coalition mission UK SECRET Releasable to (name of CJTF/Coalition mission - Name/Names of Country(ies) only) (3) u. Downgrading/destruction - Wherever possible, the originator should indicate below the protective marking and release details, that the document can be downgraded or destroyed after a certain period of time. Destruction, in most cases, will be preferable to downgrading unless there is a demonstrated need for retention. This should be considered for all UK information which will become generally known after a specific date or event eg. at the end of a mission/operation. Information Systems 1194. An increasing amount of information is now carried on information systems JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-29 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security such as portable laptop computers. Therefore the UK Contingent Commander, in consultation with the Chief J2/senior security advisor, should appoint an Information Technology Security Officer (ITSO) to ensure that all software and hardware used by the CJTF/Coalition mission is handled and protected in accordance with JSP 440, Volume 3 - Information Technology. Protectively marking individual paragraphs 1195. Individual paragraphs of UK documents protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL and above, should be protectively marked by the originator to allow further dissemination of appropriate sections. Original protective markings/caveats must be retained when information is used to prepare composite documents or briefings. UK protectively marked information exclusively for UK Armed Forces 1196. UK protectively marked material for UK Armed Forces use only must be kept totally separate from that of UK information which can be released/disseminated to the CJTF/Coalition mission. There will be a need to provide a separate mechanism to control the circulation of UK protectively marked information within the CJTF/Coalition mission. This will be achieved by: a. Establishing separate UK facilities for the collation and screening of UK protectively marked information prior to release. These facilities will be at the lowest level consistent with the security and effectiveness of the CJTF/Coalition mission; b. Permitting access to UK secure areas by non-UK personnel only when escorted; c. Prohibiting access by non-UK personnel to primary sources of UK protectively marked information or to IT systems and networks processing UK protectively marked information; d. Permitting access by non-UK personnel to meetings/briefings only after UK protectively marked information to be used in them has been approved for release; Release authority 1197. These authorities are listed in order (only in respect of UK protectively marked information) as follows: v. the originator of the document; JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-30 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information w. the UK Contingent Commander, in consultation with his Chief J2/senior security advisor, of the CJTF/Coalition mission; or x. designated UK officers given delegated authority by the UK Contingent Commander, in consultation with his Chief J2/senior security advisor. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-31 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11-32 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 11 CONDITIONS OF RELEASE LABELS/STATEMENTS FOR DOCUMENTS RELEASED TO OVERSEAS RECIPIENTS 1. The conditions of release labels/statements described in paragraphs 4-7 below are to be used by the Ministry of Defence on all protectively marked and unclassified documents which have been approved for release to other named Governments except those unclassified documents which can be given unlimited distribution, or papers for which there are no special handling requirements. The term 'document' should be interpreted widely to not only include formal technical or scientific reports but also technical memoranda, tabulated data, trials, reports etc. 2. Limitation on the release of unclassified information might, for example, be imposed because it contains information the dissemination of which would be prejudicial to proprietary rights, undesirable references to other documents, adverse comment on a contractor's product, or information which, although not of itself worthy of a protective marking has an intelligence value (eg which reveals a field of interest), or, if the sale of equipment would not be allowed, there would be no reason to release any information. 3. Sponsor branches wishing to release documents are to decide which labels/statements will apply for each release. Where copyright in documentary information and/or proprietary rights belong to Her Majesty's Government or a United Kingdom contractor, it is necessary to obtain permission before releasing the document to other governments or their contractors. Further, if information comprises manufacturing drawings, reports, design data, etc arising from work done under a development contract, it should not be assumed without verification that rights in such information are owned by Her Majesty's Government and the advice of Defence branches should be sought. In addition, information marked higher than RESTRICTED should not be released to any Commonwealth or foreign visitors unless the sponsoring authority has obtained confirmation from the appropriate Principal Security Adviser that the visitor has the appropriate security clearance. 4. LABEL/STATEMENT 'A' is to be applied to documents which the recipient Government may release to its defence contractors within its own territory. Label/Statement 'A' reads as follows; "a. This information is released by the United Kingdom Government to the ____________ Government for Defence purposes only. b. This information must be afforded the same degree of protection as that afforded to information of an equivalent classification originated by the JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security recipient Government or as required by the recipient Government's national security regulations. c. This information may be disclosed only within the Defence Department of the ___________ Government and to its Defence Contractors within its territory, except as otherwise authorised by the UK Ministry of Defence. Such recipients shall be required to accept the information on the same conditions as the ____________ Government. d. This information may be subject to privately owned rights." 5. LABEL/STATEMENT 'B' is to be applied to documents which require a special circulation to individuals outside Defence Departments of the recipient Government. Label/Statement 'B' reads as follows: "a. This information is released by the United Kingdom Government to the ______________ Government for Defence purposes only. b. This information must be afforded the same degree of protection as that afforded to information of an equivalent classification originated by the recipient Government or as required by the recipient Government's national security regulations. c. This information may be disclosed only within the Defence Departments of the ____________ Government and to those noted below, except as authorised by the UK Ministry of Defence. Such recipients shall be required to accept the information on the same conditions as the ______________ Government. d. e. This information may be subject to privately owned rights. Names and addresses of those authorised to receive this information: " 6. LABEL/STATEMENT 'C' is to be applied to documents which the recipient Government may not release to anyone outside its Defence Department. Label/Statement 'C' reads as follows; JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information "a. This information is released by the United Kingdom Government to the ____________ Government for Defence purposes only. b. This information must be afforded the same degree of protection as that afforded to information of an equivalent classification originated by the recipient Government or as required by the recipient Government's national security regulations. c. This information may be disclosed only within the Defence Departments of the ____________ Government, except as otherwise authorised by the UK Ministry of Defence. d. This information may be subject to privately owned rights". 7. LABEL/STATEMENT 'D' is to be used in conjunction with labels 'A', 'B, or 'C' in those cases where the copyright of the document and proprietary rights belonging to Her Majesty's Government or to a United Kingdom contractor might be prejudiced by its disclosure. It is intended to safeguard these rights and those owned by Departments. The permission of British contractors must be obtained before their documents are released to a foreign Government and its contractors. Label/Statement 'D' reads as follows: "a. This information is released for information only and is to be treated as disclosed in confidence. The ____________ Government is to ensure that this information is not dealt with in any manner likely to prejudice the rights of any owner to obtain patent or other statutory protection therefore. b. Before any use is made of this information for the purpose of manufacture, the authorisation of the UK Ministry of Defence must be obtained." 8. Other conditions of release may be applied where it is desired to restrict the release of information overseas for special purposes or in special ways. The wording of such conditions should be agreed with the Principal Security Adviser. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11A-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11A-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 11 THE SAFEGUARDING OF COMMERCIALLY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION IN TECHNICAL MEMORANDA AND REPORTS 1. To avoid any misunderstanding regarding the disclosure of commercially sensitive information, documents carrying the descriptor marked COMMERCIAL are to incorporate appropriate instructions to recipients. Companies having proprietary rights to information in such documents must signify their agreement to disclosure before MOD permission for disclosure can be given. Where disclosure of information is to be controlled or otherwise limited, documents are to carry Conditions of Release" instructions (detailed at Paragraph 3) after categorisation as follows: Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Proprietary information made available to the MOD. MOD information of significant commercial value. Category 2 information made available for exploitation by the Defence Technology Enterprise. Where applicable, Category 3 labels supplement instructions appropriate to Category 2; they should always be applied below a Category 2 label. Relate to MOD originated documents including any sensitive proposal, assessment or statement which should not be released to Industry for reasons other than its potential value as a trade secret. Category 4 A document containing information falling into more than one category must bear more than one label. 2. The originator is responsible for categorisation and applying the appropriate label(s). IPRG should be consulted if there is any doubt about the appropriate category or label to use, and must be consulted before any change in the designation. Conditions of release labels for technical memoranda and reports containing sensitive commercial information 3. The following text must be conspicuously marked on Technical Memoranda and Reports containing Sensitive Commercial Information: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Category 1 Documents COMMERCIAL 1 RELEASE CONDITION This document contains proprietary information made available to MOD subject to limitations of confidentiality and restricted rights of use. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed outside MOD without specific authority. Patents Directorate should be consulted if outside use or disclosure is contemplated. Proprietary Information Category 2 Documents COMMERCIAL RELEASE CONDITIONS This document contains MOD information of significant commercial value. It must not be disclosed outside MOD without specific approval from Patents Directorate which will be given only for disclosures to persons who have signed relevant confidentiality agreements, licence agreements or contracts. MOD Information 2 Category 3 Documents (Text to appear following that described for Category 2) 3 DTE Exploitation Made available for release and exploitation through Defence Technology Enterprises Ltd to UK firms under confidentiality agreements. Note: This does not affect the right of release by MOD for use on MOD contract work. Category 4 Documents COMMERCIAL 4 MOD only This document and the information it contains are for use within UK Government only and must not be released to any other persons without the agreement of the originator. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 11 SECURITY OF OFFICIAL MAPS, CHARTS, PLANS, AIR PHOTOGRAPHS (INCLUDING AIR PHOTOMOSAICS AND FILMS) AND DIAGRAMS Maps, charts and plans 1. There are a small number of MOD sensitive establishments and installations (hereinafter referred to as "sensitive sites") which it would not be in the national interest for full details of them to be included on maps, charts and plans that are made available to the public. However, the general public, business and other non-government organisations are entitled to expect that the maps, charts and plans supplied by government are accurate, reliable and comprehensive. Information must not therefore be omitted from such documents unless this is necessary to protect the safety and security of the sensitive site concerned. 2. Identifying and registering sensitive sites. It is considered most unlikely that the majority of MOD establishments and installations will be placed at threat by the release of normal, comprehensive survey information unless all the following criteria are met: a. the establishment or installation is assessed to be at enhanced threat of terrorist attack or other forms of serious crime, or is a potential target for Foreign Intelligence Services; b. the survey information which the establishment wishes to omit would provide useful information to terrorists, to foreign intelligence organisations, or to others planning serious criminal activities; c. the survey information to be omitted could not readily be obtained by other means (eg by observation from public access to the site, from the site boundary or from a suitable vantage point, including legitimate oversight or from existing published sources). d. Each Principal Security Adviser keeps a list of sensitive sites within its area of responsibility. These lists are reviewed annually to consider if there is a continuing need for map, chart, plan or photography restrictions to apply to the sites which have been identified. e. The integrity and effectiveness of the arrangements for applying these restrictions, depend on keeping the number of sites to a minimum. f. USyOs or ESyOs concerned about the sensitivity of their sites, in JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security relation to providing official site survey information, should contact their appropriate Sector security staff for advice. 3. Landmarks essential for public safety. The application of the arrangements described above is subject to the need to retain an indication of landmarks considered to be essential to safe navigation by sea or air. 4. The MOD considers itself bound, in the interests of safe navigation, to indicate on its published charts, radio stations which give navigational direction-finding service and certain installations on land which would be conspicuous to a mariner from seawards. Nevertheless, the latter need not be specified in detail, and they are in nay case very prominent objects which cannot be concealed. In addition, overhead cables must be shown where they cross waterways, thereby limiting headroom. The MOD also considers itself bound to show names against marine terminals, jetties, wharves etc connected with sensitive sites where such names are of vital interest to shipping. Air photographs (including air photo-mosaics and films) and diagrams 5. It is recognised that, except where overflight is prohibited by air traffic regulations, it is impractical to regulate the activity of "taking" aerial photographs and that any control - which in practice is likely to be little more than influence - can only be applied to their sale or distribution. In addition, this approach can only be directed towards the professional aerial photography companies: there is little or no effective control over others who have the ability to take photographs from the air. Only professionals, however, are likely to have the very expensive equipment needed to take high-resolution photographs which themselves pose the greatest threat to security. 6. Guidance to the press and commercial photography companies is given by the Secretary of the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee (DPBAC) as is prescribed in DA Notice No 5 - "Identification of Specific Installations". 7. Aerial surveys by foreign firms. An application for a foreign registered aircraft to carry out aerial survey or other similar flights over the United Kingdom would normally be submitted to the Department of Trade, who after appropriate enquiry would submit it for clearance to the Sec/DPBAC. Any application, from whatever source, received directly within the MOD, should be referred to Sec/DPBAC. Handling material containing information about sensitive sites 8. All official maps, charts and plans which merit security protection should be overstamped with the appropriate protective marking. Protectively marked maps, charts and plans may be issued only to those who have a "need-to-know" and are authorised to receive them; the directorate/unit responsible for the protectively marked content should always be consulted. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information 9. Official photographs (including air photo air-mosaics and films) and diagrams which include any of the sensitive sites covered by this guidance should be similarly treated. 10. Guidance on the regulation of air imagery from Service sources is contained in JSP 348. Open Skies 11. This guidance does not apply to photography carried out under the Open Skies Treaty. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11C-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11C-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Disclosure of Protected Information ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 11 SECURITY ASSURANCE 1. The (country or organisation) represented by (name, rank and function) in the furtherance of the (name of the CJTF/Coalition mission) agrees: a. to safeguard UK protectively marked information provided to it by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in a manner equivalent to that used to protect its own classified information of an equivalent or higher level; b. to provide such UK protectively marked information only to appropriately cleared individuals under its jurisdiction with a need-to-know; c. to use the information only for the purposes for which it was provided; d. not to transfer the information to a third party without the prior written approval of the originator of the information; and e. to abide by any other conditions of release or security requirements conveyed by the Commanding Officer (or his delegated representative) of the UK contingent, even after completion of the (name of the CJTF/Coalition mission). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11D-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 11D-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security CHAPTER 12 CONTRACTS SECURITY Chapter 12. Section I - Contracts security Sub-section IA - Introduction and definitions Introduction Definitions Security advisors Sub-section IB - Conditions of contracts relating to security The two conditions DEFCON 531 (Disclosure of Information) DEFCON 659 (Security measures) DEFCON 76 (Conditions applicable to work performed by contractors personnel at Government establishments) Sub-section IC - Release of protectively marked information to industry Rules governing the release of information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above to UK contractors Procedure for obtaining security approval to use a company Completion of security questionnaire Action following provisional approval Document security Doubtful protective marking of documents JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12-1 12010 12013 12014 12001 12003 12008 Para Page 12016 12017 12023 12026 12027 12029 12030 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Visits to contractors Visits from contractors Recovery of documents etc. Sub-section ID - Protective marking of work and documents Responsibility of requisitioning branch Protective marking of contract documents MOD contracts bulletin European Journal Sub-section IE - Security aspects letters (SALs) Notification of "secret matter" to the contractor Importance of defining "secret matter" to contractors Points to be considered by RBs in preparation of a SAL Level of signature Example letters Use of technical grading guides in SALs Security aspects clause Distribution of tenders, contracts and SALs Sub-section IF - Amendments to contracts and SALs Amendments to contracts Amendment of security aspects letter or security aspects clause Review and amendment of grading 12-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12056 12057 12060 12041 12042 12044 12045 12046 12051 12052 12054 12036 12038 12039 12040 12031 12033 12035 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security Sub-section IG - Subcontracts protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL or above Approval to place a subcontract protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL or above Responsibilities of the requisitioning branch Sub-section IH - Protectively marked contracts with overseas contractors Application for approval Obligations of an overseas contractor Contracts involving the disclosure of RESTRICTED information Notification of contracts to Info Sy (Industry)1 Sub-section IJ - Other forms of contracts Orders on agency establishments or agency factories Extramural research agreements and consultancy contracts Contracts for building and civil engineering works Printing contracts placed by MOD with commercial firms Local purchase orders Contracts associated with international collaborative projects Sub-section IK - Contracts involving the release of RESTRICTED information only to UK contractors Security measures Notification to the firm of RESTRICTED aspects JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12-3 12085 12086 12072 12075 12078 12079 12080 12084 12065 12067 12068 12071 12061 12064 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Distribution of RESTRICTED contract/tender documents and SALs Sub-section IL - Security of contractors' computer installations Section II - Project security planning Introduction Principles Initial programme phases Preliminaries to the development contract Review of grading Grading committee machinery Project security duties Completed and cancelled projects Involvement of contractors in security plans Open release of official information Research programmes Security of contractor's private venture projects Annex A Annex B Annex C Annex D Annex E Annex F Def Con 531 Def Con 659 Def Con 76 Request for confirmation of security status of UK contractors Letter to contractor requesting completion forms Security Questionnaire Letter to contractor requesting completion of OSA Forms 12-4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12090 12093 12094 12095 12096 12097 12098 12099 12100 12101 12102 12103 12A-1 12B-1 12C-1 12D-1 12E-1 12F-1 12087 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security Annex G Annex H Annex I Annex J Annex K Annex L Annex M Annex N Annex O Annex P Annex Q Annex R Annex S Annex T Annex U Annex V Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Appendix 3 Appendix 4 Tender SAL for List X contractors SAL to non List X contractors for release of CONFIDENTIAL or above at tender stage SAL to non List X contractors for release of RESTRICTED information only at tender stage Contract SAL to List X contractors Contract SAL to non List X contractors Amendment letter for SALs Doubtful gradings Request to place protectively marked contract overseas Tender SAL for overseas contractors Contract SAL for overseas contractors Restricted Security Conditions overseas Restricted Security Conditions UK Tender/Contract SAL for RESTRICTED information only Committees appointed for the security grading of defence equipment and technology Security of contractor's private venture projects Template Of Security Requirements (TSR) For Contractors Requiring Access Definitions And Abbreviations Reference Documents Security Training Requirements TSR Schedule 12-5 12G-1 12H-1 12I-1 12J-1 12K-1 12L-1 12M-1 12N-1 12O-1 12P-1 12Q-1 12R-1 12S-1 12T-1 12U-1 12V-1 12V1-1 12V2-1 12V3-1 12V4-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank 12-6 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security CHAPTER 12 SECTION I CONTRACTS SECURITY SUB-SECTION IA INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS Introduction 12001. This Chapter describes the security procedures which apply and the protective arrangements which need to be implemented in connection with the award of a protected contract to Industry. 12002. The security measures which are necessary depend on the protection given to: a. b. the work to be performed on the contract (or subcontract) and the official information to be disclosed to the contractor. The security measures afforded to any contract, at any level, for goods or services depend on the protective marking of the contract. Before deciding on the protective marking of any contract the security authority of the requisitioning branch or establishment (see below) is to be consulted to ensure that the protective marking proposed by the requisitioning branch or establishment is correct. The security authority should normally be approached before the feasibility study is written, and certainly before the invitation to tender is offered. For protective markings of CONFIDENTIAL or above, the full range of security measures described in this chapter are applicable. Where the marking does not exceed RESTRICTED, the security measures are less stringent and are summarised in Sub-section 1K. Care must be exercised to distinguish between the protection given to the work performed or information disclosed under the contract and the protective marking of the tender or contract documents themselves which are generally lower. (See Sub-section 1D). Definitions 12003. Requisitioning branches or establishments. The term 'Requisitioning branch' (RB) means the technical, supply or project branch which raises the contract action request for the supplies or services in question. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 12004. "Secret Matter" and "Restricted aspects". The term 'Secret Matter', is any matter connected with or arising out of the execution of a contract marked CONFIDENTIAL or above. The term 'Restricted Aspects' similarly refers to material or aspects of information marked RESTRICTED. The 'Secret Matter' and the 'Restricted Aspects' are defined to the contractor in a 'Security Aspects Letter' (SAL), or by a 'Security Aspects Clause' in the contract, or by a Restricted Aspects Letter. 12005. Contract Arrangements. For the purpose of these instructions, the term 'contract' covers invitations to tender, tenders, advance orders, contracts, extracts and orders. 12006. List X. This term refers to contractors or subcontractors who have been formally placed on List X because they are undertaking work marked CONFIDENTIAL or above - "On the Company Premises". Contractors who are on the list are not entitled to any preferential status in the granting of new contracts. 12007. "Authorised for Access". In Industry a personal security clearance allowing access to protected information up to and including SECRET is known as "Authorised for Access". Security Advisers 12008. The security authority. The security authority is the security branch ultimately responsible for identifying and overseeing the security aspects of a contract. 12009. Officers of the Security Service, in their capacity as advisers on security in industry, visit a contractor who has received his first contract marked CONFIDENTIAL or above as soon as possible after the contract has been placed. They advise the contractor on the security measures necessary, including personnel security, which must be taken to safeguard the "secret matter" of the contract in accordance with the obligations imposed by DEFCON 659. Advisers have no powers to visit or advise a contractor until a contract protected at this level has been let. NB The value and scope of this advice will be severely limited until the "secret matter" of the contract has been notified to the contractor. 12-8 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security SUB-SECTION IB CONDITIONS OF CONTRACTS RELATING TO SECURITY The two conditions 12010. The following condition relates to security: DEFCON 659 - Security Measures In addition, there is a condition covering both protected and UNCLASSIFIED information primarily for protection of intellectual property rights interests: DEFCON 531 - Disclosure of Information . The texts of DEFCONs 531 and 659 are reproduced as Annexes A and B. 12011. All Government contracts placed in the UK are subject to DEFCON 531 but where it is necessary to disclose to the contractor information marked CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET, DEFCON 659 must also be included. DEFCON 659 takes precedence over DEFCON 531 12012. DEFCON 659 is not to be used for contracts placed with Overseas contractors. The security provisions for these and other types of contracts are dealt within Sections 8 and 9. DEFCON 531 (Disclosure of Information) 12013. DEFCON 531 requires the contractor to safeguard information provided by MOD and requires him to ensure his employees are aware of his arrangements for so doing before they receive information. There is a mutual obligation to treat in confidence all information disclosed in connection with or under the contract. DEFCON 659 (Security measures) 12014. Contracts which involves disclosure of information marked CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET are subject to DEFCON 659 which apprises the contractor of the necessary security precautions. 12015. Amongst other things DECON 659 draws attention to the provisions of the Official Secrets Act and obliges the contractor: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. To allow only persons approved by the Ministry of Defence and with a valid "need to know" to have access to the "secret matter". b. To safeguard the "secret matter" strictly at all times to the standard prescribed. c. To ensure that employees with access to the "secret matter" are aware of and observe the security obligations imposed on the contractor and to report any default on their part. d. Not to place subcontracts involving disclosure of "secret matter" without the Ministry of Defence's written consent, and to include security conditions as defined in Appendix to DEFCON 659. e. To allow the Ministry of Defence to inspect his security arrangements. f. To permit no information in any form whatever to be published, or circulated except as necessary for the work, without the Ministry of Defence's written consent. DEFCON 76 (Conditions applicable to work performed by contractors' personnel at government establishments). 12016. DEFCON 76 is included in contracts where work is performed by contractors at Government establishments. Some of its provisions relate to the control of contractors' employees who require access to protected information or where it would not be possible to exclude them from access to protected information, even if the work upon which they are engaged is UNCLASSIFIED. In such circumstances this condition may be used in conjunction with, but never instead of DEFCON 659. DEFCON 76 is reproduced at Annex C. DEFCON 76 also obligates the contractors employees to comply with any rules, regulations and requirements in force whilst at the establishment as required and dictated by the Head of Establishment or his delegated official. For security, the applicable requirements of JSP 440 will be required to be communicated to the contractors personnel and overseen by the Establishment Security Officer (ESyO). In addition, and where appropriate, PPP/PFI/CFQ Guides and the provisions of the Template of Security Requirements at Annex X may also be applied. 12-10 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security SUB-SECTION IC RELEASE OF PROTECTIVELY MARKED INFORMATION TO INDUSTRY Rules governing the release of information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above to UK contractors. 12017. A contract which is subject to DEFCON 659 may be placed only with companies who have been approved by Info Sy (Industry)2/3 to undertake work marked CONFIDENTIAL or above at a specified location or address. With the exception of preliminary negotiations of a general nature, as provided for in para 12018, the Requisitioning Branch, (or Contracts Staff, in respect of any company it wishes to add to the list of those to be invited to tender as recommended by the Requisitioning Branch), must obtain approval from Info Sy (Industry)2/3 using the proforma at Annex D, before entering into any discussion, negotiations or the issuing of any invitation to tender that may lead to a contract marked CONFIDENTIAL or above. This applies whether or not it is necessary to disclose any information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above before the contract is placed. A contractor or his representative may not be told, even informally, that the company, is being subjected to a security check, or that the placing of a contract is subject to security approval. 12018. Preliminary negotiations of a general nature with the potential contractor may be made prior to approval, provided that: a. no information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above is disclosed; b. no indication is given that information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above will be involved in the contract: c. d. no commitment is entered into; it is understood that discussions may be terminated without explanation. 12019. Submission to Info Sy (Industry)2/3 for approval may be waived only if the Requisitioning Branch or Contracts Staff (as appropriate) holds unexpired Info Sy (Industry)2/3 provisional approval to release protected matter at the appropriate level to the company. 12020. Officers of the Ministry of Defence must not disclose information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above to a member of a company, however senior, without first satisfying themselves that he has a 'need to know' and has been 'Authorised for Access' to protected information at the appropriate level. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 12021. For contractors not on List X Info Sy (Industry)2/3 are responsible for processing "Authority for Access" for the 2 or 3 initial contacts. If the contractor is on List X, the Security Officer, (whose name can be obtained from Info Sy (Industry)2/3) should be asked whether an individual has been "Authorised for Access" to protected information. 12022. When the proposed contractor is on List X or approval by Info Sy (Industry)2/3 has been given to use the company, any disclosure of information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above during preliminary negotiations and discussions must be accompanied by warnings that the information is entrusted in strict confidence, that it is protected by, and its recipients are subject to the Official Secrets Act, and that it may be communicated only to other members of the company who have been "Authorised for Access" to protected information by the Ministry of Defence. If protected information is disclosed orally, its protective marking must be made quite clear. Procedure for obtaining security approval to use a company 12023. Provisional approval. Provisional approval means that there is no objection in principle to a contract marked CONFIDENTIAL or above being placed with the company, but it does not constitute approval of the main body of the contractor's employees, nor that its premises are necessarily suitable for the performance of contracts protected at this level. 12024. Applications for provisional approval. When having followed the procedure set out in para 12017, the proforma as at Annex H, is returned by Info Sy (Industry)2/3 indicating in column 'c' that no clearance (whether full or provisional) exists, an application for Provisional Approval should be submitted in writing to Info Sy (Industry)2/3 by the Requisitioning Branch or Contracts Staff (as appropriate) and should include the following: a. Full name, registered address and company registration number of contractor along with first point of contact. b. c. Proposed place of manufacture. Brief description of proposed work. d. Highest protective marking of information and any special type of information (eg ATOMIC, Caveat) likely to be disclosed in preliminary negotiations and under any eventual contract. e. Name of employees of the contractor (usually no more than 3) who will require access to information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above at the provisional approval stage. 12025. It is up to the Requisitioning Branch to establish whether the contractor holds the 12-12 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security required QA certification. If the contractor is not qualified, the advice of MOD Commercial Policy Branch should be sought before seeking Provisional Security Approval. Enquiries concerning the company will normally take ten to twelve weeks to complete If approval is refused by Info Sy (Industry)2/3 the Requisitioning Branch or Contracts Staff must refrain from entering into negotiations with the contractor and must discontinue any exploratory discussions without revealing that security is the reason. Completion of Security Questionnaire/Supplement 12025. As soon as an application for Provisional Approval is made to Info Sy (Industry)2/3 they will write to the nominated contacts at the company along the lines of Annex I, asking them to complete the appropriate Security Questionnaires. Action following provisional approval 12026. Until the award of a protected contract ie at the tender stage, it is the responsibility of the Requisitioning Branch or Contracts Staff (as appropriate) to ensure that any protected information at CONFIDENTIAL level or above released to the contractor is properly protected. The following action must therefore be taken by the Requisitioning Branch or Contracts Staff when passing CONFIDENTIAL or above information to contractors with Provisional Security Approval: a. Protected documents passed to the contractor must be addressed to a person known to be authorised for access to such information. b. The contractor must be notified that their premises will be a prohibited place to which the official Secrets Acts 1911-1989 will apply; that the information is entrusted in strict confidence; and that it may be communicated only to other members of the company who have been authorised for access to protected information by the Ministry of Defence. c. The contractor must be given a copy of the "Memorandum on Security for Contractors", copies of which will be provided by Info Sy (Industry)2/3 with the approval letter. d. Enquiries must be made to see whether there is likely to be any difficulty about the provision of adequate physical security precautions at the contractor's premises at which the protected work is to be done; for example, whether it would be possible to segregate protected work from other work on the premises. There is, however, no need to go into too much detail at this stage. If a contract is placed, a Security Adviser will be appointed and the company placed on list X. However, if the provision of security precautions is likely to affect JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12-13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security programme costs, the contractor must be made aware of the likely requirements at this stage. e. If at a tender stage protectively marked information at SECRET level is to be sent to the company, the SECRET matter must be copied IMMEDIATELY to Info Sy (Industry)2/3 to allow for arrangements to be made for a security adviser to be temporarily appointed to the company to provide advice on the safeguarding of SECRET material. f. Those members of the company who will have access to protected information must be asked to sign the Official Secrets Acts declaration form (MOD Form 134) in duplicate; (supplies of which are obtainable from MOD Stores Llangennech). One copy should be retained by the individual and the other returned to the Requisitioning Branch or Contracts Staff (as appropriate) (an example letter is at Annex F). 12027. Where work on a contract marked CONFIDENTIAL or above will be carried out solely at MOD Establishments and there is no need for protected information to be held on the premises of a company, advice and security supervision of the contract, including the arrangements for seeking personnel security approval, will rest with the Security Officer of the Establishment; or if there is no Establishment Security Officer, with the responsible MOD Security Directorate. Document security 12028. All information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above being despatched to contractors must be sent initially to the Security Officer in the case of a company already on List X; or to the initial contact of the company who will ensure that the information is properly recorded and protected. However, care should be taken to address the Security Officer by name only, not by appointment. The outside envelope must not bear the words "Security Officer". The name of the Security Officer may be obtained from Info Sy (Industry)2/3. Doubtful marking of documents 12029. A special proforma (copy at Annex M) has been devised for contractors to send to the originators of a protected document, whenever they wish to query the protective marking of any aspect of a contract. Contractors have been assured that the use of these forms will in no way prejudice their interests vis-a-vis Government Contracting Departments. An officer of the Ministry of Defence receiving one of these forms should deal with it promptly, if necessary issuing an amendment to the SAL, which should be distributed in accordance with para 12055. 12-14 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security Visits to contractors 12030. Under clause 3 d) of DEFCON 659, a contractor has a duty to ensure that a visitor has written approval from the Ministry of Defence to discuss protected matters. He also has a duty to satisfy himself about the 'need to know' of any visitor, whatever his status. This latter requirement applies equally to RESTRICTED and UNCLASSIFIED matters. 12031. In order to avoid delay and embarrassment at the time of a visit, officers of the Ministry of Defence should observe the following rules: a. When intending to visit a contractor for the first time, they should ensure that they are introduced beforehand by letter from the Head of Branch or some other officer known to the contractor. The letter should be sent to the contractor's Security Officer. b. They should give adequate warning of all subsequent visits. c. They should not take persons unknown to the contractor on a visit without giving prior warning, and without notifying the contractor of the names of the individuals and the degree of access required. d. If sponsoring unaccompanied visitors, they should give advance notification together with personal details, confirmation of 'need to know', and degree of access required. e. They should not seek to use their official position to try to convince a contractor of their 'right' to have access to protected information connected with contractors or to visit parts of his premises other than those with which they are personally concerned. Visits from contractors 12032. An officer who is to receive a visitor from a company must determine whether he may be given protected information. The contractor must not be allowed to acquire protected information nor is he to be given it, unless he needs to know it and has been authorised to receive it (see paras 12020 and 12021). Disclosure of information marked CONFIDENTIAL and above must first be authorised by the Security Directorate or local security officer. 12033. The person visiting should be escorted at all times unless that person satisfies the required security status for unescorted access (see para 12033 above). He must be left in no doubt about the protective marking of any information that has been disclosed to him and then he is responsible for safeguarding it (see para 12022). If documents marked CONFIDENTIAL or above are handed out at demonstrations, conferences etc, each document is to be copy numbered and strictly controlled, and the names of persons JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12-15 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security receiving copies recorded. At the end of each session of the demonstration, conference etc, visitors are to hand in their copies. When transmission is to be made to their official address, this must be done through normal secure channels. However, the material should be addressed initially to the security officer of the company (see para 12029) who will ensure that the documents are properly recorded and safeguarded. Further guidance on control and transmission of protected documents is given in Chapter 4. Recovery of documents etc 12034. Clause 4b) of DEFCON 659 gives the Ministry of Defence the right, by giving notice, to require the contractor to deliver to the Ministry of Defence any document (including all copies and extracts therefrom) which contain or may reveal information about any "secret matters". Requisitioning Branches must ensure that protectively marked documents etc are withdrawn from the contractor on completion of the contract, unless they need to be retained for a further contract, or as inspection records for a certain period. Similarly all branches which have issued protectively marked documents or drawings to contractors in connection with an invitation to tender should ensure that such documents and drawings are recovered from all but the successful tenderer immediately the result is known. 12-16 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security SUB-SECTION ID PROTECTIVE MARKING OF WORK AND DOCUMENTS The responsibility of the requisitioning branch 12035. It is the responsibility of the Requisitioning Branch when submitting a requisition or other request for tendering or contract action to answer the following questions in the space provided on the Requisition Form: a. Will the execution of this contract involve the disclosure and/or custody of information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above on the contractors premises? b. What is the highest protective marking of information to be included in the tender or initial contract documents? If disclosure of protected information is solely on MOD premises, an affirmative answer should still be given to the question in para 12038a, but the requisition form must be annotated with a request for DEFCON 76 to be included in the tender or contract document (see para 12016). 12036. If the answer to the question in para 12036a is that information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above will be disclosed, the Requisitioning Branch must take action in accordance with Sub-section IC. In addition, the Contracts Staff must include DEFCON 659 in the tender or contract document. Protective marking of contract documents 12037. When considering para 12036b, Requisitioning Branches should bear in mind that contract documents have a wide circulation in companies, and the aim should therefore be to exclude information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above from contract documents. If it is not possible to avoid protectively marking the contract document itself, the Requisitioning Branch should consider whether the particulars which will need to appear on the advice, inspection note and on bill forms can be couched in UNCLASSIFIED terms. Reference to "vetting", "security clearance" of the company must not appear in contract documents (see paragraph 12017). All contracts subject to DEFCON 659 must bear a protective marking no lower than RESTRICTED. MOD Contracts Bulletin 12038. When compiling entries for the MOD Contracts bulletin, Requisitioning or 12-17 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Contract Branches must ensure that each entry is UNCLASSIFIED. It is also essential to ensure that the subscriber will not be able to build up a picture of a protected project from the scanning of a number of UNCLASSIFIED entries. Requisitioning Branches must therefore consult the Project Branch and the Operational Requirements Branch before forwarding entries for inclusion in the bulletin, which relate to a protected contract. European Journal 12039. Depending upon the value of a particular contract, EEC legislation requires that such contracts must also be advertised in the European Journal. However, where a contract will involve access to protectively marked information bearing a national caveat, or will involve access to sensitive sites/equipment, an application for exemption to advertise should be submitted for Info Sy (Industry)1 for consideration. 12-18 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security SUB-SECTION IE SECURITY ASPECTS LETTERS Notification of "SECRET MATTER" to the contractor 12040. The "SECRET matter" in an invitation to tender (ITT), or contract containing DEFCON 659 must be defined to the contractor in writing. The special obligations laid upon the contractor become legally effective only when the Ministry of Defence has issued a notice, in writing, defining which aspects of the ITT or contract are to be marked as CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET. This is achieved by means of a Security Aspects Letter (SAL) written by the Requisitioning Branch, or by the inclusion of a Security Aspects Clause in the ITT or contract. The contractor is required to confirm in writing that he understands and will implement the provisions of the SAL or clause. The SAL must therefore be issued to the contractor along with the ITT or contract document. Info Sy (Industry)2/3 must be informed in advance if this is not possible. It is sometimes unnecessary to define the "secret matter" to the contractor in the form of an SAL. This is usually the case when all access to protected information will be on a Government property only ­ eg. the employment of consultants etc. In these circumstances, the Requisitioning Branch should include of the following clause in the contract, under security measures: "The requirement under DEFCON 659 for the provision of a Security Aspects Letter is waived, as all work on the contract will be carried out on Government premises only." Advice on the compilation of SALs can be sought from Def Sy (S&T). Any difficulties which the company foresees or experiences in protecting the "secret matter" should be referred to Info Sy (Industry)2/3. Importance of defining "SECRET matter" to the contractor 12041. The importance of defining "SECRET matter to the contractor are explained as follows: a. The aim of the SAL or security aspects clause at the tender stage is to ensure that the contractor safeguards protected information, documents or material adequately during and after the tender stage; and to enable the contractor to make financial provision in the tender for the measures which will need to be taken to safeguard the "secret matter" in the event of them being subsequently awarded the contract. b. The aim of the SAL or clause in the contract is to provide guidance on the security markings of the main features of a project and those sub-assemblies 12-19 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security or components from which any of the protected features might be deduced. 12042. Contracts Staff will be guided by SALs when protectively marking their correspondence and it is therefore important that all sensitive features of the work which are likely to be the subject of correspondence between Contracts Staff and contractors should be correctly identified. Points to be considered by requisitioning branches in the preparation of a SAL 12043. Points to be considered by the Requisitioning Branch in preparation of a SAL are: a. A SAL which gives only provisional guidance must be amplified by the Requisitioning Branch directly with the contractor as soon as possible. When a contract is placed following consideration of tenders, a further SAL, as set out in para 12049 below, must be issued by the Requisitioning Branch even if there is no change in the definition and passed to the Contracts Branch. b. Separate notification of "secret matter" must be made for each new contract; it is not sufficient to state that these are the same as for previous contracts even though it maybe the continuation of an on going task. c. When the work to be undertaken by the contractor does not stem from a Service requirement (eg research initiated by the Ministry of Defence), the appropriate protective markings may have to be decided by the R&D establishment or project branch concerned, in consultation with Def Sy (S&T) in the first instance. d. When production is current with, or follows research and development, the project branch which acts as Requisitioning Branch must consult the appropriate HQ R&D branch to ensure that the definition of "SECRET matter" is consistent with that given at the research and development stage. e. Projects at very early stages of development may not yet have been considered by a technical grading committee; it is then necessary to seek the advice of the OR Branch sponsoring the project and Def Sy (S&T). The Requisitioning Branch together with the sponsor and Def Sy (S&T) should then analyze the project, and allocate appropriate protective markings to the main features, assemblies and sub-assemblies which need to be protected, in a Technical Grading Guide if necessary. f. Project and technical branches should consult the appropriate technical grading authority when in doubt about the definition of "secret matter" aspects in relation to defence equipment. 12-20 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security g. SALs should be protected strictly according to content, and care should be taken not to overgrade them. For instance, if certain aspects of an equipment, such as the weight or internal dimensions, are SECRET, then the letter should simply state that fact, without giving any actual figures. The SAL may then be protectively marked no higher than RESTRICTED. h. In running contracts which cover both protected and UNCLASSIFIED work, eg contracts for drawing, reproduction or film processing, it will be sufficient for the "secret matter" to be defined in general terms such as any [drawing etc] marked CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET. i. The association of one piece of equipment with another, or of one component part with one or more other parts (the several parts having perhaps been manufactured by different contractors) may require protection. In some cases, the fact that an UNCLASSIFIED, proprietary component is being used in an item of equipment may require protection; in such cases the "association" of the component with the equipment must be protected. j. The use of blanket technical protective markings must be avoided. k. The contractor must be notified of the protected aspects of any equipment issued to him on embodiment loan. l. In certain sensitive fields of work, it may be necessary to protect knowledge of the destination of equipment and to give detailed instructions on security during transportation and storage. If a Technical Grading Guide is issued, these details must be included. m. It may be necessary to protect the numbers on order and/or the delivery programme and costs. n. It may be necessary to protect the "existence" of the project. Level of signature 12044. It is important that SALs should be signed at such a level as to reflect their importance. It is not possible to lay down hard and fast rules, but as a general rule, the signatory should not be less than Band C1. The signatory should also be competent to answer technical questions on matters of detail arising from the definition of the "secret matter". Where this is not possible (eg when the Requisitioning Branch is acting on behalf of an outstation establishment) the name and telephone number of the individual to whom detailed technical enquiries should be referred to should be included in the SAL. 12-21 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Example letters 12045. Examples of the type of Security Aspects Letters are reproduced at Annexes G to L. a. Annex G is for tenders to UK List X contractors. b. Annex H is for tenders to UK contractors with "Provisional Approval" (see Section 3). c. Annex I is for tenders to UK contractors with Provisional Approval and where RESTRICTED information only needs to be released at the tender stage (see Chapter 3) d. e. f. Annex J is for contracts to UK List X contractors. Annex K is for contracts to UK contractors with "Provisional Approval". Annex L is for a change or amendment to d or e above. 12046. Annexes G - L may be reproduced locally, but there is no obligation to use them provided the content of the appropriate proforma is included in the SAL. 12047. The SAL (undated) must be forwarded to the Contracts Staff with the requisition or request for tender action. Any contract proposal for protected work received without a draft SAL should be returned to the originating branch for further action. 12048. On receipt of a copy of the invitation to tender or contract, the Requisitioning Branch must check that an SAL has been issued, or that the security aspects clause has been included (see para 12054). 12049. The Requisitioning Branch should ensure that a prompt response to the SAL is received from the contractor stating that he understands and will implement the provisions of the SAL. Use of Technical Grading Guides in SALs 12050. Reference to a Technical Grading Guide simplifies the work of defining the "SECRET matter" to the contractor. Security Aspects Clause 12051. In those cases where a contractor is already on List X, and when the "secret matter" of a tender or contract can be adequately defined by reference to a Technical 12-22 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security Grading Guide, the Requisitioning Branch may, instead of issuing a separate SAL request the inclusion of the following clause in the tender or contract document, supplying the references to be inserted: Security Aspects For the purpose of DEFCON 659, the "secret matter" of the Contract shall be as defined in ..... The Contractor shall confirm in writing to [the Requisitioning Branch) that this definition of the "secret matter" has been brought to the attention of the person directly responsible for the security of the Contract, that the definition is understood, and that measures can and will be taken to safeguard the "secret matter", and shall immediately refer any difficulty in these respects to [the Requisitioning Branch]. 12052. A request to include a Security Aspects Clause must be forwarded to the Contracts Staff no later than the Requisition. Distribution of tenders, contracts and Security Aspects Letters (SALs) 12053. When ITT are issued, the contracts despatch centre (or Contracts Staff in the case of branches which undertake their own distribution) must send the SAL to the Security Officer or main contact in the case of provisional clearance at each firm invited to tender. Similarly, if the Requisitioning Branch has requested the inclusion of a security aspects clause, an extra copy of the tender document only must be sent to the Security Officer or nominated contact. (See para 12029). 12054. Apart from their normal distribution, contracts dispatch centres and Contracts Staff must arrange distribution of copies of the SAL (indicating if it is provisional) with the related contract, to: a. b. c. d. Info Sy (Industry)2/3 Def Sy (S&T) Inspectorate of QA Branch Outstation establishment 1 copy 1 copy 1 copy 2 copies, one to the department concerned with the work and the other to the establishment's security officer. 12-23 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12-24 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security SUB-SECTION IF AMENDMENTS TO CONTRACTS AND SALS Amendments to contracts 12055. Amendments to contracts must be protected according to their content, and branches initiating contract amendment action must inform the Contracts Staff of the appropriate protective marking. They must also consider whether the amendments necessitate any alteration or addition to the definition of "secret matter". Amendment of Security Aspects Letter (SAL) or Security Aspects Clause 12056. When alterations to gradings approved by the appropriate technical grading authority involve amendment to the "SECRET matter" of the contract the Requisitioning Branch must immediately inform the contractor by amending the SAL. The amendment should take the form of Annex L and should be prepared, signed and issued by the Requisitioning Branch. 12057. When the "SECRET matter" is defined by a clause in the contract, and the description in the Technical Grading Guide is changed, the Requisitioning Branch should request the Contracts Staff to make an amendment to the contract in the form of the security aspects clause at para 12054 (adapted to suit the circumstances). The Requisitioning Branch must in the meantime ensure that the contractor is immediately made aware of the changes to the Technical Grading Guide. 12058. Distribution of the amended SAL or contract amendment, should be in accordance with paras 12055 and include the Contracts Staff if appropriate. Review and amendment of grading 12059. Requisitioning Branches must keep under review the protective marking of all aspects of the contract for which they are responsible. SALs should be reviewed regularly and at least every six months; this regular review, however, must never become a substitute for action as and when it is required (eg by revised protective markings promulgated by the technical grading authority, or by bringing changes to a Technical Grading Guide promptly to the contractor's notice). When changes in design are made, branches should consider and advise the technical grading authority of the possible security implications of the changes. 12-25 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12-26 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security SUB-SECTION IG SUBCONTRACTS PROTECTIVELY MARKED CONFIDENTIAL OR ABOVE Approval to place a subcontract protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL or above 12060. Clause 7 a) of DEFCON 659 requires a contractor to seek the Ministry of Defence's approval before subcontracting any work which involves the disclosure of any of the "SECRET matter" of the main contract. This approval is not necessarily required when the place of manufacture of the prospective subcontractor is known to the main contractor to be on List X and contracts subject to DEFCON 659 can, if authorised by the Requisitioning Branch, contain the following provision: "Submissions for approval under Clause 7 a) of DEFCON 659 are not required in respect of work to be carried out by subcontractors at premises which are known to be on List X. In other cases the information required under DEFCON 659, Clause 7a) shall be submitted to Info Sy (Industry)2/3 and copied to your Security Adviser in accordance with arrangements notified in "Manual of Protective Security" (MPS). 12061. If a main contractor wishes to place a subcontract involving the disclosure of information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above, on a company not on List X, Info Sy (Industry)2/3 will make an assessment of the suitability of the potential subcontractor solely from a security viewpoint and if there are no objections will notify the main contractor accordingly. 12062. In all cases, the main contractor will be required to include the conditions in the subcontract equivalent as laid down at Appendix to DEFCON 659 and to define to the subcontractor the "Secret Matter" of the subcontract. Responsibilities of the requisitioning branch 12063. Requisitioning Branches control of subcontracting is based on details provided by contractors when submitting tenders or accepting contracts, and by close liaison with contractors, particularly under Research and Development contracts. Requisitioning Branches should accordingly maintain sufficient liaison with main contractors as will enable them to exercise supervision over subcontracting generally, and to ensure that no more protected information than is necessary is disclosed to subcontractors. 12-27 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12-28 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security SUB-SECTION IH PROTECTIVELY MARKED CONTRACTS WITH OVERSEAS CONTRACTORS Application for approval 12064. If it is considered necessary for a contract marked CONFIDENTIAL or above to be placed with a contractor in another country, Ministry of Defence agreement must be obtained in accordance with Chapter 11. The Requisitioning Branch (or the Contracts Staff in respect of any companies it wishes to add to the list of those invited to tender as recommended by the Requisitioning Branch) must then obtain security approval from Info Sy (Industry)1 using the proforma at Annex N before the issue of any ITT or contract or before the release of any information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above; this action must be taken even if the Requisitioning Branch knows the prospective contractor is performing other protectively marked work, or if the contract is to be placed by an authority in the other country on behalf of the MOD (eg the UK Defence Procurement Office in Washington). 12065. The Requisitioning Branch or Contracts Staff (as appropriate) must give Info Sy (Industry)1 a minimum of 10 days notice when seeking security approval of contractors in NATO countries and a minimum of 15 days notice for contractors in non-NATO countries. On no account should CONFIDENTIAL information be passed to an overseas contractor without consulting Info Sy (Industry)1, who will confirm in writing their approval to use the contractor, and provide the appropriate overseas security conditions to be included in the ITT or contract documents. Where a contractor is not already security cleared, advice should be sought from Info Sy (Industry)1, telephone No. 020 7218 4263/0125. Obligations of an overseas contractor 12066. If Info Sy (Industry)1 gives security approval, the overseas contractor must be provided with details of the information which is protectively marked, and notified that he is required to give at least the same protection to this information as he is obliged to give to information of equivalent security grading entrusted to him by his own government. The Requisitioning branch must prepare an SAL which should be attached to the formal ITT contract documents that are sent to the contractor (see annexes O and P). Contracts involving the disclosure of RESTRICTED information 12067. There is no requirement to seek security approval from Info Sy (Industry)1 12-29 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security before placing a RESTRICTED contract with an overseas contractor (but see para 12070). The Requisitioning Branch must verify by reference to the instructions on the release of military information (promulgated by the RMIPC) that the country is not one which is debarred from receiving any protected information. The Security Conditions to be included in RESTRICTED ITT or contract documents are reproduced at Annex Q. 12068. The Requisitioning Branch must inform the contractor in writing of the RESTRICTED Security Aspects and notify him that this information may be disclosed only to those of his employees who have a "need to know" for the performance of the contract. 12069. Requisitioning Branch or Contracts Staff (as appropriate) should consult Info Sy (Industry)1 using the proforma at Annex N should they wish to place a RESTRICTED contract with a contractor in Australia, Austria, Israel, Italy, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands or USA. Notification of contracts to Info Sy (Industry) 1 12070. One copy of all protectively marked contracts and the SAL, or equivalent, must be sent to Info Sy (Industry)1, one copy of the SAL, or equivalent, must be sent to Def Sy (S&T). Where necessary, Info Sy (Industry)1 will inform the government of the other country, and in the case of contracts involving information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above, will endeavour to arrange for an appropriate department of the other government to accept responsibility of supervising the protection of protectively marked information which will need to be disclosed, as well as the general security of the contract. 12-30 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security SUB-SECTION IJ OTHER FORMS OF CONTRACTS Orders on agency establishments or agency factories 12071. For security purposes, contractors managing Ministry of Defence owned establishments under agency agreements are to be treated generally in the same way as other contractors. Certain modification of detailed procedure are, however, necessary on account of the nature of the contractual relationship. 12072. The standing instructions relating to agency establishments include provisions equivalent to those of DEFCON 659. Orders placed on agency establishments which involve access to information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above must draw attention to the relevant security provisions of the agency agreement and the associated standing instructions. Contracts Staff must follow the instructions in para 12055 in despatching an extra copy of an order to the security officer of the agency establishment and in distributing one copy of the order to Info Sy (Industry) 2/3. 12073. An SAL must be issued for each order involving access to information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above. It should take the general form of Annex H, but the reference in the first paragraph should be to sub-paragraph A 1(a) of Section 1 of the 'Standing Instructions Relating to Agency Establishments'. Distribution must be as in para 12057. Extramural research agreements and consultancy contracts 12074. The majority of research agreements and consultancy contracts are placed with universities or university personnel. Because of the practical difficulties of safeguarding protected information in such circumstances and the universities' own reluctance to handle such information, agreements which involve the disclosure of information protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL or above should only be placed in very exceptional circumstances. DVA(York) should be advised at the earliest possible stage of the intention to place such an agreement. 12075. Before negotiating the agreement, the branch sponsoring it must obtain personal details on Security Questionnaire & Supplement forms (available from the usual forms supplier) of any person who will be engaged in the research, and submit them to DVA(York) for approval. The formal agreement/contract must include a security clause, and Info Sy (Industry)2/3 must be consulted about the wording at an early stage. In general, the security clause will state the protection which must be afforded to the work, and will require, amongst other things, that no person shall be engaged upon the work without the prior approval of the Ministry of Defence, that persons engaged on the 12-31 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security work shall be subject to and sign the Official Secrets Acts declarations, and that protected material shall be protected in accordance with security instructions. A copy of the formal agreement/contract should be sent to Info Sy (Industry)2/3. It is especially important that sponsoring and other branches, who may be asked to approve the engagement of individuals for the work or to agree to individuals having access, should consult DVA(York) before replying. 12076. The personnel working on the agreement/contract will be visited by a Security Adviser who will provide a briefing on their security responsibilities and arrange provision of adequate security furniture. (See also chapters 2 and 5.) Contracts for buildings and civil engineering works 12077. Some contracts subject to the General Conditions of Government Contracts for Building and Civil Engineering Works (Forms GC/WORKS/1 and CCC/WORKS, C1001 and 2) and to MOD DEFCONS derived there from are placed by the Defence Procurement Agency. These include a 'secrecy' clause drawing attention to the Official Secrets Act and a clause empowering the Ministry of Defence to exclude persons from the site of the work. Printing contracts placed by MOD with commercial firms 12078. Central Services (Printing) (CS(Pr)) is responsible for the provision of all MOD printing requirements. When a print requirement is identified, MOD Form 1185 for general printing or MOD Form 185a for letter headed paper etc. should be completed and forwarded to CS(Pr)1a. A decision will then be made to either print in-house or through The Stationary Office (TSO) in which case CS(Pr)1 will ensure the work is placed with a contractor who has been approved by Info Sy (Industry) to undertake Protectively Marked contracts. Local purchase orders 12079. There are no special security provisions in the Conditions of Local Purchase Orders (LPO). It is therefore undesirable for work protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL or above to be placed in this way. Work so marked should be placed by headquarters Contracts Staff responsible for the stores concerned, and if the requirement is recurrent, an enabling arrangement should be considered. 12080. There may, however, be exceptional occasions when it is essential to place a LPO for protected work marked CONFIDENTIAL or above, and in these circumstances it will be necessary to include the full text of DEFCON 659 in the contract (see annex B). LPO work involving protected work CONFIDENTIAL or above may not be placed without the written prior agreement of Info Sy (Industry)2/3. 12081. Local purchase orders must not be placed for film if the purchase price includes 12-32 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security processing, unless it is quite certain that no protected material will be included in the exposed film. Enabling arrangements with the major makers of photographic film contain DEFCON 659 and provide for the direct demand by outstation establishments for supplies of film and for processing where relevant. Special arrangements are promulgated by the contracts division for the handling of protected film under these contracts, and outstation establishments must ensure that these are adhered to when despatching exposed protected film. Any difficulty should be referred to the appropriate Contracts Staff. 12082. The full text of DEFCON 76 should be invoked in RESTRICTED and UNCLASSIFIED LPO where work is performed by contractors' employees at Government establishments (see Annex C). Contracts associated with international collaborative projects 12083. These may involve special procedures, and if in doubt, Requisitioning Branches should consult Info Sy (Industry)1 and Def Sy (S&T). Bilateral or multilateral collaborative projects are normally covered by government Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), the security clauses of which would normally require a Project Security Instruction (PSI) to be drawn up by the designated project offices in collaboration with the National Security Authorities (NSA)/Designated Security Authorities (DSA) of the participants concerned, as early as is sensible in the life of the project. However, the existence of a PSI does not preclude SALs for individual contracts. 12-33 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12-34 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security SUB-SECTION IK CONTRACTS INVOLVING THE RELEASE OF RESTRICTED INFORMATION ONLY, TO UK CONTRACTORS Security measures 12084. Contracts involving the release of information which is marked RESTRICTED should not include DEFCON 659. However, DEFCON 531 (which is applicable where release of UNCLASSIFIED as well as protected information is involved) should be included. The security precautions necessary for the protection of CONFIDENTIAL or above information do not apply to RESTRICTED information. However, such information must only be released on a personal basis to a named UK National in the company and where the contractor is not on List X, Annex R should be included in the Technical Specification or Statement of Work. This gives the contractor advice on the protection of RESTRICTED information. Notification to the firm of RESTRICTED aspects 12085. The Requisitioning Branch should prepare and sign a RESTRICTED aspects letter to the firm defining the RESTRICTED aspects in the form of Annex S leaving blank spaces for insertion of the ITT or contract number and date. The Requisitioning Branch should forward the RESTRICTED aspects letter to the Contracts Staff with the requisition so that it can be issued with the ITT or contract. If the guidance given is provisional, the Requisitioning Branch should prepare and distribute a further RESTRICTED aspects letter, as soon as possible. Distribution of RESTRICTED contract/tender documents and SALs 12086. The Contracts Stafff, or contracts despatch centre, should send the RESTRICTED Aspects Letter (RAL), together with the appropriate ITT or contracts document, to the main contact at the company. Copies of the RESTRICTED aspects letter and ITT or contract documentation should be sent to the branches listed in para 12055. When the contractor is on List X a further copy of the RAL and ITT or contract documentation should be sent to the Security Controller. 12-35 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12-36 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security SUB-SECTION IL SECURITY OF CONTRACTORS' COMPUTER INSTALLATIONS 12087. When processing protectively marked information, the same security policy guidelines apply to computer and information technology systems owned by contractors or subcontractors as for such systems in HMG service. These guidelines are described in the Manual of Protective Security (MPS); Chapter 5 Annex 3 gives the minimum mandatory computer security standards for any information technology system handling HMG protectively marked information (CESG Compusec Memorandum No 10). DMS Volume 3 reflects and expands these guidelines for all parts of the MOD. 12088. Requisitioning branches or project managers are responsible for the security aspects (including IT security) of any contracts they award and manage. To meet the above policy guidelines, they must seek approval (accreditation or confirmation of accreditation) from Info Sy (Industry) 2/3 of any IT system to be used to process protectively marked HMG information (see DMS Vol 3). They will arrange for the approval of any IT systems, the appropriate advice to be given on how the work is to be processed, and on what security and operation procedures will be required to protect the security aspects. 12089. Any ITT or contract must make it clear that approval (accreditation) by an approved HMG authority of any IT system processing protectively marked HMG information is mandatory. 12-37 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12-38 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security SECTION II PROJECT SECURITY PLANNING Introduction 12090. Integrated Project team (IPT) Leaders are formally responsible for all aspects of security for their projects. The purpose of this Section is to outline, for all IPT Leaders at all levels and their staff in MOD Headquarters, outstations, Commands, Defence Procurement Agency and Agencies, the resources available to assist them in the identification and protection of security aspects of their projects. 12091. Every IPT Leader needs to ensure that the procedure for the award of protectively marked contracts and the protection of work in industry are followed. 12092. Guidance relating to the application of security principles to SMART Procurement can be found on the Acquisition Management System (AMS), available to all project team members Principles 12093. Reliable security is achieved by: a. Correct assessment. The protective markings applied must be appropriate to the state of development of the project itself, the countermeasures known or anticipated and the progressive disclosure of details as the project materializes. b. Need to know. This rule must be impressed on all concerned both in the Ministry of Defence and in industry. c. Co-ordination. Dispersal of responsibility for project development and deployment brings increased risks and the same standard of security must be applied at all places where a project is being either developed, tested or used. d. Review. The security grading of a project shall be reviewed at each R&D milestone and at least at yearly intervals until the system is brought into service. These principles will apply to equipment modification as appropriate. Initial programme phases 120944. Formal indication of Service security requirements will normally be in 12-39 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security the User Requirement, Document (URD) and System Requirement Document (SRD) although some preliminary discussions may have taken place before hand. The security clauses in the URD or SRD are generally stated in broad terms. These need to be amplified when preparing guidance for use in the protection of documents and hardware, preferably in the form of a technical grading guide. a. It is important for the IPT or project branch associated with a project to prepare a Security Aspects Letter (SAL) and to consult Def Sy (Industry)2/3 and Def Sy (S&T) before approaching any firm prior o the letting of the contract (even for UNCLASSIFIED discussions). This will avoid the embarrassment of negotiations having to be terminated for security reasons. b. This chapter also describes the security procedures in connection with the award of protectively marked contracts and the protection of work in industry. c. Assessment phase contracts should require the contractor to examine the broad security requirements set out in the URD or SRD and to report any special precautions and expenditure needed to meet the level of security in the development, testing and production phases for British equipment. Projected foreign sales are likely to require variants with different security criteria. a. This report must be scrutinized by the IPT (if necessary in consultation with CB Sy 2 and Def Sy (S&T) to check: (1) That the necessary level of security is possible and achievable in the proposed places of manufacture. (2) Procedures required for transportation. (3) Information technology and computer security (see DMS Vol 3). (4) Electronic emission security (ELSEC Memorandum No 1 issued by CESG). (5) Other security problems associated with trials. Preliminaries to the development contract 12095. Preliminaries to the development contract are: a. Following Assessment Phase the terms of a further SAL should be discussed with Def Sy (S&T) and the contractor, so that it covers any security 12-40 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security matters revealed by the phase. Imposition of special or additional security required after the contract has been let may necessitate revision of the price or the contracts. b. The definitions set out in a SAL should not leave the firm with any doubts or difficulties concerning its interpretation. The firm's Security Adviser will give detailed guidance to the firm on the way physical, documentary and emission protection requirements are to be met. c. The SAL for a demonstration phase needs to be in greater detail than that for any earlier phase. The security gradings or requirements must be analyzed and interpreted by the IPT Leader, if necessary in consultation with the Equipment Capability Customer and Def Sy (S&T). The contractor must be advised of the appropriate security gradings to be applied to detailed drawings, assemblies, sub-assemblies and lesser items of hardware and all related documentation. The SAL should be signed by not less than a C1 grade. The advice of Def Sy (S&T) should be sought if any difficulty is encountered in drafting. d. The IPT Leader should also prepare a detailed protective marking breakdown which, if approved by the appropriate Equipment Grading Committee, will be promulgated in the official grading guide for that equipment. Review of grading 12096. The Technical Grading Guide is reviewed at least annually by the appropriate grading committee or sub-committee: a. To identify those aspects of the project which require security grading. b. Wherever possible, to reduce security gradings as the project progresses; this does not imply that initial standards were set too high but recognizes that not all operational security requirements can be maintained throughout the demonstration and manufacture phases without unacceptable expenditure or disruption to the programme. The IPT Leader must consult Def Sy (S&T) who provide the secretariat of the appropriate grading committee, to initiate these reviews. 12-41 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Grading committee machinery 12097. The grading committee machinery is: a. The process of grading equipment for security purposes is controlled by the following committees (see Annex T): (1) The Naval Equipment Security Committee and its subcommittees, which deal with ships, their propulsion, weapons and ancillary equipment. (2) The Land Systems Equipment Security Policy Committee and its sub-committees, which deal with most equipment procured for the Army. (3) The Air Equipment Security Committee and its sub-committees, which deal with aircraft, aircraft engines and ground equipment, avionics and electronics, armaments, together with all guided weapons and nuclear weapons. (4) b. The Special Armour Security Committee (SASC). Grading committees are responsible for: (1) Assigning protective markings to new projects and equipment destined for use by the UK Forces. (2) Advising on protective markings to new projects and equipment arising from or destined for defence research work. (3) Keeping existing gradings under review and, when necessary, introducing appropriate amendments. (4) Advising on the release of defence related data for publication. c. The Equipment Capability Manager or the Research Director or theIPT Leader, as appropriate, is responsible for notifying the Secretary of the appropriate sub-committee as soon as a project requirement or item of equipment reaches the stage where detailed security gradings need to be promulgated. Consultation between them is essential. The Secretary of the committee will obtain from the branches details of items which need to be considered for initial grading or in connection with contractor's publicity. 12-42 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security Project security duties 12098. Project security duties are: a. For minor projects the security function is normally carried out by the IPT Leader who retains the responsibility of Project Security Officer. For all major projects protected at CONFIDENTIAL or above, a technical officer shall be appointed by the Project Manager to assume the duties of Project Security Officer. He should be familiar with the project, be normally of at least C1 grade, and have a reasonable expectation of continuity in post. b. The duties of the Project Security Officer include: (1) The drafting of SALs and the security plan for the project, in consultation as necessary with Info Sy (Industry)2/3, CBSy 2, Info Sy (Tech), Def Sy (S&T) and Equip Sec 3. (2) Liaison with the Equipment Grading sub-committee and Def Sy (S&T) and where appropriate DESO and PR branches, on matters arising from the interpretation of the Technical Grading Guides and column release schedules (controlled by Def Sy (S&T)). (3) Representing the Project Manager on the appropriate grading sub-committees and at project progress meetings. (4) Co-ordination of effective security measures throughout the project. (5) Occasional spot checks to monitor the application of security measures. (6) Supervision of the project access list where one exists. (7) Liaison with Info Sy (Industry)2/3 on the security clearance of contractors and contractor's personnel. (8) Liaison with CB Sy 2 and R&D establishments' security officers, as appropriate, on the physical security aspects of the project. Completed and cancelled projects 12099. In contracts subject to DEFCON 659 a contractor is required to protect at the appropriate level any protectively marked information and equipment he holds even after the completion or cancellation of a contract. IPT Leaders must, therefore, inform the contractors concerned of any change in protective marking so that the protection 12-43 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security afforded to the project conforms with the current protective marking of a completed or cancelled project. Involvement of contractors in security plans 12100. Points concerning the involvement of contractors are as follows: a. Security should be included on the agenda of progress meetings held with contractors, who should be encouraged to take an active part in determining security gradings. Proposals for regrading which emerge from such discussions should be notified to the appropriate grading committee. b. Contractors are advised and encouraged to challenge gradings which they believe to be unrealistic or impractical. Such challenges are to be dealt with fully and quickly in consultation with the grading authority. c. The IPT Leader is responsible for arranging, in the absence of any other action, for the current secret aspects letter to be reviewed once per year. Open release of official information 12101. Information should only be released to the press through Defence Public Relations staff to whom all requests from the press must be referred. Consultation between the Equipment Capability branch for the project, the IPT Leader, the contractors and the appropriate security grading authority (see para 12100 and Annex T) is essential before any release is made by Defence Public Relations staff. Releases and the conditions on which they are made must be recorded by the Operational Requirements branch and it is essential for this information to be passed to D Def Sy and others involved in the project. a. Isolated and minor items of information which may not of themselves appear significant may, when placed with information obtained from other sources, result in the publication of a speculative or harmful article of major security importance. b. Def Sy (S&T) Authored Material is responsible for clearance of matters submitted by Mod staff, contractors and consultants for open publication or for presentation at lectures, seminars, etc or to learned societies, universities, professional bodies, etc at home and abroad. c. Def Sy (S&T) Pubs & Exhibs is responsible for clearance of UNCLASSIFIED publicity and information brochures, etc produced by the MOD or the defence industry for display at exhibitions or trade shows or for other purposes. 12-44 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security d. The Inventions Unit D Def Sy (S&T) Inv & Pat is responsible for advice to the Patent Office on prohibition for security reasons of the publication of British and foreign patent applications. e. The procedures governing the release of military information to overseas countries are given in the Manual of Defence Security, chapter 11. Research programmes 12102. The organization responsible for initiating a research project should seek advice on project security grading from Def Sy (S&T), who will consult the appropriate Service sponsor branch and the Project Manager responsible for the project for which the outcome of the research may eventually be used. Any proposed release of information concerning a research project is to be referred to Def Sy (S&T). Security of contractor's private venture projects 12103. Notes on private venture projects are at Annex U to this Chapter. 12-45 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12-46 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 12 DEFCON 531 (EDN 10/97) MINISTRY OF DEFENCE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 1. 'Information' means any information in any written or other tangible form disclosed to one party by or on behalf of the other party under or in connection with the Contract. 2. Subject to Clause 5 and 6 each party: a) shall treat in confidence all Information it receives from the other; b) shall not disclose any of that Information to any third party without the prior written consent of the other party, which consent shall not unreasonably be withheld, except that the Contractor may disclose Information in confidence, without prior consent, to such persons and to such extent as may be necessary for the performance of the Contract; c) shall not use any of that Information otherwise than for the purpose of the Contract; and d) shall not copy any of that Information except to the extent necessary for the purpose of exercising its rights of use and disclosure under the Contract. 3. The Contractor shall take all reasonable precautions necessary to ensure that all Information disclosed to the Contractor by or on behalf of the Authority under or in connection with the Contract: a) is disclosed to its employees and sub-contractors, only to the extent necessary for the performance of the Contract; and b) is treated in confidence by them and not disclosed except without prior written consent or used otherwise than for the purpose of performing work or having work performed for the Authority under the Contract or any sub-contract under it. 4. The Contractor shall ensure that his employees are aware of his arrangements for discharging the obligations at Clauses 2 and 3 before they receive Information and take such steps as may be reasonably practical to enforce such arrangements. 5. Clauses 2 and 3 shall not apply to any Information to the extent that either party: a) exercises rights of use or disclosure granted otherwise than in consequence of, or under, the Contract; 12A-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b) has the right to use or disclose the Information in accordance with other conditions of the Contract; or c) can show: i) that the Information was or has become published or publicly available for use otherwise than in breach of any provision of the Contract or any other agreement between the parties; ii) that the Information was already known to it (without restrictions on disclosure or use) prior to it receiving it under or in connection with the Contract; iii) that the Information was received without restriction on further disclosure from a third party who lawfully acquired it and who is himself under no obligation restricting its disclosure; or iv) from its records that the same information was derived independently of that received under or in connection with the Contract; provided the relationship to any other Information is not revealed. 6. Neither party shall be in breach of this Condition where it can show that any disclosure of Information was made solely and to the extent necessary to comply with a statutory, judicial or parliamentary obligation. Where such a disclosure is made, the party making the disclosure shall ensure that the recipient of the Information is made aware of and asked to respect its confidentiality. Such disclosure shall in no way diminish the obligations of the parties under this Condition. 7. Nothing in this Condition shall affect the parties' obligations of confidentiality where information is disclosed orally in confidence. 12A-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 12 DEFCON 659 (EDN 9/97) MINISTRY OF DEFENCE SECURITY MEASURES Definition 1. In this Condition:a) "Secret Matter" means any matter connected with the Contract, or its performance which is designated in writing by the Authority as "Top Secret", "Secret" or "Confidential", and shall include any information concerning the content of such matter and anything which contains or may reveal that matter; b) "Employee" shall include any person who is an employee or director of the Contractor or who occupies the position of a director of the Contractor, by whatever title given. The Official Secrets Acts 2. The Contractor shall: a) take all reasonable steps to ensure that all Employees engaged on any work in connection with the Contract have notice that the Official Secrets Acts 19111989 apply to them and will continue so to apply after the completion or termination of the Contract; and b) if directed by the Authority, ensure that any Employee shall sign a statement acknowledging that, both during the term of the Contract and after its completion or termination, he is bound by the Official Secrets Acts 1911-1989 (and where applicable any other legislation). Security measures 3. Unless he has the written authorisation of the Authority to do otherwise, neither the Contractor nor any of his Employees shall, either before or after the completion or termination of the Contract, do or permit to be done anything which they know or ought reasonably to know may result in Secret Matter being disclosed to or acquired by a person in any of the following categories: 12B-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a) who is not a British citizen; b) who does not hold the appropriate authority for access to the protected matter; c) in respect of whom the Authority has notified the Contractor in writing that the Secret Matter shall not be disclosed to or acquired by that person; d) who is not an Employee of the Contractor; e) who is an Employee of the Contractor and has no need to know the information for the proper performance of the Contract. 4. Unless he has the written authorisation of the Authority to do otherwise, the Contractor and his Employees shall, both before and after the completion or termination of the Contract, take all reasonable steps to ensure that: a) no photograph of, or pertaining to, any Secret Matter shall be taken and no copy of or extract from any Secret Matter shall be made except to the extent necessary for the proper performance of the Contract; b) any Secret Matter is at all times strictly safeguarded in accordance with the Manual of Protective Security and upon request, is delivered up to the Authority who shall be entitled to retain it. A decision of the Authority on the question of whether the Contractor has taken or is taking reasonable steps as required by this Clause, shall be final and conclusive. 5. The Contractor shall: a) provide to the Authority: i) upon request, such records giving particulars of those Employees who have had at any time, access to any Secret Matter that is required to be kept in accordance with Sub-clause 4.b.; ii) upon request, such information as the Authority may from time to time require so as to be satisfied that the Contractor and his Employees are complying with his obligations under this Condition, including the measures taken or proposed by the Contractor so as to comply with his obligations and to prevent any breach of them; iii) full particulars of any failure by the Contractor and his Employees to comply with any obligations relating to Secret Matter arising under this Condition immediately upon such failure becoming apparent; b) ensure that, for the purpose of checking the Contractor's compliance with the obligation in Sub-clause 4.b., a representative of the Authority shall be entitled at any time to enter and inspect any premises used by the Contractor which are in any way connected with the Contract and inspect any document or thing in any such premises, which is being used or made for the purposes of the Contract. 12B-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security Such representative shall be entitled to all such information as he may reasonably require. 6. If at any time either before or after the completion or termination of the Contract, the Contractor or any of his Employees discovers or suspects that an unauthorised person is seeking or has sought to obtain information directly or indirectly concerning any Secret Matter, the Contractor shall forthwith inform the Authority of the matter with full particulars thereof. Sub-Contracts 7. If the Contractor proposes to make a sub-contract which will involve the disclosure of Secret Matter to the sub-contractor, the Contractor shall: a) submit for approval of the Authority the name of the proposed subcontractor, a statement of the work to be carried out and any other details known to the Contractor which the Authority shall reasonably require; b) incorporate into the sub-contract the terms of the Appendix to this condition and such secrecy and security obligations as the Authority shall direct. In the appendix "Agreement" shall mean the "Sub-Contract", "First Party" shall mean the "Contractor" and "Second Party" shall mean the "Sub-Contractor"; c) inform the Authority immediately he becomes aware of any breach by the subcontractor of any secrecy or security obligation and, if requested to do so by the Authority, terminate the sub-contract. Termination 8. The Authority shall be entitled to terminate the Contract immediately if: a) the Contractor is in breach of any obligation under this Condition; or b) the Contractor is in breach of any secrecy or security obligation imposed by any other contract with the Crown;where the Authority consider the circumstances of the breach jeopardise the secrecy or security of the Secret Matter. 12B-3 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12B-4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security APPENDIX TO DEFCON 659 (EDN 9/97) MINISTRY OF DEFENCE SECURITY MEASURES PROVISIONS TO BE INCLUDED IN RELEVANT SUBCONTRACTS Definition 1. In this Condition:a. "Secret Matter" means any matter connected with the Agreement, or its performance which the First Party informs the Second Party in writing has been designated by the Authority as "Top Secret", "Secret" or "Confidential", and shall include any information concerning the content of such matter and anything which contains or may reveal that matter; b. "Employee" shall include any person who is an employee or director of the Second Party or who occupies the position of a director of the Second Party, by whatever title given. c. The "Authority" means the Secretary of State for Defence. The Official Secrets Acts 2. The Second Party shall: a. Take all reasonable steps to ensure that all Employees engaged on any work in connection with the Agreement have notice that the Official Secrets Acts 1911-1989 apply to them and will continue so to apply after the completion or termination of the Agreement; and b. If directed by the First Party or the Authority, ensure that any Employee shall sign a statement acknowledging that, both during the term of the Agreement and after its completion or termination, he is bound by the Official Secrets Acts 1911-1989 (and where applicable any other legislation). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12B1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Security Measures 3. Unless he has the written authorisation of the Authority to do otherwise, neither the Second Party nor any of his Employees shall, either before or after the completion or termination of the Agreement, do or permit to be done anything which they know or ought reasonably to know may result in Secret Matter being disclosed to or acquired by a person in any of the following categories: a. who is not a British citizen; b. who does not hold the appropriate authority for access to the protected matter; c. in respect of whom the Authority has notified the Second Party in writing that the Secret Matter shall not be disclosed to or acquired by that person; d. who is not an Employee of the Second Party; e. who is an Employee of the Second Party and has no need to know the information for the proper performance of the Agreement. 4. Unless he has the written permission of the Authority to do otherwise, the Second Party and his Employees shall, both before and after the completion or termination of the Agreement, take all reasonable steps to ensure that: a. no photograph of, or pertaining to, any Secret Matter shall be taken and no copy of or extract from any Secret Matter shall be made except to the extent necessary for the proper performance of the Agreement; b. any Secret Matter is at all times strictly safeguarded in accordance with the Manual of Protective Security and upon request, is delivered up to the Authority who shall be entitled to retain it. A decision of the Authority on the question of whether the Second Party has taken or is taking reasonable steps as required by this Clause, shall be final and conclusive. 5. The Second Party shall: a. provide to the Authority: i) upon request, such records giving particulars of those Employees who have had at any time, access to any Secret Matter that is required to be kept in accordance with Sub-clause 4.b.; ii) upon request, such information as the Authority may from time to time require so as to be satisfied that the Second Party and his Employees are complying with his obligations under this Condition, including the measures JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12B1-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security taken or proposed by the Second Party so as to comply with his obligations and to prevent any breach of them; iii) full particulars of any failure by the Second Party and his Employees to comply with any obligations relating to Secret Matter arising under this Condition immediately upon such failure becoming apparent; b. ensure that, for the purpose of checking the Second Party's compliance with the obligation in Sub-clause 4.b., a representative of the First Party or the Authority shall be entitled at any time to enter and inspect any premises used by the Second Party which are in any way connected with the Agreement and inspect any document or thing in any such premises, which is being used or made for the purposes of the Agreement. Such representative shall be entitled to all such information as he may reasonably require. 6. If at any time either before or after the completion or termination of the Contract, the Second Party or any of his Employees discovers or suspects that an unauthorised person is seeking or has sought to obtain information directly or indirectly concerning any Secret Matter, the Second Party shall forthwith inform the Authority of the matter with full particulars thereof. Sub-Contracts 7. If the Second Party proposes to make a sub-contract which will involve the disclosure of Secret Matter to the sub-contractor, the Second Party shall: a. submit for approval of the Authority the name of the proposed subcontractor, a statement of the work to be carried out and any other details known to the Second Party which the Authority shall reasonably require; b. incorporate into the sub-contract the terms of this Condition and such secrecy and security obligations as the Authority shall direct. c. inform the Authority immediately he becomes aware of any breach by the sub-contractor of any secrecy or security obligation and, if requested to do so by the Authority, terminate the Agreement. Termination 8. The First Party shall be entitled to terminate the Agreement immediately if: a. the Second Party is in breach of any obligation under this Condition; or b. the Second Party is in breach of any secrecy or security obligation imposed by any other contract with the Crown; JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12B1-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security where the Authority consider the circumstances of the breach jeopardise the secrecy or security of the Secret Matter and notifies its contractor accordingly. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12B1-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX C DEFCON 76 (EDN 10/97) MINISTRY OF DEFENCE CONTRACTOR'S PERSONNEL AT GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHMENTS Definitions 1. Reference herein to: a) "Government Establishment" or "site" shall be deemed to include any of Her Majesty's Ships or Vessels and Service Stations; and b) "Officer in Charge" shall be deemed to include Officers Commanding Service Stations, Ships' Masters or Senior Officers, and Heads of Government Establishments. General 2. a) The Officer in Charge shall provide such available administrative and technical facilities for the Contractor's representatives employed at Government Establishments for the purpose of the Contract as may be necessary for the effective and economical discharge of work under the Contract. These facilities will be provided free of charge unless otherwise stated in the Contract. The status to be accorded to the Contractor's representatives for messing purposes will be at the discretion of the Officer in Charge. b) Any land or premises (including temporary buildings) made available to the Contractor by the Authority in connection with the Contract shall be made available to the Contractor free of charge, unless otherwise stated in the Contract, and shall be used by the Contractor solely for the purpose of performing the Contract. The Contractor shall have the use of such land or premises as licensee and shall vacate the same upon completion of the Contract. Any utilities required by the Contractor shall be subject to the charges set out in the Contract. 12C-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security c) The Contractor shall have no claim against the Authority for any additional cost or delay occasioned by the closure for holidays of Government Establishments, where this is made known to him prior to placing the Contract. Liability in respect of damage to Government property 3. Without prejudice to the provisions of Standard Condition 11 (Issues of Government Property) and Standard Condition 12 (Loss of or Damage to the Articles) of Form GC/STORES/1, where those Conditions form part of the Contract, the Contractor shall, except as otherwise provided for in the Contract, make good or, at the option of the Authority, pay compensation for all damage occurring to any Government Property, which includes land or buildings, occasioned by the Contractor, or by his servants, agents or sub-contractors, arising from his or their presence on a Government Establishment in connection with the Contract, provided that this Condition shall not apply to the extent that the Contractor is able to show that any such damage was not caused or contributed to by any circumstances within his reasonable control or of that of his servants, agents or sub-contractors. 4. The total liability of the Contractor under Condition 3 herein shall be subject to any limitation specified in the Contract. Contractor's property 5. All property of the Contractor while at a Government Establishment shall be at the risk of the Contractor, and the Authority shall accept no liability for any loss or damage howsoever occurring thereto or caused thereby, except as follows:a) where any such loss or damage was caused or contributed to by any act, neglect or default of any Government Servant, agent or contractor then the Authority shall accept liability therefore to the extent to which such loss or damage is so caused or contributed to as aforesaid; and b) where any property of the Contractor has been taken on charge by the Officer in Charge, and a proper receipt has been given therefore, then the Authority shall be liable for any loss or damage occurring to that property while held on such charge as aforesaid. Contractor's representatives 6. The Contractor shall submit in writing to the Authority for approval, initially and as necessary from time to time, a list of the representatives who may need to enter a Government Establishment for the purpose of, or in connection with, work under the 12C-2 JSP 440 Volume1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security Contract, giving such particulars as the Authority may require, including full details of birthplace and parentage of any representative who: a) was not born in the United Kingdom; or b) if he was born in the United Kingdom, was born of parents either or both of whom were not born in the United Kingdom. 7. The Authority will issue passes for those representatives who are approved by him in accordance with Condition 6 herein for admission to a Government Establishment and a representative shall not be admitted unless in possession of such a pass. Passes shall remain the property of the Authority and shall be surrendered on demand or on completion of the work 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Conditions 6 and 7 hereof if, in the opinion of the Authority, any representative or agent of the Contractor shall misconduct himself, or it shall not be in the public interest for any person to be employed or engaged by the Contractor, the Contractor shall remove such person without delay on being required to do so and shall cause the work to be performed by such other person as may be necessary. 9. The decision of the Authority upon any matter arising under Conditions 6 to 8 shall be final and conclusive. Observance of regulations 10. a) The Contractor shall be responsible for ensuring that his representatives have the necessary probity (by undertaking a Basic Check) and, where applicable, are cleared to the appropriate level of security when employed within the boundaries of a Government Establishment. The Contractor's representatives shall comply with such rules, regulations and requirements as may be in force whilst at that Establishment. b) Where the Contractor requires information on the Basic Check procedure or security clearance for his representative and/or is not in possession of the relevant rules, regulations and requirements and/or requires guidance thereon, he shall apply in the first instance to the Project Manager/Equipment Support Manager. c) When on board ship, compliance with the rules, regulations and requirements shall be in accordance with the Ship's Regulations as interpreted by the Officer in Charge. Details of such rules, regulations and requirements shall be provided on request by the Officer in Charge. 12C-3 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Transport overseas 11. Where the Contractor's representatives are required by the Contract to join or visit a Government Establishment overseas, transport between the United Kingdom and the place of duty (but excluding transport within the United Kingdom) shall be provided free of charge by the Authority whenever possible, normally by Royal Air Force or by MOD chartered aircraft. The Contractor shall make such arrangements through the Project Manager/Equipment Support Manager named for this purpose in the Contract. When such transport is not available within a reasonable time, or in circumstances where the Contractor wishes his representatives to accompany materiel for installation which he is to arrange to be delivered, the Contractor shall make his own transport arrangements. The Authority shall reimburse the Contractor's costs for such transport of his representatives on presentation of evidence supporting the use of alternative transport and of the cost involved. Transport of the Contractor's representatives locally overseas which is necessary for the purposes of the Contract shall be provided wherever possible by the Authority and, where so provided, will be free of charge. Medical treatment overseas 12. Out-patient medical treatment given to the Contractor's representatives by a Service Medical Officer or other Government Medical Officer at a Government Establishment overseas shall be free of charge. Treatment in a Service hospital or medical centre, dental treatment, the provision of dentures or spectacles, conveyance to and from a hospital, medical centre or surgery not within the Establishment, and transportation of the Contractor's representatives back to the United Kingdom, or elsewhere, for medical reasons, shall be charged to the Contractor at rates fixed in accordance with current MOD regulations. Injuries, disease and dangerous occurrences 13. Any injury, disease or dangerous occurrence involving Contractor's employees, representatives, agents or equipment which requires to be reported under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1985 shall be reported by the Contractor to the Officer in Charge in addition to any report which it is the responsibility of the Contractor to make to the Health and Safety Executive. Dependants of contractor's representatives 14. No assistance from public funds, and no messing facilities, accommodation or transport overseas shall be provided for dependants or members of the families of the 12C-4 JSP 440 Volume1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security Contractor's representatives. Medical or necessary dental treatment may, however, be provided for dependants or members of families on repayment at current MOD rates. Provision of funds overseas 15. The Contractor shall, wherever possible, arrange for funds to be provided to his representatives overseas through normal banking channels (eg by travellers cheques). If banking or other suitable facilities are not available, the Authority shall, upon request by the Contractor and subject to any limitation required by the Contractor, make arrangements for payments, converted at the prevailing rate of exchange (where applicable), to be made by the Establishment to which the Contractor's representatives are attached. All such advances made by the Authority shall be recovered from the Contractor. Special Health and Safety hazards 16. a) The Contractor shall notify the nominated site project liaison officer or overseeing officer of any special health or safety hazards which might be involved in the work to be performed and shall advise him of any precautions that ought to be taken. b) The Authority shall notify the Contractor of any special health or safety hazards which might be encountered on the Government Establishment by the Contractor and shall advise him of any precautions that ought to be taken. c) The Contractor shall draw to the attention of his employees, sub-contractors, the employees of sub-contractors and all other persons under his control: i) All hazards required to be notified under sub-clause a. above; and ii) All hazards of which the Authority gives him notice. d) The Contractor shall take all steps necessary to ensure that such persons are adequately instructed on such hazards and any associated safety measures. e) The Contractor shall provide to the nominated site project liaison officer or overseeing officer: i) Copies of the section of his own and sub-contractors safety policies relevant to hazards notified under sub-clause a. above; and ii) Copies of notifications and instructions issued under sub-clauses b. and c. above. 12C-5 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12C-6 JSP 440 Volume1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 12 MEMORANDUM TO: Info Sy (Industry)2/3 ROOM 312 St Giles Court 1-13 St Giles High Street London WC2H 8LD FROM: REF NO: DATE REQUEST FOR CONFIRMATION OF SECURITY STATUS OF A UK CONTRACTOR LEVEL OF PROTECTED INFORMATION TO BE RELEASED TO THE CONTRACTORS (TICK APPROPRIATE BOXES) TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL ATOMIC UK EYES ONLY UK EYES DISCRETION OTHERS (STATE WHICH) SERIAL NO COLUMN A (TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUISITIONING BRANCH) COLUMN B (TO BE COMPLETED BY INFO SY (INDUSTRY)) COLUMN C (TO BE COMPLETED BY INFO SY (INDUSTRY)) LIST X STATUS AND LEVEL OF CLEARANCE NAME AND ADDRESS OF CONTRACTORS PREMISES NAME OF SECURITY OFFICER AND ADDRESS IF DIFFERENT FROM COLUMN A (CONTINUE ON A SEPARATE SHEET IF NECESSARY) NB. When column 'C' indicates that a contractor holds only a provisional clearance a separate letter will be attached. Where no clearance exists see Subsection IC. FOR INFO SY (INDUSTRY) USE SIGNED: DATE: STAMP: 12D-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12D-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX E TO CHAPTER 12 LETTER TO CONTRACTOR REQUESTING COMPLETION OF FORMS SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE Personal to: 1. Please refer to our recent discussions/correspondence concerning the possibility of your company undertaking work for the Ministry of Defence. 2. As it may be necessary for members of your company to be granted access to protected information in the course of the tender or contract, it will be necessary for yourself and perhaps one or two other members to be authorised for such access in advance. 3. I should, therefore, be grateful if you would complete, in duplicate the enclosed Security Questionnaire in respect of yourself. If necessary you should also arrange for the completion of Security Questionnaires in respect of one or two members of staff whose services will required in the preparation of the tenders. This personal information should be obtained from company records wherever possible. 12E-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12E-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX F TO CHAPTER 12 LETTER TO CONTRACTOR REQUESTING COMPLETION OF OSA FORMS Personal to: 1. Please refer to my letter of.......................................... reference ................................. concerning the approval of certain members of your company for access to protected information. 2. You should be aware that any protected information which may be disclosed under this tender/contract is entrusted to you in strict confidence. It is protected by and its recipients will be subject to the Official Secrets Acts 1911 to 1989. This applies whether or not a contract or subcontract is eventually placed with you. 3. Can I please therefore ask you [and the other 2 employees Mr ......... and Mr ...........] to complete the enclosed Official Secrets Acts Form E74 in duplicate, retaining one copy and returning the other to me at the above address. Yours sincerely JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12F-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12F-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX G TO CHAPTER 12 SECURITY ASPECTS LETTER FOR INVITATIONS TO TENDER TO UK CONTRACTORS CURRENTLY ON LIST X (PROTECTIVE MARKING) Messrs ............................................ For the personal attention of: (Name of company Security Controller) Dear Sir TENDER NO (to be inserted by the Contracts staff) 1. On behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence, I hereby give you notice that any sketch, model, article, note or document, or information connected with or arising out of the above-mentioned Invitation to Tender, is subject to the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts 1911-1989. Your attention is particularly drawn to the following specific aspects which must be fully safeguarded: PROTECTIVE MARKING a. To be disclosed to firms submitting tenders )Note: ) ) ) ) ) ASPECTS Either of these headings may be used or adapted as appropriate. b. To be disclosed to the successful bidder only 2. Will you please confirm that: a. This definition of the protected aspects of the above Invitation to Tender has been brought to the attention of the person directly responsible for the security of this tender. b. c. The definition is fully understood. Measures can, and will, be taken to safeguard the protected aspects. (PROTECTIVE MARKING) 12G-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (PROTECTIVE MARKING) 3. If you have any difficulty either in interpreting this definition of the protected aspects or in safeguarding them, will you please let me know immediately, and send a copy of your letter to your Security Adviser. 4. In the event of a contract being placed with you, these aspects would constitute `SECRET matter' for the purpose of clause1 a) of Def Con 659 - Security Measures. 5. Any access to protected information on MOD premises that may be needed will be subject to MOD security regulations under the discretion of the MOD Project Officer. Yours faithfully Copy to: Info Sy (Industry)2/3 Def Sy (S&T) (PROTECTIVE MARKING) 12G-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX H TO CHAPTER 12 SECURITY ASPECTS LETTER FOR INVITATIONS TO TENDER TO UK CONTRACTORS WHERE PROVISIONAL MOD SECURITY APPROVAL FOR THE COMPANY HAS BEEN GRANTED AND WHERE CONFIDENTIAL OR ABOVE NEEDS TO BE DISCLOSED AT THE TENDER STAGE (PROTECTIVE MARKING) Messrs ................................ For the personal attention of: (Name of company's approved recipient) Dear Sirs TENDER NO (to be inserted by Contracts staff) 1. On behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence, I hereby give you notice that any sketch, plan, model, article, note or document, or information connected with or arising out of the above-mentioned Invitation to Tender, is subject to the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts 1911-1989. Your attention is particularly drawn to the following specific aspects which must be fully safeguarded: PROTECTIVE MARKING a. To be disclosed to firms submitting tenders b. To be disclosed to the successful bidder only (describe in non-specific terms if possible) ASPECTS ) Either of these ) headings may be ) Note: used or adapted ) as appropriate. ) ) ) 2. A copy of a Memorandum on Security for Contractors, which outlines the principal measures required to safeguard protected information, is enclosed. Your particular attention is drawn to paragraph 12 of the Memorandum, and I should be grateful if you would send to the Technical Authority, on MOD SECURITY (PROTECTIVE MARKING) 12H-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (PROTECTIVE MARKING) QUESTIONNAIRE(s) Forms (available on request), personal details of any other members of your firm to whom you need to disclose information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above in order to complete your tender. The number of such other persons should be restricted to the fewest possible, and they should not in any case be allowed access to information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above until they have been approved by the Ministry. 3. Will you please confirm that: a. b. The above is fully understood. Measures can, and will, be taken to safeguard the protected aspects. 4. If you have any difficulty either in interpreting this definition of the protected aspects or in safeguarding them, will you please let me know immediately. 5. In the event of a contract being placed with you, the above aspects would constitute `secret matter' for the purpose of clause 1 a) of Def Con 659 - Security Measures. 6. Any access to protected information on MOD premises that may be needed will be subject to MOD security regulations under the direction of the MOD Project Officer. Yours faithfully Copy to: Info Sy (Industry)2/3 Def Sy (S&T) (PROTECTIVE MARKING) 12H-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX I TO CHAPTER 12 SECURITY ASPECTS LETTER FOR INVITATIONS TO TENDER TO UK CONTRACTORS WHERE PROVISIONAL MOD APPROVAL HAS BEEN GRANTED FOR THE CONTRACTOR BUT NO INFORMATION ABOVE RESTRICTED NEEDS TO BE DISCLOSED AT THE TENDER STAGE PROTECTIVE MARKING (not higher than RESTRICTED) Messrs ....................................... For the attention of: (Name of company's approved recipient) Dear Sir TENDER NO (to be inserted by the Contracts staff) 1. On behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence, I hereby give you notice that any sketch, plan, model, article, note or document, or information connected with or arising out of the above-mentioned Invitation to Tender, is subject to the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts 1911-1989. 2. In the event of a contract being placed with you, the following aspects would constitute `secret matter' for the purpose of clause 1 a) of Def Con 659 - Security Measures.. PROTECTIVE MARKING a. RESTRICTED (to be disclosed to tendering firms) b. (To be disclosed to the contractor) Note: Describe Aspects at CONFIDENTIAL and above in non-specific terms. ASPECTS PROTECTIVE MARKING (not higher than RESTRICTED) JSP 440 Volume 1 issue 2 12I-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security PROTECTIVE MARKING (not higher than RESTRICTED) 3. The enclosed form, which outlines the principal measures required to safeguard RESTRICTED information, is attached for your information. 4. Will you please confirm that measures can and will be taken as necessary to safeguard the protective aspects referred to above. Yours faithfully Copies to: Info Sy (Industry)2/3 Def Sy (S&T) PROTECTIVE MARKING (not higher than RESTRICTED) 12I-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX J TO CHAPTER 12 SECURITY ASPECTS LETTER FOR CONTRACTS AT CONFIDENTIAL AND ABOVE TO LIST X CONTRACTORS (PROTECTIVE MARKING) Messrs .................................. For the personal attention of: (Name of company Security Officer) Dear Sirs CONTACT NO DATE OF CONTRACT (to be inserted by the Contracts staff) 1. On behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence. I hereby give you notice that the following aspects are designated `Secret Matter' for the purpose of clause1 a) of Def Con 659 - Security Measures included in the above contract: PROTECTIVE MARKING 2. Will you please confirm that: a. The above definition of the Secret Matter of the above contract has been brought to the attention of the person directly responsible for the security of this contract. b. c. The definition is understood. Measures can, and will be taken to safeguard the Secret Matter. ASPECTS 3. If you have any difficulty either in interpreting the definition of the Secret Matter or in safeguarding it, will you please let me know immediately, and send a copy of your letter to your Security Adviser. 4. Any access to information on MOD premises that may be needed, will be in accordance with MOD security regulations under the direction of the MOD Project Officer. Yours faithfully Copies to: Info Sy (Industry)2/3 Def Sy (S&T) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 (PROTECTIVE MARKING) 12J-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12J-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX K TO CHAPTER 12 SECURITY ASPECTS LETTER FOR CONTRACTS TO UK FIRMS WITH PROVISIONAL MOD SECURITY CLEARANCE (PROTECTIVE MARKING) Messrs .................................. For the personal attention of: (Name of company's approved recipient) Dear Sirs CONTRACT NO DATE OF CONTRACT (to be inserted by the Contracts staff) 1. On behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence, I hereby give you notice that the following aspects are designated `Secret Matter' for the purpose of clause 1 a) of Def Con 659 - Security Measures included in the above contract: PROTECTIVE MARKING ASPECTS 2. A copy of a Memorandum on Security for Contractors, which outlines the principal measures required to safeguard protected information, is enclosed. Your particular attention is drawn to paragraph 12 of the Memorandum, and I should be grateful if you would send to the Technical Authority, on MOD SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE Forms (available on request), personal details of any other members of your firm to whom you need to disclose information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above. The number of such other persons should be restricted to the fewest possible, and they should not in any case be allowed access to information marked CONFIDENTIAL or above until they have been approved by the Ministry. 3. Will you please confirm that: a. b. The above definition of the Secret Matter of the contract is understood. Measures can, and will, be taken to safeguard the Secret Matter. If you have any difficulty either in interpreting the definition of the Secret Matter or in safeguarding it, or in any other respect, will you please let me know immediately. (PROTECTIVE MARKING) 12K-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (PROTECTIVE MARKING) 4. Any access to information on MOD premises that may be needed will be in accordance with MOD security regulations under the direction of the MOD Project Officer. Yours faithfully Copies to: Info Sy )industry)2/3 Def Sy (S&T) (PROTECTIVE MARKING) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12K-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX L TO CHAPTER 12 SECURITY ASPECTS LETTER - CHANGE TO OR AMENDMENT OF A SECURITY ASPECTS LETTER (PROTECTIVE MARKING) Messrs .................................. For the personal attention of: (Name of company's Security Officer) Dear Sirs CONTRACT NO DATE OF CONTRACT (to be inserted by Requisitioning Branch) Reference: Letter reference ...... dated ....... (the letter to be cancelled) 1. On behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence, I hereby give you notice that the following aspects are designated `Secret Matter' for the purpose of clause 1 a) of Def Con 659 - Security Measures included in the above contract: PROTECTIVE MARKING 2. Will you please confirm that: a. This re-definition of the Secret Matter of the above contract has been brought to the attention of the person directly responsible for the security of this contract. b. Measures can, and will, be taken to safeguard the Secret Matter. ASPECTS 3. If you have any difficulty either in interpreting the definition of the Secret Matter or in safeguarding it, will you please let me know immediately, and send a copy of your letter to your Security Adviser. 4. Access to information on MOD premises that may be need will be in accordance with MOD security regulations under the direction of the MOD Project Officer. Yours faithfully Copies to: Info Sy (Industry)2/3 Def Sy (S&T) (PROTECTIVE MARKING) 12L-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12L-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX M TO CHAPTER 12 DOUBTFUL GRADINGS From: ................. ................. ................ ................. To ................. ................. ................. ................. Subject Reference Number ............... Dear Sir We acknowledge receipt of your letter/report on the above subject which is receiving attention. The reason for the grading of ..................... is not, however, clear to us. From our knowledge of the subject and the written definition of the secret matter in the Security Aspects Letter, reference ................. we should have considered a grading of ................. more appropriate. If you agree with this would you please let us know so that we may re-grade the document. If, on the other hand, you confirm that your grading is correct we should be much obliged if you would, in due course, amend the Security Aspects Letter so that we know precisely what information must be safeguarded under Def Con 659. Our Security Adviser has asked us to use this form when in doubt about a grading and to send him a copy. Yours faithfully Copy to: Info Sy (Industry)2/3 Def Sy (S&T) 12M-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12M-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX N TO CHAPTER 12 (PROTECTIVE MARKING) MEMORANDUM TO: INFO SY (INDUSTRY)1 ROOM 312 ST GILES COURT 1-13 ST GILES HGH STREET LONDON WC2H 8D FROM: Insert full name and address of requisitioning branch or contracts branch as appropriate. REQUEST FOR SECURITY APPROVAL TO PLACE A PROTECTIVELY MARKED CONTRACT OVERSEAS A. Full Name and Address of Contractor B. Full Name and Address of Place of Manufacture (if Different from A.) C. Maximum Level of Release of Protectively Marked Material: D. Name of Project: E. Is the Contract Associated with an International Collaborative Project? YES/NO Is the Project Governed by a MOU? YES/NO I Confirm that all Protectively Marked Material Relating to the Proposed Contract/Tender will be Approved for Release Overseas in Accordance with JSP 440, Chapter 12, Sub-Section I. Signed: Date: (PROTECTIVE MARKING) 12N-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12N-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX O TO CHAPTER 12 SECURITY ASPECTS LETTER FOR INVITATIONS TO TENDER TO OVERSEAS FIRMS APPROVED BY INFO SY (INDUSTRY)1 FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION AT THE APPROPRIATE PROTECTIVE MARKING (PROTECTIVE MARKING) Messrs ........................... For the personal attention of: (Company Security Controller) Dear Sir TENDER NO (to be inserted by the Contracts staff) 1. Referring to the above quoted Invitation to Tender, and in particular paragraph .......... I hereby give you notice that the classified aspects, which are entrusted to you in confidence are as follows:CLASSIFICATION (Note: The Prefix UK ......... will be needed) a. To be disclosed to firms submitting tenders b. To be disclosed to the successful bidder only ) ) ) ) ) ASPECTS Either of these headings may be used or adapted as appropriate. The description of Aspects at b to be in non-specific terms if possible. Note 2. Any access to classified information on Ministry of Defence (MOD) premises that may be needed will be subject to MOD security regulations under the direction of the MOD Project Officer. 3. You are requested to acknowledge receipt of this letter confirming that: a. The definition of the classified matter is understood and has been brought to the attention of the person directly responsible for the security of the tender. (PROTECTIVE MARKING) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12O-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (PROTECTIVE MARKING) b. Measures can, and will, be taken to safeguard the classified matter as set out above and in the tender documents. 4. Any difficulties experienced in interpreting and implementing the above should be reported immediately to me. Yours faithfully Copies to: Info Sy (Industry)1 Def Sy (S&T) (PROTECTIVE MARKING) 12O-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX P TO CHAPTER 12 SECURITY ASPECTS LETTER FOR CONTRACTS TO OVERSEAS FIRMS APPROVED BY INFO SY (INDUSTRY)1 FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION AT THE APPROPRIATE PROTECTIVE MARKING (PROTECTIVE MARKING) Messrs For the personal attention (Company Security Controller) CONTRACT NO (to be completed by Contract staff) of the attached contracts document, I hereby 1. With reference to paragraph give you notice that the classified matter is as follows: CLASSIFICATION (Note: The prefix UK will be needed) ASPECTS 2. Any access to information on Ministry of Defence premises that may be needed will be in accordance with MOD security regulations under the direction of the Ministry of Defence Project Officer. 3. You are requested to acknowledge receipt of this letter confirming that: a. The definition of the classified matter is understood and has been brought to the attention of the person directly responsible for the security of the contract. b. The requirement and obligations set out above and in the contract document can and will be met. 4. Any difficulties experienced or expected in interpreting and implementing the above should be reported immediately to me. Yours faithfully Copies to: Info Sy (Industry)1 Def Sy (S&T) (PROTECTIVE MARKING) 12P-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12P-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX Q TO CHAPTER 12 RESTRICTED SECURITY CONDITIONS OVERSEAS Definitions 1. The term "Authority" means Contracting Authority. Security grading 2. The Authority shall issue a RESTRICTED Aspects Letter which shall define the RESTRICTED matter that is furnished, or which is to be developed, under this Contract. The Contractor shall mark all RESTRICTED documents which he originates or copies during the Contract with the equivalent national grading. Protection of RESTRICTED information 3. Except with the consent in writing of the Authority, the Contractor shall not disclose the Contract or any provision thereof to any person other than a person employed by the Contractor. It must be confined to those members of the staff whose access to the information is essential for the purpose of his duties. 4. Except with the consent in writing of the Authority the Contractor shall not make use of the Contract or any information issued or furnished by or on behalf of the Authority otherwise than for the purpose of the Contract, and, save as provided for in Clause 5 the Contractor shall not make any article or part thereof similar to the Articles for any other purpose. 5. Subject to any rights of Third Parties, nothing in this Condition shall, however, constrain the use for any purpose by the Contractor of any specifications, plans, drawings and other documents, the rights of which vest in him otherwise than as a result of work carried out under this Contract. 6. Any samples or patterns or any specifications, plans, drawings or any other documents issued by or on behalf of the Authority for the purposes of the Contract remain the property of the Authority and must be returned on completion of the Contract. 7. When not in use RESTRICTED documents should be stored under lock and key. 12Q-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Loss 8. Any loss of a RESTRICTED document should be reported without delay to the Authority. Transmission 9. RESTRICTED documents should be transmitted in such a way as to ensure that no unauthorised person has access. Commercial Couriers may be used, however, transmission via public networks such as the Internet or any other form of electronic connectivity is not permitted without the use of encryption mutually acceptable to the appropriate security authorities. 12Q-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX R TO CHAPTER 12 RESTRICTED SECURITY CONDITIONS UK Definitions 1. The term "Authority" means Contracting Authority. Security grading 2. The Authority shall issue a RESTRICTED Aspects Letter which shall define the RESTRICTED matter that is furnished, or which is to be developed, under this Contract. The Contractor shall mark all RESTRICTED documents which he originates or copies during the Contract with the equivalent national grading. Official Secrets Acts 3. The Contractor's attention is drawn to the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts 1911 to 1989 in general, and to the provisions of Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 (as amended by the Act of 1989) in particular. The Contractor shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that all persons employed on any work in connection with the Contract have notice that these statutory provisions apply to them and will continue so to apply after the completion or earlier termination of the Contract. Protection of RESTRICTED information 4. Disclosure of RESTRICTED information must be strictly in accordance with the "need to know" principle. Except with the written consent of the Authority, the Contractor shall not disclose the Contract or any provision thereof to any person other than a person employed by the Contractor. It must be confined to those members of the staff whose access to the information is essential for the purpose of his duties. 5. When not in use RESTRICTED documents should be stored under lock and key. 12R-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Transmission of RESTRICTED information 6. RESTRICTED documents should be transmitted, both within and outside company premises in such a way as to ensure that no unauthorised person has access. They may be sent by ordinary post in a single envelope. The word RESTRICTED should NOT appear on the envelope. The envelope should bear a company stamp that clearly indicates the full address of the office from which it was sent. 7. Advice on the transmission of RESTRICTED documents abroad or any other general advice including the transmission of RESTRICTED hardware should be sought from the Authority. Loss 8. Any loss of RESTRICTED information should be reported without delay to the Authority. 12R-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX S TO CHAPTER 12 SECURITY ASPECTS LETTER FOR A CONTRACT INVOLVING INFORMATION PROTECTIVELY MARKED RESTRICTED BUT NOT ABOVE, TO UK FIRMS (PROTECTIVE MARKING) Messrs .......................... For the personal attention of: (Name of company Security Controller if List X; Name of responsible Officer if not List X) Dear Sirs CONTRACT NO DATE OF CONTRACT (to be inserted by Contracts Branch) 1. On behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence I hereby give you notice that the following aspects of the work under the above contract are marked RESTRICTED: 2. Will you please confirm that the definition is understood. 3. I have to remind you that information about this contract must not without the approval of the Authority be published or communicated to anyone except where necessary for the execution of the contract. 4. Your attention is drawn to the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts 1911-1989 in general, to the provisions of Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 (as amended by the Act of 1920) in particular, that you should take all reasonable steps to ensure that all persons employed on any work in connection with the contract have notice that these statutory provisions apply to them and will continue so to apply after the completion or earlier determination of the contract. 5. Any access to information on MOD premises that may be needed will be in accordance with MOD security regulations under the direction of the MOD Project Officer. (PROTECTIVE MARKING) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12S-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (PROTECTIVE MARKING) 6. The enclosed form, which outlines the principal measures required to safeguard RESTRICTED information is attached for your information. Yours faithfully (PROTECTIVE MARKING) 12S-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX T TO CHAPTER 12 COMMITTEES APPOINTED FOR THE SECURITY GRADING OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. 1. Naval Equipment Security Committee: : : Equipment Capability Manager ESB (Sea) Equip Sec 3 Chairman Secretary Naval Equipment Security Sub-Committees NEGC 2 Chairman NEGC 3 Chairman NEGC 4 Chairman NEGC 5 Chairman NEGC 6 Chairman 2. : : : : : : : : : : Communications, Command and Control, and Electronic Warfare Equipment Capability Manager Above Water Warfare Equipment Capability Manager Under Water Warfare Equipment Capability Manager Ship construction, engineering and NBCD Equipment Capability Manager Naval Aviation Equipment Capability Manager Land Systems Equipment Security Policy Committee : : Equipment Capability Manager ESB (Land) Equip Sec 3 Chairman Secretary Army Equipment Grading Sub-Committees: Eight grading sub-committees have been appointed with responsibilities as shown: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12T-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. Fighting Vehicle Grading Sub-Committee (FVGS) - with responsibility for armoured fighting vehicles and APCs, their associated weapon systems and "B" vehicles. Chairman : Equipment Capability Manager b. Close Combat Weapons Grading Sub-Committee (CCWGS) - with responsibility for close combat and anti-armour weapons and infantry equipment. Chairman : Equipment Capability Manager c. Engineer Equipment Grading Sub-Committee (EEGS) - with responsibility for general engineer equipment, mines and demolition equipment. Chairman : Equipment Capability Manager d. NBC Grading Sub-Committee (NBCGS) - with responsibility for NBC defence equipment. Chairman : Equipment Capability Manager e. Artillery Weapons Grading Sub-Committee (Arty WGS) - with responsibility for artillery fire support and air defence, artillery fire control equipment and artillery ADP systems. Chairman : Equipment Capability Manager f. Army Communications Grading Sub-Committee (A Comms GS) - with responsibility for Army signals equipment, communications security equipment in use by the army (prime responsibility in this field rests with CESG), command and control information systems and ADP systems. Chairman : Equipment Capability Manager g. STANOC and Electronic Warfare Grading Sub-Committee (STEWGS) with responsibility for surveillance, target acquisition, night observation, survey, counter surveillance, electronic warfare and directed energy weapons. Chairman : Equipment Capability Manager h. IS and COIN Grading Sub-Committee (ISCGS) - with responsibility for IS and COIN equipment, Special Forces and EOD. Chairman : Equipment Capability Manager 12T-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security Note : In each case, the secretary is provided from the Branch which supplies the Chairman. The results are published in the Army List of Classified Equipment (ALCE), edited by Def Sys ESB (OM). 3. Air Equipment Security Committee : DDef Sy(S&T) Executive Secretary This Committee does not meet formally. Its Executive Secretary, DDef Sy (S&T), obtains and disseminates the classification policies in major international collaborative projects, and through the Air Equipment Security Sub-Committees. The Air Equipment Security Sub-Committees cover the following aspects of air equipment: Aircraft and aircraft engines Aircraft and ground equipment Aircraft instruments Air armaments and weapons Avionics and electronics Technical Secretariat for all the Air Equipment Security Sub-Committees is Def Sy (S&T). These sub-committees meet at the relevant stage in the project when material classification changes are required. Def Sy (S&T) are also responsible for the provision of classification guides for private venture funded equipment, atomic weapons and nuclear warheads, and guided weapons for all three Services. 4. Special Armour Security Committee (SASC) Chairman : Equipment Capability Manager JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12T-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12T-4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security ANNEX U TO CHAPTER 12 SECURITY OF CONTRACTORS' PRIVATE VENTURE PROJECTS 1. 'Private Venture' (PV) projects are likely to fall within one of three categories: a. Variants. Variants of standard defence equipment under development or in production, eg aircraft, military vehicles or ships, etc with non-standard equipment or fitments, offered to meet special customer requirements or to avoid security or commercial difficulties associated with the sale of the Service item. b. Derivatives. Equipment for military or civil use which is not based on standard Service designs but depends on expertise or technology acquired in the course of defence contracts. c. Freelance. Equipment of defence importance which is in no way based on information gained from defence contracts. 2. IPT Leaders will be primarily concerned with variants or derivatives although cognizance may need to be taken of items in category (c) if they have an actual or potential military application. The Patent Office has arrangements whereby patents can be given security protection. (But see paragraph 12102d). 3. The variant is one of the more common forms of private venture. Many such variants may be no more than paper studies prepared for consideration by the defence department of other prospective overseas customers. Each variant should be subjected to a proper security assessment, since it may embody protectively marked aspects of Service projects and therefore require formal departmental approval of release before details of it may be made available to prospective overseas customers. Supporting documentation, etc may also require in-house protection by the contractor and by potential and actual customers. 4. The derivatives may not necessarily come formally to the notice of IPT Leaders. The existence of paper studies or work on such derivatives should in every case be reported to the security grading authority. A foreign power will rightly assume that Service technology is fully abreast of such derivative work, that the performance of Service equipment is unlikely to fall short of the performance of the derivative, and that there will be much in common in the design work. Hence a degree of security protection may be required to protect Service interests. Derivative projects may subsequently be adopted for limited or full UK Service use. 12U-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 5. It is desirable that project managers be aware of the extent of contractors' obligations in respect of private venture work, since such obligations may not always be clear-cut and may be disputed. Both classified and unclassified defence contracts have clauses prohibiting the publication of material related to a contract without the approval of the department. In addition the Manual of Protective Security contains advice on reporting private venture work for grading (see paragraph 7 below). Contractors may have considerable commercial or other incentives for denying that their private ventures are in any way associated with Defence Contracts, though it is often possible to persuade them that the security protection of their own designs is not only in the public interest, but a factor of importance to prospective customers. 6. Overseas sales of private venture equipment need not concern IPT Leaders, except where they conflict with a contractor's undertakings to the department, eg if they make unacceptable demands on existing design, production, or testing resources, or where they require the release of information (protectively marked or unclassified). 7. For further information on private venture funded projects, see the Security In Industry insert B1 of the Manual of Protective Security. 12U-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities ANNEX V TO CHAPTER 12 TEMPLATE OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (TSR) FOR CONTRACTORS REQUIRING ACCESS TO [INSERT NAME OF SITE] Contents Para Introduction Background Guidance Reporting Requirements and Security Meetings Nominated Security Officials Definitions and Abbreviations Reference Documents Personnel Security Physical Security Counter Terrorism Security Access International Arms Inspections Security Operations Security of Information Technology (IT) Systems Communications Discipline and Security Approved Security Products Crime Prevention JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12V-1 1 2 3-4 5-6 7 8 9 10-17 18-19 20 21-25 26 27 28-29 30 31-33 34 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Training Template of Security Requirement (TSR) Definitions and Abbreviations Reference Documents Security Training Requirements TSR Schedule 35-36 37 Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Appendix 3 Appendix 4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12V-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities TEMPLATE OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTRACTORS REQUIRING ACCESS TO [insert name of site] Introduction 1. The information contained in this Template of Security Requirements (TSR) details the obligations and requirements of the Establishment Security Officer (ESyO) and Contractors when contractor personnel require access to [insert name of site]. Background 2. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is subject to threats from espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism and crime, and has a security infrastructure throughout the Department. To counter these threats, the Department has established a range of security regulations and procedures with which the Contractor will be required to comply. Security is the responsibility of all personnel on MOD sites and contract (including sub-contract) employees are to comply with all security regulations and orders that are in issue (or may, from time to time, be issued) by the Head of Establishment or on his behalf by the Establishment Security Officer (ESyO) or other Security Authority. The Contractor is required to have a disciplinary system to ensure that action can be taken against any member of staff who fails to comply with security regulations or orders. Guidance 3. The purpose of this TSR is to provide basic principles and guidance on the security requirements when contractors personnel are required to undertake work at [insert name of site]. The policy and specific security regulations are contained in JSP 440 (Defence Manual of Security). In particular further information can be found in JSP 440, Volume 1, Chapter 5 on Physical Security and the requirements on Access to sites, Chapter 12 on Contract Security and Vetting of contractor personnel in Volume 2. Copies of this TSR must be provided to the Contractor's Site Manager or his deputy as appropriate for communication to the contractors personnel. 4. One of the main activities of security is to control access, which includes the reception of visitors. One of the purposes of access control is to establish identity, especially that of temporary or short term contractors, for whom it may not be practicable to carry out security vetting (which may involve Counter Terrorist Check (CTC) clearances) which takes up to 6 weeks, or 6 months for the higher or foreign clearances. Access measures may involve vehicle and body searches and, very JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12V-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security importantly, the need to escort those not in possession of a Defence Identity Card or a local unescorted access pass. However, escorting is seldom possible without a detrimental effect on the efficient running of the unit, and the instructions in this TSR are designed to give flexibility whilst maintaining security. For instance, it may be reasonable to accept that the identity documents provided by recognised organisations to their employees towards proof of identity. Also the new Driving Licence with photo is likely to be accepted. Reporting requirements and security meetings 5. At the request of the [INSERT NAME OF SITE Designated Officer (DO), the Contractor's Site Manager is to report directly to the ESyO on the status and effectiveness of the security and service provided. All suspected security incidents and breaches of security are to be reported, in the first instance, to the ESyO. Records of such incidents are to be maintained by both parties. However, the DO retains primacy over all security-related matters on behalf of the HOE. 6. The Contractor's Site Manager, or his deputy, is required to attend unit Security Committee meetings to review and, if necessary, amend security practices in line with Government or MOD requirements. In addition, the Contractor's Site Manager is to nominate employees of a management/supervisory level from each of the main functional areas operated by the Contractor to perform the role of Contractor Security Office (CSO). The CSO will also be required to attend Security Committee meetings. Nominated security officials 7. The nominated security officials for [insert name of site] and [insert name of company] are: For [insert name of site] Insert details of post and post holders name For [insert name of company] Insert details of post and post holders name JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12V-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities Definitions and abbreviations 8. The definitions and abbreviations applicable to this TSR are contained in Appendix 1. Reference documents 9. The references applicable to this TSR are contained in Appendix 2. Personnel security 10. A fundamental part of personnel security within the MOD is the principle that access to classified or protectively marked material is limited to those personnel with the need to know the information in order to perform their duties efficiently. This is known as the "need to know" principle and is enforced irrespective of rank or appointment. 11. In addition to the need to know principle, access to classified material is not permitted unless the appropriate security clearance has been granted. The process leading to the issue of a security clearance is called security vetting. The Contractor is to ensure that all staff are subjected to background checks. All posts filled or created by the contractor are to have the appropriate level of clearance determined by the level of access given on a case by case basis. In addition, where access to national caveats is concerned, the rules in JSP 440 Volume 1 are to be applied. Where necessary, the ESyO will advise on the level of security clearance needed subject to the level of access required. 12. The policy on security clearances for the MOD is contained in JSP 440 Volume 2. The minimum level of clearance for any contract employee to have unescorted access to MOD sites is the Basic Check (BC), in addition, a CTC is needed for all who declare Irish or certain foreign connections. CTC may be needed for all employees at sites of special importance, or where criminal convictions have been declared or are suspected. All contractor employees are required to fill in the Security Questionnaire MOD Form 1109 which will be checked by the ESyO, or completed under his supervision. The BC is an employment check and may also be carried out by the contractor under the supervision of the ESyO. This level of clearance also permits supervised access to assets upto and including those protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL. Any access to SECRET material requires Security Check (SC) clearance, and access to specific higher levels, such as regular access to TOP SECRET requires Developed Vetting (DV). Dual nationals (of which one nationality is British) may only have access to UK EYES DISCRETION information with the approval of the originators. If the contract involves the release of UK EYES DISCRETION information to named recipients, such individuals may only exercise their named recipient discretion, to disseminate further, in consultation JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12V-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security with the originator or owner of the information. The ESyO will provide advice on which posts need to be DV-annotated. There may also be access restrictions to some types of protectively marked material by people who hold another nationality in addition to British or who are not entirely British nationals. 13. No contract employee engaged to fill a post requiring a security clearance shall be granted access to protectively marked material until the ESyO has proof of the clearance being granted. Vetting can be a lengthy process. The average time taken for the most common checks and clearances are: BC, which requires proof of identity and 2 references a day or 2; CTC, after BC is complete, 6 weeks from submission, but may take up to 6 months if a foreign country is involved; SC up to 6 weeks; DV up to 6 months. Currently, MOD does not charge for vetting, but the Department reserves the right to introduce such charges. 14. In all instances, BC procedures are to be completed by the Contractor and the results notified to ESyO, in the form of a Basic Check Verification Record (BCVR), in advance of personnel reporting for work. If the Contractor is a List X firm, and personnel have already been security cleared, it is the firm's responsibility to notify the EsyO of the security clearance details of the personnel. Clearance levels of such personnel are to be notified to the ESyO before access to protectively marked material will be granted. If the Contractor is either not a List X firm or is a List X firm but the personnel do not hold the relevant clearance, it is their responsibility to ensure that vetting applications are completed, in respect of their own and any SubContractor's staff, and submitted to the ESyO who, after verifying that clearance is required, will formally sponsor the clearance application and forward the forms to the appropriate Vetting Authority. 15. The Contractor is required to maintain a current list of all employees, SubContractors and their agents detailing all posts, requisite security clearance levels and expiry date, along with the personal details of the incumbent and provide the ESyO with an updated list upon request. The Contractor is responsible for maintaining an auditable and accurate record of the security clearance of all personnel introduced to the establishment in conjunction with the contract, for a period of 7 years. Should any circumstances arise which could bring into question an employee's suitability to hold or retain security clearance, or to have continued access to [insert name of site], the Contractor is required to notify the ESyO without delay. 16. No contract employee shall be allowed unescorted entry to [insert name of site] without BC, and CTC when needed, unless specifically authorised by the ESyO. However, contractor employees holding full passes may be authorised by the ESyO to escort other employees awaiting CTC or SC. Apart from this, these checks are the minimum necessary for employment within, and to permit unescorted access to, [insert name of site]. Access to assets protectively marked SECRET or above is not permitted unless the appropriate level of security clearance has been granted. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12V-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities 17. Under Government nationality rules, the MOD can refuse to disclose or permit access to information if disclosure or access would be contrary to the national security interest. In particular, material bearing certain caveats carries nationality qualifications. Physical security 18. The ESyO is responsible for determining the physical security measures appropriate for the safeguarding of protectively marked material. The type of secure container, lock and level of checking required will be assessed and instructions issued in accordance with security regulations. 19. Contractors and their staff will be required to adhere to the MOD policies on physical security and be responsible for the handling and storage of sensitive materials, data and information in their custody or control. Security containers will be provided. All protectively marked material is to be handled in accordance with JSP 440 Volume 1. Counter Terrorism 20. The overall responsibility for counter terrorism (CT) within the UK lies with the civil police. At [insert name of site] the is ESyO responsible for actioning CT measures for the protection of personnel within MOD property. It is the responsibility of the Contractor, Sub-Contractors and their staff to cooperate with any security measures that may be imposed. Any staff who fail to comply with CT measures increase the risks to all personnel and will be liable to be excluded from [insert name of site] either permanently or for a prescribed period at the discretion of the ESyO. Security access 21. Access to [insert name of site] is the prerogative of the Head of Establishment who has the authority to exclude personnel or their vehicles from MOD property in response to security threats or personal indiscipline. 22. The ESyO is responsible for enforcing access control policies, and the Contractor is responsible for ensuring that all staff comply with control of entry requirements. All persons entering [insert name of site ]are required to positively identify themselves and are liable to be searched on entering or leaving the Establishment and at certain other facilities. Failure to comply may render staff liable to exclusion from the Establishment. 23. All contract staff are to be in possession of a Pass at all times within the bounds of [insert name of site]. In addition, all staff are expected to identify JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12V-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security themselves using the Pass, upon the request of any Service person or other MOD employee. 24. The ESyO is responsible for issuing all contract personnel with a Pass. The Contractor is responsible for ensuring passes are withdrawn from those personnel who leave his (or his Sub-Contractor's) employ, and returned to the ESyO for cancellation. 25. Physical access to areas holding official or protectively marked information (in whatever form) may need to be restricted. In particular: a. The DO retains the right of access to the Contractor's premises, as well as to any information stored on systems, and the information held by the Contractor or his Sub-Contractors. For example access by the Establishment's security staff, MOD security auditors, the Data Protection Registrar and the National Audit Office carrying out security monitoring, spot checks etc. b. The Contractor, his Sub-Contractors and their agents will be granted any necessary access to the Establishment for maintenance or inspection purposes, providing the ESyO is informed and the individuals meet the necessary security criteria. c. The DO retains the right to implement security spot checks on all the Contractor's staff and security records and, either in isolation or in conjunction with the Contractor, his Sub-Contractors or agents. d. The Contractor is to ensure that all staff are made aware of the "need to know" principle and is to limit access to protectively marked assets to those who require such access in the course of their duties. Further advice regarding access restrictions may be obtained from the ESyO. International arms inspections 26. [insert name of site] may be tasked to abide by international treaties in order to facilitate verification of various arms and/or weapons limitation or reduction agreements. The scope of these inspections is detailed in respective Operation Orders. All contract employees, including Sub-Contractors and their agents, are to ensure they do not obstruct these inspections and must be meticulous regarding the release of information (Appendix 4, Serial 8 refers). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12V-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Responsibilities Security operations 27. There are a number of counter-terrorist measures, which may be implemented at short notice or over extended periods, intended to protect from, or at least diminish the effects of, various terrorist threats against the Establishment and its personnel. These include operations BIKINI, TESSERAL and ROUNDUP as well as other contingency plans. Specific details and required responses are detailed in security Standing Orders. Security of Information Technology (IT) systems 28. The introduction and use of IT hardware and software to [insert name of site] is to be strictly controlled in accordance with JSP 440 Volume 3 and local security Security Orders. No hardware or software is to be introduced or used on the Establishment until it has been registered with the EsyO, accredited and viruschecked. The DO retains the right of access, audit and ownership of all official and protectively-marked information stored or processed on IT controlled by the Contractor, his Sub-Contractors and their agents. There are strict security rules governing the interconnection of IT systems and approval must be sought from the ESyO prior to any connection/alteration being made to any network or system. 29. The Contractor is expected to cooperate with IT protection programmes that may entail MOD Computer Security staff having access to the Contractor's IT equipment. The Contractor should be aware that his own 'Commercial' information will be accessible by MOD Computer Security staff conducting such duties and should give due consideration to storage of his information on site. Communications discipline and security 30. The Contractor is to ensure that employees comply with the requirements of JSP 440 and security Standing Orders prior to using any electronic communications system at [insert name of site]. The use of mobile/portable telephones, CB radios and other telecommunication equipment on [insert name of site] is restricted and their use is to be strictly in compliance with JSP 440 and security Standing Orders. Approved security products 31. Many security products and systems have been evaluated and/or certified by Government Authorities, eg for IT through the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme, for physical security by the Evaluation and Development in Counter Terrorism and Sabotage (EDICTS), and for equipment approved by the Security Equipment Advisory Panel. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12V-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 32 The use of approved security products falls into 2 categories: those to which the Contractor will have access, and those installed by the Contractor. Should a Contractor have access to, or custody to, approved security products, he should be aware that any unauthorised disclosure of information regarding any aspect of the product may constitute a breach of the Official Secrets Acts and Copyright law. 33. The ESyO 's consent is required prior to the introduction or use of any nonapproved equipment. This includes the use of any 'innovation' developed by the Contractor. Crime Prevention 34 The Contractor is to establish an internal control programme to eliminate fraud and theft. The Contractor's employees will be expected to cooperate with MOD policy crime prevention programmes, which include submitting to a cursory search of vehicles and bags entering and leaving [insert name of site]. Training 35. With assistance from the ESyO the Contractor is required to train his staff, and those of his permanent Sub-Contractors or agents, to a level of competence and understanding of security regulations that will enable them to ensure they are complied with at all times. Indeed, all personnel are to receive security training to the level and within the timescale detailed in Appendix 3. The course content for all security training is to be agreed by the ESyO. 36. General security education and problem-solving advice on security matters is to be provided by the ESyO. TSR schedule 37. A TSR Schedule is at Appendix 4 for the guidance of Security Staff and should be included in the TSR, though adapted for each situation. Appendices: 1. 2. 3. 4. Definitions and Abbreviations. Reference Documents. Security Training Requirements. TSR Schedule JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12V-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX V DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS Serial No (a) 1 Term, Expression or Title (b) Establishment Security Officer (ESyO) Definition (c) ESyO is the generic term for Base Security Officer (BSO) or Unit Security Officer (USO) in the Royal Navy, Unit Security Officer (USO) or Branch Security Officer (BSO) in the Army, Station Security Officer (SSyO) in the Royal Air Force and the appointed chief specialist security officer in MOD Agencies or industry. The person to whom the HOE has delegated authority for the routine supervision and monitoring of requirements incumbent upon contractors requiring access to a specific site. The Contractor's appointed employee responsible to the ESyO for the implementation of security policy and procedures within his specified area of responsibility. Personnel Security is the principle that access to protectively marked material is not permitted unless an appropriate security clearance is in issue. This process is called vetting. The Basic Check is needed for security vetting and CTC clearance and, whilst not in itself a vetting measure, allows authorised and supervised access to CONFIDENTIAL on a need to know basis. Vetting includes Security Check (SC) for SECRET, Developed Vetting (DV) for higher access and Counter Terrorist Check for those with Irish or some foreign connections and some others. 2 Designated Officer 3 Contractor Security Officer (SO) 4 Personnel Security 5 Security Vetting JSP 440 Volume Issue 2 12V-App1-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 6 Need to Know The "Need to Know" principle ensures that access to protectively marked material is limited to those personnel who need to know the information in order to carry out their duties efficiently. This "need to know" principle is enforced regardless of rank/status or appointment. The MOD protects its assets in terms of the threat posed and the value of the material. A protective marking indicates the value of material. Material with a protective marking is to be safeguarded in accordance with security regulations. A protective marking is given in accordance with an assessment of the damage that would be caused in the event of material being disclosed to unauthorised persons. The levels of protective marking (in ascending order) are RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, TOP SECRET. A caveat is an additional marking applied to material that is subject to special handling requirements in addition to those procedures required by its protective marking. Eg UK EYES ONLY A descriptor is a caveat added to a protective marking indicating the subject being covered. The use of the descriptor further restricts access to a document beyond that normally imposed by vetting requirements. Eg MEDICAL Acceptable documents are those listed in JSP 440, Volume 2 . The confirmation of an individual's identity by means of either visual recognition or approved proof of identity. 7 Protective Security 8 Protective Marking 9 Caveat 10 Descriptor 11 Proof of Identity 12 Positive Identification JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12V-App1- 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security 13 Pass/Identity Card (Not temporary) A card of an agreed design bearing a clear full face (or front ¾ face) photograph of the bearer along with their basic personal details in a clear point face. Ministry of Defence Police. Security Guard Force. Ministry of Defence Guard Service. Military Provost Guard Service Joint Services Publication. Term given to a contractor's site that is required to hold protectively marked material CONFIDENTIAL or above. A list X site will have a security controller security oversight and inspection is undertaken by the Security Service acting on behalf of D Def Sy 14 15 16 17 18 19 MDP SGF MGS MPGS JSP List X JSP 440 Volume Issue 2 12V-App1-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 12V-App1- 4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX V REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Ser (a) 1 Publication Reference (b) DMS (JSP 440) Vols 1-4 MPS Title (c) Defence Manual of Security Remarks (d) MOD Security Regulations M or G (e) M 2 Manual of Protective Security Baseline Security Manual issued by the Cabinet Office and used by List X sites and by Government Departments who may devise more stringent regulations M/G 3 DMS Vol 1 Chap 16 Regulations for the Use of National Caveats, The Caveat "LOCSEN" and the Special Marking "UK Comms Only" Manual of Personnel Administration Volume 1 Contains Registry procedures M 4 5 6 7 OSA M M M M Official Secrets Acts (19111989) Local Standing Orders Local Standing Orders (Security) The notations against the above references have the following meanings: M - Adherence to the policies and procedures contained therein is mandatory. G - The policies and procedures contained therein are not mandatory, but proposals for alternatives must fully interface with procedures in use globally. 12V-App2-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security This page intentionally left blank 12V-App2-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX V SECURITY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS Serial No (a) 1 Post/Functional Area (b) Managerial Post Holders Training (c) Induction - ½ Day Frequency (d) On Appointment Remarks (e) Within one month of taking up appointment. Within one month of taking up appointment. Within 3 months of taking up appointment. Within one month of taking up appointment. Within one month of taking up appointment. Within one month of taking up appointment. Within one month of taking up appointment. Within 12 months of any previous induction or refresher course. 2 Handling protectively marked material ½ day 3 All ESyOs ESyOs course 3 days Registry Course 5 days On Appointment On Appointment On Appointment 4 All Registry/Typing/ Admin Staff S&C Course 2 days 5 IT Installation Managers All Staff On Appointment Installation On Managers Security Appointment Course - 3 days Induction - ½ day On Appointment 6 Refresher - up to ½ day Annually Note: This table is representative and may require extension or modification to take account of posts at individual establishments. 12V-App3-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank 12V-App3-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX V TSR Schedule Item No 1 1a Major Contract Requirement General Attend Establishment Security Committee meetings to review and, if necessary, amend security practices in line with MOD, Service or Authority requirement. Nominate employees of management/super visory level from each of the functional areas operated by the Contractor to perform the role of Contractor SO. Report all suspected and actual security incidents and breaches of security to the ESyO. Security Clearances Ensure all contract staff are subject to background checks and vetting as required. Ensure Contract manager and any Deputy(ies) are cleared to the appropriate level. No staff will be permitted unescorted access to MOD property until a CTC screening has been satisfactorily completed. If access to protectively marked material is required in connection with contract performance. No uncleared staff on site. Related Requirement or Information The Contract Manager or Deputy is to attend Establishment Security Committee meetings. Performance Standard No instance of failing to attend meetings. 1b Contractor USOs are to attend Establishment Security Committee meetings. No instance of nominated Contractor SOs failing to attend meetings. 1c Additionally, at the request of the DO, the Contractor's Site Manager is to report directly to the DO on the status and effectiveness of the security of the service provided by the Contractor. No incidence of failing to report suspected and actual security incidents and breaches of security within 24hrs of event or sooner if situation demands. 2 2a 2b No uncleared contract management staff employed on the project. 12V-App4-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Item No 2c Major Contract Requirement Ensure all relevant post holders are cleared to respective level. Vetting Administration Requirements List X Contractors Conduct BC in respect of all contract employees (including SubContractor employees). Notify the ESyO of the clearance level of any staff previously cleared under the List X system, before they report to work. Non-List X Firms Conduct all BC action in respect of all directly employed and sub-contracted staff. Ensure that prospective staff, including SubContractors' staff, complete vetting forms as required by ESyO. When required, ensure that all completed CTC forms are submitted to the ESyO for processing. Checking procedures in accordance with Cabinet Office Manual of Protective Security. Failure to satisfactorily complete vetting forms could result in staff being denied access to a Project site. 100% of applicants to have BC action completed by the Contractor. Clearance and checking procedures in accordance with Cabinet Office Manual of Protective Security. 100% of BC action conducted by the Contractor. Related Requirement or Information Access to protectively marked material and/or a war planning role. Performance Standard No uncleared staff in post. 3 3a 3a(i) 3a(ii) SC/DV is to be in issue before any access to protectively marked material connected to annotated posts can be permitted. No more than 25% of clearances notified <48hrs and >24hrs before starting work. No clearances notified <24hrs before starting work. 3b 3b(i) 3b(ii) No incidence of contract (including sub-contract) staff requiring access to a Project site before CTC or vetting is completed. 3b(iii) The ESyO is responsible for conducting CTC screening and for processing other security clearance applications to DVA. Not more than 20% submitted <72hrs but >48hrs and 10% submitted <48hrs but >24hrs, before access required. 12V-App4-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security Item No 4 4a Major Contract Requirement "Need To Know" Requirements Maintain the"need to know" principle at all times. Related Requirement or Information Performance Standard No person is entitled, by virtue of rank or appointment, to have knowledge of or possession of protectively marked material unless they have a "need to know" in order to discharge their duties efficiently. No incidence of staff of the Contractor, his Sub-Contractors and their agents failing to maintain the "need to know" principle. 5 5a Protective Security Safeguard protectively marked material in accordance with security regulations. Secure protectively marked material when not in use. Administer protectively marked material in accordance with regulations. Counter Terrorism Comply with CT measures. Access Requirements Show Pass on demand. Pass to be issued by the ESyO. No incidence of contract (including sub-contract) staff failing to identify themselves on demand by means of a Pass. No incidence of contract (including sub-contract) staff failing to submit to a cursory search on demand. Measures will be set out by the Easy and will vary according to the threat level. No incidence of contract (including sub-contract) staff failing to comply fully with CT measures. Security standards determined by the Easy based upon policy laid down set out in JSP 440 Vol. 1. In accordance with standards laid down by the Easy. In accordance with JSP 440 Vol. 1 and any appropriate single Service publications. No incidence of protectively marked material improperly safeguarded. 5b No incidence of protectively marked material not properly secured when not in use. No incidence of protectively marked material inadequately administered. 5c 6 6a 7 7a 7b Submit to searches of vehicles, bags, packages and clothing on demand. Ensure that all contract staff are in possession of a Pass before starting work. Searches will be conducted in accordance with strict policy guidelines. 7c Pass to be withdrawn on completion of employment at a Project site or on termination of employment with the Contractor. 100% of contract (including subcontract) staff issued with a Pass. 12V-App4-3 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Item No 7d Major Contract Requirement Carry a Pass at all times within the bounds of MOD property. Display a valid vehicle pass in all Contractor's and staff owned vehicles within MOD property. Withdraw and return all MOD issued passes and permits from contract (including sub-contract) employees who no longer require or are no longer permitted to enter MOD property. Permit right of access to Contractor's premises, to any information stored on systems and to any information held by the Contractor, SubContractor or contract employee. International Arms Inspections and Security Operations Ensure that all contract staff do not obstruct International Arms Inspections. Be meticulous in the release of information during International Arms Inspections. Related Requirement or Information Pass to be produced on demand. Performance Standard No incidence of contract (including sub-contract) staff failing to carry Passes at all times. No incidence of vehicles belonging to the Contractor, his Sub-Contractor, their agents and their staffs not having a vehicle pass on display whilst on the Unit. No incidence of contractor (including sub-contract) employees, or former employees, retaining Passes and permits to which they are no longer entitled. 7e Passes issued by ESyO Pass Office. 7f Passes to be returned to ESyO or Pass Office. 7g Access by DO and official staff only, eg. Establishment security staff, MOD security auditors, the Data Protection Registrar, National Audit Office carrying out security monitoring, spot checks etc. No incidence of Contractor's, his Sub-Contractor's and their agents' staff denying access to DO or official staff. 8 8a Actions and associated measures detailed in Operation Orders and Security Standing Orders. No incidence of contract (including sub-contract) staff obstructing Arms Inspections. 8b Guidance detailed in Operational Orders. No incidence of contract (or subcontract) staff releasing gratuitous information. 12V-App4-4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security Item No 9 9a Major Contract Requirement Security Requirements Register all IT hardware and software introduced or used on the Establishment. Control and administer all IT systems and their associated media used to process official information. Communications Discipline and Security Comply with Communications Discipline and Security requirements. Security Approved Products Maintain the integrity of approved security products. Obtain the ESyO's consent before initiating any innovation. Crime Prevention Establish internal control programme to eliminate fraud and theft. Programme shall include periodic policing of Contractor's controlled facilities to detect pilfered goods. Full co-operation with ESyO, MGS, MDP and other security representatives as required. No pilfered goods found in Contractor's controlled facilities as a result of Contractor's failure to conduct inspections. Any disclosure of information relating to approved security products could be in breach of Official Secrets Act and/or copyright law. The ESyO will determine if the use of security approved products is required. No incidence of contract (including sub-contract) staff disclosing any information relating to approved security products. No incidence of non-security approved products being used without the agreement of the ESyO. In accordance with JSP 440 and Security Standing Orders. No incidence of contract (including sub-contract) staff failing to comply fully with Communications Discipline and Security requirements. Related Requirement or Information Performance Standard Register held by ESyO. No incidence of unregistered IT hardware and software being introduced or used on the Establishment. 9b In accordance with JSP 440 and Security Standing Orders. 100% compliance with MOD regulations. 10 10a 11 11a 11b 12 12a 12V-App4-5 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Item No 13 13a Major Contract Requirement Training Requirements Attend induction and refresher security training. Attend security training relevant to posts involved in handling protectively marked material. Records and Deliverables Maintain records on the creation, copying, registering, movement, transmission or destruction of protectively marked material in accordance with Government, MOD and any Service regulations. Materials, Equipment and Facilities Registers, charging sheets and other forms and documents required to administer protectively marked material will be available through the stationery supply system. As required by JSP 440 Vol 1 and Security Standing Orders. No incidence of incorrect forms being used in the administration of protectively marked material. In accordance with JSP 440 Vol 1 and Security Standing Orders. No incidence of incorrectly maintained records. Related Requirement or Information Performance Standard As set out in Appendix 3. Course content agreed by the ESyO. As set out in Appendix 3. Course content agreed by the ESyO. 100% attendance at courses within prescribed timescales. No incidence of untrained personnel handling or having access to protectively marked material unsupervised. 13b 14 14a 15 15a 12V-App4-6 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Contracts Security Item No 16 Major Contract Requirement Government Furnished Equipment Security Locks and Furniture. Approved security locks and furniture will be supplied through the supply system. Related Requirement or Information Performance Standard 16a As required by JSP 440 Vol 1 and ordered through the ESyO. No incidence of protectively marked material being stored in anything other than approved security furniture. 12V-App4-7 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 12V-App4-8 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security CHAPTER 13 SECURITY EDUCATION, TRAINING AND AWARENESS Chapter 13. Paragraph Security Education, Training and Awareness Introduction Responsibilities Education Training Appointing, Posting And Promotion Annex A. Subjects For Security Education Annex B. Security Training: Instructional Aids Annex C. Security Training: Instructional Methods Annex D. Security Training: Multimedia Learning 1301 1304 1321 1340 1347 13A-1 13B-1 13C-1 13D-1 Page JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security CHAPTER 13 SECURITY EDUCATION, TRAINING AND AWARENESS Introduction 1301. General. Security education and training are important command/management responsibilities at all levels. The threat from overseas intelligence services and terrorist organizations is considerable; and the consequences of poor security in MOD establishment could be disastrous. The best precaution against lapses in security is to ensure that everyone is properly trained. 1302. Aims. This chapter covers two aspects of one subject, the aims of each are: a. Security education. To ensure that all who work within the MOD, both military and civilian, irrespective of their access to protectively marked assets/material, understand both the security threat and their responsibilities for countering it. b. Security training. To ensure that those individuals who have specific security responsibilities as part of their normal employment are properly trained in their security duties. 1303. Higher coordination. This is achieved by means of the Security Awareness Working Group (SAWG) which is chaired by DDefSy. Responsibilities 1304. The Ministry of Defence. The Director of Defence Security (DDefSy) is, inter alia, responsible for formulating and sustaining policy on, and coordination of, security education and training in the MOD as a whole. 1305. Central Budget Security (HQ, PE & Industry). CB(Sy) is responsible for advising on security training requirements throughout the MOD civilian estate. It includes a small training branch for the provision of basic protective security training and Branch Security Officer (BSO) courses and liaises with other agencies to facilitate more specialised training. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 1306. The Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC). DISC is a Defence Agency and is located at Chicksands. It comprises the following schools: a. b. c. d. Defence Intelligence and Security School (DISS) Joint School of Photographic Interpretation (JSPI) Joint Service Intelligence Organisation (JSIO) Defence Special Signal School (DSSS) The Chief Executive of the School is responsible to 2SL/CINCNAVHOME and to CinC LAND, inter alia, for: e. Advising DDefSy through the Services security training HQ about security education and training; f. Implementing Royal Navy and Army security training policy through courses of instruction at, or sponsored by, the DISC. 1307. The RAF Provost & Security Training Squadron (P&STS). P&STS is located at RAF Halton. The OC is responsible for implementing Royal Air Force security training policy through courses of instruction at P&STS. 1308. Heads of Service Security. These are responsibilities for: a. Ensuring that officers and Service personnel are nominated by heads of establishment to attend relevant courses at DISC/P&STS, as appropriate. The courses should be attended preferably before, but always as soon as possible after, taking up appointments involving security duties. b. Organizing the security training of those establishment security officers (ESyOs) and establishment IT security officers (EITSyOs) who have not attended courses at DISC/P&STS; and that of senior secretarial staff. c. Providing advice and assistance for both intermediate level and establishment security education and training. d. The preparation and issue to DISC and to P&STS and down the chain of command of education and training material from case histories and reports. e. Monitoring security education and training in establishments by means of security inspections. 1309. Intermediate Commanders. These commanders are responsible for the security education and training within their command. Such commanders can make a major JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security contribution to security training by demanding high standards of security alertness at all times, whether in peacetime stations, during training, on exercises, or on operations. Security education and training will normally be commented on as part of the annual report on a vessel or establishment. 1310. Directors and heads of divisions in MOD and MOD agencies. Such persons are responsible for ensuring that: a. All staff receive security education on initial recruitment, and periodically thereafter, so that they are fully aware of the security threat and general counter measures. b. All staff who handle protectively marked documents/material or equipment receive security training relating to their responsibilities, and that the training is periodically updated. c. Those personnel who have full or part-time security duties attend suitable education and training courses to enable them to fulfil their responsibilities. d. The organisation and management of security education and training within their respective establishments is in accordance with MOD policy. 1311. Heads of establishments (HOE). These individuals are the most important links in the chain of command/management as far as security is concerned. It is therefore imperative that such persons should be, and be seen to be, thoroughly security conscious; they must insist on the highest standards of security throughout the establishment. They must appoint an ESyO and an EITSyO and make sure that they are properly trained by attending the appropriate course(s) prior to taking up their appointment, or within three months of doing so. The single most important factor in maintaining high standards of security will be the attitude adopted by the head of establishment to this subject. 1312. Establishment security officers (ESyO). The generic responsibilities of the ESyO are shown at para 0227 in Chapter 2 of Volume 1; and those of the EITSyO are given in Annex B to Chapter 1 of Volume 3. 1313. The ESyO, in conjunction with the EITSyO, should organize and arrange for security education and training on behalf of his HOE; so that all personnel understand the nature of the threat to security, and are instructed in the application of security procedures to counter the threat. Security education and training should be a continuous process; it must never be allowed to recede into the background due to other pressures. Special attention must be given to ensure the appropriate training of all personnel whose employment involves security duties. Such personnel include: a. All officers, warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers, with particular reference to such duties as orderly officers, guard commander, etc. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. Clerks, secretaries and all those who handle protectively marked documents. c. Engineers, technicians, arms/ammunition/explosives storemen, armourers, and others responsible for protectively marked equipment. d. Service and unit police, members of unit guards including civilian security officers (MOD Guard Service) and contract guards. e. f. g. 1314-1320. Post orderlies and messengers. Radio, telephone, facsimile and teleprinter operators. Computer operations and users. Reserved Security education 1321. The security education needs of new recruits should be assessed and met as early as possible. Security education should be part of an ongoing training process, to ensure that the subject is not allowed to lapse into the background. Properly handled, security education should make all members of the Armed Services and all civilians who work for them or for the MOD aware: a. b. own. c. d. That a threat exists and its nature (see para 1322 below). That the individual has personal responsibility for security including their Of the relevance of protective security measures. Of the need for good security at all times. e. Of the security risks associated with overseas travel, more especially for those with SC and particularly with the DV clearances. 1322. The Threat. Current threats to security, not in any particular order of priority, arise from: a. b. c. Espionage, including commercial espionage. Sabotage. Subversion. 13-4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security d. e. Terrorism. Non traditional threats, eg leakage, hacking, fraud theft and criminal damage. Full details may be found in Chapter 1. 1323. Weapons, ammunition and explosives. All serving personnel are to be regularly reminded to pay the greatest attention to the security of weapons, ammunition and explosives (see Chapter 6). The need for maximum vigilance in this matter is underscored by the fact that such items stolen from the military are known to have been used to murder British servicemen. 1324. Annual Refresher Education. a. All staff must be given security education at least once in a calendar year. The subjects to be covered are non-exhaustive but must include topics listed in para 1321 above. b. ESyOs are to maintain the following in a dedicated register: (1) (2) (3) Names of personnel attending. Topics covered. Place, time and date. (4) Type of security education given, eg formal presentation, written brief, post incident de-brief, annual confidential orders, routing orders/instructions or other medium as appropriate. c. This register is to be produced on request during inspections/investigations. 1325. Reserved. 1326. Teaching. Security education can be dull, unless it is put over imaginatively and in a way that grips the interest. The aids which should be considered are detailed at Annex B. 1327. Internal security education material. Internal security education material will be coordinated where necessary by DDefSy and includes:a. Desk calendars and other devices bearing security messages. Desk calendars and other devices bearing security messages whose aim is to remind staff of their personal responsibility for security, particularly for those procedures most closely related to desk work: locking away protectively marked documents, ensuring that assets receive the proper protective markings, etc. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. Publications, staff circulars and newsletters. Publications, staff circulars and newsletters which may be used for: (1) Promulgating security regulations and amendments. (2) Relating instances of breaches of security and the lessons to be learnt from them. (3) Encouraging the avoidance of breaches, perhaps by periodic circulation of statistics within a department - which might serve as a way of promoting a sense of competition between branches, sections and divisions to achieve the highest security standards. (4) Warning staff of specific or topical threats to security and providing guidance in countering them. (5) Providing a channel or communication with staff on security matters generally. 1328. External security education material. The quarterly "Security Education News" (SEN) and other occasional briefing notes, booklets and pamphlets published by the Security Service contain topical and timely articles and advice on security issues. Whenever possible, SEN uses Clip Art illustrations. Persons controlling security education may use and reproduce this material to promote security as an integral part of the work of the individual and organisation. 1329. New procedures. When changes in security rules or procedures are introduced, care is to be taken to ensure that these changes are made known to those affected. Furthermore, any fresh training that may become necessary as a result of such changes should be conducted without delay. 1330-1339. Reserved. Security training 1340. Such training is mandatory for all officers and civilians going to security staff appointments, including those where security is only part of their work. It is also necessary for all types of establishment security officer, secretarial staff, those engaged with weapons or explosive ordnance, and all others whose duties impinge on, or have an element of security in, their responsibilities. The appropriate Director of Security or his equivalent lays down the type of course that all staff officers and civilians with security responsibilities should attend. All lead command headquarters have this information. 1341. Range of subjects. Security training must invariably include instruction on: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. The current threat. b. Protective Security Principles - eg need to know, need to hold, defence in depth etc. c. Good security practice and procedures, to embrace: (1) Correct use of protective markings and descriptions; (2) Physical, personnel, information, communications and information technology (IT) security. d. An understanding that the compromise of assets encompasses unauthorised disclosure, interference (eg the amendment of a database), withholding (eg preventing Government from having access to the asset when needed, including through theft) or destruction. e. Practical experience in applying the security rules and procedures on the tasks in which staff are, or will be, engaged. f. Action to be taken if a breach of security is suspected (apart from reporting procedure, which will be confined to security staff and line management). 1342. Annual refresher training. The staff listed in Paragraph 1340 above are to receive annual refresher training. This training is to be recorded in a register, the details of which are specified in Paragraph 1324b(1) to (4). The subjects to be covered are primarily the threat followed by whatever topics listed in para 1341 above are most appropriate. Within Head Office establishments, responsibility for conducting this training rests with branch security officers. Outside Head Office, the training will be run by either security specialists or ESyOs. 1343. Training methods. Though a large amount of training will be through central courses of instruction; details of which are published annually in DCIs and by training teams visiting establishments, there will also be the need for talks and seminars. Detailed guidance is given in Annex B. 1344. External courses. The Ministry of Defence D Def Sy is able to arrange vacancies on outside courses of kinds not seen within the MOD (normally of one day's duration) with the Security Service. The Civil Service Staff College also runs a number of security courses, which are chargeable to local budget holders. Requests for further information and bids for vacancies should be made through Lead Commands, who hold details. 1345. Specialist training support. Both at home and in certain overseas commands Intelligence Corps and RAF P&SS personnel provide security education and training facilities for establishments within the commands. Elsewhere, specialist units provide JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security similar, but more limited, security education and training support as required by the security staff. 1346. IT security training. In addition to that available within the MOD, such training is also provided by the Security Service, the Civil Service Staff College, the Communications Electronics Security Group (CESG), DISC, P&STS and the Defence IT Management Training Centre (DITMTC). All these courses are open to both Services and civilian personnel. Appointing, posting and promotion 1347. Individuals moving for the first time to posts with responsibilities and tasks involving protectively marked material should be fully briefed by the ESyO on the security implications of the work, and the correct practices to be adopted on taking up their positions. Whenever possible, security education & training should be an intrinsic part of the preparation of a new post. 1348. Persons who already have some experience of protectively marked material should receive specific training when they are given significant additional tasks or responsibilities. In particular, further training will be required on management training courses. This should include a clear security education and training element, clarifying the respective responsibilities of line and personnel management for the security of staff in their charge. Examples of additional security education and training requirements, which are likely to arise from changes in or extension of duties include: a. Appointments/postings abroad involving more sensitive work, different procedures, or shift work to outstations remote from headquarters or entailing contact with the media and/or representational duties. b. c. Promotions involving increased staff management and/or security duties. The introduction of new technology. 1349. Overseas postings and deployment. When a vessel/unit moves to another country/region overseas, it is important that all personnel should be briefed on the local threat in their new station and on local security regulations as soon as possible after arrival. Units, both regular and reserve, going for short periods of training abroad (eg from the United Kingdom to Cyprus) should similarly be given a security briefing. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Education, Training and Awareness ANNEX A SUBJECTS FOR SECURITY EDUCATION 1. The subjects listed below are intended as a guide to those responsible for security education within an establishment: a. b. c. The general threat to security - Para 1322 above and Chapter 1. The current local threat as assessed by the appropriate security staff. Individual activities which have inherent security dangers, such as: (1) Private correspondence. (2) Travel to foreign countries, especially those to which special security regulations apply (CSSRA). DMS Volume 2, Chapter 21. (3) (4) (5) (6) Loose talk. Public disclosure of official information. Amateur radio, Citizen Band and INTERNET activities. Telephone and radio security. (7) Displaying insignias, badges, stickers etc that advertise an individual's association with MOD. d. The Official Secrets Acts and reminders of what they mean. e. Briefings on the dangers of social approaches and 'talent spotting' by overseas intelligence services. DMS Volume 2, Chapter 21. f. The need for responsible conduct to avoid the possibility of blackmail. Chapter 1. g. The importance of reporting immediately all suspicious occurrences, to include weaknesses in security procedures or vulnerable behaviour apparent in colleagues. The means of doing this in complete confidence should be widely known. h. The requirement for high standards of security in relation to protectively marked documents and equipment, and in the use of communications. Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 9. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 2. Terrorist methods and the resultant common sense precautions to be adopted by all personnel. Chapter 7. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Education, Training and Awareness ANNEX B SECURITY TRAINING: INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS 1. Multimedia Learning. This is the teaching method of the future; a full background to this new topic is set out in Annex D. 2. Lessons. Lessons may be drawn from recent security intelligence cases, security breaches and terrorist incidents. Such material is available from security staffs and should be disseminated rapidly. Lessons may also be drawn from security surveys and inspections. 3. Videos. These provide a particularly effective way of informing large numbers of staff about the various threats to security, and of making them aware of their security responsibilities. They can be used as visual aids during a course or be the main focus of a separate security session. A video should never be used in isolation, but must be set firmly in its security context by the presenter, otherwise the audience will be inclined to judge it solely on its entertainment value and so obtain little or no security benefit from it. 4. Showing a video should therefore always be preceded by a short introduction, describing its purpose and points to look out for. A discussion about the value of the video and the security lessons it highlights should follow. If guidance notes for the use of presenters are not provided with the video, the presenter should compile his own. The Joint Services military training film and video catalogue, issued by the British Defence Film Library (BDFL), includes security educational and instructional material, produced tri-Service, single Service or by the Security Service. Virtually all recent production has been in the form of videos. Commands are responsible for notifying the release of new videos that are not yet listed in the catalogue. Videos should be chosen that are appropriate to the audience (eg civilian audiences may not relate to one featuring uniformed characters), and it should be suited to the expertise and seniority of the audience. 5. Posters. Posters are not intended to teach lessons, but to remind staff of the threats to security and of the principal security measures necessary to combat them. To retain their impact, posters must not only be prominently displayed but also frequently changed. 6. Wall Calendars. These, featuring a different security theme for each month, particularly when well designed, can be very effective in pressing home the security message. 7. Stickers. Stickers are aimed at reminding staff of their personal responsibility for maintaining security, when using specific items of security equipment (eg the JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security secure use of the telephone and of computers). Stickers should be placed on, or adjacent to, the equipment concerned, but not on security containers. 8. Security Service posters and stickers are advertised through a catalogue called "Security Education Material" (97-98) etc. It is published annually and is given publicity in Security Education News - see para 1328. The posters/stickers may then be demanded from CSE Llangennech. 9. Security aide-memoires. Security aide-memoires should be produced at unprotected level, though, on occasions, they may need to be protectively marked RESTRICTED. These will be of particular value for newly inducted staff. Note: Many security training aids produced by other Agencies, such as those advertised in "Security Education Material" and "Security Education News", now attract a cost. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Education, Training and Awareness ANNEX C SECURITY TRAINING: INSTRUCTIONAL METHODS 1. The choice of method will depend on the specific training requirements (which must first be clearly identified), on the nature of the target audience and on the degree to which it is desirable that those in the audience should participate in the course. However, whatever medium of instruction is adopted, there should always be an opportunity for some participation by the audience, if only in provision for questions. 2. As a general guide, if only one subject is to be covered, a talk may be the most appropriate medium. It is useful to confirm the audience's understanding of the talk with subsequent discussion. It is also important to consider the size and composition of the audience. For example, it may be difficult to pitch a talk to capture and retain the interest of groups comprising widely different seniorities or specialisations. Large audiences may pose problems - audibility, reduced impact of the message on the individual, and the tendency for individuals to feel anonymous in a crowd and therefore to listen and contribute less. 3. Seminars or informal talks. Seminars or informal talks may be useful when a greater degree of audience participation and discussion is possible and desirable, for example: a. When persuading senior management of the importance of promoting good security practice; or b. When introducing staff to the security requirements of a specific task. 4. If a wider variety of topics of general needs to be covered, a presentation with different speakers may best hold the attention of the group, and help them to distinguish between the different subjects. 5. When a greater amount of information is to be conveyed, and the students need to understand and apply it, a longer course may be desirable, with opportunities for practical exercises to ensure that the audience understands and retains the information. 6. With both presentations and courses, frequent question and answer periods provide a change of pace and the opportunity of digesting the information. Such periods need to be guided or simulated by the course staff. 7. Appropriate visual aids (eg multimedia, the overhead projector, slides and the display board) should, whenever possible, be used to reinforce the effect of the JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security spoken word. Clear and simple aids that enhance the talk but do not distract the audience should be used. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Education, Training and Awareness ANNEX D SECURITY TRAINING: MULTIMEDIA LEARNING Introduction 1. Essentially, multimedia involves the use of text, graphic and animation files, photographic images and sound and video clips to create dynamic, computer based information delivery and learning products. Multimedia products are invariably packaged, ie recorded in a simplified playable format, on CD ROMs (Compact Disk Read Only Memory). Each CD can store up to the equivalent of 650 million characters and can be played on a compatible multimedia system. 2. The basic stand alone multimedia system differs from the standard personal computer, or laptop, in that it includes a CD ROM drive, sound card and separate speakers. Some systems include a MPEG (Motion Picture Expert Group) card that allows full screen viewing of video clips without loss of picture quality. Multimedia Products 3. A comprehensive array of commercial multimedia products is available to support a wide range of activities, all of which are essential to the workings of any organisation. These include: a. b. c. d. e. Training/education. Information Management. Product catalogues. Advertising. Presentations. Multimedia Advantages 4. The quality of multimedia products available is evidence of a growing reliance on the use of these types of media: they provide cheap, though highly effective methods of delivering information, education and training. Take training as an example: on the one hand, over the past few years many organisations have JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13D-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security slashed their training budgets and reduced their training resources. On the other, the need for training has risen relative to the rapid changes in technologies and working practices in the workplace. Consequently, organisations have been forced to reassess how they provide appropriate training for their employees. Computer Based Learning (CBL) 5. Many organisations have found that CBL provide a viable alternative to increasingly expensive traditional classroom-based/trainer-led teaching methods. The CBL approach is being adopted by many organisations as the main impetus to their training strategy. Reduced training budgets and a corresponding decrease in cost, increase in capability and enhanced user friendliness of modern IT systems; and the development of CD ROM multimedia products serve to make the use of CBL products all the more attractive. Benefits of CBL 6. Organisations using CBL as part of the whole of their training strategy have reported the following benefits when comparing CBL with traditional teaching methods; that it:a. Provides effective training, because it: (1) gets training to the point of need, irrespective of geographical location; (2) can be used for revision or for reference material; (3) can cover subjects from learning to type to servicing complex aero engines. b. Speeds up learning and project implementation, because: (1) (2) (3) c. the dynamics of multimedia products promote learning; 100s or 1000s of employees can be trained simultaneously; CBL is 30% more effective than traditional forms of training. Takes much of the stress out of learning, because: (1) individuals work at their own speed; 13D-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security Education, Training and Awareness (2) (3) (4) (5) d. there is no peer pressure; self evaluation occurs; there is no travelling or staying away from home; it is fun to use, so individuals learn and retain more. Saves money, by: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) making better use of resources; being cheaper to produce and distribute; being easy to update; saving high costs of travel and subsistence; saving staff time to and from training centres; requiring no, or reduced training, resources. The Way Forward 7. To make the best use of resources the Security Service has set up a multimedia production group. The group comprises qualified trainers with multimedia authorising skills. They are responsible for identifying, analysing and developing appropriate multimedia products in support of our protective security advisory and education roles. As a pilot scheme the Security Service has produced a CBL package which deals with the handling of sensitive intelligence. This package has been distributed for use by thousands of individuals dispersed worldwide. Its cost works out at about 42.5 pence per user! JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13D-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 13D-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection CHAPTER 14 SECURITY ON OPERATIONS ­ SECURITY ELEMENTS OF FORCE PROTECTION Chapter 14 Security On Operations ­ Security Elements Of Force Protection General Force Protection Security Elements of Force Protection Measures Responsibility for Security Security Orders Principles Threat Assessment Likely Tasks of Adversary Intelligence Protection of Potential Targets Procedures Rôle of Security Units on Operations Annex A Annex B Annex C Annex D Annex E Annex F Annex G 1401 1406 1408 1409 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1419 1421 14-A-1 14-B-1 14-C-1 14-D-1 14-E-1 14-F-1 14-G-1 Para Page Suggested Outline Allotment of Staff Responsibilities for Security within a Force HQ on Operations. Check list of Security Aspects to be Covered in Security Orders. Security Briefing for Personnel Deploying on Operations. Security of Documents on Operations. Regulations for the Control of Private Correspondence. Use of Codewords, Nicknames and Passwords on Operations. Travel Control Security (TCS). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection CHAPTER 14 SECURITY ON OPERATIONS ­ SECURITY ELEMENTS OF FORCE PROTECTION General 1401. JSP 440 has been written with the aim of setting out the principles of security and providing the guidelines and instructions required to maintain security throughout the Ministry of Defence. 1402. Surprise and security are two of the principles of war; surprise cannot be achieved without good security. On operations, the tempo, nature and extent of activity may preclude carrying out in full the detailed security procedures outlined elsewhere in JSP 440. This is not to suggest that security on operations is of less importance than at peacetime base locations or on exercises. Indeed, the success of operations depends in great measure on the element of surprise and on the steps taken to prevent knowledge of friendly force intentions reaching the adversary; security enhances freedom of action by limiting vulnerability to adversary activities and threats. Thus, security on operations is based primarily on the security of information. The main object is to prevent the adversary obtaining information about our intentions, order of battle, vulnerabilities, deployment and movements. In certain types of operations, especially where terrorism is involved, measures required to prevent the seizure of arms, ammunition and equipment, and attacks against our own forces with, for example, improvised explosive devices, also assume significant importance. 1403. Although the detailed procedures given elsewhere in JSP 440 may not all be fully appropriate to the operational scenario, the principles upon which these procedures are based remain equally valid in both peace and war. 1404. The aim of this chapter is to provide general guidance to assist commanders to produce their own security orders while deployed on operations ranging from minor conflict to general war. To ensure that all personnel are familiar with their responsibilities, these procedures are to be practised on exercises as appropriate. 1405. A clear distinction must be drawn between security on operations and operations security (OPSEC). OPSEC is "the process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the adversary knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces" (AAP6(U)). The OPSEC plan provides for the overall security of an exercise or operation, employing a wide range of military disciplines: both offensively, to disrupt or destroy the adversary's intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability; and defensively, to deny information to the adversary. The OPSEC plan will, of course, include measures and procedures taken as part of security JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security on operations. Further information and details of OPSEC can be found in AJP-01 and JDP 3/98. Force Protection 1406. In future conflict, the emphasis will be on joint operations with UK forces operating as part of a multinational force. The battlespace will be non-linear with few or no `safe' areas, and the Host Nation administration may well have collapsed, exposing the force to a wide range of threats. Security and protection, as key components of capability, assume an even higher importance in joint operations. JDP 1/99 considers UK doctrine for Force Protection in a joint and multinational context and provides a framework for comprehensive protection of the deployed force to conserve its fighting strength, in order to achieve its mission with minimum casualties to both personnel and equipment. The UK doctrine examines, within the context of joint operations, future conflict and the need for Force Protection, its aim, definitions and principles; its constituent elements; a concept of operations; and its command and control. The protection of the force, including the force generation phase, on the UK mainland, in NI and permanent garrisons abroad is addressed by existing MOD and theatre policy covering standing security measures although such policy may be modified in response to other operations. 1407. Force Protection can be defined as a process which aims to conserve the fighting potential of the deployed force by countering the wider threat to all its elements from adversary, natural and human hazards, and fratricide. Force Protection is not an issue that can be addressed separately or in isolation. It is an integral part of operations and must be incorporated into the Commander's plan from the outset. In Joint Operations involving UK forces overseas the CJO's Strategic Estimate will consider Force Protection as a factor, and this should be reflected in the deployed force levels. The Force HQ will examine Force Protection in more detail in the Operational Estimate, which will confirm Force Protection policy and security requirements based on the threat assessment. Security Elements of Force Protection Measures 1408. Following the threat assessment, appropriate protective measures can be decided. Force Protection measures fall under several broad categories which includes security covering physical and procedural measures, directed from Force HQ level and integrated into the overall plan, but mainly applied at local level. Security measures aim to minimize direct and indirect attacks on personnel, equipment, installations and lines of communication by other than the adversary's main forces. In OOTW and PSO, where the adversary may not possess an air, theatre missile and NBC capability, security is probably the main constituent of Force Protection. Some security measures will affect the civil population, and such measures must be subject to appropriate legal advice which may need to incorporate the requirements of international law, Host Nation law, and any extant status of JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection forces agreements or Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). incorporate: Security measures a. Personal Security. Standing physical and procedural measures to protect personnel. b. Physical Security. Physical and procedural measures to protect positions, installations and units from attack, sabotage and theft. c. Lines of Communication Defence. Patrols, mine clearance, overwatch, bridge guards, etc, to ensure the safety and security of lines of communication. d. Security of Information. Physical and procedural barriers to protect friendly information. The deliberate or inadvertent compromise of protectively marked information by the Media is a risk, and this aspect should be specifically addressed by Force HQ and unit instructions. Levels of access afforded to the media, and the ability to control this, will also have an impact on Force Protection. e. Liaison with Host Nation Security Forces. Where the host nation security forces retain some operational capability, liaison is vital to coordinate actions. In some cases Host Nation security forces may have primacy, in nearly all they can provide intelligence and other related information about conditions in theatre. f. Civil Population Control. Refugee and displaced persons, border and port controls, curfews and other restrictions, to minimize civil population interference with operations. g. Prisoners of War (PW) and Detainees. Secure accommodation and guard forces will be required to contain PW and detainees. Responsibility for Security 1409. Security remains a command responsibility on operations. On operations, where a commander considers that the full procedures detailed elsewhere in JSP 440 are impossible to carry out without adversely affecting the conduct of the operation and achievement of the mission. It is the responsibility of the commander to modify the existing security procedures applicable to the force in accordance with the established principles described in JSP 440. Such modifications are to be agreed by at least a onestar commander. The modifications ordered by a commander in the field are to be notified to PJHQ through the normal security chain and Force HQ. 1410. A suggested outline of staff responsibilities for security in a Force HQ on operations is at Annex A. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Security Orders 1411. Requirement. Force HQ security staff are responsible for the preparation and issue of security orders for operations and deployments. A checklist of headings that should be used in security orders is at Annex B. Not all headings need be used but security plans should include countering specific threats and must be reviewed regularly to adjust to changes in the threat. Security orders must provide for the denial to the adversary of information and intelligence received directly or indirectly from for example: a. Imagery intelligence (IMINT) from both aerial reconnaissance flights and satellite platforms. b. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) covering information obtained from the interception of communications (COMINT), including direction finding, and non-communications emissions (ELINT), e.g: radar. c. Human intelligence (HUMINT) including manned reconnaissance, patrol reports, interrogation of prisoners of war (PW), espionage and loose talk. d. Loss or compromise of sensitive and protectively marked documents, including soft copy. e. The physical protection of personnel from terrorist attack (e.g: assassination). f. The protection of personnel from seditious or subversive influences likely to undermine morale, e.g: propaganda and rumours. g. The safeguarding of protectively marked and vital assets from sabotage or capture by adversary special forces or local sympathizers. Principles 1412. The following principles must be observed. a. The commander at every level is responsible for security within his command. b. Security should enhance an operation; not constrain it. c. Security planning must start at the highest level with the initial concept of operations and be integral to operational planning. d. All personnel must be made continually aware of the threat to security, how it affects them individually and their specific responsibilities for countering it. A security briefing checklist is at Annex C. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection e. Every individual who handles protectively marked information and protectively marked or vital materiel is personally responsible for safeguarding it in the appropriate manner. f. Protectively marked information may normally only be given to those who have been cleared to the appropriate level of security clearance and who need the information to carry out their duties. Threat Assessment 1413. Responsibility. Force Protection is a risk management process based on the threat assessment, the results of which determine measures addressing: overall and collective protection; security; and health and safety. Over-protection to counter an improbable threat can divert scarce resources from achieving the mission. An overall threat assessment (which should include the protagonists' current and possible future intent derived from their aims, doctrine, culture and history) will be conducted at MOD/PJHQ level as part of the planning process. An overall assessment of Force Protection requirements based on this threat assessment should be incorporated into the CDS directive. Once the force has deployed, the Force HQ will refine this threat assessment as part of the Joint Task Force Commander's (JTFC) estimate and directive. Additional localized assessments will need to be conducted, particularly in OOTW and Peace Support Operations (PSO), where the threat may vary. Where more than one adversary exists, their intents, threats and capabilities must be included in the threat assessment. This may reveal a threat to the UK mainland or UK forces in other theatres arising from a conflict, which may include non-violent activities such as PSYOPS and other associated tactics aimed at influencing international perceptions. Countering such threats will be the responsibility of the local authorities. The threat assessment should consider the following security elements: a. The adversary's military intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets and capabilities - can he detect and locate friendly activities? b. The adversary's espionage and covert intelligence capability. Does he have operatives in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)? c. The adversary's capability to conduct Information Operations (INFO OPS) and Command and Control Warfare (C2W) activities, including those aimed at audiences and targets outside the JOA. d. The adversary's EW (including Directed Energy (DE) weapons) capability. Can he intercept, direction find, jam or interfere with friendly transmissions? e. Adversary sympathizers, agents and partisans in the JOA. Will they conduct information gathering, espionage or guerrilla acts against us? JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security f. Terrorist, criminal and insurgent organisations. What are their aims, capabilities and methods? Do they, for example, include hostage taking as a tactic? g. The attitude of the civil population and refugees or displaced persons (by region, if appropriate) to the military presence. Are they hostile, neutral or favourably disposed towards us? Could their perceptions be altered by friendly or adversary actions, including INFO OPS? h. Sabotage, in the form of planned attacks by adversary special forces or other agents, or more spontaneous activities by locally employed civilians. i. Subversion and Hostile PSYOPS. It is likely that an adversary will attempt to subvert friendly forces, either individually, to gain leverage, or collectively for political and military advantage. Likely Tasks of Adversary Intelligence 1414. Adversary intelligence requirements are likely to include the collection of information on the following aspects of friendly force activity: a. b. c. d. e. f. Future intentions. Operational plans and capabilities, including those of reservists. Communications, command and control. Protectively marked equipment. Order of battle. Strength and morale of forces. g. Intelligence organization, particularly the extent of our knowledge of the adversary and how information is gathered. h. Logistics including details of resources, reinforcement plans and equipment replacement. i. Casualties in men and materiel. Results of adversary action. j. Security organization and our knowledge of the adversary's espionage, sabotage and subversive activities. k. Personnel vulnerabilities, e.g: character weaknesses, etc, of individuals which could be used to coerce them into working for the adversary. (This would normally be expected to pertain during protracted operations). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection l. Identification of key personnel and their future movement plans. Protection of Potential Targets 1415. Security of information. The principal sources from which the adversary will attempt to derive information are: a. Surveillance and reconnaissance. Every unit and HQ must take appropriate action to deny the adversary direct observation from ground and air. This includes use of sanitized areas surrounding C3 facilities, camouflage and concealment, track discipline, night movement and use of cover. b. Radio and line communications. All messages sent by radio are liable to interception by the adversary. Similarly, although to a lesser degree, messages sent by landline can also be intercepted by the adversary. The importance of the strict application of communications security procedures laid down in Chapter 9 is particularly important. c. Non-communications emissions. Emissions from across the electromagnetic spectrum (TEMPEST) are all liable to detection and interception by the adversary. Security orders are to include the defensive measures necessary to defeat the adversary's efforts in this area. Particular attention should be paid to: (1) (2) Electronic emissions, e.g: radar and radiation from IT systems. Thermal emissions, e.g: from vehicle engines and exhausts. d. Documents and information technology (IT) systems. Documents, which include such items as maps and computer discs are particularly valuable sources of information. All documents whether private or official, must be considered to contain matters of interest to the adversary. Detailed guidance on the security of documents is given at Annex D. The primary risk to IT systems is loss of data either by capture or physical loss or damage. IT Systems which are intended for deployment on operations are to have appropriate countermeasures detailed in the System Security Policy (SSP) and the Security Operating Procedures (SyOPs). e. Loose talk. Any conversation may be overhead and ultimately communicated to the adversary. f. Discussions and briefings. Discussions and briefings within HQs and units on the subjects in paragraph 1414 above should as far as possible take place only in areas where positive access control is in place and formal counter eavesdropping measures have been taken. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security g. Private correspondence. All private correspondence in transit to and from units should be handled by the Defence Postal and Courier Service. When appropriate, and on the orders of the force commander, private correspondence will be subject to censorship. Guidance is at Annex E. h. Private telephone calls. Similar restrictions to those applying to written correspondence apply to private telephone conversations. Annex E applies. On occasions when commanders consider it operationally necessary, private telephone calls may be prohibited. i. The media. When circumstances warrant it, a system to control the movement and output of accredited correspondents will be authorized. Instructions for the implementation of this system, designed to ensure that aspects of our operations and plans are not jeopardized in any way, will be issued by the Ministry of Defence. j. Civilians. Civilians who remain in the area of operations may deliberately or by accident come into possession of information of value to the adversary. Effective measures should be taken to control their movement so that they cannot become a source of leakage. In particular, civilians with legitimate access to an operational area, e.g: traders and workmen, are to be prevented from having access to protectively marked information and, if this is not possible, should be appropriately security cleared. k. Destruction. Emergency destruction methods must be prepared for immediate use from the outset of operations. See Chapter 5 for information on methods of destruction. l. Prisoners of war. Every officer and soldier must understand their individual responsibilities in the event of capture. 1416. Security of personnel. The adversary may attempt to undermine the morale of our own troops and to breed disaffection using the following main methods: a. Propaganda. Propaganda may be spread by adversary radio and television stations or by leaflets distributed from the air, by shell or by agents. The best counter is the briefing of all personnel in the methods and aims of adversary propaganda and the dangers of naive acceptance. b. Subversion. Any identification of subversive activity is to be reported immediately to the Force HQ security staff. c. Rumours. All personnel must be instructed to check rumours and speculation and to report instances immediately to the unit security officer. Authoritative statements by Force HQ can quell rumours at an early stage. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection 1417. Security of materiel. The key factors in countering sabotage of all types, including minor damage and pilferage of materiel, are a well trained and supervised guard force, strict physical security controls, and effective access control. 1418. Personal security. The adversary will attempt to assassinate or capture key personnel. Likely adversary targets should be identified by the Force HQ security staff in consultation with the intelligence branch. Trained close protection (CP) teams should be deployed by the appropriate staff to protect these individuals. Details of the movement plans of such individuals should be kept on a strict need-to-know basis. Procedures 1419. Security of operations. Security must be an integral part of all operational plans. To be effective security must be considered from the earliest stages of operational planning. Steps to be considered are: a. Strict adherence to the "need-to-know" principle for all plans, but ensuring that information is distributed widely enough to enable all those involved to carry out their role effectively. b. Responsibility for interpreting the "need-to-know" of troops on operations rests with the commander concerned. This includes the issuing of short term protectively marked battle information to all those who need to know it for operational reasons, regardless of their security clearance. c. Keeping the number of copies of plans and associated documents to a minimum - the "need-to-know" principle. d. Good communications security. 1420. Physical security. Detailed physical security arrangements for HQs and units in the field will depend on the local threat and on the type of HQ or unit concerned. The following points are to be considered: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. Control of access. Use of a 'sanitized area'. Track discipline. Camouflage and concealment. Vehicle parking. Noise control. Lighting control. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security h. i. j. k. Security of arms, ammunition and explosives. Security of documents. See Annex D. Security of materiel - Both protectively marked and unclassified. Procedures for codewords, nicknames and passwords. See Annex F. l. Constant review of SOPs - based on experience, fresh reports and recurring problem areas. Rôle of Security Units on Operations 1421. Specialist security tasks in the field are carried out by specialist security units as directed by the Force HQ security staff. The priority allocated to and necessity for these tasks which are listed below will vary according to the intensity of the conflict and the different stages of friendly operations, e.g: offensive, defensive or consolidation phases. a. Protective Security Tasks. (1) To issue orders on, or provide advice on protective security measures to be taken by HQs and units. (2) To issue or provide advice on orders for static guard forces as appropriate. (3) To advise on the security aspects of arrangements for the protection of key points. (4) To carry out rapid investigations into breaches of security. (5) To advise on methods for the emergency destruction of protectively marked documents and materiel likely to be of use to the adversary. (6) To advise the OPSEC staff on, and in conjunction with that staff, monitor the implementation of relevant OPSEC measures. (7) Security checks and vetting of locally employed labour. (8) In order to deny information to the adversary, friendly force security personnel are to carry out security sweeps of evacuated HQs and unit areas to ensure that security measures, e.g: the destruction or removal of documents have been carried out. (9) Abandoned equipment and vehicles, including aircraft, are also to be searched, preferably by unit personnel familiar with the item, to JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-12 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection ensure they contain no information of use to the adversary and destroyed. (10) Security personnel are to be among the last to leave an area or installation, in order to carry out security sweeps. (11) When the operational situation demands and within legal constraints, to search civic and public offices, police stations, banks, etc, as appropriate for civil records and to arrange for the safe custody of such documents that are vital for subsequent civil administration or the investigation of war crimes, or may be of value to the adversary. (12) To provide advice and assistance to units in the implementation of censorship if ordered and to raise base censorship units if authorized. (13) To ensure that captured adversary materiel of intelligence interest is put in safe custody prior to exploitation. (14) To ensure that until such time as they are taken over by communications staff or units, no radio, television or telephone installations are available for use by adversary sympathizers. (15) b. To maintain security records. Security Intelligence Tasks. (1) To search captured adversary HQs and static locations, including living quarters of senior officers, for materiel of intelligence and security interest. Security personnel must be available to enter previously held adversary areas and HQs immediately after these have been captured. It is essential to try to prevent destruction of materiel by the adversary. Friendly forces need to be briefed in advance not to destroy or incapacitate in any way captured adversary materiel or documents. Procedures for passing items of immediate tactical value to the intelligence staff are to be in place. (2) Liaison, if appropriate, with Host Nation intelligence, security and police forces. (3) To collect security intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of adversary intelligence services, their agents and informers, in order to take action to counter their plans. (4) To identify and prevent espionage and sabotage activities by adversary agents and sympathizers. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security (5) To carry out the rapid investigation of any incidents suspected of being caused by adversary sympathizers or agents. (6) To carry out the questioning of suspects for information of security value. This task will often include, in addition, questioning for tactical information. (7) To make contact with friendly agents and known sympathizers who may have useful information about the adversary which is of tactical importance. (8) To make contacts with civil authorities and reliable civilians who may form the basis of an information service. (9) To round up known adversary agents, sympathizers or suspects. (10) To advise on the state of civil administration, its operation and reliability where it affects friendly operations. (11) To maintain, in conjunction with the Service police and if appropriate, Host Nation police, security controls over the civil population, especially refugees. As far as possible refugees should be canalized and checked at control posts to guard against infiltration by adversary agents. Children may be used by the adversary as messengers and must also be checked. (12) To advise on and to take action to prevent civil disturbance or subversive activity from interfering with operations. (13) To supervise and check the application of civil controls, e.g: curfews, restrictions on movement and communications, registration and issue of identity cards to civilians. (14) To provide advice and assistance on the security aspects of travel through seaports, airports and across land frontiers, and to act as travel control security units if authorized. Details of the functioning of a travel control security unit are at Annex G. (15) To assist in maintaining morale by checking rumours and attempts by adversary sympathizers to spread adversary propaganda. (16) To maintain security intelligence records. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-14 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 14 SUGGESTED OUTLINE OF STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SECURITY WITHIN A FORCE HQ ON OPERATIONS Chief J2 Advice to the force commander on all aspects of Force security. Implementation of Force security policy. Direction of the work of the Force HQ security staff. Direction and tasking of Force security units. Dissemination policy for protectively marked information. Production and dissemination of threat assessments. SO2/SO3 J2(X) Organization and day to day direction of the Force HQ security staff. Implementation of aspects of security policy as directed. Security of operations and plans. Staff work concerned with security investigations carried out by security units Direction of all protective security measures including the arrangements for the handling and custody of protectively marked documents, and vetting or screening of locally employed personnel, within Force HQ. Planning and implementation of measures for travel control security. Force HQ security officer and vetting records officer. Issue of security standing orders, instructions and operating procedures. Direction of security checks and inspections. Liaison with Media Ops Staff on release of information. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security SO2/SO3 J2(SP) Control of access to and dissemination of information from special communications cell. Branch Security Officers (BSOs) Supervision of all security arrangements and implementation of security orders within their branch. Production of branch security orders. Initial investigation of all security incidents within their branch and subsequent requests (if appropriate) for security unit involvement. Checks and inspections of branch security arrangements. Control of access to their branch. Ensuring that all branch personnel are fully aware of security procedures. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 14 CHECK LIST OF SECURITY ASPECTS TO BE COVERED IN SECURITY ORDERS The following security matters need to be addressed as soon as an operation is envisaged. (The list is not exhaustive, nor will items apply under all circumstances.) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Appointment of a security officer reporting directly to the force commander. Allotment of tasks to security personnel. Provision of threat assessments. Notification of codewords and nicknames with meanings. Timings of release of information into the public domain. Security areas and system of access control. Identifying requirements for guarding personnel, material and locations. Custody and storage of protectively marked documents. Security clearances of Service personnel. Security clearances and control of visitors. Protection from overlooking and eavesdropping. 12. Protection and storage of protectively marked materiel, equipment, arms, ammunition and explosives. 13. 14. Delivery and dispatch of protectively marked documents and materiel. Clearance of security areas. 15. Destruction of protectively marked documents, materiel and waste (including emergency destruction plans). 16. Dangers of hostile intelligence service radio and electronic interception. 17. Communication electronic security precautions, including cover and deception plans. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. Restrictions on radar and radio testing and the use of radio communications. Protective EW arrangements. Physical security of protectively marked communications equipment. Telephone security. Action on capture of adversary arms, ammunition and explosives. Action on capture of adversary documents and materiel. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-B-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 14 SECURITY BRIEFING FOR PERSONNEL DEPLOYING ON OPERATIONS Briefing 1. All personnel deploying on operations are to be briefed on the following subjects where applicable: a. The threat. This should cover all phases of the operation and all areas involved, e.g: ports of entry and exit, staging ports and in theatre. b. c. d. Security of arms, ammunition and explosives. Security of sensitive and protectively marked documents. Security of information and IT systems. e. The security risks inherent in conversation with civilians prior to, during and after operations. The need to report any suspicious approach which may be made by civilians. f. g. h. The need to be alert and to report suspicious activity. Communications security. The security of protectively marked materiel and equipment. i. Security measures required to counter hostile surveillance. Such instruction may form part of SOPs or unit security standing orders. (This area is primarily an OPSEC matter but should be included where relevant). j. The action to be taken by personnel when the presence of any civilian is noticed who appears to be taking undue interest in the preparations, or taking hostile action during the operation, e.g: loitering near a unit or HQ or taking photographs, making notes, or interfering with military property such as communication cables. Security of Arms and Ammunition 2. Commanders are to issue written orders on the safeguarding of arms, ammunition and explosives. These orders are to be framed with particular attention to the following: JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-C-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security a. Establishment of armouries or properly guarded stores where applicable. b. Control and recording the issue and receipt of arms, ammunition and explosives. c. The responsibility of individuals for the security of arms, ammunition and explosives issued to them and the procedures for handover. d. Highlighting the recovery phase of the operation as being a period requiring especially tight control. e. A tally is to be made of all arms, ammunition and explosives on personal issue. These items are also to be checked before and after moves to other locations. (On return to unit, arms, ammunition and explosives are to be checked (arms by registered number) and immediately stored in a secure armoury or magazine). f. Implementation of Force HQ policy concerning the handing-in of captured weapons or "souvenirs". Security of Protectively Marked Documents 3. There is a particular need to safeguard protectively marked documents and materiel during operations especially those held in vehicles. SOPs are to include arrangements to control access to vehicles containing protectively marked materiel including aggregations of RESTRICTED information which may merit a higher protective marking. 4. Only those protectively marked documents that are essential for use during an operation are to be removed from their normal secure place of storage and taken into the field. Such documents are to be protected as follows: a. Prior to deploying they are to be listed and booked out on signature to the appointed unit security officer. At this stage they are to be checked for completeness by page identification and page counting. b. The individual who is normally responsible for their accounting and safe custody is to retain a copy of the list. Should the unit security officer issue the documents further, he is to do so on signature to those individuals who need to use them. If the documents are destroyed this should be supported by an appropriate witness signature. c. They are to be stored in document security boxes or such other containers of approved security pattern when not in use. These boxes are, where possible, to be firmly affixed to the framework of vehicles. Vehicles and containers containing protectively marked documents are never to be left JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection unattended when not in use. The normal rules for controlling access to protectively marked documents are to be applied at all times. d. At the end of the operation the branch or unit security officer is to recall all documents issued by him and check them for completeness. On completion of the recovery phase he is to return them to the owning individual where they are to be checked once more for completeness, as in sub-paragraph a above, before being returned to their normal place of storage. 5. Protectively marked documents originated or received on operations are to be accounted for (and protected as far as is possible) in accordance with the instructions given by the force commander. Exceptionally, however, the instructions below in respect of Protected Document Registers (MOD Forms 102) are to be followed: a. Current registers are not to be taken on operations. A separate register is to be taken into use and an officer or nominated clerk is to be appointed to maintain it. An officer is to be nominated, on the first page of the register, to supervise its maintenance. b. All documents protectively marked SECRET and above originated, received and dispatched during the operation are to be recorded in the register. In the event that TOP SECRET documents are handled, a TOP SECRET Control Officer is to be appointed to maintain a register in which TOP SECRET documents are to be accounted for. c. At the end of the operation the details of those protectively marked documents that are still required to be held are to be transferred to a current register and the documents filed and stored in accordance with normal rules. All other protectively marked documents are to be destroyed in accordance with the instructions for their protective marking. d. When all details in the register have been deleted the register is to be closed formally and retained for one year. 6. A l00 per cent check of those essential policy and reference documents protectively marked TOP SECRET is to be carried out daily. TOP SECRET documents that are dependent on the operational situation for their degree of protective marking are to be subject to checks as laid down by the force commander. A l00 per cent check of all extant TOP SECRET documents is to be carried out at the end of the operation. 7. Before vacating any location an inspection is to be made to ensure that no protectively marked materiel or other sensitive documents have been left in the area. Where possible an inspection is also to be made at first light the following morning whenever a site is vacated during the hours of darkness. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-C-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 8. Protectively marked documents may, where practicable, be destroyed in the field. If shredding is impracticable, protectively marked waste is to be collected daily, and destroyed by burning. The rules for recording the destruction of documents, protectively marked SECRET or above, are to be observed. Security of Protectively Marked Equipment 9. Commanders of units with equipment protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL or above are to issue written instructions for its security protection. 10. Such instructions may form part of SOPs or Security Standing Orders. They are to include: a. The need for physical checks of the equipment during all phases of the operation and at each location as appropriate (including whilst under repair). b. Control of access to the equipment at all times. c. Action to be taken to safeguard the equipment in the event of breakdown, traffic accident, or recovery of the equipment to a repair facility. d. The protection to be afforded the equipment against the activities of adversary and hostile intelligence units, their agents and informers, and other unauthorized persons. In particular, instructions are to specify the precautions to be taken against: (1) Surveillance. Where appropriate measures are to provide protection against sophisticated surveillance devices (e.g: optical, acoustic, seismic, magnetic, radar, image intensification and thermal imaging) as well as against simple visual observation by a ground or air observer. Defences against sophisticated devices need to be based on specialist advice available through Force HQ security staff. (2) Intercept. Where appropriate measures are to provide protection against the interception of non-communications electronic emissions, e.g: radar in weapons systems (see paragraph 1415). Operations News Sheets 11. If news sheets are issued during an operation they are not to contain any protectively marked information. Care is to be taken in reporting the progress of the operation not to disclose any orders of battle, aims of the operation, special battle techniques, special weapons or any other matters that may not be made public. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-C-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection Security of Protectively Marked Documents and Equipment when in Contact with the Adversary 12. When it is essential for operational reasons for protectively marked documents or equipment to be taken into situations where a part or the whole of the operational plan involves direct conflict with the adversary, a list of equipment being taken is to be notified to the next higher formation and copies of all protectively marked documents taken are also to be held by them; so that in the event of capture or compromise swift damage assessments can be made and timely counter-measures taken. 13. Those in charge of or carrying protectively marked documents and equipment must be aware of the priority for destruction of protectively marked items in the event of imminent capture. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-C-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-C-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 14 SECURITY OF DOCUMENTS ON OPERATIONS General 1. The protection of documents in the field from unauthorized access, disclosure or loss is dependent on the proper application of: a. b. c. d. Clear and detailed security orders. Protective markings. The "need-to-know" principle. Physical security measures. 2. On operations, as in peacetime, it is necessary for every establishment holding documents protectively marked SECRET or above to know what documents it holds and where they are. In order to do this a record must be kept. The aim is to record, in the simplest form possible, the minimum information required, consistent with operational circumstances and the local threat. Protectively Marked Documents 3. Dispensations from peacetime procedures for the handling of protectively marked documents. On operations in the field, a commander may consider that the full procedures detailed elsewhere in JSP 440 are impossible to carry out without adversely affecting the conduct of the operation or achievement of the mission. It is the responsibility of the commander to modify existing security procedures for protectively marked documents as necessary in accordance with the established principles described elsewhere in JSP 440. In these circumstances the modifications ordered by the commander in the field are to be agreed by a one-star commander and notified through the normal security chain to the Force HQ security staff. Registration of Documents 4. Prior to deciding that the use of the Protected Document Register (MOD Form 102) for protectively marked documents marked SECRET and above is not possible without adversely affecting operations, a commander should consider whether the continued use of the register for TOP SECRET and CODEWORD material should JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-D-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security continue. If not, he should consider the possibility of each unit keeping a record in the appropriate log. The following details should be entered in the log: a. The communications head serial number (which is marked in the top right corner of every message received or transmitted by the communications centre of formation HQ), or other short reference in the case of messages delivered by other means, e.g: by liaison officer. b. The reference number of the battle board clip or file into which the message is filed by the unit. c. A unique folio, enclosure or sheet number. 5. In the event of a commander deciding that operational circumstances are such that it is necessary to suspend the majority or even all protectively marked document record keeping, he should consider basing the security protection of documents marked SECRET or above on the establishment of controlled areas: a. Within which no protectively marked document records need be maintained. b. To and from which access is strictly controlled at all times. c. From which no document marked SECRET or above is removed except for despatch or destruction. Checks 6. Checks of documents marked SECRET and above, should be made at appropriate intervals laid down by the Force HQ security staff. Destruction 7. All protectively marked documents taken into the field are to be reviewed for destruction on a daily basis. 8. In certain operational circumstances a commander may decide that destruction in accordance with normal procedures is not possible without adversely affecting operations. In this event he should order destruction by the most secure means available. 9. Protectively marked documents must not be allowed to fall into adversary hands. For example, in the event of adversary penetration threatening to overrun a position and capture protectively marked documents, the documents are to be destroyed or otherwise denied to the adversary by whatever means are available. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-D-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection Safeguards During Moves 10. Protectively marked documents are to be securely packed in secure containers approved by the Force HQ security staff. Such containers are to be safeguarded at all times. Safeguards on Operations 11. Protectively marked documents that are not in use but are still required to be held are to be stored in locked secure containers approved by the Force HQ. 12. Approved containers containing protectively marked documents are not to be left unattended. Where appropriate, containers should be securely anchored, e.g: bolted to an appropriate structure, to prevent them being easily removed. 13. Keys to approved containers are to be safeguarded. 14. Displays of protectively marked information are to be mounted in such a way that they cannot be seen by anyone who is not authorized to have access to them. Covers or curtains may be required for temporary screening from view. 15. Protectively marked documents should be held in HQs and units as far from the front line as operationally acceptable. 16. Protectively marked documents should not be carried when closing or in contact with the adversary unless operationally essential. Loss or Compromise 17. The loss or compromise, or suspected compromise of a document marked SECRET or above is to be reported immediately to Force HQ, to the HQ or unit which originated the document, and to all other HQs and units affected. The reporting HQ or unit is to include in the report an immediate assessment of the damage caused so that counter compromise action can be taken. Unclassified Documents 18. Unclassified documents, including letters, diaries and photographs should not be carried on operations when closing with the adversary, as they may give useful information to interrogators in the event of capture. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-D-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-D-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection ANNEX E TO CHAPTER 14 REGULATIONS FOR THE CONTROL OF PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEPHONE CALLS 1. The object of censorship can only be attained by the rigorous suppression of certain types of subject matter in correspondence. 2. Allusions to any of the following matters are forbidden at all times in private correspondence and telephone calls during operations, whether they relate to naval, military or air forces, except in specific releases authorized by the Force HQ: a. Strength, efficiency, organization of our own or allied forces, including any comment on the absence or presence in the theatre of a unit or formation, or disclosure regarding the formation to which any unit is attached or belongs. b. Location or movement of any naval, military or air force units or detachments, arrival or lack of reinforcements. c. Specialist armament or equipment of any kind. d. Distinguishing signs used for the identification of formations, units, and their transport. e. Plans and forecasts or orders for current, future, or cancelled operations or movements, whether known or merely rumoured or surmised. f. Communications, such as the use, condition, or probable extensions of roads, railways or other transportation facilities, bridging operations, etc. g. h. State of the maintenance services, including any reference to reserves. Position or description of barracks or camps. i. Casualty figures and names of individuals before official notification and publication. j. Effect of any action by the adversary. Any remark that may tend, if published, to encourage the adversary, to cause despondency in our own forces, people or allies, or to incite a feeling of hostility among the people in the theatre of operation or in neutral countries. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-E-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security k. Criticisms and statements calculated to bring into disrepute our forces or those of our allies. 3. It is forbidden to send, or attempt to send, to unauthorized persons: a. Official documents, including intelligence summaries, orders, reports, maps, etc, or to disclose their contents except in the course of duty. b. Any document captured from the adversary, or found in places occupied by the adversary, and any document containing information about the adversary. c. Any official document belonging to the civil authorities in Allied or adversary territory. d. e. Objects of intelligence or research value. Arms, ammunition and explosives. 4. It is forbidden to despatch to neutral or adversary countries photographs or pictorial matter of any kind, from whatever source they may have been obtained, except under conditions laid down in the censorship regulations of the Force HQ concerned. 5. It is forbidden to communicate with the press on military subjects except as laid down in theatre orders. Correspondence of a non-military nature will be permitted subject to regulations promulgated by the Force HQ. 6. It is forbidden to send through the post photographs or films except those taken under proper authority. 7. It is forbidden to invite correspondence with strangers by inserting advertisements or letters in any publication, or by any other means, or to enter into correspondence with strangers in response to such advertisements or letters. The greatest caution and reserve are necessary in acknowledging presents from unknown donors, or in replying to trade circulars from unknown merchants and dealers, especially those in neutral countries. 8. It is forbidden to make use of the civil postal service in the theatre of operations. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-E-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection ANNEX F TO CHAPTER 14 USE OF CODEWORDS, NICKNAMES AND PASSWORDS ON OPERATIONS Definitions 1. Codeword. A codeword is a single word used to provide security cover for reference to a particular protectively marked matters. 2. Nickname. A nickname is made up of two words selected by the originator and used for convenience for reference to any matter where security protection is not required. 3. Password. A pre-arranged word or distinctive sound used to reply to a prearranged challenge. Codewords 4. Issue. Codewords are issued by Force HQ to subordinate HQs on demand. Similarly, subordinate HQ are responsible for issue to units on demand. Bids for an allocation of codewords should be made as early as possible so that requirements can be met and an adequate reserve list of codewords for issue can be maintained. 5. Recording. A record must be kept by the issuing HQ of the following: a. b. Details of issue, cancellation and withdrawal. The protective marking of the codeword itself. c. The meaning of the codeword and the protective marking of the meaning of the codeword. Frequently the meaning will bear a higher protective marking than the codeword. 6. Compromise. If a codeword is compromised, the circumstances must be reported to the next higher HQ immediately. To minimize the risk of compromising a new codeword it must not be referred to in the same signal as the one it is replacing. When a change of codeword becomes necessary all concerned must be informed that the original has been cancelled and will be replaced by a new meaning of the codeword and should merely refer to the first signal and state: "Codeword is ........".. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-F-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Further guidance on codewords is given at Annex K to Chapter 4. Nicknames 7. To prevent duplication the use of specific nicknames should be authorised by superior HQ. Passwords 8. Force HQ is responsible for issuing a force password to be changed at 1200 hours local time daily. To avoid problems of dissemination, lists of passwords and their period of validity should be issued, sometime in advance - commensurate with the operational profile of password users. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-F-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection ANNEX G TO CHAPTER 14 TRAVEL CONTROL SECURITY (TCS) Tasks 1. Certain operations may require the establishment of a TCS system the aim of which is to: a. Detect and prevent entry and exit of persons suspected of being engaged in espionage, sabotage subversion or terrorism or undesirable political activity. b. Detect and prevent the smuggling of arms, sabotage of materiel, subversive literature etc. c. Select travellers of intelligence interest for further interrogation by the appropriate authority. d. Provide, at appropriate levels, day to day liaison and advice on policy and operations with all concerned civilian and service departments on all aspects of TCS. Organisation 2. Within the theatre or area concerned a TCS HQ will be formed under the command of a senior security control officer (SSCO). The duties of SSCO are outlined below. Since the work of TCS in any theatre or area will depend on the prevailing circumstances and the reliability of other control agencies they are given only in general terms. a. To advise the commander or appropriate government authorities on the travel restrictions necessary to maintain the security of the area concerned. b. To advise and assist in the setting up of interrogation centres for detained traveller suspects. c. To establish and, if necessary, control the machinery for the issue of entry and exit permits. d. e. To advise as to the type and method of loading and boarding passes. To exercise operational control of TCS detachments. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-G-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security 3. The work of TCS HQ will be co-ordinated and directed by the Force HQ security staff. 4. TCS HQ will direct the work of security control officers (SCOs) who command TCS detachments at port, frontiers and airfields. The RN, Army or RAF may provide these detachments. 5. RN Liaison Officers (RNLO/RN Security Team) are allocated to Army and RAF detachments at ports, airfields, or authorized sea landing places, and at canal or river frontier crossings, of where the RN is exercising control over the waterway or airfield concerned. The duties of an RNLO/RN Area Security Team: a. To act as liaison officer between the Army or RAF SCO and the RN authorities or the approved port authority. b. To act as adviser to the SNA, NOIC, SNO or approved port authority in the port or area concerned on all security matters affecting TCS. c. To ensure, in consultation with the SNA etc that all HM ships conform to the TCS regulations in force. d. To liaise with the appropriate RN authority or approved port authority concerning such harbour, coast, river or canal patrols as may be required, and the control of vessels in harbours or prohibited coastal zones. e. To advise, when required, on security and counter sabotage measures. 6. TCS detachments (Army) may be at frontiers, docks, ports, sea-borne landing places or in any other place as may be directed. An SCO (Army) is responsible for the examination of all persons and materiel entering or leaving the area served by the detachment. The aim is to: a. b. Prevent or detect communication with the adversary. Detect all agents, saboteurs or subversive persons. c. Prevent or detect the introduction of any item that may be used for sabotage or subversive purposes. d. Ensure that all the security control measures designed to channel all traffic through travel control posts are working smoothly. 7. TCS detachments (RAF) may be located at authorized and non-authorized airfields, landing strips, areas or in any other place as directed. The RAF Police are responsible for the examination of all persons and materiel entering or leaving the area served by the detachment. The aim is as in paragraphs 6 a - d above. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-G-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection Methods 8. Control of entry into and exit from a territory is achieved by: a. b. c. 9. Port control. Frontier control. Airfield control. At ports, frontiers and airfields TCS falls into two broad divisions. These are: a. Travel control. This includes the examination of all persons and materiel channelled through travel control posts by a series of preventive measures known as security controls. The application of travel control principles is similar whether applied to posts, frontiers or airfields. In travel control TCS personnel have an executive function. b. Security control. This is the collective term to describe the measures designed to seal coastlines and frontiers, ports and airfields with the aim of directing all traffic through established travel control posts. The application of security control principles varies with ports, frontiers and airfields. In security control TCS personnel have an advisory function. Travel Control 10. Travel control has two aspects common to all its posts at ports, frontiers and airfields. These are: a. The preventive role which involves the examination of all persons and materiel in transit, with the aim of carrying out the tasks listed in paragraph 2 a. and b. above. b. The informative role, which involves the screening of all travellers with the aim of carrying out the task listed in paragraph 2 c. 11. The preventive role includes: a. Location of travel control posts. The travel control examination may take place in a building or on board ship or an aircraft. At a frontier the post should have a clear visual approach and a barrier to show the traveller where he must present himself for examination. b. Examination, which must take place at such a point that no person, can embark or disembark or cross the frontier without authority. Guards may be necessary. Travellers must have passports examined, visas or entry permits checked and be checked against security suspect and stop lists; they may be JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-G-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security interrogated to determine any security suspicions. Any security suspects will be forwarded to the interrogation centre for detailed interrogation. c. Searches of persons and baggage and of vessels, aircraft and vehicles may be carried out. 12. The informative role includes the interrogation of selected travellers who have been assessed in the initial screening as possessing information of possible intelligence value. Action may consist of: a. Obtaining the information on the spot and submitting a report or b. Notifying the TCS HQ of the traveller's destination so that he may be interrogated by the appropriate intelligence agency. Security Control 13. The success of travel control depends on well organized security control which, in turn, must be tied in with all other security measures. The executive responsibilities of all concerned must be clearly defined and understood. 14. The way in which traffic will be canalized through ports, frontiers or airfields will vary with the geographical and other factors. The essentials of preventive security controls are discussed in the following paragraphs. 15. Coastlines. A prohibited zone (PZ) is necessary, both on the seaward and landward side of the coastline. This involves a coast watching system and normal civil and service controls in the PZ. These usually consist of: a. Seaward side. Movement of shipping up to a three mile limit is controlled by the Royal Navy which is also responsible for harbour control as directed by the approved port authority. Coastal vessels and small boats must also be controlled. b. Landward side. A three mile limit, with restrictions of movement of all persons and vehicles in the area, will normally be imposed by the military commander in consultation with the civil authorities. 16. Ports and dock areas. A port of dock area will normally be declared a protected place (PP). The port commandant or approved authority is responsible for the physical protection of the port and for all other security matters therein. 17. Frontiers. Where no natural obstacles exist a physical barrier should be erected and the frontier clearly marked. The frontier must be guarded either by police, frontier guards or troops as a deterrent to illegal frontier crossers (IFCs). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-G-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Security on Operations ­ Security Elements of Force Protection 18. A prohibited frontier zone (PFZ) may also be established to a depth of 5 - 10 miles behind the frontier. An identity check of permanent residents and authorized frontier crossers should be carried out. 19. Security along the frontier and within the PFZ is the responsibility of the area commander. 20. Airfields. Close liaison between air traffic control tower and TCS personnel is essential if the latter are to be informed on the movement of aircraft entering or leaving the airfield. Security control in the airfield is the executive responsibility of the station commander, advised by the I(S)O and the local APM. Investigation of Security Control Breaches 21. Investigation must be made of all breaches of security control occurring in the PZ, PA or PP. Normally these investigations are undertaken by the Service security agencies or the civil police. TCS personnel must be kept informed of incidents of TCS interest. Only in the absence of reliable Service or civilian security agencies or police forces will TCS personnel undertake investigations themselves. Requirements for TCS Personnel 22. To operate efficiently TCS personnel must: a. Be trained in the principles, methods and teachings of TCS. b. Maintain good relations with customs, police and security, embarkation staffs, port officials etc. c. d. Know how to work the various technical equipment used. Know shipping and airline procedures. e. Possess a quick, balanced judgement and be capable of remembering and applying complicated regulations. Records and Reports 23. As with all CI work the basis of TCS is a sound record and report system with a well-run central index and information database. 24. Reports will vary according to circumstances but are normally covered by standard formats. They will include: a. Examination reports. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-G-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. 25. Passengers ­ arrivals and departures. Crew report. Ship report ­ arrivals and departures. Routine intelligence reports. Aliens in transit ­ aircraft and ships. Weekly return of ships cleared. Incident reports. Port survey reports. Records will include: a. b. c. d. e. f. All necessary forms. Security suspect index and database. File on each ship. Sufficient numbers of passes and permits in use. Local index. Seamen's index. Conclusion 26. TCS is a necessary part of the overall security plan. For it to be efficient: a. It must be integrated with the other security measures, under the control of the CI staff. b. The executive responsibilities of all concerned, specialists and nonspecialists, must be clearly defined and understood. c. TCS personnel must be well trained in their travel control duties. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 14-G-6 RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security CHAPTER 15 (SPARE) JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 15-0- 1 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 15-0- 2 UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED National Caveats CHAPTER 16 NATIONAL CAVEATS Chapter 16. National Caveats General UK EYES ALPHA and BRAVO UK EYES ONLY and UK EYES DISCRETION Composite caveats Access to nationally caveated information 1601 1605 1606 1607 1608 Para Page Exchange/integrated/attached personnel (including those serving in joint operations) serving with the UK Armed Forces and Gurkhas serving with the British Army 1613 Waivers Marking, handling and transmission of nationally caveated information Protecting information to be sent to the US Formal messages bearing a core national caveat or special handling (SPH) instructions Changes to the nationality rules Annex A. Core National Caveats 1615 1617 1622 1629 1632 16A-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 16-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Annex B. UK protective markings in messages to addressees served by non-UK comms networks and use of the SPH instruction 'UK COMMS ONLY' Summary of release levels 16B-1 16C-1 Annex C. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 16-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED National Caveats CHAPTER 16 NATIONAL CAVEATS General 1601. This chapter provides guidance on the use of core national caveats, guidance on marking assets to be sent to the US and the special handling instructions for messages. Throughout this chapter you will see references made to the words listed below. These are deemed to mean the following: a. "Information"- includes documents, signal messages, electronic media and any other forms of recorded information referred to in this manual. b. "Originator"- the creator/author of the information. c. "Owner"- the originator or his/her successor(s). In the event that the original post may have been abolished, then the owner becomes whoever has immediate line management responsibility for that post. d. "Recipient" is a person who has entitlement to access the information. 1602. Purpose and use of national caveats. The majority of protectively marked assets are intended for dissemination in the UK, within and between government departments and agencies, and where appropriate, contractors. National caveats are available for the additional protection of sensitive assets in relation to other countries, particularly the UK's closest allies. Assets that attract a national caveat should always be marked with an appropriate protective marking. Where necessary, a descriptor may also be applied. Any additional national caveats that may be required by originators, specifically for use within the MOD, should ensure that the same principles laid down in this chapter are applied. The core national caveats are detailed at Annex A and a summary of release levels at Annex C. 1603. Before applying a national caveat to any information, the originator should give serious consideration to the content, recipients and the likely uses to which that information will be put within MOD. This is particularly relevant in the following: a. Organisations and training establishments where foreign exchange personnel are employed and where an inappropriate caveat could prevent foreign exchange personnel from carrying out their full range of duties in post. b. UK industry where a high proportion of dual and foreign nationals are employed. Particularly in non-List X companies where the only MOD information held is at the non-protectively marked or RESTRICTED level. 1604. "UK" prefix. Staff should not confuse the prefix "UK" used in conjunction with a protective marking (eg UK RESTRICTED or UK SECRET) with national JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 16-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security caveats (eg UK EYES ONLY or UK EYES DISCRETION). The prefix "UK" is not a national caveat. It is used to prevent protectively marked information from being disclosed under existing or future local Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation in other countries (For sending UK information to the US see paras 1622 to 1626). UK EYES ALPHA and BRAVO 1605. These caveats are obsolete and should no longer be used within the MOD. Although documents bearing these caveats may still be current, it is unnecessary to amend such documents retrospectively. For the purposes of releasing such information to foreign nationals you should seek advice from the originator/owner. In cases of doubt as to the protection and transmission of such documents they are to be treated as if they carry the new caveat "UK EYES ONLY" unless directed otherwise by the originator. Notwithstanding, it is important that, where access to UK EYES B material has already been agreed with the originator for foreign/integrated/attached personnel, the arrangements for such access remain extant. UK EYES ONLY and UK EYES DISCRETION 1606. The two UK national caveats, UK EYES ONLY and UK EYES DISCRETION, should be used as follows: a. UK EYES ONLY. The originator should only use this caveat to indicate that the information is of particular sensitivity to UK national interests. Information bearing this caveat must not be released to any foreign nationals without the originator's specific consent, as incorrect usage will cause considerable difficulties in areas where dual and foreign nationals are employed (eg such as Exchange personnel, and generally in UK industry). b. UK EYES DISCRETION. The originator should use this caveat when the information, while having sensitivity to UK national interests, may be capable of wider, discretionary dissemination. In marking material with this caveat, the originator is implicitly delegating subsequent release authority to HOE/COs, who may authorise subsequent release in accordance with Annex C. This discretion provides flexibility for HOE/COs to make effective risk management decisions without reference to the originator. If in any doubt, staff should always seek advice from their Principal Security Adviser. Composite caveats 1607. A composite caveat denotes that the information may be shared by nationals of more than one country (eg UK/US etc). The aim of composite caveats is to restrict the dissemination of sensitive assets by limiting disclosure only to foreign nationals with a proven "need-to-know", who are authorised and appropriately cleared for access. These caveats are most widely used in areas of activity where the exchange of sensitive information is routine, for example, between the international JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 16-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED National Caveats intelligence communities. In such circumstances the need to identify to whom such information can be released is vitally important. A quick guide is given at Annex A. Access to nationally caveated information 1608. UK nationals All UK nationals in HM Service, and MOD civilians and Service personnel who are dual nationals (of which one nationality is British), may have access to information bearing a national caveat provided the line manager is satisfied that they: a. have a need to know the information; b. hold a security clearance appropriate to the protective marking which accompanies the caveat (additional vetting requirements may apply to MOD civilians who are dual nationals and hold SC security clearance - see JSP 440, Volume 2, Chapter 4); c. have been briefed on the arrangements for safeguarding such information and the local sensitivities; and d. can otherwise be entrusted with the information. 1609. UK nationals employed in industry UK nationals employed by UK contractors may, as recipients, have access to all national caveated information. However, where MOD contracts involve the release of UK EYES DISCRETION information, which normally allows further dissemination by the recipient without reference back to the originator, the contract Security Aspects Letter should state that industry recipients may not disseminate without the agreement of the originator or owner of the information. Where no contract exists, originators should similarly qualify this requirement to recipients via an official letter. 1610. Dual nationals in industry Dual nationals (of which one nationality is British) employed by UK contractors may only have access to UK EYES DISCRETION information with approval of the originator. Where MOD contracts involve the release of UK EYES DISCRETION information, and where dual nationals have been granted access to such information by the originator, the contract Security Aspects Letter should be the same as stated in para 1609 above. 1611. Non-UK nationals in HM Service Serving members of the UK Armed Forces, who are Commonwealth or Republic of Ireland nationals, may be allowed access to UK national caveated material. This is because they are deemed to have given their allegiance to the Crown and, provided they meet the criteria set out in para 1608, are entitled to access if their duties necessitate it. However such nationals who are civilians serving within the MOD may only have access to UK national caveated material if they were already in post on 31 May 1996 (see paragraph 1632 for details). Otherwise access to composite caveated information JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 16-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security may only be granted, without the originator(s) approval, where the civilian non-UK national is a national of one of the countries concerned. 1612. Non-UK nationals Such nationals are not to be given access to any UK national caveated information without the express approval of the originator. They are only allowed access to composite caveated information if they are a national of one of the countries concerned. Release is subject to the requirements of subparagraphs 1608a-d above being fulfilled and having regard to the release levels set out in Table X which is issued by DESP2. Where conflict exists, the rules on release of protectively marked information take precedence. Exchange/integrated/attached personnel (including those serving in joint operations) serving with the UK Armed Forces and Gurkhas serving in the British Army 1613. Exchange/integrated/attached personnel When planning to establish such posts in environments where there is a likelihood of unsupervised access to UK EYES ONLY material, the potential sensitivities need to be considered. If the proposed working environment cannot be managed so that such personnel are insulated from inadvertent access to UK EYES ONLY material, the agreement of all the most likely originators of such material in that environment should be obtained before the posts are established. For those personnel involved in joint operations, the advice given in Section IV to Chapter 11 should also be noted. In the case of material originating in the DIS, the single point of contact is Sec DI (Ext 86919 MB). In cases of doubt, advice should be sought from the appropriate Principal Security Adviser, who will consult DD DefSy(Info) as necessary. 1614. Gurkhas. These personnel may only have access to UK EYES DISCRETION information on a need-to-know basis. Waivers 1615. Exceptionally, it may be necessary to grant access to a specific document to those not normally entitled to receive nationally caveated information. Permission for a waiver should always be sought from the originator, who should consider the release levels set out in Table X and consult Info(Exp)Access1 if there is potential for release under any foreign Freedom of Information (FOI) regimes. Originators are advised to consult their Principal Security Adviser before carrying out a risk analysis to determine the potential damage to UK national security should such information be passed on to a third country. 1616. Where the originator of UK national caveated information is unidentifiable, the specific authority of the Departmental Security Officer (DSO), through DD Def Sy(Info), must be sought in writing and in good time before the proposed release. The DSO will only approve release when it can be demonstrated that the originator is JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 16-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED National Caveats unidentifiable, and will not in any circumstances override an originator's explicit decision to the contrary. Marking, handling and transmission of nationally caveated information 1617. Nationally caveated information must always be marked with an appropriate protective marking, and, when necessary, a descriptor. The sequence of these markings should be protective marking, descriptor and national caveat. 1618. National caveats must not appear on envelopes. You should address it to either an individual or a specific post entitled to receive it. The envelope should be marked EXCLUSIVE. This will ensure that in an addressee's absence, special local arrangements will enable a designated officer to gain access to the information and act accordingly. Details on how to correctly despatch protectively marked information is given in JSP 440, Volume 1, Chapter 4. 1619. Registered files, branch folders or other covers enclosing caveat information must be marked accordingly. When in transit, despatching procedures laid down in JSP 440, Volume 1, Chapter 4 are to be followed. 1620. Originators should, when asked to permit discretionary access to caveated material by those not normally entitled to see it, consider if access can be limited to a single document rather than allow full access to a range of assets. This is particularly important in cases where information is stored on and accessed from IT systems. Such access will be subject to appropriate access controls and user profiles for IT systems. 1621. Guidance on distributed IT systems and the interconnection of IT systems is provided in JSP 440, Volume 3 - Information Technology. The System Security Policy will ensure that information attracting a national caveat can only be accessed by either those who satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1608 above or nationals of other countries to which the caveat authorises release. Protecting information to be sent to the US 1622. The United States has operated a FOI regime for some years under the US Freedom of Information Act (US FOIA). Great care must be taken when sending information to the US to guard against the risk that UK information, which would be exempted from disclosure requests under our own legislation, could be released on application to the US. 1623. Under the terms of the UK/US General Security Agreement, UK protectively marked material will be protected form automatic release, provided that it is prefixed "UK". However, such information may still be requested under US legislation, and originators should be prepared to justify why the information should not be JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 16-7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security disclosed, quoting the UK FOI exemption when necessary. Furthermore, where it is necessary to limit dissemination of sensitive information beyond a US authority holding the UK-sourced data, in addition to the appropriate protective marking, the document should be clearly marked with the precise conditions for its disclosure to other authorities, and for any public release. 1624. UK information without protective markings (ie UNCLASSIFIED) will be more vulnerable to applications for disclosure under US FOIA. However, the recent Presidential Executive Order (EO) 12958 has made some provision for protecting UK UNCLASSIFIED information, although this will only apply to UK information that would also be exempted from the provisions of UK FOI 2000. US Department of Defense (DoD) staff advise that one or other of the labels, shown at Figure 1a or 1b below, should be used as appropriate to denote material requiring protection from public disclosure: Use either of the following as appropriate: This document contains sensitive information of the UK Government which is withheld from public disclosure in the United Kingdom and is provided to the United States Government on the condition that it is not to be released to the public until [insert date for release] Fig 1a This document contains sensitive information of the UK Government which is withheld from public disclosure in the United Kingdom and is provided to the United States Government on the condition that it is not to be released to the public without the approval of the UK Government. Fig 1b It should be noted that this label will only provide protection to information passed to the US Departments of Defense and Energy, as they are the only departments granted exemption from the US FOIA provisions. No other marking should be used unless there is a written agreement with the US authority concerned that information so marked will be protected from disclosure. 1625. The US authorities do not recognise the UK term "protective marking", instead using the term "classification". Furthermore, the UK's "RESTRICTED" classification is not recognised in the US. In accordance with EO12958, information marked UK RESTRICTED will be treated as classified information by the US recipient. Upon receipt, it will be marked on the cover or first page with, "This document contains UK RESTRICTED information; to be protected in compliance with EO 12958". US documents, or other media containing UK RESTRICTED information will also be marked with this wording. Additionally, each separate paragraph or segment will be marked to denote the UK RESTRICTED content of the information (shown as 'UK_R'). JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 16-8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED National Caveats 1626. MOD staff originating information which incorporates US-sourced material should contact the relevant US DoD desk officer to determine whether or not the USsourced content is sanctioned for release under the US (or any other) FOI legislation before it is issued. If MOD staff are unable to identify the US source of origin, they should contact Info(Exp)-Access staff who will try and locate the appropriate US DoD desk officer for advice. 1627. Originators are encouraged to mark individual paragraphs of documents with the appropriate protective marking as this will greatly assist in assessing information which have been requested for release under any FOI legislation. Originators should consider especially: a. Has the appropriate protective marking been used? b. Is the document likely to be released to foreign governments now or in the foreseeable future? c. Is the sensitive element of the document clearly identifiable? 1628. Departments and agencies should consult their Principal Security Adviser where they experience difficulties in applying appropriate markings for assets to be sent to the US, or in the general handling of US classified information. Formal messages bearing a core national caveat or special handling (SPH) instructions 1629. Formal signal messages and diplomatic telegrams bearing any of the core national caveats (see Annex A to this Chapter) or a Special Handling (SPH) instruction (see below), are given 'special handling' by appropriately cleared communications staff. Caveats and SPH instructions are entered in the 'Special Handling Caveat/Descriptors' box or field on the message form and, with the exception of 'UK COMMS ONLY', as the first words in the message text. Messages containing a caveat or SPH instruction are to bear an appropriate protective marking for caveats and SPH instructions, and the control Subject Indicator Code (SIC) AAA followed by appropriate SIC(s). The term 'special handling' (SPH) embraces caveats and SPH instructions. 1630. Originators may specify that a signal message receives SPH by assigning a SPH instruction or caveat. Not all SPH instructions are recognised by the international community - this is indicated in brackets after each instruction shown below. a. EXCLUSIVE (Internationally recognised). 'EXCLUSIVE' is applied to messages which may only be seen by specified individuals or their nominated representatives. The words 'EXCLUSIVE FOR........FROM......' are entered as the first words of the text. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 16-9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security b. DELTEXT (UK Services only - to be used with a UK protective marking). 'DELTEXT' is used where the content of a message is particularly delicate or sensitive and its handling and distribution has to be strictly limited. 'DELTEXT' is entered as the first words of the text. c. UK COMMS ONLY (UK Services - to be used with a UK protective marking). UK protectively marked messages may, under certain circumstances, be routed over non-UK networks and may consequently be read in clear by nonUK personnel. 'UK COMMS ONLY' is used when an originator considers it essential that a signal is seen and handled only by UK comms staff and is routed accordingly. This instruction is to appear in the Special Handling Caveat/Descriptor box or field but is not entered at the start of message text. Further guidance on the use of 'UK COMMS ONLY' is given in Annex B. 1631. The changes to security described in this chapter, and the wider distribution of SPH cryptographic facilities, has enabled caveats and SPH instructions to be sent and received in signal form throughout Defence. a. COMMCEN staff can advise on the handling, delivery and collection of SPH messages. b. Caveats are not to appear on outer envelopes, (see paragraph 1618). Except where a COMMCEN is in the same building as the recipient or addressee, such messages are always to be double enveloped. Details of COMMCEN SPH procedures are contained in ACP 122 UK Supp-1 (Communications Security). c. The use of SPH cryptographic keying material and authentication tables is detailed in BRN/09/2 and BAA/09/2. Changes to the nationality rules 1632. On 1 March 1996 the Government announced changes to the nationality rules for recruitment to the Civil Service. As a result, from 1 June 1996 Irish and Commonwealth citizens will no longer be eligible for recruitment to "Reserved" posts. These are posts that require special allegiance to the state and which in future will be reserved for UK nationals. However, Irish and Commonwealth citizens in post on 31 May 1996 will have reserved rights to the full range of posts for the remainder of their careers, provided that there is no break in service. These new rules should be borne in mind when deciding whether or not a person should have access to caveated information. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 16-10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED National Caveats ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 16 CORE NATIONAL CAVEATS Core national caveats United States UK EYES ONLY UK EYES DISCRETION 1 UKUS EYES ONLY CANUKUS EYES ONLY CANAUSUKUS EYES ONLY CANAUSNZUK EYES ONLY CANAUSNZUKUS EYES ONLY 2 AUSNZUKUS EYES ONLY AUSUKUS EYES ONLY No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Release to nationals of Canada No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Australia No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes New Zealand No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No Other Countries No No No No No No No No No Notes: 1 2 See Annex C for release of UK EYES DISCRETION information to exchange and integrated officers and officers on attachment with the MOD. In certain arenas, primarily the intelligence domain, the exchange of information with all of the allies mentioned in the table above is routine. In such circumstances, it may be a branch's/unit's or agency's normal, authorised practice to allow the holders of information discretion to share it with those countries, with the caveat CANAUSNZUKUS EYES ONLY being assumed rather than explicit. Originators should therefore ensure that they apply the appropriate national caveat to information when it is necessary to constrain dissemination to nationals of those countries. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 16A-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 16A-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED National Caveats ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 16 UK PROTECTIVE MARKINGS IN MESSAGES TO ADDRESSEES SERVED BY NON-UK COMMS NETWORKS AND USE OF THE SPH INSTRUCTION 'UK COMMS ONLY' Introduction 1. The SPH instruction 'UK COMMS ONLY' may be appropriate for example where a UK addressee is served by a non-UK comms network, and sight of the text of a message may cause embarrassment to either the UK or the host organisation/nation. The use of this SPH instruction ensures that a message reaches the intended UK addressee(s) without having been seen by non-UK nationals. (This may be achieved by off-line encryption, by using suitably approved or protected UK communications links or, in some cases by sending a signal by protectively marked mail.) The paragraphs below contain the rules for the highest UK protective markings which may be sent over non-UK communications networks. UK protectively marked messages to UK authorities served by nonUK comms networks 2. Originators should use the following information as a guide to when to use 'UK COMMS ONLY'. a. NATO networks. Messages up to and including RESTRICTED may be sent in clear over suitably protected or approved NATO networks. b. AUS/CAN/NZ/US networks. Messages up to and including RESTRICTED may be sent in clear over suitably protected or approved AUS/CAN/NZ/US circuits. Exceptions are currently granted for the following: (1) NP 1011 - up to and including CONFIDENTIAL, (served by the US network). (2) RNLO DIEGO GARCIA - up CONFIDENTIAL, (served by the US network). to and including (3) HM SHIPS/RFAs reading AUS/CAN/NZ/US broadcasts - up to and including CONFIDENTIAL in clear. c. Other Foreign networks. Messages up to and including RESTRICTED may be sent in clear over suitably protected or approved foreign JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 16B-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security networks. UK protectively marked messages to foreign agencies only. 3. Provided the address section does not include a UK Signal Message Address (SMA), signal messages up to and including UK SECRET may be sent to foreign agencies over suitably secure and approved US, NATO or old Commonwealth networks. Originators must be sure the text is releasable, and must insert the words 'UK CLASSIFIED RELEASE IN CONFIDENCE' at the start of message text. UK protectively marked messages addressed to UK authorities and foreign nationals 4. Provided the information is releasable to the foreign addressees concerned, messages to both foreign agencies and UK addressees (in the same message) protectively marked up to and including UK SECRET, may be sent in clear over suitable secure and approved US, NATO or old Commonwealth networks. Originators must insert the words 'UK CLASSIFIED RELEASE IN CONFIDENCE' at the start of message text. Example of a UK SECRET message sent to foreign agencies and UK addressees 5. The address section and start of text of a UK SECRET message to UK addressees and foreign agencies served by more than one foreign network. FROM HQ STC TO INFO DEFAIR AFSA BRITMILREP CANBERRA RAF MARHAM DIA WASHINGTON DPA CAPE CANAVERAL (DCN) (Australian network) (DCN) (DCN) (US network) (US network) SECRET. HKL. UK CLASSIFIED RELEASED IN CONFIDENCE. Note. Had the above message been addressed to UK addressees only, UK RESTRICTED would be the highest protective marking that could be sent in clear over foreign networks. JSP Volume 1 Issue 2 16B-2 RESTRICTED SUMMARY OF RELEASE LEVELS CORE NATIONAL CAVEATS UK NATIONALS DUAL NATIONALS IN HM SERVICE DUAL NATIONALS IN UK INDUSTRY NON-UK NATIONALS # IN HM SERVICE NON-UK NATIONALS EXCHANGE/ INTEGRATED/ ATTACHED PERSONNEL AND GURKHAS NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO o ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 16 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UK EYES ONLY UK EYES DISCRETION 16C-1 UK/US EYES ONLY CANUKUS EYES ONLY CANAUSUKUS EYES ONLY CANAUSNZUK EYES ONLY CANAUSNZUKUS EYES ONLY AUSNZUKUS EYES ONLY AUSUKUS EYES ONLY YES YES* YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES (DV/SC+) YES (DV/SC+) YES (DV/SC+) YES (DV/SC+) YES (DV/SC+) YES (DV/SC+) YES (DV/SC+) YES (DV/SC+) YES (DV/SC+) NO YES* NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES (DV/SC+) YES (DV/SC+) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO o NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO o RESTRICTED RESTRICTED National Caveats o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Notes: * Within industry, may only be released to named recipients, and not disseminated further without the agreement of the originator of the material ­ see paras 1609 and 1610 respectively. ° Non-UK nationals may only be granted access without the originator's permission if they are a national of one of the countries concerned. # Serving members of the UK Armed Forces and MOD civilians who are Commonwealth or Republic of Ireland nationals ­ see para 1611. + Additional vetting requirements may apply to MOD civilian dual nationals holding an SC clearance. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 16C-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED STRAP Security Guidelines (Sanitized) CHAPTER 17 STRAP SECURITY GUIDELINES (SANITIZED) Chapter 17. STRAP Security Guidelines (Sanitized) Introduction to the STRAP System The Threat to Sensitive Intelligence How the STRAP System Operates Three Levels of Protection Administration of the STRAP System Inadvertent Access To STRAP Material Relationship with STRAP Authorities 1701 1702 1707 1709 1710 1712 1713 Para JSP 440 VOLUME 1 Issue 2 17-1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 VOLUME 1 Issue 2 17-2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED STRAP Security Guidelines (Sanitized) CHAPTER 17 STRAP SECURITY GUIDELINES (SANITIZED) Introduction to the STRAP System 1701. The "STRAP System", which is explained fully in Volume 5 - STRAP Security, is a set of nationally agreed principles and procedures to enhance the "need-to-know" protection of sensitive intelligence (and related operational information) produced by the principal UK Intelligence Agencies, including MOD sources. STRAP is a Codeword, not an acronym. It is used to mark most types of material handled under the STRAP System. (Where this is practicable, because of technical constraints, the originating Agencies will give guidance on the STRAP equivalent of Codewords.) The Codeword STRAP, in isolation, does not require a protective marking. The Threat to Sensitive Intelligence 1702. The principal threat to sensitive intelligence arises when a target becomes aware of an intelligence attack. So warned, the target can initiate countermeasures, and intelligence of the kind protected by the STRAP System is particularly vulnerable to this type of reaction. 1703. The UK's intelligence capability is similarly at risk when knowledge of an intelligence success against a target falls into the hands of any other country, organisation or individual. They may assume their own activities against the UK national interest to be similarly targeted. At worst, future success against a valuable target could be denied, and an agent's life lost, but in any event, the cost of recovering lost intelligence capability is likely to be very high. 1704. The "traditional" threat to the UK's intelligence operations from foreign intelligence services (FIS) remains a potent one - particularly in the field of scientific, technical and industrial espionage - and the classic methods of attack are likely to be employed. However, many of today's high priority intelligence targets are not connected to a foreign Government or, therefore, to a professional intelligence service. Whilst this may be seen to reduce the level of risk, it does not make these intelligence operations any less vulnerable. 1705. For example, activities against the UK national interest, such as terrorism, drug trafficking and other illegal dealing by individuals and organisations are increasing in significance - and hence in priority as intelligence targets. The threat to operations against these targets is less likely to arise from positive acts of counter-espionage, than from leakage of information through disaffected members of staff, or as a result of the attentions of an investigative journalist, or simply by accident or carelessness. 1706. In this wider definition of Threat, the "enemy" is unwelcome publicity of any kind, and through any medium. The most effective safeguard is to reinforce those JSP 440 VOLUME 1 Issue 2 17-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security aspects of security that minimise the risk of leakage of sensitive intelligence operations or product into the public domain - whether by accidental exposure or deliberate intent. The STRAP System aims to achieve this. How the STRAP System Operates 1707. The STRAP System seeks to "add value" to the standard security measures employed for intelligence matters (TOP SECRET, SECRET etc), by using additional effective procedures. It aims to minimise the risk of unauthorised disclosure of particularly vulnerable intelligence assets by: a. restricting access to sensitive intelligence material on a strict "need-toknow" basis; b. agreeing the appropriate facilities for its protection in transit (ie "STRAP Channels") use, storage and disposal; and c. providing explicit briefings and guidance for individuals who handle this type of material. 1708. Information that requires protection under the STRAP System will be clearly defined and labelled. It will be carried by authorized couriers during transit, and signed receipts will be obtained at all stages of handover. Three Levels of Protection 1709. Within the overall definition of "particularly sensitive", some items of intelligence, handled within the STRAP System, require more stringent protection than others. In order to avoid being over restrictive, material is assigned, by the originators, to one of three "levels" of STRAP protection (or"handling"). These are designated, in ascending order of sensitivity and, hence, access control: STRAP 1, 2 or 3. Administration of the STRAP System 1710. DDef Sy is responsible overall for the administration of the STRAP System within the Department. He is a member of the STRAP Management Board which has overall responsibility for the review and formulation of STRAP policy and guidelines. Any queries regarding the Department's policy on STRAP should, in the first instance, be referred to: Departmental Policy InfoSy(Pol)1, Main Building Tel: 020 7218 3994 1711. Within the Department are individually appointed STRAP Security Officers (STRAPSOs) who oversee the implementation of the approved STRAP security measures within the Services and MOD HQ, DPA and DERA. The principal Sector STRAPSOs are as follows: JSP 440 VOLUME 1 Issue 2 17-4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED STRAP Security Guidelines (Sanitized) Royal Navy - DNSyICP.X3 SCU Leydene Tel: 01730 824205/6 DI(SI) SO2 (S) Old War Office Tel: 020 7218 3989 SyCIS3b(RAF) RAF Brampton Tel: 01480 52151 Ext 6667 DIS Sy(STRAPSO) Old War Office Tel: 020 7218 6141/85030/82608 Army - Royal Air Force - MOD HQ, DPA & DERA - Inadvertent Access to STRAP Material 1712. Anyone not cleared to receive material or information marked with a STRAP label, who inadvertently gains access, must not show it or discuss it with anyone else, but should immediately report the fact to one of the principal Sector STRAPSOs listed in paragraph 1711 above. Arrangements will then be made for the safe custody of the material by the relevant STRAPSO. You will be briefed on the fact that the material is sensitive intelligence material and that you are obliged not to divulge any knowledge you may have gained through inadvertent access. Relationship with STRAP Authorities 1713. The arrangements described in the foregoing paragraphs, which are common to all Government Departments, are codified by a Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the Department and the STRAP Authority. The SLA between MOD and the STRAP Authority is signed by AUS(S&S) (now DGS&S), as the Departmental Security Officer, and the Chairman of the STRAP Management Committee. Detailed arrangements for procedure applicable to each Sector under the overarching SLA, are contained in Annexes to the MOD SLA. Copies of these are held by Principal Security Advisers. JSP 440 VOLUME 1 Issue 2 17-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. JSP 440 VOLUME 1 Issue 2 17-6 RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB CHAPTER 18 SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF UNARMED COMMERCIAL GUARD FORCES IN GREAT BRITAIN Chapter 18 Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in Great Britain Introduction Categories of Defence Establishments for Guarding Purposes and Composition of Guard Force Criteria for Selecting a Commercial Guarding Company Statements of Requirements Vetting Evaluation of Tenders Security Considerations on Commercial Issues Annex A. Commercial Staff and Principal Security Authorities Annex B. Sequence of Events in Appointing Commercial Guard Forces Annex C. Responsibilities of Heads of Establishments Appendix 1. Appendix 2. Appendix 3. Annex D. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Daily Briefing for Guard Force Monitoring Guard Force Performance Guard Force Vetting Training of Commercial Guards 18-0-1 1801 1807 1810 1816 1817 1818 1821 18A-1 18B-1 18C-1 18C1-1 18C2-1 18C3-1 18D-1 Para Page UNCLASSIFFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security Appendix 1 The MOD Unarmed Guard Training Course Annex E. Statement of Requirements 18D1-1 18E-1 18F-1 18G-1 18H-1 Annex F. Code of Conduct for Commercial Guards Employed by MOD Annex G Security Considerations on Commercial Issues Annex H. Contract Start/Renewal Proforma JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 18-0-2 UNCLASSIFFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB CHAPTER 18 SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF UNARMED COMMERCIAL GUARD FORCES IN GREAT BRITAIN Introduction 1801. The purpose of these instructions is to set out minimum security standards, criteria and procedures for the selection and use of commercial companies to provide contracted unarmed guard forces to the MOD, including its agencies. Heads of Establishment (HOE) may seek higher standards if they wish, bearing in mind the additional costs which might be incurred. 1802. When an establishment is considering the employment of a Commercial Guard Force (CGF) or is considering the renewal of an existing CGF contract the HOE is to inform the appropriate PSyA. Contact details are at Annex A. Advice on the Sequence of Events to be followed during this process is at Annex B. The responsibilities of Heads of Establishment and advice for staff are set out in Annex C and its appendices. (Appendix 1 details the Daily Briefing to be given to guards, Appendix 2 gives advice on how to monitor guard force performance and Appendix 3 summarises the vetting requirements for commercial guards). 1803. CGF may be used, where appropriate, by MOD establishments in Great Britain subject to the MOD Guard Service (MGS) retaining 75% of all unarmed civilian guarding posts within the Defence Estate. This condition was established in an undertaking by Ministers given to the House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC Session 1995-96, Eighth Report) and is to be kept under review by the PSyA and D Def Sy who maintain a database of commercially contracted guard forces. Should a proposed commercial contract appear to lead to a breach of this undertaking, Ministers will be informed by DG (S&S); their agreement is to be obtained before the relevant contract is awarded. The future of the ratio, and the current embargo on further CFQ of contract guarding imposed by Minister (AF) in 1998 is to be determined after consultation with Ministers. 1804. One of the HCDC recommendations, accepted by Ministers, enabled MGS to compete with the private sector at contract re-let (provided bids were mounted under Competing for Quality (CFQ) rules) and to compete for sub-contracts to prime contractors on multi-activity contracts. 1805. No contract for the use of commercial guards may be entered into before consulting the PSyA. Contracts are to be arranged through the appropriate Commercial Staff (CS). Contact details are at Annex A. 18-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security 1806. Guidance for the HOE, the PSyA and CS on the security aspects of seeking a commercial guarding contract is set out at the Annexes. The guidance applies to the security element of all guarding contracts, including multi-activity contracts (MAC), public and private partnership projects involving guarding, private finance initiatives, market testing, contracting out processes and to sub-contractors providing a guarding service via a prime contractor. The decision whether to include security guarding in a MAC is to be a matter of consultation with DGS&S through D Def Sy. Categorisation of establishments and composition of guard forces 1807. Details of categorisation of Defence Establishments for guarding purposes and composition of guard forces are in JSP 440 Volume 1, Chapter 5, Section VIII. Details of Categorisation for general security purposes are at JSP 440 Volume 1,Chapter 2, Paragraph 0214a. PSyAs are to take into account these instructions when determining whether use of a CGF is appropriate. CGF may be used on any unarmed guarding task. They may be integrated with armed guard forces (e.g when armed guarding is required MDP or service personnel may provide the armed element supplemented by a CGF to carry out unarmed tasks). The use of CGF in Category A establishments must be carefully considered, with due regard being paid to the tasks the CGF will be required to undertake and the appropriate levels of security clearance required. 1808 to 1809. Spare Criteria for selecting a commercial guarding company General 1810. To ensure that MOD contracts are only awarded to CGFs that are capable of achieving and sustaining the required standards, the compulsory eligibility criteria set out in Paragraphs 1811 to 1817 are mandated. Under CFQ rules MGS are exempt from this scrutiny. Membership of professional bodies 1811. Companies are to be selected from among those: a. or b. The Inspectorate of the Security Industry's Register of Manned Security Companies. PSyAs and CS hold copies of these registers. Registered on the DTI UK Register of Quality Assured Companies 18-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB Accreditation 1812. Companies which are invited to tender must satisfy the CS that they are certified by an accredited third party body to ISO 9000 sequence of Quality Management and Quality Assurance Standards. It is important that the Certification Body also includes in its accredited scope, the full requirement of BS 7499:1998 (Code of Practice for Static Guarding, mobile patrol and keyholding services). Particularly stringent attention must be paid to the company's recruiting policy and standards. Structure and Management 1813. The PSyA should take the following steps in consultation with CS: a. If necessary confirm with D Def Sy and with HOEs, at whose sites the firm has an existing contract, that contracts and are being fulfilled satisfactorily. b. Firms tendering for the first time should be assessed as to their suitability to hold the proposed contract, by inspection against the criteria laid down in these instructions. The PSyA should pass this information to the CS. Manpower 1814. The CS is to ensure that the contract stipulates that, in accordance with the EU Working Time Directive, guards are to work a maximum average 48-hour week, in shifts not exceeding 12 hours. A minimum manning ratio of 4 guards for each 24hour post is mandated. The Contractor is to maintain an adequate pool of employees who are security cleared and trained to the required standards to ensure that the guarding requirement is fully met at all times. Training 1815. Companies invited to tender must agree that all commercial guards and onsite supervisors will have achieved the training standards laid down in Annex D, before the start of the contract. Statements of requirements 1816. Advice on the need for and preparation of Statements of Requirements (SOR) is at Annex E. Vetting 1817. All commercial guard force personnel must undergo a Basic Check (BC) and Counter Terrorist Check (CTC) before they are permitted to take up their duties. The 18-3 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security procedure to be followed, including completing identity verification, is contained at Appendix 3 to Annex C. Instructions for the vetting of Commercial Guards are contained in JSP 440, Volume 2, Chapter 10. Evaluation of tenders General 1818. On receipt of tenders, CS will call for a technical evaluation. The purpose of the evaluation is to ensure that the company meets the standards required by these instructions. It is to be conducted by the PSyA on behalf of the HOE. The PSyA is to inform the CS of any company judged unable to meet the security requirements of the Contract. The report of the Technical Evaluation should be forwarded to the CS who will then conduct the commercial evaluation and, taking all aspects of the tender into account, recommend a company to the HOE for award of the contract. Medical 1819. In putting forward the name of a Guard or Supervisor for employment the Contractor should be required to confirm in writing in each and every case that they have established that the Guard or Supervisor is medically fit for employment. If this is subsequently found not to be so, the Guard or Supervisor should be withdrawn by the Contractor and replaced by an approved substitute. The cost of any medical examinations required should be borne by the company competing for the Contract. The medical standards required by a company of its site employees should be examined. The following is an extract from BS 7499:1998. Paragraph 5.1. These should be used as medical guidelines when drawing up a contract. "Persons [potential employees] should present a medical history prior to commencement of employment, and should demonstrate general good health and mobility by undergoing physical tests. Eyesight, hearing and sense of smell should be checked. Procedures should be in operation to ensure that the physical condition of persons is maintained during the length of employment. If there is a change in a person's duties, further physical tests should be performed by the person if appropriate. Persons employed for security duties should be aged between 18 years and 65 years. Persons over 65 years should undergo annual medical examinations to ensure fitness for duty." Conduct 1820. A code of conduct for on-site employees, the terms of which tendering companies must accept, is at Annex F. 18-4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB Security consideration on commercial issues 1821. Advice to CS on the security considerations in certain commercial issues is at Annex G. 18-5 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 18-6 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB ANNEX A COMMERCIAL STAFFS AND TLB PRINCIPAL SECURITY ADVISERS COMMERCIAL STAFFS 1. CINCFLEET / 2SL/CNH: a. b. c. 2. CB/FLEET 1F, Spur 4, the Crescent, , Ensleigh, Bath, BA1 5AB. Tel: 01225 467074 (Bath/Ensleigh Ext 67074) Fax: 01225 468761 (Bath/Ensleigh Ext 68761) CINCLAND / AG: a. DD/LCCS, G9, HQ LAND, Erskine Barracks, Wilton, Salisbury, Wilts, SP2 0AG b. c. Tel: 01722 433137 (Salisbury Mil, Ext 3864) Fax: 01722 433142 (Salisbury Mil, Ext 3142) 3. CINCSTC / HQ PTC: a. b. c. ADC/STC, Bldg 1406, RAF Daws Hill, High Wycombe HP11 1SH Tel: 01494 461461 Ext 5379/5308/5380 (High Wycombe RAF, Ext 5379/5308/5380) Fax: 01494 461461 Ext 5094/5399 (High Wycombe RAF, Ext 5094/5399) 4. MOD Centre TLBs and Defence Estates: a. b. c. CB (Com) 1, Central Budgets Commercial, Room 311, Wellesley House, 103-109 Waterloo Street, Glasgow G2 7BN. Tel: 0141 224 8328 (Glasgow Mil Ext 8328) Fax: 0141 224 8412 (Glasgow Mil Ext 8412) 18A-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security 5. Defence Procurement Agency (DPA): a. b. c. FMG1b1, Poplar minus one, Mail Point # 2005, Abbey Wood, Bristol, DS34 8JH Tel: 0117 91 #30627 Fax: 0117 91 #30926 PRICIPAL SECURITY ADVISERS TLBs 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. CINCFLEET / 2SL/CNH CINCLAND / AG CINCSTC / HQ PTC PJHQ CDL (DLO) CDP (DPA) MOD Centre 01705 727131 01722 336222 #2349 01494 461461 #6364 01923 826161 #46145 01225 468712 / 467772 0117 9130627 0207 2180963 Trading Funds DERA DSTL Meteorological Office UK Hydrographic Office DARA (via DLO) 01252 397272 (until 1 Jul 01, when DERA becomes QinetiQ and ceases to be a Trading Fund) 01980 613424 01344 854631 01823 337900 # 3363 01225 68712 67772 18A-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB ANNEX B SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN APPOINTING COMMERCIAL GUARD FORCES 1. The Head of Establishment (HOE) informs the appropriate Commercial Staff (CS) and the TLB Principal Security Adviser (PSyA) that the employment of a Commercial Guard Force (CGF) is being considered. 2. Having received confirmation from the PSyA that the award of a commercial guarding contract would be compatible with current security policy the Head of Establishment (HOE) decides if such a contract is desirable. The establishment then initiates a Statement of Requirement (SoR) as detailed at Annex D. 3. The HOE informs Trade Unions. The consultation procedures contained in the MOD Personnel Manual, Volume 12, Chapter 3, Annex G should be followed. If MOD permanent staff are to be transferred under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (TUPE), advice is to be sought from Agency / TLB secretariats as appropriate. 4. 5. 6. The PSyA approves SoR. SoR sent to finance branch for endorsement. Financially endorsed SoR sent to CS. 7. CS advertises in Contracts Bulletin. Conduct pre-qualification exercise. CS issues the Invitation to Tender (ITT) to firms who meet the criteria laid down in these instructions. A copy of the ITT is to be sent to HOE and PSyA. No more than six firms will be invited to tender and CS will take other steps to shorten the list if more than six firms pre-qualify. 8. Site Meeting to be organised by HOE; representatives of the PSyA (usually represented by their inspection/auditing organisation (Area Security Team (RN), 2 MI Bn (Army), P & SS (RAF) or CB (Sy) (Centre)), tendering companies and CS attend. 9. Tenders received by CS. 10. CS forwards the technical element of the tenders to HOE (through the Project Officer undertaking management of the requirement on his behalf) and the PSyA for evaluation. The PSyA is to carry out this evaluation and inform CS of any tenders that are non-compliant and ranking all tenders in order of technical merit. 18B-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security 11. CS conducts commercial evaluation of tenders, and taking into account the technical and commercial evaluations, recommends the winning tender to the HOE for approval. 12. 13. 14. Finance branch approves funding for the Contract. CS awards contract. CS forwards full detail of Contract to the HOE. 15. CS notifies D Def Sy and the PSyA of details of winning bid using the proforma at Annex H. 16. Contractor initiates vetting action for his employees in accordance with Annex C, Appendix 3. 18B-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guards in GB ANNEX C RESPONSIBILITIES OF HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS Acquiring a Contract 1. On reaching a decision that contract guarding for the establishment is desirable, the Head of Establishment (HOE) is to nominate a Project Officer from the staff, directed to manage the project from "cradle to grave". The Project Officer is to establish contact with the Principal Security Adviser (PSyA) and Commercial Staff (CS). Some PSyAs may direct the DO to establish contact and maintain liaison with the local Security Unit. The PSyA will provide contact details. 2. The Project Officer is responsible, on behalf of the HOE, for the following: a. In consultation with the PSyA and CS, preparing a Statement of Requirement (SoR) for the required guarding service. b. In conjunction with the PSyA, acquiring financial endorsement for the SoR from the appropriate budget holder. c. In conjunction with the PSyA and CS, briefing prospective contractors on site as to the requirement. d. In conjunction with the PSyA, conducting a technical evaluation of the tenders. e. In consultation with the CS, acquiring financial approval for the selected Contract from the appropriate budget holder. f. In conjunction with the Establishment Security Officer, processing the security clearances for the Contractor's employees. Supervising the Contract 3. The HOE is to appoint a Designated Officer (DO) to supervise the contract. The DO is to hold a copy of the Contract and is to be the single point of contact for the CS and PSyA with regard to all on-site aspects of the Contract. 4. In supervising the Contract at local level, the DO is responsible for the following: 18C-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security a. Establishing contact with the Contractor's contract manager and arranging a timetable of formally recorded meetings to discuss the working of the Contract. b. Establishing contact with the Contractor's local on-site supervisor and arranging a procedure for briefing and discussion on day-to-day working of the Contract. c. In consultation with the CS, establishing an agreed procedure with the Contractor for auditing Performance Indicators set out in the Contract; conducting the periodic audit and reporting findings to the PSyA and CS. d Maintaining an establishment incident log to record any shortcomings by the Contractor's employees; this log to be the basis for discussions with the Contractor's local supervisor and contract manager. e. Reporting to the PSyA and CS any shortcomings that cannot be resolved at sub-para d above. 5. Further detailed guidance for the DO in respect of his responsibilities in supervising the contract is set out in the Appendices to this Annex. 18C-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guards in GB APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C DAILY BRIEFING FOR GUARD FORCE 1. Every member of the guard force is to be briefed by his supervisor, who will, in turn, have received a briefing from the establishment DO or his representative, before the tour of duty starts. 2. The briefing should include at least the following as appropriate, but it should be noted that this list should not be regarded as exhaustive: a. b. c. d. e. f. Changes to the threat. Alert state. Changes to the normal routine. Planned events. Details of known visitors, special events etc. Specific areas of responsibility e.g.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) g. h. i. Passes (personnel/vehicles). Vehicle search. Enforcement of parking restrictions. Contractors employees/vehicles. Security of buildings. Details of armed patrols. Communications. Administration. 18C1-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 18C1-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guards in GB APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C MONITORING GUARD FORCE PERFORMANCE General 1. This Appendix gives guidance to the Designated Officer (DO) in monitoring Commercial Guard Force performance. In order to exercise any control of performance it is incumbent on the Head of Establishment (HOE) to ensure that the following points are covered fully in the Statement of Requirements (SoR) - (see Annex E). 2. The DO is responsible to the HOE through the Project Officer for maintaining a record of contract performance (See Annex G, Paragraph 7 for the action to be taken in the event of unsatisfactory performance). The following aspects are to be covered: a. Professional performance against the requirement stated in the Contract including a record of quantifiable performance indicators. b. c. d. The scale and frequency of deficiencies. Training standards. The turnover of guards. e. Administrative performance - relevant aspects are: freshness, smartness, state of the uniform, reports of breaches, log sheets, discipline and fitness for work generally, including training. f. The quality of supervision by the Contractor, both at local level and at company management level and responses to any establishment complaints. Manpower 3. The Contractor should maintain sufficient resources to ensure the performance required in the contract is achieved. This may include maintaining a specified number of guards on site at times of designated alert. 4. In nominating those staff that he would wish to assign to the task, the Contractor must provide a strength of Guard Force sufficient to be self-contained and able to cover normal time off, meal breaks, leave, training and sickness. The mandated minimum ratio is 4 guards to each 24-hour guard post. 5. To cover exceptional circumstances such as long-term sickness or non-arrival of staff for duty and to ensure that only a maximum of 56 hours a week is 18C2-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security worked, (see Paragraph 9 below) the Contractor should be required to nominate reserves; these reserves, to be approved by the DO, must have successfully completed the MOD Unarmed Guard Training Course; the induction element of the course must have been completed within the preceding 12 months at the site where the guard is to be employed. If it has not the training must be given. Reserves may be employed elsewhere within the company, but their use on the DO's task, although exceptional, must have priority if and when the need arises. These nominated reserves should be on 2 hours notice to be on site for duty; reserves should also be nominated on a ratio of one for every 6 persons employed for guarding tasks in the Contract. The provisions of the Contract must apply to proposed replacement staff as they apply to other staff. 7. The Contractor should be required to take all reasonable steps to avoid changes in staff assigned to and approved for the guard force. Where the Contractor proposes such a change, the DO should be given not less than one month's notice thereof. If circumstances wholly beyond the Contractor's control prevent the giving of such a period of notice, the Contractor should be required to give the maximum period of notice possible. Hours of work 8. The DO should ensure that any contractual limitations on working hours are adhered to. A daily record is to be kept on site by the Contractor for the regular inspection by the DO, of hours and shifts worked by each individual. 9. DOs should be aware that the normal hours of work should be 48 hours per week; as an exception an extra shift or number of hours may be worked up to a maximum of 56 hours in a period of 7 days. A Guard or Supervisor, having worked 56 hours in 7 consecutive days, must be given 48 hours consecutive time off by the Contractor unless there is an emergency whilst he is waiting for a replacement. Over an agreed reference period, normally 17 weeks but in certain circumstances (as set out in the EU WTD) up to 52 weeks, the contractor is to ensure that his employees do not exceed an average of 48 hours of weekly working time. 10. Whenever a Guard or Supervisor leaves his post (e.g. for a rest, meal or tea break) the contract should require his duties to be assumed by a replacement guard or supervisor. Staff clothing and equipment 11. Clothing. a. The Contractor shall ensure that each guard or supervisor accepted by the DO for employment is dressed in a clean, presentable and military style uniform (including head wear) and that he has stout, clean footwear. The uniform is to be approved by the DO in accordance with Section 2 of the Uniforms Act 1984. 18C2-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guards in GB b. The Contractor shall further provide foul weather clothing for each Guard and Supervisor when on duty which, when worn, will not impede the execution of their tasks. 12. Equipment. a. The Contractor shall provide for each guard or supervisor a high intensity flashlight, whistle, personal attack alarm, and safety helmets if required by the site. b. The Contractor shall further provide the necessary number of under vehicle mirrors (with light facilities) to meet the requirement to search vehicles. c. The Contractor shall further provide guards and supervisors, whilst on duty, with a reliable man-portable personal radio, and its accompanying controlling base station, to a scale to be agreed between the Contractor and the DO. d. The DO will undertake to provide for the use by the Contractor's staff such specialist search and communications equipment as may be deemed necessary for their contracted tasks. e. The Contractor shall ensure that no unauthorised personal items of clothing or equipment are worn/carried by his employees while employed under the terms of the contract. f. The contractor shall provide adequate high visibility clothing for personnel engaged on access control and on traffic control duties. Code of conduct 13. Contract guarding personnel will be contractually expected to abide by the MOD's "Code of Conduct for Guards" (see Annex F). This Code amplifies the basic code of conduct contained in BS 7499. The DO is to report any contravention of the Code as a breach of contract. Any member of the CGF who is in breach of the MOD's Code of Conduct may be refused access (by the DO) to the MOD property being guarded under the terms of the contract. Management and supervision by contractor 14. The Contractor's manager is to liase with the DO, and act as the "point of contact" to supervise and monitor the performance of the guards. The manager should personally visit the site at least once every 10 days and not always by day if 24-hour cover is being provided. In addition, the Company should be required to provide a separate inspectorate capability from their local area office which will visit each site at random intervals at least once per 24 hours for normal periods and once 18C2-3 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security per shift out of normal working hours including at weekends and public holidays (inspection at more frequent intervals can be arranged under the terms of the contract if so required by the DO). 15. Contractor's guards are to be supervised in the first instance by management staff specially chosen and named by the Contractor. Their selection and appointment is to be based on appropriate expertise, training and experience. There are both "management" and "security" considerations in deciding whether a supervisor should be employed on a guarding post or separately; the supervisor will normally be employed separately from a guarding task unless the alternative is acceptable to the Security Authority. For every 4/5 guard posts manned at one time, the Contractor should employ a Supervisor grade. 16. During silent hours duties, frequent communication between site and area control either by telephone or radio is essential; the frequency may be varied according to the importance of that which is being protected but once per hour is normal with irregular "reverse" calls being made by Control to ensure that all is well; any missed calls from the site should be investigated immediately by the Company. Supervision by the DO 17. The guard force on duty is to be wholly responsible to the requirements of the DO in execution of their agreed tasks. Guards on duty are to be visited, not less than once every 24 hours by the DO's staff or representative, this may be in conjunction with the Contractor's Inspectorate. 18. The guard force is to be tested in the execution of their agreed tasks not less than once a year by the DO (who should consult the TLB Principal Security Adviser (PSyA) over details of the execution of the test and assistance from the local Security Unit if required). The Contractor's Inspectorate may attend such exercises as observers. The DO is to render to the Contractor a report on each occasion of a test and within 30 days of that test on the effectiveness and performance of the guard force; for their part, the Contractor shall respond to that report within 30 days of receiving the report. No on-site training or exercises are to take place without the permission of the DO. 19. In an emergency the DO will have the right to order the Contractor's staff on duty to perform such reasonable tasks as may be necessary for the security of the site. Any such emergency task must be reported to the Contractor, the Commercial Staff (CS) and the TLB PSyA as soon as reasonably possible. Paragraphs 3 and 4. See Annex G, Industrial action 20. In the event of industrial action by any of the guards on the establishment premises, the DO is not to interfere but is to inform the Contractor and in the first instance ask him to provide alternative arrangements. If he is unable or unwilling to 18C2-4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guards in GB do so the DO is to seek alternative guarding arrangements from the PSyA (if deemed necessary, depending on the scale of the industrial action) as an immediate action. Full details of the industrial action are to be forwarded to the CS. 18C2-5 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank 18C2-6 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C GUARD FORCE VETTING 1. Paragraphs 1 to 6 must be read in conjunction with JSP 440, Volume 2, Chapter 10. All contract guards employed by the MOD are to have basic check (BC) approval and counter terrorist check (CTC) clearance. Depending on the guard's duties, it may be necessary to conduct a security check (SC); details of these procedures are contained in JSP 440 Volume 2. 2. On award of the Contract, the Contractor is to forward a completed Basic Check Verification Record (BCVR) and MOD Form 1109 in accordance with DEFCON 76 to the HOE for each intended employee at the site under the terms of the Contract. 3. On receipt of the MOD Form 1109 and BCVR, the HOE is to satisfy himself that they contain sufficient information on the prospective guard for the award of the BC clearance. The award of BC clearance is to be recorded by the HOE and the supporting documentation retained on the applicant's file. 4. The HOE is to forward the original MOD Form 1109 to the relevant Vetting Agency for completion of a CTC. A copy of the original MOD Form 1109 is to be retained by the HOE for record purposes. The Vetting Agency is to report the granting of a CTC to the HOE and this clearance is to be recorded. 5. In forwarding the BCVR and MOD Form 1109, the Contractor is to confirm in writing (using the proforma at the end of this Appendix) that they have themselves carried out a background check on the prospective guard covering the previous 3 years, or a lesser period for recent school leavers, consulting former employers as necessary, and have no reason to doubt the reliability of the guard or supervisor. In this context it should be noted that the security companies do not have access to the Police National Computer, nor are they exempt from the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. 6. The Contractor should be required to give not less than 3 month's notice to the DO, should the Contractor wish to assign Guards or Supervisors who are, or have been, employed on duties concerned with a foreign embassy or a company abroad. The DO is to notify the appropriate TLB Principal Security Adviser (PSyA) and provide as much detail as possible. 18C3-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYEE - STATUS REPORT To: (Designated Officer) From: (Company) (include full postal address and telephone and fax numbers) Telephone: Fax: Date: Contract number: Details of Prospective Employee Surname Forenames (in full) Date and Place of Birth Age of guard Role (either Guard/Supervisor/Manager) National Insurance Number Page 1 of 2 18C3-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB It is confirmed that:a. Full background enquiries have been completed to BSIA or equivalent years without adverse result. standards covering the last b. There is no reason to doubt the identity of the subject. c. He/she has successfully completed the MOD Unarmed Guard Initial Training Course under the auspices of the Security Industry Training Organisation Ltd. Certificate Number Date of Issue d. He/she is medically fit for employment as a guard/supervisor. e. Before assuming employment the guard/supervisor will be provided with full uniform. 6. It is understood that the above-named cannot be employed on the above assignment until approval is given by the Designated Officer or his representative. 7. BCVR & MOD Form 1109 are attached and details are correct to the best of my knowledge. Signed for Contractor Date Position in Company Name in Blocks Telephone No 8. Approval is granted for the above named to work under the terms of the above Contract: Signed for Head of Establishment Date Page 2 of 2 NOTE: 1 copy to be retained by the Designated Officer and 1 copy to be returned to the Contractor. Appointment Name in Blocks Telephone No 18C3-3 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 18C3-4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB ANNEX D TRAINING OF COMMERCIAL GUARDS Training Standards 1. All contract guards and on-site supervisors, including those who form the mandated reserve pool and normally work elsewhere, are to have successfully completed the MOD Unarmed Guard Training Course (MUGTC) prior to commencing their duties. 2. The MUGTC consists of: a. The MOD Unarmed Guard Initial Training Course (MUGITC) (5 days). b. The MOD Unarmed Guard Induction Training Course (MUGInTC) (1 day). MUGITC 3. The course documentation is held by the Security Industry Training Organisation Ltd (SITO), the National Training Organisation for the Secure Environment. A summary of the course training objectives is at Appendix 1. The MUGTC may only be taught by instructors who have successfully completed the SITO "Train the Trainers Course Parts I and II" and the "SITO/MOD Train the Trainers Part III Assessment Module". All guards and on-site supervisors must successfully complete the MUGITC before they commence work. MUGInTC 4. The course documentation is held by SITO. All guards and on-site supervisors must successfully complete the MUGInTC during their first 2 days onsite, as part of their induction process. Guards nominated for the reserve pool may complete the MUGInTC up to 12 months prior to employment. If not employed onsite over a 12 month period, they must retake the course to remain eligible for employment. Continuation Training 5. There is a requirement for a minimum of 13 hours of on-site continuation training to be completed over a two-year cycle after 1year in-post, for each guard and on-site supervisor. The training is mandatory and Companies must provide sufficient manpower to accommodate the requirement. Companies are to: 18D-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security a. Record details of training in individuals' Personal Development Log Books (PDLB) which are issued by SITO. Logs books are to be made available for inspection by the HOE/DO as required. b. Send a consolidated return of continuation training carried out to SITO Operations Department every three months. The return is to show the following details: (1) (2) Company name. MOD Site at which contract is being conducted. (3) A separate section for each Training Subject carried out showing date of training and details of individuals who received the training. (4) Confirmation that training has been recorded in individual PDLBs. Supervision of Training Standards 6. SITO will maintain a database, on behalf of MOD, of all instructors who are qualified to teach the MUGTC. 7. SITO will maintain a database, on behalf of MOD, of all guards and on-site supervisors who have sat and passed the MUGTC. A list of all personnel so qualified will be provided to the HOE by the contractor prior to the start of the contract. Untrained personnel may not be used for guarding except in extremis when no alternative is available. Prior authorisation in this instance is to be obtained from the HOE. If this happens on a frequent basis, the PSyA is to be informed by the HOE and consideration is to be given to terminating the contract. On passing the MUGTC personnel will receive a PDLB from SITO in which Initial, Induction and Continuation Training and NVQ achievements will be recorded. This book must be available at all times for inspection by SITO/MOD representatives. 8. All companies must allow the SITO auditing team and/or MOD Inspection teams access to their training courses, training records and to inspect their employees PDLBs. TLB PSyAs may initiate such an inspection at any time. HOEs who have any doubts about the training standards of any guards at their establishments should request an inspection by the appropriate PSyA. A full audit report is to be submitted to the appropriate PSyA and D Def Sy. 18D-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB 9. HOEs may contact SITO direct to consult the databases of either Qualified Trainers or Trained Guards. This can be achieved by contacting the Operations Department either by e-mail (address: info@sito.co.uk) or by facsimile (fax number: (01905) 724949). Telephone calls will not be accepted initially until the contact has been authenticated by one of the approved methods. 10. Company Training Staff wishing to obtain information from the database must apply in writing to SITO Operations Dept quoting their individual SITO Trainer's Number. Access to the MUGTC 11. Contract guarding companies requiring access to the MUGTC must follow the procedures below: a. Provide SITO with a list of instructors who are to teach the course (by fax or e-mail ­ see Paragraph 9 above) and confirm that all have successfully completed the SITO "Train the Trainers Course Parts I and II" and the "SITO/MOD Train the Trainers Part III Assessment Module". SITO will verify the list against their records. b. Purchase from SITO the approved training materials. These can be bought as individual packages or under licence for multiple in-house reproduction. Training may only be delivered using this material. c. Conduct the MUGITC training and examinations. d. Submit examination results to SITO for verification and certification. At this stage SITO will record all candidates' details onto the maintained MOD database. e. Issue guards and on-site supervisors who have successfully completed the MUGITC with their PDLB after first recording the result of the MUGITC. f. g. h. Conduct the MUGInTC training and examinations. Submit examination results to SITO for verification and certification. Record the results in candidates' PDLB. Validation of Training 12. Validation of the training course will be carried out by D Def Sy periodically. 18D-3 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security NVQ/SVQ 13. The company must have a training programme in place which will ensure that within 9 months of the start of the MOD contract at least 30% of its guards allocated to the contract will possess: A. or B. Scottish Vocational Qualification (SVQ) in Security, Safety & Loss Prevention to Level 2. The company must also ensure that it can maintain that level of NVQ/SVQ involvement for the duration of the contract. a National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) 18D-4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D THE MOD UNARMED GUARD INITIAL TRAINING COURSE 1. are: The MOD Unarmed Guarding Initial Training Course Training Objectives a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. j. k. l. m. n. o. p. q. Understanding the threat. Understanding the role of an unarmed guard. Understanding the purpose of a security post. Execute access control duties. Execute procedures for dealing with visitors. Handle persons under the influence of alcohol. Execute traffic control duties. Handle lost and found property. Write reports and notebook entries. Execute an effective search of vehicles, buildings and people. Communicate using correct telephone and radio procedures. Execute a patrol. Powers of Arrest (Common Law; Statute; Demonstrations). Fire-fighting and Fire Prevention. Implement general emergency procedures. Classified documentation and security containers. 18D1-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank 18D1-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB ANNEX E STATEMENTS OF REQUIREMENTS Introduction 1. Once the HOE has reached a decision that commercial guarding would be appropriate for the site, the sequence of events at Annex B is to be followed in full consultation with the PSyA and Commercial Staff (CS). Before tenders can be sought by the CS, the security requirements must be clearly defined by the sponsor establishment in a Statement of Requirements (SoR), also known in some areas as a Statement of Security Requirements (SSR). The SoR should comprise the site specific, mandatory security requirements. These requirements should take the form of stating the output required of the contractor, for example "to deny access to the site by unauthorised persons" rather than to state an input requirement "x number of access control personnel to be employed". In this way, responsibility for denying access rests with the contractor should a breach occur. Factors to be considered in preparing the SoR are set out below. The TLB PSyA must be consulted on the contents of the SoR. The Commercial Staff should also advise during its preparation. 2. The SoR will form the basis of the contract resulting from the tendering exercise. The contractor is only bound to perform the requirements specified in the contract. Factors to be considered in drawing up a statement of requirements 3. The SoR will vary according to the nature of the site to be guarded and the availability of physical protective security measures. When drafting the SoR, site security must always be borne in mind because copies of the SoR are likely to be circulated to a number of firms, only one of which will eventually be awarded the contract. Existing security measures should only be described on a `need-to-know' basis, and SoR will normally be protectively marked RESTRICTED. The management of companies circulated should be advised to protect all such information accordingly. Establishment contingency plans should not be included in the SoR. Any security sensitive aspects of the proposed contract may be covered verbally during the on-site briefing conducted by the HOE and attended by the PSyA, CS and Contractors who have been invited to tender. 4. However, it is most important that the requirement is described as clearly, comprehensively and unambiguously as security considerations will allow as the SoR provides the template against which the Invitation to Tender (ITT) will be framed and tenders evaluated. In turn the ITT will form the basis of the Contract and thus define the criteria that the Contractor will be required to meet in performance. The HOE must bear in mind that he will have no grounds for future complaint should a requirement not be specified in the Contract. The CS are available to give advice and should be consulted during the drafting stage of the SoR. Once approved by the 18E-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security PSyA, the HOE is to forward the SoR, together with financial approval from the budget manager, to the CS who will invite competitive tenders based on the SoR. 5. In preparing the SoR, the HOE and PSyA should cast it in terms of defining the task or output required of the Contractor, rather than an input in terms of specifying the number of guard posts required for each task. The latter is a matter for the prospective bidder to consider having been given the task(s) and will be judged by the HOE and PSyA at the technical evaluation phase of the contract process. Note, however, that a minimum-manning ratio of 4 personnel to each 24-hour guarding post is mandated at Paragraph 1814 of this Chapter. 6. One essential part of the Contract is a list of quantifiable and auditable performance indicators to be agreed by the CS, the PSyA, the HOE and the Contractor. This list will form the contractual basis for any evaluation of shortfalls by the Contractor and evidence in support of the Contractor's submission for renewal of contract. 7. The following is presented as an aide memoire in drawing up the SoR: a. Command and Control: (1) Chain of Command within contract guard force including qualifications of managers and supervisors as appropriate. (2) Supervisor's responsibilities and the name of his immediate superior within establishments. (3) Aspects of military command procedures where they affect civilian personnel employed by the contract guard force. b. Site or Building Access Control: (1) Guard and supervisor requirements - to include powers in exercising access control with regard to arrest/detention/searching of individuals (also adequate meal and break reliefs). (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Searching of vehicles and baggage. Calling for escorts. Identification and issue of passes. Responsibility for keys. Requirement for communications. 18E-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB (7) c. Responsibility towards deliveries by tradesmen, etc. Site Patrols: (1) (2) (3) (4) Tasks during and outside working hours. Composition and frequency of patrols. Calling for escorts. Identification of visitors and issue of passes. (5) Requirement for clock stations or other patrol management systems. (6) d. Location of backup and acceptable callout delay time. Building Checks and Internal Patrols: (1) Tasks to include security sweeps, periodic security checks and power supplies. (2) (3) Frequency of patrols. Buildings that are excluded. e. General Responsibilities: (1) Reporting of incidents and to whom reports should be made. (2) Compliance with establishment orders, including security orders. (3) (4) Parked vehicles within the perimeter. Alarm systems. (5) Maintaining normal records such as an incident book, roster register, lost/found property book, local orders and instructions. f. Emergency Procedures. Outline actions required in the event of: (1) Actual attack. 18E-3 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) g. h. Intrusion or attempted intrusion. Discovery of a suspected Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Bomb threat (direct or by telephone). Fire. Mains service failure. A change in the alert state.1 High Profile Visitors: Additional security requirements.2 Communications: (1) (2) (3) Inter-communication within the guard force. Responsibilities toward telephone manning and checks. Communications off site where appropriate. j. Conditions of service: (1) (2) (3) Security approval and vetting. Medical fitness. Hours of work. (4) Training standards (The training standards at Annex D are to be adhered to). (5) (6) Code of conduct. Performance indicators. k. Guard Force Facilities (The SoR will need to specify who will provide which facilities i.e. either MOD or the Contractor): (1) Heated guardroom. 1 See Annex G, Paragraph 3 for the requirement to insert a Security Enhancement Clause in all commercial guarding contracts 2 Ditto 18E-4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) l. m. Furniture. MOD telephone. Lavatories and ablutions. Cooking or messing facilities. Guard force responsibilities for cleanliness. Transport if required. Provision of emergency medical treatment. Additional/Reserve manpower. Health and safety provisions. 8. The SoR should also reflect the Unit/Establishment additional security requirements for heightened BIKINI Alert States or any other contingency plan which could be activated during the period of the contract and involve increased guarding over and above the norm. 9. The performance requirements to be monitored by the HOE contained in Appendix 3 to Annex C are to be covered in the SoR as a contractual obligation on the employer. Similarly, the vetting requirements contained in Appendix 3 to Annex C are to be included in the SoR. 10. The SoR will form the basis of the contract resulting from the tendering exercise. Only the requirements specified in the Contract will be performed by the Contractor. Accordingly, it is essential that any proposed changes to the SoR which may arise during the evaluation process must be scrutinised and approved by the HOE and the PSyA before the contract is awarded. 18E-5 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 18E-6 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guards in GB ANNEX F CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COMMERCIAL GUARDS EMPLOYED BY MOD Introduction 1. The principal function of the Guard is to support the maintenance of security at MOD units and establishments where the Guarding Contract applies. Personal Qualities 2. Commercial Guards employed on MOD Contracts are required to uphold the fundamental values and requirements inherent in the Rule of Law. In doing so, each individual will need to exhibit the following personal qualities: a. b. c. d. Honesty. Integrity. Impartiality. Common sense. Code of Conduct Respect for the Individual 3. Guards are expected to show respect for the dignity of the individual at all times, and every individual must be treated with courtesy and understanding irrespective of their social position, race, colour, gender, rank or creed. Professional Approach 4. Guards must strive to maintain the highest standards. The manner in which Guards approach their duties will influence the way others measure their efficiency and ultimately the effectiveness of what they do. Rule of Law 5. The Law (Statute and Common) reflects rules imposed upon the community that are binding. 18F-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security Exercise of Powers 6. Guards must carefully weigh up all factors; be fair and firm but above all avoid intolerance, over-enthusiasm and being dictatorial. They must show caution when acting upon suspicion and comply with the law concerning citizen's powers of arrest. (The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Section 24 and Criminal Law Act 1967, Section 3). Breaches of the Code 7. Guards are to abide by the following code of conduct: committing, or condoning, any one of the following will be regarded as a breach of this code of conduct: a. Neglecting or, without due and sufficient cause, failing to carry out promptly and diligently a required task within their Job description whilst at work. b. Leaving a place of work during any period of duty without due permission or sufficient cause, or failing to work to the agreed shift pattern. c. Knowingly making or signing any false oral or written statement. d. Destroying, mutilating, altering or erasing any official document or record. e. Divulging to any other person, who does not need to know, any matter which is protectively marked or is the private business of the MOD or contractors, past or present. f. Soliciting or receiving any bribe or other consideration from any person. g. Failing to account for documents, keys, a pass or passes, money, or property received in connection with their duty and/or the MOD's business. h. Being uncivil to persons encountered in the course of their duty, or abuse their position of authority in connection with the discharge of the MOD's business. i. Acting in a manner reasonably likely to bring discredit upon the MOD, or to fellow employees. 18F-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guards in GB j. Wearing the uniform provided by the Company incorrectly or using MOD equipment without authority. k. Carrying out or reporting for duty whilst under the influence of alcohol, controlled drugs, or solvents, or to consume any of these while on duty. Guards are to advise their supervisor if their performance may be affected by drugs prescribed by a medical practitioner. l. Failing to report forthwith to the Designated Officer through the Commercial Guarding Management any conviction for a criminal or motoring offence (other than a minor motoring offence which does not impact on the effective discharge of official duties). m. Allowing any access to MOD premises by any unauthorised person or persons. n. Whilst on duty carrying any unauthorised equipment not issued to him/her as part of their duties, (eg handcuffs and truncheons). o. Failing to report for duty at the correct time and place unless due notice and reasons have been given to their supervisor. p. Sleeping whilst on duty. q. Smoking or carrying any smoking materials including matches and cigarette lighters, in any prohibited place where such activities and materials are banned. 8. Any breach of this Code of Conduct may render the individual to be unacceptable for employment on MOD property; in such a case the Contractor will be notified by the Designated Officer accordingly and will replace the offending individual forthwith. 18F-3 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 18F-4 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB ANNEX G SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ON COMMERCIAL ISSUES Evaluation of Tender Bids 1. Commercial Staff (CS) are responsible for making a recommendation for the award of a contract to the HOE, with input from the TLB Principal Security Adviser (PSyA) in evaluating the technical aspects of the bid. Notification on Awarding a Contract 2. Once a contract has been let CS are to notify D Def Sy, copy to the PSyA, on the proforma at Annex H. The HOE (through the Project Officer) is to be furnished with a copy of the contract. Variation of Requirement General 3. An alteration to the guarding posture may be required due to a change in the overall threat level, reassessment of the security of the location concerned by the relevant security staff, or due to particular security requirements for a specific event (e.g. a VVIP Visit). Thus, all guarding contracts are to contain a Security Enhancement Clause (SEC) to meet the additional requirements of higher Alert States. The contract should state that in the case of a change to the threat level the Designated Officer (DO) has the right to invoke the SEC without prior permission. (See Annex C, Appendix 2, Paragraph 19). The DO should familiarise himself with the contract documents which may have procedures which differ from those detailed below. Implementation of the SEC in an Emergency 4. As stated above, the DO must have the right to invoke the SEC if a higher Alert State is declared and additional guards are required. Higher Alert States will either be declared on a national basis or on a local basis to meet a specific threat. In either case the higher Alert State will be imposed for a short period, normally not more than 5 days. Another case for invoking the SEC might be the establishment receiving a high profile visit requiring additional guards and the fact of a visit needing to be protected until the latest possible moment. The following procedure for the emergency implementation of the SEC is to be adopted: a. DO confirms the requirement with the PSyA; JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 18G-1 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security b. The DO calls on the Contractor to provide the additional guards specified in contract; c. CB is notified by the DO immediately the commencement or cessation of the requirement occurs and the number of personnel/hours involved. A signal or fax to CB is acceptable providing the fax is followed up with a financially endorsed Requisition Form for Contract Action within 14 days so that contract amendment can be processed to enable the Contractor to make a claim for payment. Permanent Amendment to a Contract 5. Where a permanent change to the SoR is needed an amendment reflecting that change should be made to the Contract. All discussions with regard to an amendment to a contract are to be channelled through the CS. In all such cases contractors must not be instructed to carry out any work until formal contractual authority has been obtained from the CS. Failure to do so may result in non-payment and therefore DOs must clearly understand the rules. The procedure for the DO is as follows: a. Identify the extra (or decreased) requirement in consultation with the PSyA. b. Prepare SoR to reflect the change, this should be as detailed as possible. c. Obtain financial approval for the proposed change, and then forward the financially endorsed requisition to the CS. d. CS will then negotiate with the Contractor and agree a price for the proposed amendment, and then issue a formal amendment to the contract. Monitoring and Review of Contracts 6. The HOE is responsible for monitoring the Contractor's execution of the Contract. To achieve this in a quantifiable manner, Performance Indicators, set out in the Contract, are to be audited at stated intervals and a report is to be forwarded to the PSyA, copy to the CS and the Contractor. Less formally, the DO is to observe day-to-day performance by the guard force and maintain an incident log to be used in discussion at the regular meetings with the Contractor and as evidence should the Contract require a formal review. 7. Advice must be sought from the CS on the remedies to be pursued when a Contractor fails to meet contractual obligations. Serious consideration must always be given to the termination of a contract if a contractor repeatedly fails to meet his JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 18G-2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB obligations. For example, any evidence that the contractor is working his staff on shifts in excess of what is permitted in the contract should be recorded and reported as a breach. The CS will write to the Contractor to ensure that the MOD's contractual rights are safeguarded. Minor problems should be covered in regular monthly contractor/client meetings, but all indications of dissatisfaction (including those dealt with orally at local level) are to be recorded and kept on file. More serious breaches should be notified immediately in writing to the CS, copy to the PSyA. If the report is deemed by the PSyA to be particularly serious, for example the incident calls the functioning of the company, as opposed to individual employees of the company, into question, or is likely to attract media attention, D Def Sy is to be notified. PSyAs are to include details of all serious instances of breach of contract in their annual security report to D Def Sy. Change in Role 8. If it is likely that the location to be guarded will have a change of occupancy/role which may invalidate the use of commercial guards, the change is to be reflected in the terms for terminating the contract. MGS Competing with Commercial Guarding Companies 9. Ministers have accepted a HCDC recommendation (HCDC Session 1995-96) that the MGS should be allowed to compete with the commercial sector for manned guarding requirements under the Competing for Quality (CFQ) concept. MGS are allowed to compete against the private sector when: a. Commercial guarding contracts are due for renewal. b. When the current provider is the MGS and commercial guarding is being considered. c. Under a multi-service contract either to provide guarding services as a sub-contractor to short list bidders or to provide support to the local In-House Bid Team. TUPE 10. When permanent MOD staff are to be transferred under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (TUPE), advice is to be sought from Command Secretariats and Civil Management. The sensitivity of industrial relations, particularly where permanent staff are to be transferred under TUPE, should not be underestimated. Where redundancy may result, Ministers may need to be informed. Command Secretariats and Civil Management will advise. Where MDP and/or MGS may be involved, the relevant HQ should also be consulted. All TUPE transfers of MOD staff are to be managed in accordance with the "Code of Practice for TUPE Transfers in MOD Contracts" which has been agreed JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 18G-3 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security with TUs and Industry. This code of practice is to be used by all parties involved in contracting with MOD and outlines best practice to be followed for the transfer of staff under TUPE from MOD to the private sector, or between contractors. JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 18G-4 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Instructions for the Use of Unarmed Commercial Guard Forces in GB ANNEX H RESTRICTED - COMMERCIAL (When completed) CONTRACT START/RENEWAL PROFORMA Complete white boxes as appropriate Contractor Name: Address: Contract Reference: Contract start date: Unit/establishment being guarded Name of Designated Officer (DO) Commercial Staff: TLB of Establishment being guarded: Type of guarding (Tick the appropriate box if the activity is included in the contract) Area Perimeter Access Control With Dogs Without Dogs Telephone no: Telephone no: Contract end date: Cost per year: Total cost: £ £ Composition of Guard Force (Tick box if Commercial Guard Force is integrated with any of the following) MDP MGS MPGS Other CGF Service Personnel Service Police Shift pattern No of guards per shift: No of hours per guard per week: Remarks:/Any other relevant information: No of shifts per day: Total complement of guards to fulfil the contract, including a reserve to cover sickness and leave etc: (when completed) RESTRICTED ­ COMMERCIAL 18H-1 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Defence Manual of Security This page intentionally left blank. 18H-2 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED Glossary GLOSSARY OF TERMS The definitions given in this glossary are intended for use specifically within the terms of this manual for dealing with Defence security matters. Some terms shown below are more precise or particular than when used for general purposes and defined elsewhere (e.g. in Joint Warfare Publication 0-01.1 - United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions). Access control Control over the flow of information. The prevention of unauthorized access. Additional markings Agent See special markings. A person who is recruited, trained, controlled and employed to obtain and report information for intelligence purposes. The term includes all forms of ammunition, explosives, detonators, pyrotechnics and anti-riot agents but excludes inert items and substances. All man-portable weapons, including: Weapons removed from vehicles or helicopters. Infantry mortars. Man-portable anti-tank weapons, e.g., MILAN. Machine guns, sub-machine guns, pistols, full bore rifles and small bore weapons. Certain drill purpose (DP) weapons. Privately owned weapons (including shotguns) which have been accepted for establishment storage. Flare and pyrotechnic pistols. Asset Asset value Anything of value, either tangible or intangible, that is owned or used by an organisation or business. The impact of the compromise (breach of confidentiality, breach or loss of integrity or loss of availability) of an armoured fighting Ammunition Arms JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security asset. ATOMAL A NATO marking applied to documents containing information provided by the government of the United States to other NATO member nations under the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for co-operation regarding atomic information 1964. A UK national marking applied to information protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL or above which reveals either directly or indirectly information about: The design and fabrication of nuclear warheads. Certain features of the design and fabrication of inertial confinement fusion, including laser fusion systems. The costs and production rate or stockpile of nuclear warheads. Certain features concerning the production, handling and stockpile of fissile, fissionable and special materials used in nuclear warhead. Certain features of the design of naval nuclear propulsion plants. The production rate of naval nuclear propulsion plants. Certain other categories of nuclear information as advised by the Atomic Energy Authority. ATSy Audit The application of air transport security measures. An independent review by the DSSO of the systems and structures in place to support the TLB security risk management processes. Entry control system based on technical means. Continuous or timely access to information, systems or physical assets by authorized users. A fence used to delineate an area where access may need to be controlled in certain circumstances, e.g., in the event Gloss - 2 ATOMIC Automated access control system Availability Barrier fence JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Glossary to be controlled in certain circumstances, e.g., in the event of a heightened threat. Such a fence is of limited security value but it deters casual intruders and channels pedestrian and vehicular access. Baseline measures Measures or a combination of measures which will provide an acceptable minimum level of protection at each level of the protective marking system. The minimum level of security to be reached by a combination of baseline measures at each level of the protective marking system. This is NOT a security check but merely a means to provide a degree of assurance of identity, nationality and integrity. MOD Employees with basic check alone are only allowed access to government assets marked RESTRICTED and CONFIDENTIAL under normal supervision. The unclassified codeword used as the name of the alert system in Great Britain and elsewhere to give warning of possible terrorist activities and the counter measures to be taken. A container approved by security staffs as sufficiently secure for the storage of weapon bolts/working parts. Boxes must be secured by a security pattern mortice lock or a security approved robust padlock and robust hasp and staple. They must be bolted to the floor or wall. (A similar box, bolted to the structure of a building, may be used for the storage of .22 ammunition when approved by the security staffs). Publications permanently and securely bound from which the pages cannot be detached except by force, cutting or tearing or by deliberate destruction of the controlling binding. A fence used to delineate an area. Baseline objectives Basic Check (BC) BIKINI Bolt box Bound books Boundary fence Branch Security Officer An officer appointed by the senior staff officer of a branch of a headquarters to be responsible for the security (BSO) arrangements within that branch. Attendance on an establishment security officers course is mandatory. JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Breach of security Briefcase (approved) Anything which prejudices security or contravenes security regulations. An approved briefcase is a robust, commercial type briefcase which has nothing in its appearance to connect it to the Armed Forces or the Ministry of Defence. It must have two good locks and will not burst open if dropped. To assist in deciding priorities for the allotment of security resources (e.g., for security surveys and inspections and guarding) establishments are placed into categories. Cases of loss, compromise or finds of protectively marked documents or equipment are categorized as follows: Category 1 - All TOP SECRET, IDO, ATOMIC and Codeword material. Also COMSEC material (which means all documents, aids, devices or equipment, including CRYPTO material, associated with the securing or authentication of telecommunications). Category 2 - SECRET material. Category 3 - CONFIDENTIAL and below. Categories of establishments Categories of loss, compromise and finds Caveats Civil security See Special markings. Civil security is the application of measures to the civil population to control its activities. Such measures are distinct from those used for protective security in that they affect the population in its way of living, e.g., control of aliens by entry visa, labour permits and registration are civil controls, whereas control of access to MOD establishments by passes and permits is a protective security measure. Civil security is normally applied through the civil administration. Measures include control of: Movement (by curfew, control at ports and airports; control of immigration/aliens). Identity (by the issue of identity documents and ration documents). Assembly (by the restriction of meetings and JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Glossary assemblies). Communication (by censorship). Publication (by censorship, licensing and restrictions of newsprint). Close protection duties Codeword The provision of an armed bodyguard to protect a nominated individual from harm. A single word used to provide security cover for reference to a particular protectively marked matter. Codewords are issued to Commands by the Ministry of Defence (DCMC). Includes commanders of field force and static formations, garrisons, stations and installations. A collective reference to commands and forces under the direct control of the Ministry of Defence. The protection resulting from the measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information which might be derived from the possession and study of protectively marked communications, including telephone conversations, radio, telegraph, fax and data transmissions. Compromise encompasses the full range of means, both deliberate and accidental, by which damage could be caused to Government assets. This includes disclosure, loss, theft, destruction, tampering or accidental damage. The prevention of the unauthorized (including accidental) disclosure of information. An officer appointed by a head of establishment to be personally responsible for the safe custody of and accounting for all documents protectively marked TOP SECRET (i.e., TOP SECRET control officer (TSCO)) and/or documents which require special handling (e.g. ATOMIC control officer (ACO)). A NATO marking applied to NATO documents protectively marked TOP SECRET (i.e., COSMIC TOP SECRET). The NATO definition is: Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to Commander Commands Communications security Compromise Confidentiality Control officer COSMIC Counter intelligence JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security security posed by foreign, including hostile, intelligence services or organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. See also security intelligence. CRYPTO A marking applied to protectively marked operational cryptographic keying material. Items so marked are subject to specific controls governing access, distribution, storage, accounting, disposal and destruction. An officer responsible for the custody, handling, safeguarding and distribution of cryptographic material. Material used for the settings of encryption devices for cryptographic machines; the settings are changed at predetermined intervals. Cryptographic Custodian Cryptographic keying material Cryptographic material All documents, devices and equipment which contain information essential to the encryption or decryption of communications. Cryptographic security The defence against crypto-analysis which results from the protection given to classified traffic by the use of cryptographic equipment, ciphers and codes. CRYPTO-SECURITY A marking applied to documents containing cryptographic information, less keying material (which is marked CRYPTO), the knowledge of which needs to be restricted to individuals authorized to receive it. The correctly authorized removal of any protective marking (including RESTRICTED) from information, documents, equipment or material in order to make them unclassified. Declassification does not of itself authorize release to press or public. See special markings. In this manual destruction means destroying protected material by the methods approved both for the particular protective marking of the information concerned and for the medium on which it is recorded. Declassification Descriptors Destruction Developed Vetting(DV) The clearance required for posts involving long-term, frequent and uncontrolled access to assets marked TOP SECRET. JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Glossary Disclosure Disclosure of information means its communication by one person to another whether intentionally or otherwise. It is said to be authorized when it is passed necessarily in the course of official duty. Any form of recorded information constitutes a document. Apart from printed, typewritten or reproduced papers, the items listed below and others of similar types are treated as documents: Files, branch folders, manuscripts, notebooks (including shorthand notebooks), and drafts. Maps, charts and graphs. Vufoils. Imagery records, photographs, negative, film slides and films. Stencils, matrices, carries, masters, and litho plates. Plain language and machine-readable paper. Recording tape and punched cards. Removable IT magnetic storage media of all types. Paper tape and punched cards. Visual display unit (VDU) displays. Microfilm material. Typewriter ribbons and carbon papers. Document Downgrading The correctly authorized replacement of any protective marking from a higher to a lower one. This may normally only be authorized by the originator. The acquisition or attempted acquisition of information covertly or illegally to assist a foreign power or to further a subversive political aim. Unless otherwise qualified, the used throughout this manual organization formed on a (organisational structure), term "Establishment" is to embrace any MOD separate establishment including formation Espionage Establishment JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security headquarters, units, branches, establishments, air fields, vessels, depots and installations. The term also includes all civilian organizations for which the MOD has a security responsibility. Establishment Security Officer (ESyO) ESyO is the generic term for Base Security Officer (BSO) or Unit Security Officer (USO) in the Royal Navy, Unit Security Officer (USO) or Branch Security Officer (BSO) in the Army, Station Security Officer (SSyO) in the Royal Air Force and the appointed chief specialist security officer employed in MOD Agencies or industry. A Western European Union (WEU) marking applied to WEU documents with the protective marking TOP SECRET (i.e. FOCAL TOP SECRET). The GSE is the general security environment in which the computer system is located. It covers everything outside the control of the systems manager (SM), which may have involved a systems security (e.g. site access control) (see also security domains). A Government Owned - Contractor Operated Venture. The term "head of establishment" is used to denote all Service commanders or Civil Service equivalents of any MOD organisation formed on a separate establishment (organisational structure), including formation headquarters, units, establishments, airfields, vessels, depots and installations or civilian organisations for which MOD has a security responsibility. The term includes Chief Executives of Defence Agencies and Chief Executives of GOCO organisations formed on a separate establishment or organisational structure. FOCAL Global security environment (GSE) GOCO Head of Establishment(HOE) Higher Threat Personnel A small number of individuals who have been assessed as at a higher threat of terrorist attack than the majority of (HTP) Service personnel and for whom certain essential additional precautions for protection are authorized. Identity card A document issued for the purpose of establishing the identity of the holder. It is not a pass or a permit. Information Technology Measures to ensure the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of information in IT systems. (IT) Security JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Glossary Integrity International Defence Organization (IDO) The maintenance of information, systems of all kinds and physical assets in their complete and proper form. The words NATO and WEU (COSMIC and FOCAL when NATO and WEU TOP SECRET documents, respectively, are involved) are special markings which, when applied to a document, signify that the document is authorized for circulation on a need to know basis within the IDOs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Western European Union, respectively, and subject to certain security procedures and regulations of these organizations. Electronic devices used to provide continuous surveillance of an area to detect attempted or actual entry of an intruder and to alert the guard. See also PIDS. International Visits Control Office. See special markings. See special markings. The principle that protectively marked documents or material are to be held only by those individuals who are authorized and have a need for immediate access to them for the efficient discharge of their official duties, and in those Establishments/areas where there are appropriate arrangements to protect them. The principal that access to protectively marked information is to be restricted solely to those individuals who are authorized to have it and need to know the information to carry out their official duties efficiently. A nickname is made up of two words selected by the originator and used for convenience for reference to any matter where security protection is not required. A firm which is contracted by the MOD but is not authorised to hold protectively marked material above RESTRICTED on its premises. (see also List X Company) Information, whether protectively marked or unclassified, in any form, both oral and recorded, which is concerned with the business of the Government or Service activities. Intruder Detection System (IDS) IVCO National caveats National caveats Need to hold Need to know Nickname Non-List X Company Official information JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security On-line system A system which performs directly under the control of the central processor, while the user remains in communication with the computer. A detailed check of individual pages of a publication against an integral list of effective pages (LEP) or in the absence of an LEP, the Table of Contents. An approved document which authorizes the holder to pass through a security control. Page by page check Pass Technical measures which may be used to enhance the Perimeter intruder detection systems (PIDS) level of security offered by a perimeter fence. Permit Personnel security An approved document which authorizes the holder to perform a specified act or acts. That part of protective security concerned with all measures related to personnel designed to counter the threat posed by foreign intelligence organizations or subversive groups or individuals. Procedures include vetting designed to ensure that only persons whose reliability and trustworthiness are not open to doubt have access to classified information. An officer appointed by a head of establishment to keep Personnel Vetting Records Officer (PVRO) the records of establishment posts which require security clearance, and of the vetting status of the individuals filling these posts. Physical security That part of protective security concerned with physical measures (e.g. fences, buildings, intruder detection systems (IDS), containers and locks) designed to safeguard personnel and material from espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist attack, and theft. Protected compartment Any compartment containing material protectively marked CONFIDENTIAL and above which depends upon the compartment door for protection, (i.e. the material cannot be locked in a security container). Protected document Any medium on which classified information is recorded in either visible or electronic form. See also Protective marking. JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Glossary Protected Document Register (PDR) A register (MOD Form 102) kept by an establishment to record the receipt, production, disposal, regrading, declassification, destruction and dispatch of every document classified with a protective marking of SECRET and above, or bearing special markings requiring separate registration e.g., ATOMIC. A register (MOD Form 102 suitably amended) kept by an establishment to record the receipt, disposal, regrading, declassification, destruction, and dispatch of all protected equipment and detachable protected components. Information in any form, both oral and recorded, which is to be safeguarded in the interests of national or international security and which has been classified with a protective marking. See also Protective marking. See protected equipment register. A grading given to information or material to show the degree of damage that could result from its unauthorized disclosure and the standard of protection to be given to it. (It should be noted that International Defence Organisations and member nations as well as members of the Commonwealth use protective markings, known as classifications, except RESTRICTED in certain cases, with similar, but less all embracing, meanings.) See also Protected document and Protected information. A method of assigning asset values to things to indicate the level of security or protection required. Assets may be marked physically (e.g. with headers and footers on pages of print) or, for risk management purposes, may be "treated as if" they carried a marking. The organized system of defensive security measures (physical security measures and personnel security measures) designed to protect information, material, personnel activities and installations. Protected equipment register Protected information Protected material register Protective marking Protective marking system Protective security Protective security check A check carried out by, or on the orders of, a head of establishment to ensure that a specific security measure within his establishment is adequate and correctly applied. JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Protective security inspection A routine security inspection carried out for a specific purpose by a security unit to examine, report and make recommendations upon any aspect of the state of security of an establishment. It is additional to a security survey. An examination carried out by, or on the orders of, a head of establishment of the overall security arrangements within his establishment. The purpose is to maintain the establishment system of protective security. A detailed pre-planned periodic security examination carried out by a security unit to examine, report and make recommendations upon the state of security of an establishment. The purpose of survey is to give commanders a clear idea of the state of security in their formations and to provide HOE with assistance and advice in the application of security measures to remedy any identified weaknesses. Information, material or equipment protectively marked RESTRICTED or above. The elimination or containment of unintended intelligence-bearing emanations from cryptographic, communications and other electronic equipment (see TEMPEST). Changing the protective marking of items by correctly authorized upgrading, downgrading or declassification. The product of threat and vulnerability (normally the lower of the two), that is the probability or likelihood of an attack succeeding; or of sustaining damage as a result of compromise. Reducing to an acceptable level the risk of a successful attack or damage from a compromise occurring; and/or reducing the damage which could be caused. This can be achieved in a number of ways, for example by transferring a part of the risk by insurance or by moving the assets to another site or by protective security. An acceptable risk is when the risk manager is prepared to accept the remaining risk. Risk management is a dynamic process and needs to be kept under review. Protective security review Protective security survey Protectively marked assets Radiation security Regrading Risk Risk management JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 12 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Glossary Sabotage An act, falling short of a military operation, or an omission, intended to cause physical damage in order to assist a hostile foreign power, or to further a wider subversive political aim. See secure armoury. Any part of an establishments location to which access is controlled. (Note: ammunition should not normally be stored in the same room as arms). An armoury or ammunition store which complies with the minimum structural standards laid down in the appropriate SAFE/SSG specification, and is either: a. Visited by a guard or patrol at intervals of not more than one hour when not occupied, or b. Fitted with an approved intruder detection system (IDS). Secure ammunition store Secure area Secure armoury (and secure ammunition store) Secure room Security See strong room. The condition achieved when designated information, material, personnel, activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, as well as against loss or unauthorized disclosure. The term is also applied to the measures necessary to achieve this condition and to the organizations responsible for these measures. Any part of an establishment to which access is controlled. The level of clearance required for posts involving longterm, frequent and uncontrolled access to assets marked SECRET and those which afford occasional and controlled access to assets marked TOP SECRET. Covers for documents are coloured as follows: TOP SECRET ­ Red SECRET ­ Pink CONFIDENTIAL ­ Green Security area Security Check (SC) Security colour code JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security RESTRICTED ­ Buff UNCLASSIFIED - Any colour other than Red, Pink or Green Security container An item of security equipment approved by the Security Equipment Assessment Panel and supplied by DOE(SSG/SFE) for the storage or carriage of protected material. The container are classified according to the level of security they offer; Class 4 being the highest and Class 1 the lowest. The instruction given to all Service personnel and MOD civilian staff to keep them informed of the threat to security and aware of their general responsibilities for countering it. A fence constructed to an approved minimum standard to assist control of entry to and from an area to be protected, and to deter and delay intruders. Intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of hostile organisations or individuals who are or who may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. See also Counter intelligence. A security investigation carried out by a security unit at the direction of the security staff to establish the cause and extent of a breach of security, to recommend remedial action, and to assist commanders to minimize the damage done. A security key is one which operates a lock fitted to a: Security container for housing classified material. Door of a secure building, room or area. Box, security pouch, security briefcase, etc, used for the transmission or circulation of classified documents. Door of a room which has been given special protection against technical eavesdropping. Door of an armoury, ammunition or explosives store. JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 14 Security education Security fence Security intelligence Security investigation Security key RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Glossary Security alarm box. Security lock A lock which has been tested to establish its resistance to both surreptitious and forcible attack and which has been approved by the Security Equipment Assessment Panel. Security locks are divided into four classes: 1 to 4. Class 4 being the highest and Class 1 the lowest level. An official pouch made of PVC-coated nylon designed for the transmission of classified documents. It is fitted with a shoulder strap and secured by a locking bar with a Chubb 2 in Ava padlock or Abloy 3041 padlock; supplied by HMSO. Specialist instruction in the application of security measures for the incumbents of posts which carry specific security responsibilities. Security unit is the generic term given to area security teams in the Royal Navy, Intelligence Corps MI and security units in the Army, Provost & Security Services (P&SS) regions in the Royal Air Force and security personnel in the DLO, DPA and MOD Centre. The routine process for identifying persons who are suitable for access to information protectively marked SECRET or above. There are two levels of security clearance within the MOD: Security Check (SC) and Developed Vetting (DV); other Government Departments may use a third and lower Basic Check (BC). All Royal Navy (including Royal Marines), Army and Royal Airforce personnel serving on a regular or reserve basis. Additional systems of control (i.e., restrictions on handling and distribution) applied to certain types of classified information, documents or material, authorized by the Ministry of Defence or security staffs, in order to limit access to specifically nominated individuals. Markings in the form of a phrase, word or abbreviation applied to documents as warnings, which are additional to but do not modify any security classification allotted to them, and which consist of the following: Security pouch Security training Security units Security vetting Service Personnel Special handling procedures Special markings JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 15 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Descriptors. Markings which are available, if required, to show the nature of sensitive material, e.g.. MEDICAL, HONOURS, CONTRACTS, STAFF (a comprehensive list is at Annex A to Chapter 1). They also indicate the broad categories of people who may have access. Restrictive markings. Markings used to limit the handling and circulation of documents to those categories of persons authorized to have access to them in order to enforce the need to know principle, e.g. EXCLUSIVE and CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION REQUIRED. No copy should be made without permission of the originator. Additional markings. Markings which indicate the conditions of issue/release, origin or ownership of documents. National caveats. Caveats used to provide additional protection of certain types of UK protectively marked material. Station Security Officer RAF term for the Establishment Security Officer. (SSyO) Strong room Strong rooms and secure rooms are specially constructed rooms which provide a specified degree of security protection, according to their structural detail laid down in the appropriate SAFE/SSG specification (which are held by DE), for the storage of classified material. Strong rooms provide a higher degree of protection than secure rooms. An Army term for an armoury which complies with the minimum structural standards laid down in the appropriate SAFE/SSG specification (which are held by DE), but is not fitted with an approved intruder detection system (IDS), nor visited hourly, nor permanently occupied. Activities which threaten the safety or well being of the State and are intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface of subsurface areas, places, persons or things by visual, aural, Gloss - 16 Structurally approved armoury Subversion Surveillance JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Glossary electronic, photographic or other means. Talent spotting Activity by foreign intelligence services (FIS) and subversive organizations aimed at identifying individuals who are potentially suitable for subversion or coercion to assist hostile activities. A country, area, installation, agency or person against which espionage, subversion, sabotage, or terrorism is directed. A device fitted to a telephone which provides a degree of privacy against casual overhearing. It does not provide security protection. The unintentional radiation or conduction of compromising emanations from communications and information processing equipment. A peripheral device which provides a means of access to a computer system at which data may be input to or output from the system, or at which an individual may control the processing of data. The use of violence or intimidation in the furtherance of a political aim. The unclassified codeword issued as a warning against a possible terrorist SAM attack in the UK. The probability or likelihood of an attack or undesirable event (including environmental hazards and natural disasters) taking place. Threat includes such factors as capability, resources and intention and probabilities (e.g. of unplanned, external events occurring). These cover surreptitious attack, e.g. from espionage and leakage, theft, e.g. from burglary or dishonest staff, damage, e.g. from vandalism, hostile members of the public, pressure groups or natural disasters and so on. The threat from terrorism is considered separately and appropriate steps are incorporated into the universal baseline measures. Defence against traffic analysis, that is, against everything that an intercept organisation can do to derive intelligence Target Telephone privacy equipment (scrambler equipment) TEMPEST Terminal Terrorism TESSERAL Threat Threat types Transmission security JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 17 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security from a study of traffic short of breaking ciphers. Such measures include use of correct signal procedures, proper message classification and communications discipline. UNCLASSIFIED Universal baseline measures Upgrading Vulnerability The marking or description given to information which is not protectively marked. Measures which apply to all assets at all levels of the protective marking system. The correctly authorized alteration of a protective marking from a lower to a higher one. A feature or characteristic of an asset which renders it susceptible to compromise, damage, misuse or unreliability. e.g. a VDU which emits radiation, windows which could shatter scattering lethal splinters of glass in an explosion, or something which makes an asset particularly susceptible to damage in the event of a disaster occurring, e.g. basement accommodation in an area liable to flooding. Any point vulnerable to sabotage in or connected with a key point where destruction or serious damage would result in unacceptable interruption of the key points' services or loss of products. Vulnerable Point (VP) JSP 440 Volume 2 Issue 2 Gloss - 18 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Abbreviations LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS The abbreviations listed below are intended for use specifically within the terms of this manual for dealing with Defence security matters. AACS ACO ACPO ACTO ADAS ATSy BC BID BSO BSSO(G) BSyO BTR CB(Sy) CCRIO CCTA CCTV CEAG CESG CGF CI CPF Automated access control system ATOMIC control officer Association of Chief Police Officers Attractive to criminal and terrorist organisations Automated document accounting system Air Transport Security Officer Basic Check British Inter Departmental Equipment Branch Security Officer British Services Security Organization (Germany) Branch Security Officer (RAF) British TEMPEST Regulation MOD Central Budget (Security) Central Criminal Records and Intelligence Office The Government Centre for Information Systems Closed circuit television Counter Extremist Advisory Group Communications Electronics Security Group Commercial Guard Force Counter intelligence Civilian Police Forces JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Abbrev - 1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security COCO COMSEC COMSO CPSyO CSE CTC DAC D Def Sy Contractor owned, contractor operated Communications security Communications Security Officer Command Provost & Security Officer (RAF) Catalogue of Security Equipment Counter Terrorist Check Defence Audit Committee Directorate of Defence Security D INT CORPS Director of the Intelligence Corps DCMC DCS DE DGS&S DIDC DIDCAC WG DISS DMS DP DPA DS DSO DSSO DSPC DSy(Pol) Defence Crisis Management Centre Defence Courier Service Defence Estates Director General Security and Safety Defence identity card Defence identity card and access control working group Defence Intelligence and Security School Defence Manual of Security (JSP 440) Drill purpose Defence Procurement Agency Directing Staff Departmental Security Officer Defence Security Standards Organisation Defence Security Policy Committee Director of Security (Policy) - now D Def Sy JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Abbrev - 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Abbreviations DTMA MCC DV DVA EDICTS ERO ESO ESyO FAX FCO FIS FOI FPS GAIs GCHQ GOCO HIS HMG HMSO HOE HTP ICO IDO IDS Defence Transport and Movements Agency, Movements Control Centre Developed Vetting Defence Vetting Agency Evaluation and development in counter terrorism and sabotage Explosive Responsible Officer Event Security Officer Establishment security officer Facsimile communication equipment Foreign and Commonwealth Office Foreign intelligence service Freedom of Information (Act) Focal Point System General Administrative Instructions Government Communications Headquarters Government owned, contractor operated Hostile intelligence service Her Majesty's Government Her Majesty's Stationery Office Head of Establishment High threat personnel Incident control officer International Defence Organization Intruder detection system JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Abbrev - 3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security IED ISC IT JSP KP KPC KPSO LCT LTI MDP MDT MGS Min(AF) MPSB OGD OTTAL OSE PDR PfP PIDS PME PSDB PSI PSS Improvised explosive device Internal security committee Information technology Joint Service Publication Key Point Key Point Committee Key Point Security Officer (Army) London Courier Terminal Limited technical inspection Ministry of Defence Police Mechanical document transfer Ministry of Defence Guard Service Minister for the Armed Forces Metropolitan Police Special Branch Other Government Departments Overseas Terrorist Threat Assessment List Off Site Event Protected Document Register (MOD Form 102) Partnership for Peace Perimeter intruder detection system Public Military Event Police Scientific Development Branch Protective security inspection Protective security survey JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Abbrev - 4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Abbreviations PSyA RCIED RMIPC ROI SAFE/SSG SC SCIT(A) SEAP SIGINT SIRS SOP SSG SSOs SSR SSyO STP STRAPSO SVA SyOPs TEMPEST TF TLB TSCO Principal Security Adviser Remotely controlled improvised explosive device Release of military information policy committee Republic of Ireland Security Facilities Executive, Special Security Group Security Check Special Counter Intelligence Team (Army) Security Equipment Assessment Panel Signal intelligence Security Incident Reporting Scheme Standing operating procedure Security Services Group Security standing orders Statement of security requirement OR Security Structures Review Station Security Officer (RAF) Services technical publication STRAP Security Officer Security Vilgilance Area Security operating procedures Radiation security Trading Fund Top Level Budget TOP SECRET control officer JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Abbrev - 5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security TSI TSU UARS UNIRAS USO USR USyO VDU VP XPM Technical security inspection Technical Security Unit Unit Annual Report on Security (Army) Unified Incident Reporting and Alert Scheme Unit Security Officer (Army) Unit security register Unit Security Officer (RAF) Visual display unit Vulnerable Point Expanded metal JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Abbrev - 6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Index A AACS-classes of, 05119 -definitions, 051010 -doors, 051031 -effective use, 051020-051027 -installation criteria, 051014 -management, 051028-051030 -operational requirement, 051007-051009 -responsibility for, 051006 -secondary systems, 051032-051033 -security criteria, 051015-051017 -system criteria, 051018-051019 -types of, 051012 Accommodation:-moves, Chapter 5 Section XIV -planning, 05224-05226 AC12 intruder detection system, Chapter 5 Section VII Annex A Action to counter terrorist attack, 07203 ACTO (Attractive to criminal and terrorist organizations) stores, 06004, 05811 Air conditioning and other 'life support' systems, 05439 Alert states: 07304 -MOD BIKINI AMBER, counter measures, Chapter 7 Section III Appendix 4 to Annex A -MOD BIKINI BLACK, counter measures, Chapter 7 Section III Appendix 2 to Annex A -MOD BIKINI BLACK SPECIAL, counter measures, Chapter 7 Section III Appendix 3 to Annex A -MOD BIKINI Alert State, definitions, Chapter 7 Section III Annex A -MOD BIKINI RED, counter measures, Chapter 7 Section III Appendix 5 to Annex A -MOD BIKINI WHITE, counter measures, Chapter 7 Section III Appendix 1 to Annex A -MOD TESSERAL Alert State, counter measures, Chapter 7 Section III Appendix 1 to Annex B -MOD TESSERAL, definitions, Chapter 7 Section III Annex B Alert States Overseas, 07309 Amateur radio operations, See Vol 3 Amendments to JSP 440, 0273 Anonymous telephone call:-checklist for telephoned bomb warnings, Chapter 7 Section IV Appendix 1 to Annex C -with warnings or threats, advice on handling, Chapter 7 Section III Annex C Armoury buildings:-approved locks and devices, Chapter 6 Section III Annex C -physical security standards, Chapter 6 Section III Annex A Arms, ammunition and explosives:-basic security principles, 06116-06127 -buildings containing valuable and attractive explosives, minimum physical security standards, Chapter 6 Section III Annex B -bulk (non-individual) movement by air, 06246 -bulk (non-individual) movement by rail, 06229 -bulk (non-individual) movement by road, ammunition and explosives, 06217 -bulk (non-individual) movement by road - arms, 06218 -bulk (non-individual) movement by road general, 06214 -bulk (non-individual) movement by sea, 06242 -cadet forces, security of arms and ammunition, Chapter 6 Section IV -carriage of arms, ammunition and explosives by individuals - guiding principles, 06208-06213 -carriage of arms and employment of armed personnel on security and police duties in peacetime, 07313, 05806 -checks, 06137 -definitions, 06103 -establishment security instructions, Chapter 6 Section I Annex A -handling and firing of MOD weapons by civilians, 06316 -issue and return, 06135 -issued to individuals, 06314 -keys, 06128 -keys, loss or compromise of keys to armouries and magazines, format of report, Chapter 6 Section I Annex C -losses and recoveries, 06139 -losses, recovery or attempted theft, format of report, Chapter 6 Section I Annex B -materiel on loan, 06142 -movement for training by Service shooting clubs and Cadet Forces, Chapter 6 Section II Annex A -movement of, Chapter 6 Section II -patrols, 06134 -planning movements, 06204 -range practices and exercises, 06325 -registers, 06136 -response force, 06130 -responsibilities, 06106 -security instructions for the protection of, Chapter 6 Section I Annex A -security of, Chapter 6 -storage of protectively marked, 06307 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Index - 1 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security -storage, minimum standards, Chapter 6 Section III -storage of MDP owned, 06321 -storage of privately owned, 06318 Army HQ and police locations:-list of for PME notification, 07469 Automated document accounting systems (ADAS), 051317-051322 Awareness, security, Chapter 13 B Batons, 07324, 05803 Batons, Issue and use by Service PersonnelChapter 7 Section III Annex D Batons, Rules of Engagement, Chapter 7 Section III Appendix 2 to Annex D Batons, training, Chapter 7 Section III Appendix 1 to Annex D Boxes, pouches etc, 04087-04092 Buildings, 05118 C Cadet forces:-security of arms and ammunition, Chapter 6 Section IV Cadet forces premises:-indices for the storage of arms and ammunition, Chapter 6 Section IV Annex B -security standards, Chapter 6 Section IV Annex A Capital Works Projects, security advice, Chapter 5 Section II Annex B Armed Forces Careers Offices:-minimum security standards, Chapter 7 Section IV Annex F -security at, 07415­07423 Casual courier:-authorization certificate, Chapter 4 Annex F -diplomatic immunity, 04129-04133 -Prohibited items, Chapter 4 Annex N Categorisation of Establishments, 0222, Chapter 2 Annex A Caveats National, Chapter 16 -access to nationally caveated material, 16081616 -composite, 1607 -core, Chapter 16 Annex A -exchange/integrated/attached personnel, 1613 -Gurkhas,1614 -handling, 1617-1621 -marking, 1617-1621 -nationality rules, changes to, 1632 -protecting information to be sent to the US, 1622-1628 -special handling (SPH) instructions, 1629-1631, Chapter 16 Annex B -transmission, 1617-1621 -UK EYES ALPHA and BRAVO, 1605 -UK EYES DISCRETION, 1606 -UK EYES ONLY, 1606 -waivers, 1615-1616 Certificates of credentials, 05926-05930 Clearance:-for access to protected information, 1103-1105 -for custody of protected information, 1106-1109 Closed circuit television (CCTV), 05127, Chapter 5 Section VI Codewords and nicknames, Chapter 4 Annex K, Chapter 14 Annex F Commercial Guard Forces (CGF), Chapter 18 -Standards, criteria and procedure, 1801-1806 -Criteria for selection, 1810-1815 -Vetting of, 1817 -Evaluation of Tenders, 1818-1821 -Commercial Staffs and TLB Security Advisers, Chapter 18 Annex A -Appointing CGF, Chapter 18 Annex B -HOE responsibilities, Chapter 18 Annex C -Daily briefing of CGF, Chapter 18 Appendix 1 to Annex C -Monitoring of CGF performance, Chapter 18 Appendix 2 to Annex C -Vetting, Chapter 18 Appendix 3 to Annex C -Training, Chapter 18 Annex D -MOD Unarmed Guard Training Course (MUGTC), Chapter 18 Appendix 1 to Annex D -Statement of Requirement, Chapter 18 Annex E -CGF Code of Conduct, Chapter 18 Annex F -Security considerations, Chapter 18 Annex G -Contract start and Renewal proforma, Chapter 18 Annex H Commercially significant information, safeguarding of, Chapter 11 Annex C Communications security, See Vol 3 Compromise, action on loss and levels of authorization to write-off, 0251 Computer security, See Vol 3 COMSEC, See Vol 3 Conditions of release labels:-for technical memoranda and reports containing sensitive commercial information, Chapter 11 Annex C Conditions of release stamps/labels:-for documents released to overseas recipients, Chapter 11 Annex B Conference security, Chapter 5 Section XVII Containers, security:-action in the event of suspected tampering, 051118 -care, 051109-051110 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Index - 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Index -classes, Chapter 5 Section I Annex E -classification, 051104 -control, 051111-051115 -general, 051101-051103 -records, 051116-051117 -standards, 051105-051108 Contingency planning:-and post incident procedures, 07424-07434 -for unexpected events, Chapter 7 Section IV Annex A Contracts security, Chapter 12 Control of entry:-control of entry, Chapter 5 Section IX -general regulations, 05953-05959 -to building, area or site, 05119-05121 Copiers, user held, 04029-04032 Counter eavesdropping, See Vol 3 Counter Extremists Advisory Group (CEAG), 07205 Counter terrorism:-measures, Chapter 7 -personal security and anonymity, 07508 -protection and MOD CT strategy, principles, Chapter 7 Section II -search (CTS), 07479 -search awareness security measures (CTSASM) ­ Guidance on, Chapter 7 Section IV Annex J Counter terrorist physical security measures for MOD buildings, 05211, Chapter 5 Section II Annex G Cryptographic material, See Vol 3 Cryptographic systems, See Vol 3 Customs and Excise officers, 05936 Defence Estate Organisation (DEO), Chapter 5 Section II Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO) clearance procedures, 1172 Defence in Depth, Chapter 1 Annex F Defence Mail Service, use of, Chapter 4 Annex C Defence Standards Security Organisation, 0217 Demountable weaponry, 06315 Descriptors, Chapter 1 Annex B, Chapter 4 Annex J Diplomatic bag, use of, Chapter 4 Annex C Disc recording, Disclosure by the UK of information owned by other countries and international Defence organisations, Chapter 11 Section III Disclosure of information, 05614 -aerial surveys by foreign firms, 1142 -at university courses, study conferences, seminars etc, 1115-1116 -by careless talk, 1140 -by the UK of information owned by other countries and international Defence organisations, Chapter 11 Section III -Chain letters, 1141 -on the telephone, 1136 -Protected, Chapter 11 -Protected outside Government Service, Chapter 11 Section I -Publications, 1138-1139 -to commercial organisations for commercial publications (information on names etc), 1137 -to contractors, 1110-1113 -to local authorities, 1126 -to members of Parliament (including members of the House of Lords and UK members of the European Parliament), 1127-1130 -to Parliamentary committees, 1131-1135 -to promotion, appointment boards etc, 11171119 -to the media, 1120-1125 -to university Defence lecturers, 1114 Documents, -Carriage by officials travelling within Great Britain or Northern Ireland, 04115-04122 -Carriage by officials travelling overseas, 0412304128 -Carriage overseas by Service personnel during emergency operations, 04149-04151 -Carriage overseas, instructions to officers, Chapter 4 Annex G -Carriage overseas, CONFIDENTIAL or above specimen authorization form, Chapter 4 Annex E -Carriage to NATO countries by casual couriers not possessing diplomatic immunity, 0413404145 -Carriage to non-NATO countries by casual couriers possessing diplomatic immunity, 0412904133 -Control of, Chapter 4 Section I -Security of on operations-Chapter 14 Annex D D Dogs, 05848-05851 -Guidance for the release of dogs by Service personnel on duty, Chapter 5 Section VIII Annex B Doors:-bolts, 05420 -dog bolts, 05421-05422 -doors, 05409-05418 -emergency exit, 05417-05418 -frames, 05419 -inter-communicating doors, 05415 -internal doors, 05416 Double glazing, 05430-05431 JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Index - 3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Defence Manual of Security Downgrading of information, 04040 Downpipes, 05435 Drill purpose weapons, 04143 Drivers:-staff cars, additional security precautions, Chapter 7 Section III Appendix 1 to Annex B D Def Sy, role of, 0213 -Supervision, 05836 -Weapons, 05807-05808 H High Threat Personnel (HTP), 07509 Hinges, 05421-05422 Hijacking:-Precautions against, 04146-04148 -Guidelines to couriers, Chapter 4 Annex I Homeworking, 04158-04160, Chapter 4 Annex M Hostage Situations, Survival in, 07517, Chapter 7 Section V Annex E E Education:-Security, 1321-1329 -Subjects for security, Chapter 13 Annex A Emergency destruction of protectively marked material in ships, Chapter 5 Section XVI Annex B Emergency procedure terminology, ACPO, Chapter 7 Section IV Appendix 1 to Annex G Engagement, Rules of (ROE), 07322 Envelopes, packages, bags etc, opening and examination, 0483-04086 Equipment:-Security matrix, Chapter 5 Section XVIII Annexes A to F -Security of, Chapter 5 Section XVIII Espionage, 0107 Exemptions, 0263 Event security officers (ESOs), aide memoire, Chapter 7 Section IV Annex I I Identity cards:- Withdrawn pending DCI -civil police officers, -Defence identity cards (DIDC), -Defence Identity Card and Access Working Group (DIDCAC WG), -loss of pass, permit or identity document, -Registration, -Replacement, withdrawal, cancellation and disposal of passes, permits and DIDCs, -Responsibility for policy, Improvised explosive devices (IED):-Sample guide to identification of, Chapter 7 Section IV Annex E -Action upon discovery of suspected IED, Chapter 7 Section IV Appendix 1 to Annex H -Action should an IED explode, Chapter 7 Section IV Appendix 2 to Annex H Incident management, general principles of, Chapter 7 Section IV Annex H Individuals at higher threat:-Personal security at home, 07410-07414, 07516 Chapter 7 Section V Annex A -Protection of High Threat Personnel, 07509 Information:-of other ownership, 1184 -Owned by NATO, 1185 -Owned by other international Defence organisations (IDOs), 1186 -Relating to projects developed jointly with other countries, 1183 Intruder detection systems (IDS):-Access control panel, 05724 -Alarm display, 05715 -Alarm signalling for remote sites, 05716 -Alarm systems, 05123 -Control panel, 05712 -Detection sensors, 05710-05711 -Event log, 05713-05714, 05726 -IDS, 05123 -installation and maintenance, 05721-05723 -installation wiring, 05717 F Fanlights, 05434 Fences, 05124, 05303-05311, Chapter 5 Section I Annex E Focal Point reporting procedure, 07111 Force Protection security elements,Chapter 14 G Glazing, 05429 Grilles, 05423-05424 Guards:-Access to protectively marked material, 0582705828, 05856 -Accommodation and equipment, 05826 -and alarm systems, 05122-05123 -and patrols, Chapter 18 -Cadet Units, 05818-05824 -Commercial Guard Forces (CGF),05829-05831, Chapter 18 -Composition of Force and categorisation of Establishment, 05811 -Duties of, 05812 -Instructions, 05837-05838 -Response forces, 06130, 05803, 05811 -Response time, 05718 -Point guards, 051818 -Policy for conducting Searches, Chapter 5 Annex C JSP 440 Volume 1 Issue 2 Index - 4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Index -investigation of alarms, 05727 -operational requirement, 05706-05708 -portable IDS, 05729 -reaction force and response time, 05803, 05811, 05819 -refurbishment of buildings, 05728 -system components, 05709 -system management, 05719-05720 -testing, 05725 International defence organisation (IDO) markings, Chapter 4 Annex L J Joint Service Search Policy and Resources committee (JSSPRC), 07216, 07482 JSyCC, role of, 0216 K Key locks, vulnerabilities, 051218-051221 Key register, 051224 Keys:-action in the event suspected compromise or loss, 051238-051239 -classes, Chapter 5 Section I Annex E -for armouries and ammunition stores, 06128 -other, 051237 -security, 051222-051236 L Leaks, 0257 Leave and duty travel:-Northern Ireland, Chapter 7 Section VI -Republic of Ireland (ROI), Chapter 7 Section VI Loading bays, 05437 Local traders, 05935 Locks:-classification, 051203; Chapter 5 Section I Annex E -combination, 051204-051217 -general, 051201 Locks and security keys, Chapter 5 Section XII Lodger units, 0233 Loss of a pass, permit or identity document, 05939-05942 Loss or compromise:-of protectively marked material, format of IMMEDIATE signal report, Chapter 2 Annex D Losses and recoveries:-arms, ammunition and explosives, 06139 -keys, 06128 M Mail:-addressing of, to private addresses (including civilian firms) in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, 04096 -despatch to private addresses in Great Britain, 04093-04095 -despatch to UK defence contractors, 04105 Materiel, security of:-in laboratories, 06312 -in process buildings, 06312 -on display, 06309 -on loan, 06142 -under test in chambers, 06312 Mechanical document transfer systems & automated document account systems, 051301051316; Chapter 5 Section XIII Media, dealing with the, Chapter 7 Section V Annex D Minimum Baseline Measures Matrix (MBMM), Chapter 5 Section I -guide for use, Chapter 5 Section I Annex D MOD Counter Terrorist Organization, 07205 MOD Establishments, special precautions for protection outside, Chapter 7 Section IV Annex B MOD Form 24 (Receipt for Protected Documents), 04009 MOD Form 72 (Authorization for Typing and/or Reproduction of Protected Documents), 0400904010 MOD Form 102 (Protected Document Register), 04009; 04013-04015 MOD Form 171 (Downgrading), 04040; Chapter 4 Appendix 1 to Annex A MOD Form 189